ORDER : P. Sathasivam, J.—Aggrieved by the order of the second respondent made in T.S.E. Appeal No. 36 of 1996 dated November 8, 1997 the petitioner has filed the above writ petition on various grounds. 2. The case of the petitioner is briefly stated hereunder: According to him he has joined as Manager (Finance) in the first respondent Company on December 15, 1984. He was confirmed on June 14, 1985 and was promoted as Chief Manager (Finance) from December 15, 1986. He was confirmed in this post on June 14, 1987. The management of the first respondent Company was taken over by SPIC in May, 1991. He was promoted as Joint General Manager (Finance) from November 1, 1993. On October 10, 1994 a typed letter of voluntary retirement was brought to him by the Chief Manager (Administration & Personnel), wherein he was forced to sign the letter of voluntary retirement effective from December 15, 1994. He was shocked by the above treatment. He sent lawyer notices on November 5, 1994 and November 8, 1994. He received a communication on November 15, 1994 stating that he should either accept the voluntary retirement or regulate the period of absence or report to SPIC Medical Centre on November 18, 1994, if really sick. Though he reported for duty on November 17, 1994, he was not allowed to join duty. He reported to the SPIC Medical Centre as directed and he joined duty by producing a Fitness Certificate issued by the SPIC Medical Centre. The first respondent gave him lot of pinpricks and harassments in order to send him out, they devised another method viz., the letter of voluntary retirement obtained by force should be notarised. His father-in-law and his wife were made by the management to sign the letter of alleged voluntary retirement dated December 29, 1994. This letter was also obtained by threat or coercion. He made a representation to the Chairman on June 22, 1995. Since there was no reply, legal notice was sent on December 30, 1995 to the management. The petition filed by him u/s 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") was dismissed as not maintainable. He preferred an appeal before the appellate authority under the Shops and Establishments Act, with a petition to condone the delay. Since there was no reply, legal notice was sent on December 30, 1995 to the management. The petition filed by him u/s 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") was dismissed as not maintainable. He preferred an appeal before the appellate authority under the Shops and Establishments Act, with a petition to condone the delay. After dismissal of the writ petition filed by the petitioner against the order condoning the delay, the Shops Act appeal was taken up for decision. The Shops Act authority after finding that it has no jurisdiction to determine the question has actually gone into that question and gave a finding that the voluntary retirement was not in force and not a case of termination. Against the order of the appellate authority dismissing his appeal, having no other remedy he has filed the present writ petition. 3. The first respondent-Management has filed a counter affidavit disputing various averments made by the petitioner. It is stated that, besides retiring voluntarily from the service, the petitioner's accounts have been settled and he has received all his retirement benefits without any demur or protest and he is also receiving the pensionary benefits as per the Pension Scheme implemented by the first respondent Company. The petitioner on his own accord voluntarily came out with a letter dated October 10, 1994 seeking for voluntary retirement from the service of the Company. Nobody ever coerced him to submit the letter of resignation as alleged by him. By his letter dated December 29, 1994 the petitioner volunteered to finally retire from the services of the Company, wherein he has admitted that there is no coercion on the part of the Management when he originally requested (sic) for voluntary retirement under his letter dated October 10, 1994. The petitioner in order to show that his request for voluntary retirement was genuine and voluntary, got his request for voluntary retirement duly attested by his wife and father-in-law and in fact got it duly notarised by Mr. J. Krishnamachary, Advocate and Notary Public before it was submitted to the Company. The Company therefore accepted his voluntary retirement and allowed him to voluntarily retire by December 31, 1994. J. Krishnamachary, Advocate and Notary Public before it was submitted to the Company. The Company therefore accepted his voluntary retirement and allowed him to voluntarily retire by December 31, 1994. The second respondent appellate authority under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act (hereinafter referred to as "Shop Act" ) after framing necessary points and after considering the case of both parties rejected the appeal filed by the petitioner. It is also stated that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. In the light of the above pleadings, I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as first respondent. 