JUDGMENT Ms. Kamlesh Sharma, J.—This appeal under Section 100, C.P.C. is being disposed of at the admission stage after giving full hearing to the learned Counsel for the parties and going through the record, as on the basis of substantial question of law as urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by both the courts below do not deserve to be interfered with. 2. The appellant and pro forma respondent No.3 in this appeal were the defendants, whereas, respondents No.1 and 2 were the plaintiffs in the Civil Suit out of which the present appeal has arisen. The suit of the plaintiffs was decreed for recovery of suit property along with house built over it comprising of Khasra No.123 measuring 4 biswas, situated in Phati Dhalpur, Kothi Maharaja, Tehsil and District Kullu by Senior Sub Judge, Lahaul and Spiti at Kullu exercising the powers of Sub-Judge 1st Class, Kullu on 27.8.1997. The appeal filed by appellant-defendant Nathu Ram against the decree and judgment of the trial Court was also dismissed by the District Judge, Kullu on 30.5.1998. Hence, the present regular second appeal. 3. It is not in dispute that in Jamabandis Ex. PB for the year 1948-49, Ex. PC for the year 1952-53, Ex. PD for the year 1956-57 and Ex. PE for the year 1960-61 the suit property is shown as Gair Mumkin Abadi in the ownership of Laxmi Dutt, Lekh Ram and Hari Chand, and in possession of Saran, son of Manglu as tenant on payment of Rs. 3/- as Lagan. In the latest Jamabandi Ex. PA-Ex. D-5 for the year 1986-87, all the entries continued to be as before except in the column of tenant wherein Smt. Maina Devi widow of Saran was recorded after the death of Saxan. Both the courts below have concurrently relied upon these revenue entries to uphold the case of the plaintiffs that after the death of Maina, who died issueless, the plaintiffs became entitled to the possession of the suit property as its owners and the possession of the appellant-defendant is illegal and merely that of a trespasser having no right to induct the pro forma respondent-defendant as a tenant over a part of it and to demolish a portion of the house standing on it and threaten to demolish the remaining portion thereof. 4. 4. For coming to these concurrent findings both the courts below have further held that the presumption of correctness attached to these Jamabandis, as provided under Section 45 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, is not rebutted by the oral and documentary evidence produced by the defendants. The case set up by the defendants in their written statement that Saran son of Manglu, the husband of Maina Devi was never a tenant of the suit property and he had constructed the disputed house upon the suit land about 50/60 years ago of which he became owner by way of adverse possession has also been concurrently rejected by both the courts below holding that they have failed to produce any evidence to prove the necessary ingredients of adverse possession. Both the courts below have referred to the statement of appellant-defendant Nathu Ram, who appeared as DW-1, in which he has nowhere stated that Saran was in hostile possession of the suit property from a particular date, rather, in his cross-examination he has denied his knowledge whether Saran was given the house on the land in dispute on payment of Rs. 3/- as rent, which he and after his death, his wife was paying to the plaintiffs as owners in two instalments of Rs. 1.50 each in a year. On the other hand, both the courts below have referred to the statements of Laxmi Kant PW-1, Atam Parkash PW-2 and Thakur Dass PW-3, who have categorically stated that Saran and thereafter his wife Maina were tenants in the suit property on payment of Rs. 3/- per year. 5. The learned Counsel for the appellant-defendant has vehemently urged that the above concurrent findings of fact arrived at by both the courts below deserve to be interfered with on the substantial question of law that the District Judge has failed to consider the documents Ex. D-l toD-4 and Ex. DW-3/A to DW-3/J produced by the defendants which duly rebut the presumption of correctness attached to the Jamabandis mainly relied upon by the courts below and prove that Saran and after his death Maina Devi were the owners of the suit property. Documents Ex. D-l toD-4 and Ex. DW-3/A to DW-3/J produced by the defendants which duly rebut the presumption of correctness attached to the Jamabandis mainly relied upon by the courts below and prove that Saran and after his death Maina Devi were the owners of the suit property. Documents Ex. D-l and D-3 are the copies of formats (pages 197 and 209 of the trial Court file), which were submitted by Lekh Ram and Hem Chand, the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs, before the Land Reforms Officer for resumption of land including the land measuring 1 biswas comprised in Khasra No. 123 and the documents Ex. D-2 and D-4 are the copies of the office orders dated 3.11.1977(pages 203 and 213 of the trial Court file) passed by the Land Reforms Officer in the application for resumption of land and documents Ex. DW-3/A to Ex. DW-3/J are the copies of the Assessment Register of House Tax of different years from 1943 to 1986, wherein Saran and after his death his wife Maina Devi were shown as owners of a house situated at Dhalpur. According to the learned Counsel for the appellant-defendant from these documents, it is proved on record that Saran and after his death Maina Devi and not the plaintiffs were the owners of the house constructed on the land in dispute and the concurrent findings of fact holding the plaintiffs as owners are wrong. 