Judgment : Aggrieved by the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the respondents for a public purpose, namely, for allotment of free house-sites to landless poor, the petitioners have filed the above writ petition. 2. The case of the petitioner is briefly stated hereunder: According to him, he is the owner of ryotwari wet land bearing T.S.No.F/11/2/1 A.H. 6. 00 situate at Adivipolam (Darialathippa) village, Yanam Sub-Taluk. He got the said land under a partition deed dated 18. 1989. Subsequent to the partition, the mutation of the Revenue Record was also done showing his name as the owner of the said land as per his petition No.2009 of 1991 dated 26. 1991. The said lands are also included in his Patta No.103. While so, the second respondent herein initiated proceedings to compulsorily acquire an extent of H.66. 00 out of his above mentioned lands, and published a notification under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) As per the said Notification the said lands are needed for a public purpose viz., for allotment of free house sites to the landless poor. Under the same Notification the enquiry contemplated under Sec.5-A of the Act was also dispensed with in view of the urgency. In the said Notification instead of his name, the name of his mother Thirumathi Kamichetty Nagarathinam was shown as the owner of the land. Thereafter, notification under Sec.6 of the Act was published on 13. 1995. In the 6 declaration also, the name of his mother was shown as owner of the land. The third respondent served a Notice under Secs.9(1)(3) and 10 of the Act calling upon his mother to appear in person or by the authorised agent on 24. 1995 before him for award enquiry. At that stage only, copies of 4(1) Notification and 6 Declaration were furnished along with the award enquiry notice dated 24. 1995, which was served only on 24. 1995. The entire acquisition proceedings are invalid in law especially when the proceedings had been taken in the name of the person who is not the owner of the land. The land acquisition proceedings are also contrary to law, a colourable exercise of power, irregular, suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record and violative of principles of natural justice. In such circumstances, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present writ petition. 3. The land acquisition proceedings are also contrary to law, a colourable exercise of power, irregular, suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record and violative of principles of natural justice. In such circumstances, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present writ petition. 3. On behalf of the respondents, Deputy Collector (Revenue)-cum-Land Acquisition Officer, Yanam, third respondent herein, has filed a counter affidavit disputing various averments made by the petitioner. It is stated that an extent of land of 2.06.00 H. bearing T.S.No.F/11/2/1A, Adivipolam (Darialatippa) village of Yanam Sub-Taluk was registered in the name of Kamichetty Nagaratnam, wife of Perumal, who is the mother of the petitioner herein in the Revenue Records. The land is also comprised in Patta No.103 as found in the Revenue Records. It is not correct to state that the mutation of Revenue records was done in his name, as at the time of acquisition proceedings the land in question was registered in the Revenue records in his mothers name only. Considering the urgency in providing house-sites to landless poor, emergency provision under Sec.17(4) of the Act was invoked and enquiry under Sec.5-A was dispensed with. The acquisition proceedings were initiated after proper verification of the Revenue records and on the basis of the provisions of the Act, notices were issued and notifications were made. Further, in order to avoid delay in allotment of house-sites to landless poor, emergency provision was invoked and as such they did not commit any irregularity and illegality in resorting to acquisition proceedings. It is also stated that the acquisition proceedings will benefit number of poor families living in Darialatippa village as there are no suitable Government poromboke land available and therefore, this land was chosen by the Government for the said public purpose. It is always open to the petitioner to participate in the award enquiry and place all the available documents to establish his title or interest in the land so that suitable award for acquisition can be passed. With these averments, they prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 4. In the light of the above pleadings, I have heard Mr.G.Masilamani, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr.K.K.Sashidharan, learned counsel for the respondents. 5. Mr.G.Masilamani, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, contended that in spite of the Registered Partition Deed dated 18. With these averments, they prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 4. In the light of the above pleadings, I have heard Mr.G.Masilamani, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr.K.K.Sashidharan, learned counsel for the respondents. 5. Mr.G.Masilamani, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, contended that in spite of the Registered Partition Deed dated 18. 