5. The point for consideration is whether the voluntary retirement dated December 29, 1994 was given by the petitioner on his own accord and appellate authority is justified in dismissing the appeal. It is the definite case of the petitioner that, resignation was obtained by coercion at the instance of the Management. It is seen from the records that, initially the petitioner on his own accord voluntarily came out with a letter dated October 10, 1994 seeking for voluntary retirement from the services of the Company. It is further seen that after prolonged correspondences between the petitioner and the first respondent Company and because of the fact that he went back on his voluntary retirement, he was allowed to join back duty as Joint General Manager (Finance) on probation. According to the Company after his reporting for duty he continued to be on probation and his performance continued to be unsatisfactory, therefore he was reverted back as Chief Manager (Finance) with effect from November 28, 1994 from which post he was earlier promoted and put on probation. We are not concerned with the earlier letter dated October 10, 1994. On the other hand, if it is established that letter of the petitioner dated December 29, 1994 was written voluntarily without any coercion on the part of the Management, the case of the petitioner is liable to be rejected. In order to show that resignation obtained be coercion amounts to termination, Mr. R. Ganesan, learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the following decisions: 1. J.K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd., Kanpur v. State of U.P. and Ors. (1991) LLJ 39 : 2. In order to show that resignation obtained be coercion amounts to termination, Mr. R. Ganesan, learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the following decisions: 1. J.K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd., Kanpur v. State of U.P. and Ors. (1991) LLJ 39 : 2. State of U.P. v. Dharamvir Singh Tyagi 1986 5 C C 665 : 3. Ravinder Singh v. State of M.P. 1995 Service Law Reporter 424: 4. P. Kasilingam Vs. P.S.G. College of Technology, : (1981) 1 SCC 405 5. Vinayak Bhagwan Shetye Vs. M/s Kismet Pvt. Ltd. and another, : (1984) 1 LLJ 203 6. Premier Tyres Ltd., v. V.A. Abraham 1978 II LLJ 220: 7. TISCO Ltd., v. Labour Court 1989 II LLJ 989 and 8. Punjab National Bank Vs. P.K. Mittal, (1989) 1 LLJ 368 . In view of the fact that, it is settled legal position that once it is proved that resignation was obtained by coercion, undoubtedly it would amount to termination. In such circumstance, I am of the view that there is no need to refer all those decisions in detail. However, let us find out whether the letter dated December 29, 1994 was submitted by the petitioner voluntarily or the same was due to coercion on the part of the Management. 6. It is seen from the records that, it is the definite case of the petitioner that the management has resorted to victimisation by giving various difficulties and obtained the letter of voluntary retirement by coercion and threat, accordingly the letter of voluntary retirement obtained by the management amounts to termination of service, hence the same should be set aside. On the other hand the first respondent management has specifically pleaded that the petitioner had voluntarily retired from service with effect from December 31, 1994 and settled his retirement benefits fully and finally including pension, gratuity etc. It is also stated on the side of the management that the appeal preferred by him u/s 41(2) of the Act is not maintainable. It is also stated that the petitioner was occupying the managerial position with all managerial powers, he is not a "person employed" within the meaning of Section 4(1)(a) of the Shop Act. 7. Before the second respondent appellate authority, petitioner himself was examined as A.W.1 and marked Exhibits A.1 to A.22. It is also stated that the petitioner was occupying the managerial position with all managerial powers, he is not a "person employed" within the meaning of Section 4(1)(a) of the Shop Act. 7. Before the second respondent appellate authority, petitioner himself was examined as A.W.1 and marked Exhibits A.1 to A.22. Likewise, one S. Arumugham, Senior Manager (Administration & Personnel) of the first respondent Company was examined as R. W. 1. They also marked Exhibits R. 1 to R. 29 in support of their defence. 8. With regard to the question viz., whether at the relevant time petitioner was occupying the managerial position exercising all managerial powers and a "person employed" within the meaning of Section 4(1)(a) of the Shop Act, after considering the materials placed before it, the authority came to the conclusion that, petitioner is a "person employed" within the meaning of Section 4(1)(a) of the Shop Act. 9. With regard to letter of voluntary retirement, as stated earlier, we need not discuss voluntary retirement dated October 10, 1994. We are concerned with the letter of voluntary retirement dated December 29, 1994, The said letter has been marked as Exhibit A. 19. The perusal of the letter shows that the same was written by him in his own hand-writing and is not a typed one. The said letter has been endorsed by his wife and father-in-law of the petitioner and also notarised by a Notary Public. It is also quite reasonable inasmuch as the petitioner herein has withdrawn the voluntary retirement letter dated October 10, 1994, this time first respondent management has insisted the petitioner to get the signature of his wife and father-in-law and also from the Notary Public. Accordingly, the petitioner has secured signature from all the three persons. It is also quite reasonable inasmuch as the petitioner herein has withdrawn the voluntary retirement letter dated October 10, 1994, this time first respondent management has insisted the petitioner to get the signature of his wife and father-in-law and also from the Notary Public. Accordingly, the petitioner has secured signature from all the three persons. As rightly observed by the appellate authority, even if it is accepted that the first respondent has forced the petitioner to sign the letter of voluntary retirement, it is highly improper and how could the Company force the wife and father-in-law as well as the Notary Public to sign the letter of voluntary retirement: Even though the action of the wife, father-in-law and Notary Public is disputed by the petitioner, the fact remains he had not examined any one of those persons who endorsed the voluntary retirement letter as a witness and proved the contention that the letter of voluntary retirement dated December 29, 1994 was obtained on coercion and threat. It is also clear from the records that the management has accepted the voluntary retirement letter dated December 29, 1994 and as a follow up action communicated the same to the petitioner on December 