6. Learned Counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs has pointed out that these documents were duly considered by the trial Court in paragraph 8 of the judgment but did not weigh with it in the absence of any other evidence corroborating the defence of adverse possession and also in the presence of long-standing revenue entries of record of rights and other evidence produced by the plaintiffs. In view of this, according to learned Counsel, it is of no consequence if the District Judge concurring with the findings of the trial Court has not referred to these documents. The learned Counsel has also referred to para 6 of the replication, wherein it was explained under which circumstances Khasra No.123 might have been mentioned along with other tenancy land in the format for resumption of land by the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs. The learned Counsel has also referred to para 6 of the replication, wherein it was explained under which circumstances Khasra No.123 might have been mentioned along with other tenancy land in the format for resumption of land by the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs. He has also argued that since the land in dispute does not come within the definition of land as given in sub-section (7) of Section 2 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter called as the Act) it is of no consequence even if it was mentioned in the format of resumption of land. In this background, the submission of learned Counsel for the plaintiffs is that non-consideration of the documents Ex. D-1 to Ex. D-4 and Ex. DW-3/A to Ex. DW-3/J in affirming the findings of fact by the District Judge is not a substantial question of law which can be considered by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100, C.P.C. 7. In view of these submissions, first of all this Court will refer to the judgments of the Supreme Court cited by the learned Counsel for the parties wherein the scope of Section 100, C.P.C. has been laid down. In Jagdish Singh v. Nathu Singh, AIR 1992 SC 1604, it is held in para 8 that, "where the findings by the Court of facts is vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by an essentially erroneous approach to the matter, the High Court is not precluded from recording proper findings". In Shri Bhagwan Sharma v. Smt Bani Ghosh, AIR 1993 SC 398, it is held in paragraph 5:— "The High Court was certainly entitled to go into the question as to whether the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate Court which was the final Court of fact were vitiated in the eye of law on account of non-consideration of admissible evidence of vital nature. But, after setting aside the findings of fact on that ground the Court had either to remand the matter of the first appellate Court for a re-hearing of the first appeal and decision in accordance with law after taking into consideration the entire relevant evidence on the records, or in the alternative to decide the case finally in accordance with the provisions of Section 103(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure which reads as follows:— "103. Power of High Court to determine issue of fact. Power of High Court to determine issue of fact. In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal,— (a) ................................... (b) which has been wrongly determined by such Court or Courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Section 100." If in an appropriate case, the High Court decides to follow the second course, it must bear the parties fully with reference to the entire evidence on the records relevant to the issue in question and this is possible if only a proper paper book is prepared for hearing of facts and notice is given to the parties. The grounds which may be available in support of a plea that the finding of fact by the Court below is vitiated in law, does not by itself lead to the further conclusion that a contrary finding has to be finally arrived at on the disputed issue. On a reappraisal of the entire evidence, the ultimate conclusion may go in favour of either party and it cannot be prejudged, as has been done in the impugned judgment.....". 8. In Sundra Naicka Vadiyar (dead) by LRs. and another v. Ramaswami Ayyar (dead) by his LRs., AIR 1994 SC 532, it is held in para 3:— "A perusal of the impugned judgment of the High Court shows that there were good reasons for treating the finding on the question of possession recorded by the first two Courts to be vitiated. Apart from the reasons given by the High Court, it appears to us that ignoring some of the documents which were vital for deciding the question of possession also vitiated the finding on the question of possession recorded by the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court. Apart from the documents evidencing the compromise, Exhibits B-19 and A-1, containing the recital of surrender of possession of the land by S.N. Badiyar to R. Ayyar, the other documents material for the purpose were the orders Exhibits B-4 and A-2 made in the eviction proceedings by the Revenue Court when the matters were taken up by the Revenue Court on 25.6.1962 and dismissed on the basis of the compromise accepted by the parties who were present. Ignoring these orders Exhibits B-4 and A-2 and overlooking the logical effect thereof and basing the conclusion on the question of possession only on the oral evidence adduced by S.N. Vadiyar did cause an infirmity in the finding of fact which justified interference in second appeal. We have been taken through the discussion of the evidence made by the High Court and we are satisfied that there is no infirmity therein to permit any interference in these appeals." Similar view was taken in Kochukakkada Aboobacker (dead) by LRs and others v. Attah Kasim and others, (1996) 7 SCC 389; Major Singh v. Rattan Singh (dead) by LRs and others, AIR 1997 SC 1906 and Smt. Mehrunnisa and others v. Smt. Visham Kumari and another, AIR 1998 SC 427, that if the trial Court and the first appellate Court for coming to their concurrent findings did not consider relevant documents in proper perspective and the effect of those documents on the rights of the parties, it is a substantial question of law on the basis of which the High Court may interfere with the concurrent findings of fact of both the courts below