1989 and Patta, which stood in the name of the petitioner, issued by the Revenue Authorities, his name was not shown as the owner of the land either in the 4 (1) Notification or in the Declaration under Sec.6. He also contended that there is no justification for invoking the urgency provision under Sec.17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. The said action is only to shut the mouth of the petitioner in raising his objection during enquiry under Sec.5-A. He also stated that even in conducting enquiry, the respondents have failed to allow the minimum 15 days’ time as provided in the statute. .6. Onthe other hand, Mr.K.K.Sashidharan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, by placing the records, would state that as per the Revenue records one Kamichetty Nagaratnam, wife of Perumal, who is the mother of the petitioner herein, alone is the owner of the land in question and hence her name was shown in the notification under Sec.4(1) and declaration under Sec.6. He also contended that inasmuch as there was mutation in the Revenue Records, since the same was not signed by the Officer concerned, the Patta produced by the petitioner cannot be relied upon. He also stated that the respondents are justified in invoking the urgency clause since the landless poor people are in urgent need of house-sites. He further contended that in view of the death of the mother of the petitioner, who is the land owner as per the records, at the most award alone is to be set aside and in that event, it is open to the petitioner to participate in the award proceedings. 7. I have carefully considered the rival submissions. .8. With regard to the first contention, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner by drawing my attention to the Partition Deed dated 18. 1989 as well as the Patta issued by the Specified Officer, Yanam, would state that on the date of the 4(1) Notification, the petitioner alone was the owner of the land in question. .8. With regard to the first contention, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner by drawing my attention to the Partition Deed dated 18. 1989 as well as the Patta issued by the Specified Officer, Yanam, would state that on the date of the 4(1) Notification, the petitioner alone was the owner of the land in question. A perusal of the copy of Patta produced by the petitioner would show that on the basis of Document No.15 of 1990 dated 16. 1989 and Petition No.2009 of 1991 dated 26. 1991, the Specified Officer, Yanam, has mentioned the name of Kamichetty Thirukameswararao as owner of the land in question. Disputing the contents of Patta learned counsel appearing for the respondents by placing the original records has stated that inasmuch as the Specified Officer under Settlement Act, Yanam has not signed the concerned entry in the original register, the Patta produced by the petitioner cannot be acted upon. I have carefully perused the original records produced by the learned counsel for the respondents. At page 27 of the Register though there are entries mentioning the name of the petitioner and partition document number etc., in column No.2, namely, “Name and fathers/husbands name of the pattadar”, the Specified Officer, who is stated to have been the concerned officer to sign, has not signed beneath the said entries. In such a circumstances, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, the patta produced by the petitioner cannot be taken as an authentic one. It is also stated by the learned counsel for the respondents that the person who had issued Patta is none-else than the cousin of the petitioner. Accordingly, in the absence of any mutation in the Revenue records as seen from the original register produced by the learned counsel for the respondents, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, namely, failure to issue notice to the petitioner and mentioning his name in the notification on the basis of patta cannot be countenanced. I am satisfied that the person who issued Patta being a relative to the petitioner, in order to help the petitioner even without signature from the Specified Officer, has deliberately issued patta as if the petitioner is the owner of the property in question. I am satisfied that the person who issued Patta being a relative to the petitioner, in order to help the petitioner even without signature from the Specified Officer, has deliberately issued patta as if the petitioner is the owner of the property in question. Inasmuch as Kamichetty Nagaratnam, wife of Perumallu, mother of the petitioner alone was the owner of the land in question on the date of 4(1) notification, the action taken by the respondents 2 and 3 cannot be faulted with. Accordingly, I accept the explanation offered by the respondents and reject the first contention raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner. Concerned Revenue Authority is directed to take appropriate action against the person who issued Patta in favour of the petitioner even before the approval by the appropriate officer. It is also clear from a decision of the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Umashankar Rajabh State of Maharashtra v. Umashankar Rajabh State of Maharashtra v. Umashankar Rajabh , (1996)1 S.C.C. 299 that in the absence of mutation in the Revenue records, Notice served on the original owner whose name alone is found in the Revenue records cannot be faulted with. 9. Regarding invoking of urgency clause it is seen that the Government of Pondicherry proposed to acquire lands in question for the purpose of allotment of free house-sites to landless poor and in view of urgency under Sec.17(4) of the Act, the Administrator, Pondicherry directed that Sec.5-A of the Act shall not apply. The notification under Sec.4(1) was published in the Gazette dated 2. 1995 and the same has been reiterated in declaration under Sec.6 and published in the Gazette dated 13. 1995. It is clear that in order to allot free house-sites to landless poor and to avoid delay considering the need, the Government, have invoked the urgency clause and dispensed with 5-A enquiry. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has contended that for providing free house-sites to landless poor, it is not open to the respondents to invoke the urgency provision and dispense with 5-A enquiry. According to him, by dispensing with 5-A enquiry, the petitioner had lost his valuable right to make his objection. He also stated that though this Court has ordered Notice of Motion even on 25. According to him, by dispensing with 5-A enquiry, the petitioner had lost his valuable right to make his objection. He also stated that though this Court has ordered Notice of Motion even on 25. 