31, 1994. On receipt of the same he put his signature without any reservation. Here again, as rightly observed by the appellate authority he has not recorded any protest in the letter stating that the letter of voluntary retirement has been obtained on coercion or threat. It is also seen from the records that, consequent on the acceptance of the voluntary retirement the management has settled his retirement benefits. It is also clear that he has received the gratuity of Rs. 36,375.00 and signed the receipt which has been marked as Exhibit R. 16. In the said receipt also he has merely put his signature and no protest was made. Apart from this, he had also sent a letter dated February 3, 1995 to the Trustee, the TAC Employees Superannuation Fund for communication of 1/3 of the pension. The said letter has been marked as Exhibits R. 17. Here again, the petitioner has not stated anything about coercion or threat of the respondent. Even in the subsequent letters addressed to the management, the petitioner had not raised nor alleged anything regarding coercion or threat. The said letter has been marked as Exhibits R. 17. Here again, the petitioner has not stated anything about coercion or threat of the respondent. Even in the subsequent letters addressed to the management, the petitioner had not raised nor alleged anything regarding coercion or threat. On the other hand, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the first respondent management, in Exhibit R. 18 he had thanked the Officers and staff of the respondent Company. After considering the said letter, the appellate authority has concluded: "In this letter also, he has not raised the bogey of coercion and threat. Admittedly, this letter was written by the appellant on his own volition and not on the direction and dictates of the respondent. In the letter he has whole-heartedly thanked the officers and staff of the Company for the association during his tenure. If the letter of voluntary retirement has been obtained by the respondent under coercion or threat as alleged by the appellant, the appellant could not have extended his heart felt thanks to the Officers and staff of the respondent Company." This amply supports the claim of the management that there was no coercion or threat in respect of the letter of the voluntary retirement written by the petitioner on December 29, 1994. It is further seen that, even thereafter he had sent a letter dated March 31, 1995 to the management for settlement of some dues. The letter has been marked as Exhibit R. 19. There also he has not complained about coercion or threat. Again, on April 27, 1995 he had sent another letter seeking settlement of certain claims which have been marked as Exhibit R.21. Another letter dated August 9, 1995 addressed to the management is marked as Exhibit R. 22. 10. It is clear from the particulars furnished that, consequent on the acceptance of his voluntary retirement, the petitioner has received his gratuity dues, commuted portion of the pension from the L.I.C. and still continue to receive monthly pension of Rs. 647.00 from the L.I.C. It is clear that, he has received all the retiral benefits without any murmur or protest. All these things, undoubtedly show that the letter of voluntary retirement dated December 29, 1994 has been written by the petitioner on his own volition. 647.00 from the L.I.C. It is clear that, he has received all the retiral benefits without any murmur or protest. All these things, undoubtedly show that the letter of voluntary retirement dated December 29, 1994 has been written by the petitioner on his own volition. Accordingly, I concur with a conclusion arrived by the appellate authority and reject the contra argument made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 11. Even though, learned counsel for the petitioner has cited other decisions in support of his contention, I am of the view that, in the light of the abundant evidence that the letter of voluntary retirement dated December 29, 1994 was not due to coercion or threat at the instance of the management, it is not necessary to refer those judgments as claimed. It is settled legal position that, when the facts are clear and supported by acceptable evidence let in, there is no need to refer various decisions. The appellate authority after considering the oral and documentary evidence let in by both side demonstrated, how the claim of the petitioner cannot be accepted. Likewise, even though it is stated that, in the light of the earlier finding of the appellate authority, it is not open to the said authority to go into the merits of the claim, in view of the scope u/s 41(2) of the Shop Act while deciding the appeal, the appellate authority is competent and rendered a finding one way or other based on the evidence. Accordingly, the conclusion of the appellate authority cannot be faulted with. In this regard it is useful to refer the conclusion of the Division Bench rendered in Sree Meenakshi Mills v. The Asst. Commissioner of Labour 1990 1 MLJ 424 . In that decision their Lordships have observed that, when the person employed putforth a complaint that his services have been dispensed with by the employer without a reasonable cause and in answer, the employer says that it is not a case of dispensing with the services of the person employed by him by any unilateral act of his certainly the jurisdictional issue arises as to whether it is a case of dispensing with the services of the person employed or not and to say that the jurisdictional issue is beyond the pale of an enquiry by the Appellate Authority u/s 41(2) of the Act would practically make the provisions nugatory. They also observed that, such should not be the result achieved by any judicial thinking or construction put on the provisions. 12. In the light of what is stated above, I do not find any terror or infirmity in the impugned order of the second respondent. Consequently, the writ petition fails and, the same is dismissed. No costs.