in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 9. Now, this Court will refer to other judgments of the Supreme Court in which essential pre-requisite for exercise of jurisdiction in second appeal under Section 100, C.P.C. have been laid down. In Panchugopal Barua and others v. Umesh Chandra Goswami and others, (1997) 4 SCC 713, after referring to the provisions of Section 100, C.P.C. it is observed in para 7:— "7. A bare look at Section 100, C.P.C. shows that the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal after the 1976 amendment is confined only to such appeals as involve a substantial question of law, specifically set out in the memorandum of appeal and formulated by the High Court. Of course, the proviso to the section shows that nothing shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if the court is satisfied that the case involves such a question. Of course, the proviso to the section shows that nothing shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if the court is satisfied that the case involves such a question. The proviso presupposes that the Court shall indicate in its order the substantial question of law which it proposes to decide even if such "substantial question of law" was not, earlier formulated by it. The existence of a "substantial question of law" is thus, the sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended provisions of Section 100, CPC." And in para 8:— "8. Generally speaking, an appellant is not to be allowed to set up a new case in second appeal or raise a new issue (otherwise than a jurisdictional one), not supported by the pleadings or evidence on the record and unless the appeal involves a substantial question of law, a second appeal shall not lie to the High Court under the amended provisions. In the present case, no such question of law was formulated in the memorandum of appeal in the High Court and grounds (6) and (7) in the memorandum of the second appeal on which reliance is placed did not formulate any substantial question of law. The learned Single Judge of the High Court also, as it transpires from a perusal of the judgment under appeal, did not formulate any substantial question of law in the appeal and dealt with the second appeal, not on any substantial question of law, but treating it as if it was a first appeal, as of right, against the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Court. The intendment of the Legislature in amending Section 100, CPC was, thus respected in its breach. Both the trial Court and the lower appellate Court had decided the cases only on questions of fact, on the basis of the pleadings and the evidence led by the parties before the trial Court. No pure question of law nor even a mixed question of law and fact was urged before the trial court or the first appellate Court by the respondent. No pure question of law nor even a mixed question of law and fact was urged before the trial court or the first appellate Court by the respondent. The High Court was, therefore, not justified in entertaining the second appeal on an altogether new point, neither pleaded nor canvassed in the subordinate courts and that too by overlooking the changes brought about in Section 100, CPC by the Amendment Act of 1976 without even indicating that a substantial question of law was required to be resolved in the second appeal. To say the least, the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same." 10. In Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait and others, (1997) 5 SCC 438, referring to paras 7 and 8 of the judgment in Panchugopal Barua and others v. Umesh Chandra Goswami and others (supra) the learned Judges have further observed in paras 10, 11 and 12:— "10. We would only add that (a) it is the duty cast upon the High Court to formulate the substantial question of law involved in the case even at the initial stage; and (b) that in (exceptional) cases, at a later point of time, when the Court exercises its jurisdiction under the proviso to subsection (5) of Section 100, CPC in formulating the substantial question of law, the opposite party should be put on notice thereon and should be given a fair or proper opportunity to meet the point. Proceeding to hear the appeal without formulating the substantial question of law involved in the appeal is illegal and is an abnegation or abdication of the duty cast on Court; and even after the formulation of the substantial question of law, if a fair or proper opportunity is not afforded to the opposite side, it will amount to denial of natural justice. The above parameters within which the High Court has to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100, CPC should always be borne in mind. We are sorry to state that the above aspects are seldom borne in mind in many cases and second appeals are entertained and/ or disposed of, without conforming to the above discipline. 11. The above parameters within which the High Court has to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100, CPC should always be borne in mind. We are sorry to state that the above aspects are seldom borne in mind in many cases and second appeals are entertained and/ or disposed of, without conforming to the above discipline. 11. The guidelines to determine as to what is a "substantial question of law" within the meaning of Section 100, CPC, have been laid down by this Court in a Constitution Bench decision in Chunilal v. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314. There is also a later decision of this Court in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India, (1979) 2 SCC 529. It is unnecessary to deal at length with that aspect any further. 