1995, the respondents have not taken any step to get the interim order vacated; hence the urgency, as claimed, does not exist; accordingly prayed for quashing of the entire proceedings. This aspects has been explained by the third respondent in his counter affidavit. In para 8 it is stated thus: “…Most of the families who are landless poor, are residing on the side of the flood bank from Farampeta to Darialatippa by encroaching Government poromboke lands, canal bunds and road sides. The places encroached by them are unfit for habitation. Further the encroachment also caused problem to hygiene and traffic problem and also development works. Since some of the families were residing in Government poromboke land during the flood season in the River Godavari, some areas occupied by encroachers got inundated and Government had to spend huge amounts for rehabilitation. Off and on the Government also received number of applications from the landless poor requesting allotment of free house sites. As the Government did not have adequate suitable Government poromboke land for allotment of house sites to the landless poor, the inspection committee which visited the land under acquisition chose this particular land as most suitable for allotment of free house sites to the landless poor.” As a matter of fact, at one stage, the petitioner himself has given his written consent for acquiring the entire land by the Government while it was was proposed to acquire for Health Sub-Centre. As rightly contended, having given consent, it is not open to the petitioner questioning the acquisition proceedings on various grounds. 10. Apart from the above factual position, learned counsel for the respondents cited the following decisions of the Supreme Court as well as this Court to show that the Government is justified in acquiring lands for allotment of free house-sites to landless poor by invoking urgency clause under Sec.17(4) of the Act. In the case of Chameli Singh v. State of U.P. Chameli Singh v. State of U.P. Chameli Singh v. State of U.P. (1996)2 S.C.C. 549 while considering similar contention, the Supreme Court has observed thus: “…Larger the delay, greater be the urgency. In the case of Chameli Singh v. State of U.P. Chameli Singh v. State of U.P. Chameli Singh v. State of U.P. (1996)2 S.C.C. 549 while considering similar contention, the Supreme Court has observed thus: “…Larger the delay, greater be the urgency. So long as the unhygienic conditions and deplorable housing needs of Dalits, Tribes and the poor are not solved or fulfilled, the urgency continues to subsist. When the Government on the basis of the material, constitutional and international obligation, constitutional and international obligation, formed its opinion of urgency, the court, not being an appellate forum, would not disturb the finding unless the court conclusively finds the exercise of the power mala fide Providing house sites is a national problem and a constitutional obligation. So long as the problem is not solved and the need is not fulfilled, the urgency continues to subsist. The State is expending money to relieve the deplorable housing condition in which they live by providing decent housing accommodation with better sanitary conditions. The lethargy on the part of the officers for pre and post-notification delay would not render the exercise of the power to invoke urgency clause invalid on that account.” 11. In the case of Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust, Amritsar v. State of Punjab , (1996)4 S.C.C. 212 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has made the following observation: “Thus the Government, by virtue of State Amendment is empowered to exercise the urgency clause under Sub-sec.(4) of Sec.17 and to dispense with the enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act. Shri Parekh has contended that mere existence of the power is not sufficient. The urgency should be such as would not brook delay of 30 days in conducting the enquiry contemplated under Sec.5-A. In this case, allotment of the house sites to the poor is not such an urgency which cannot wait for conducting the enquiry. Therefore, exercising the power under Sec.17(4) is bad in law. He seeks to place reliance on the decision of this Court in Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra , (1977)1 S.C.C. 133 . Therefore, exercising the power under Sec.17(4) is bad in law. He seeks to place reliance on the decision of this Court in Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra , (1977)1 S.C.C. 133 . In a recent decision in Chameli Singh v. State of U.P. Chameli Singh v. State of U.P. Chameli Singh v. State of U.P. (1996)2 S.C.C. 549 this Court considered the entire case law and held that providing house sites to the poor is an urgent necessity and exercise of the power under Sec.17(4) to dispense with the enquiry under Sec.5-A would be justified. The reasoning of this Court in , (1977)1 S.C.C. 133 , also was considered and it was held that exercising the power under Sec.17(4) cannot be struck down when the Government was of the opinion that it urgently required for possession of the land for providing house sites to the poor.“ It is clear from the records produced that the Government after taking note of urgent need to provide free house sites to the landless poor decided to invoke urgency clause, in such circumstances, as observed by their Lordships, the same cannot be interfered or struck down by this Court. 12. In the case of M.Padmavathy v. Government of Tamil Nadu M.Padmavathy v. Government of Tamil Nadu M.Padmavathy v. Government of Tamil Nadu , (1999)2 C.T.C. 323 Jagadeesan, J., after considering the action taken by the Government for establishing industrial complex by the SIPCOT as well as the relevant records has concluded that when a decision is taken by the Government to invoke urgency clause based on materials, the Court cannot interfere with the decision taken by the Government including invoking urgency clause by accepting the proposal of SIPCOT. The said decision is in consonance with the above referred decisions of the Supreme Court and with respect I am in agreement with the same. .13. With regard to the plea that the Government have not taken effective steps for vacating the interim order granted by this Court on 25. 1995 all along, it is seen from the records that the third respondent herein filed a counter affidavit even on 19th December, 1995 seeking dismissal of the writ petition. .13. With regard to the plea that the Government have not taken effective steps for vacating the interim order granted by this Court on 25. 1995 all along, it is seen from the records that the third respondent herein filed a counter affidavit even on 19th December, 1995 seeking dismissal of the writ petition. Even though the writ petition was not posted for hearing, in view of the fact that the third respondent has filed counter affidavit within a period of four months from the date of receipt of notice from this Court, I am of the view that the respondents cannot be blamed. Even otherwise, as observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (1996)2 S.C.C. 549 as well as in A.P.Sareen v. State of U.P. A.P.Sareen v. State of U.P. A.P.Sareen v. State of U.P. , (1997)9 S.C.C. 359 urgency continues as long as the scheme is not initiated, action taken and the process completed. In the light of the decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court and in the light of the information furnished by the respondents in their counter affidavit as well as from the records, I hold that the respondents are justified in applying urgency provision under Sec.17(4) of the Act and dispensing with enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act; accordingly I reject the argument of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner. .14. Regarding the other contention that there is no clear 15 days Notice for award enquiry, it is stated by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that notice under Secs.9(1)(3) and 10 was served on the petitioner on 24. 1995 and award enquiry was conducted on 24. 1995 i.e., within a period of two days which is against the said provision. In this regard, it is relevant to refer para 5 of the counter affidavit of the third respondent wherein it is fairly stated that notice under Secs.9(1)(3) and 10 of the Act dated 24. 1995 was sent to the registered owner viz., Thirumathi Kamichetty Nagaratnam, wife of Perumal calling upon her and also other persons interested in the land to appear in person or by the authorised agent on 24. 1995 at 3.00 p.m. for the award enquiry. 1995 was sent to the registered owner viz., Thirumathi Kamichetty Nagaratnam, wife of Perumal calling upon her and also other persons interested in the land to appear in person or by the authorised agent on 24. 1995 at 3.00 p.m. for the award enquiry. It is also stated that since Kamichetty Nagaratnam was not alive by that time notice was received by the petitioner herein who claimed to be the owner of the land. Further, according to them, after publication of Sec.6 declaration the respondent came to know that the petitioner is the interested person in the land and hence copies of 4(1) Notification and Sec.6 declaration were immediately furnished to him. In view of the death of Kamichetty Nagaratnam, learned counsel for the respondents fairly stated that award will be passed after notice to the petitioner and in that event, it is open to him to participate in the enquiry and raise his objection if any. However, on that ground the acquisition proceedings cannot be interfered. Learned counsel for the respondents has brought to my notice a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Nasik Municipal Corporation v. Harbanslal Laikwant Rajpal Nasik Municipal Corporation v. Harbanslal Laikwant Rajpal Nasik Municipal Corporation v. Harbanslal Laikwant Rajpal , (1997)4 S.C.C. 199 . In that case similar contention was raised before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and Their Lordships after rejecting the said contention have observed thus: .“It is then contended by Mr.U.R.Lalit, that the respondents had not been given the information of the notification under Sec.9 of the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, the award is bad in law. We find no force in the contention. In the absence of notice or failure to serve notice, the award does not become invalid…” 15. In the case of Lakhbir Chand v. Land Acquisition Collector , A.I.R. 1979 Delhi 53 a learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court with regard to non-service of a notice or service of a defective or short notice under Secs.9 and 10 has held that the same cannot nullify the subsequent proceedings to the extent that the Governments title by acquisition should fail. The learned Judge has concluded thus: “…The scheme of the Act is that no real prejudicial consequences follow in the non-service of a notice or service of a defective or short notice under Secs.9 and 10 and thus the provisions cannot be held as mandatory. The learned Judge has concluded thus: “…The scheme of the Act is that no real prejudicial consequences follow in the non-service of a notice or service of a defective or short notice under Secs.9 and 10 and thus the provisions cannot be held as mandatory. The condition of service of notices upto the making of the award are imposed merely for administrative purposes.” The learned Judge has also concluded thus: “The failure to issue notice or failure to issue a