12. In the light of the legal position stated above, we are of the view that the High Court acted illegally and in excess of its jurisdiction in entertaining the new plea, as it did, and consequently in allowing the second appeal. Even according to the High Court, the point urged on behalf of the appellant was only a "legal plea" though no specific plea was taken or no precise issues were framed in that behalf. The High Court failed to bear in mind that it is not every question of law that could be permitted to be raised in second appeal. The parameters within which a new legal plea could be permitted to be raised, are specifically stated in subsection (5) of Section 100, CPC. Under the proviso, the Court should be "satisfied” that the case involves a "substantial question of law” and not a mere "question of law". The reason for permitting the substantial question of law to be raised, should be "recorded” by the Court. It is implicit therefrom, that on compliance of the above, the opposite party should be afforded a fair or proper opportunity to meet the same. It is not any legal plea that could be raised at the stage of second appeal. It should be a substantial question of law. The reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded. Thereafter, the opposite party should be given a fair or proper opportunity to meet the same. It is not any legal plea that could be raised at the stage of second appeal. It should be a substantial question of law. The reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded. Thereafter, the opposite party should be given a fair or proper opportunity to meet the same. In the present case, as the extracts from the judgment quoted hereinabove should show, the High Court has totally ignored the mandatory provisions of Section 100, CPC. The High Court proceeded to entertain the new plea and rendered its decision without following the mandatory provisions of Section 100, CPC. On this short ground, we are of the view that the judgment and decree of the High Court dated 30.11.1982 are illegal and in excess of its jurisdiction and so unsustainable and deserve to be set aside. We hereby to so. The appeal is allowed with costs, including advocates fee which we estimate at Rs. 10,000/-.” 11. In Trumla Tirupati Devasthanams v. K.M. Krishnaiah, (1998) 3 SCC 331, the learned Judges have reiterated that under Section 100, C.P.C. in second appeal it is not open to the second appellate Court to reappreciate the evidence and reject the evidence accepted by the courts below on the question of possession of land. Similarly, in Babu Ram alias Durga Prasad v. Indra Pal Singh (dead) by LRs, (1998) 6 SCC 358, the learned Judges have reiterated that under Section 100, C.P.C. the High Court has no jurisdiction in second appeal to make cut a new case and render its findings thereon. It was held that the High Court in second appeal exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100, C.P.C. in giving a finding on an issue which was not pressed in the trial Court. In Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor, (1999) 2 SCC 471, it is observed in para 10:— "10. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions aforesaid, we find ourselves unable to sustain the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge of the High Court for the reasons that follow: It has to be kept in view that the learned Single Judge was exercising jurisdiction under Section 100, CPC as it was amended in 1976. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions aforesaid, we find ourselves unable to sustain the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge of the High Court for the reasons that follow: It has to be kept in view that the learned Single Judge was exercising jurisdiction under Section 100, CPC as it was amended in 1976. A mere look at the said provision shows that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100, CPC only on the basis of substantial questions of law which are to be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal and the second appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial questions of law. The impugned judgment shows that no such procedure was followed by the learned Single Judge. It is held by a catena of judgments by this Court, some of them being, Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait, (1997) 5 SCC 438 and Sheel Chand v. Prakash Chand, (1998) 6 SCC 683, that the judgment rendered by the High Court under Section 100, CPC without following the aforesaid procedure cannot be sustained. On this short ground alone,. this appeal is required to be allowed. 12. Testing the rival contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties in the light of the scope and jurisdiction of Section 100, C.P.C. as laid down in the above judgments of the Supreme Court, the learned Counsel for the appellant-defendant may be right in urging that non-consideration of documents Ex. D-1 to Ex. D-4 and Ex. DW-3/A to Ex. DW-3/J is the substantial question of law arising in the present appeal but in view of the fact that these were considered and rejected by the trial court for arriving at its findings that Saran and after his death his widow Maina Devi were the tenants of the suit property including the house, as recorded consistently in the Jamabandis for the years from 1948-49 to 1986-87, which were affirmed by the first appellate Court, it will not be of any consequence. The trial court has rightly rejected Ex. D-1 to Ex. The trial court has rightly rejected Ex. D-1 to Ex. D-4 for the reason that these are not covered by the provisions of the Act as the land in dispute is not covered by the definition of the land given in subsection (7) of Section 2 of the Act, as the land in dispute is occupied as the site of a building in a town. So far as the other documents Ex. DW-3/A to Ex. DW-3/J are concerned, these have also been rightly rejected in view of the revenue record. In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100, C.P.C, this Court is not required to reappreciate the evidence on record to come to its independent findings of fact rejecting the findings of fact arrived at by the courts below. 13. The result of above discussion is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is rejected. There is no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.