correct notice under Secs.9(3) and 10(1) cannot nullify the subsequent proceedings to the extent that the Governments title by acquisition should fail. The declaration made under Sec.6 is made conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose. Thereafter the Government may acquire the land in the manner provided. After the declaration, the Collector takes orders for acquisition. Thereafter the only interest of the person interested is to receive its compensation. The right to receive compensation as determined by the court is reserved irrespective of the notice under Secs.9(3) or 10(1) or the participation in the enquiry. If any person wrongly receives the compensation, the right of the person interested is reserved to him under 3rd proviso to Sec.31. In these circumstances, the failure to give notice or a correct notice loses all its importance and for these reasons the provisions of Sec.9(3) or 10(1) cannot be held as mandatory. The proceedings in relation to the acquisition of the land in dispute in the two cases cannot be held to be illegal or void or without jurisdiction for non-service of the notices on the petitioner Ram Prakash or service of a defective notice, on the petitioner Lakhbir Chand under Sec.9(3) of the Act.” 16. In the case of State of M.P. v. Sugandhi State of M.P. v. Sugandhi State of M.P. v. Sugandhi , A.I.R. 1980 M.P. 19 a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has observed thus: “It is admitted that Dammulal was not served with any special notice as contemplated by Sec.9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act. In the case of State of M.P. v. Sugandhi State of M.P. v. Sugandhi State of M.P. v. Sugandhi , A.I.R. 1980 M.P. 19 a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has observed thus: “It is admitted that Dammulal was not served with any special notice as contemplated by Sec.9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act. But omission or failure to serve notice due to want of requisite information, or due to bona fide mistake or due to inadvertence, would not make the proceedings bad, or the award illegal, or the vesting without jurisdiction…” In the light of the decision of the Apex Court, namely, Nasik Municipal Corporation v. Harbanslal Laikwant Rajpal Nasik Municipal Corporation v. Harbanslal Laikwant Rajpal Nasik Municipal Corporation v. Harbanslal Laikwant Rajpal , (1997)4 S.C.C. 199 with respect I am in agreement with the view expressed by the learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court as well as Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and I hold that defective notice under Sec.9(3) of the Act would not make the earlier proceedings bad or the award illegal. 17. Apart from this, the learned counsel for the respondents would state that since the petitioner has filed the writ petition only on 25. 1995, the same is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches. It is true that 4(1) notification was published on 2. 1995 and 6 declaration was published on 13. 1995, however the writ petition was presented before this Court on 25. 1995, and hence the same cannot be rejected on the ground of delay. 18. Inview of my discussion, all the contentions raised by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner is liable to be rejected. However, Mr.G.Masilamani, learned senior counsel by relying on a decision of the Apex Court reported in Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Raj Kumar Johri , A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1538 as well as a decision of P.Shanmugam, J., in Tmt.Thirupurasundariammal v. State of Tamil Nadu and two others, W.P.No.21124 of 1992, dated 29. 1999 contended that in case if this Court holds that the acquisition proceedings are declared to be valid, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the date of Notification under Sec.4(1) can be advanced to meet the ends of Justice. 1999 contended that in case if this Court holds that the acquisition proceedings are declared to be valid, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the date of Notification under Sec.4(1) can be advanced to meet the ends of Justice. After going through the factual position in the cases before the Supreme Court as well as this Court, I am unable accept even the alternative argument made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner. In the case before the Supreme Court, there is a finding by their Lordships to the effect that the Government authorities failed to follow certain provisions. In other words, in that case, there is a finding that pre-conditions had not been complied with strictly under the statutory provisions. On the ground and in view of public purpose for acquisition of the land in question, their Lordships have directed the deemed date of notification under Sec.4(1) to be postponed by almost three years. Here, I have already held that there is no infirmity or irregularity in the acquisition proceedings. Moreover, in our case even 4(1) notification has been issued only on 2. 1995 and in view of the death of the original land owner Kamichetty Nagaratnam, the third respondent is to issue notice to the petitioner who is the interested person and thereafter pass an award under Sec.9(3). When such an opportunity is available even now to the petitioner, I am of the view that there is no need to up-date the 4(1) Notification; accordingly I reject the said request also. 19. Under these circumstances, I do not find any error or infirmity in the acquisition proceedings; consequently the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs. All the miscellaneous petitioners are closed. It is made clear that in view of the death of Kamichetty Nagaratnam and the third respondent is yet to pass award, undoubtedly award is to be passed after notice to the petitioners and after affording adequate opportunity to him.