Honble GUPTA, J.–Through this criminal revision, petitioner Smt. Aziza Khan, calls in question the order of the Family Court, Jodhpur dt. 17.11.95 rejecting her application u/S. 125 Cr. P.C. (2). The common ground between the parties is that petitioner, Advocate and respondent doctor entered into marital relations on 6.8.82 in accordance with Mus-lim rites and customs, and Rs. 10,000/-were settled as the `Mehar amount to be paid by the non-petitioner to the petitioner in case of `Talaq. (3). The petitioners case is that the non-petitioner was having illicit relations with two ladies-one, a doctor and the other of Jain community-and that she was subjected to cruelty and inhuman treatment at the hands of non-petitioner. It is alleged that the non-petitioner was not satisfied with the dowry given by the parents of the petitioner and she was asked to fetch handsome money from his father, who was Minister at that time. The petitioner in her application filed on 15.2.94 under Sec. 125 Cr. P.C. for maintenance alleged that she was neglected by the non-petitioner, who was earning Rs. 20,000/-per month from his private nursing home. (4). The non-petitioner came out with a case that he had given `Talaq to the petitioner on 14.3.86 by written `Talaqnama Ex. A-2 and sent the same by registered post to the petitioner and also get it published in a daily newspaper dated 9.12.86. He denied that he had ever caused cruelty to the petitioner or that made a demand for the dowry. It was also denied that the non-petitioner was having illicit relations with any lady. It was pleaded that the petitioner is not entitled to maintenance from the non-petitioner because of the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorces) Act, 1986. It was also pleaded that the petitioner is earning Rs. 5000/-per month from the legal practice. (5). After recording the evidence of both the parties, the learned Judge, Family Court held that the non-petitioner had divorced the petitioner by a written `Talaqnama in 1986 and she was not entitled to maintenance u/S. 125 Cr.P.C. because of the provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorces) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1986). (6). Ms. Aziza Khan, argued the matter herself. She pointing out that there was no attempt for reconciliation and pre-divorce conference was not held, contended that `Talaq dt. 14.3.86 is not valid. (6). Ms. Aziza Khan, argued the matter herself. She pointing out that there was no attempt for reconciliation and pre-divorce conference was not held, contended that `Talaq dt. 14.3.86 is not valid. She urged that even after the coming into force of the Act of 1986 she is entitled to maintenance u/S. 125 Cr. P.C. read with Sec. 3(1)(a) of the Act of 1986. She cited the cases of Smt. Hamidan vs. Mohd. Rafiq (1), K. Kunhammed Haji vs. K. Amina (2) and Noor Saba Khatoon vs. Mohd. Quasim (3) in support of her contention. (7). Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, pointing out that the provisions in the Holy Quoran for an attempt of settlement or pre-divorce conference are directory in nature and their non-compliance does not render the `Talaq invalid. His contention was that after the coming into force of the Act of 1986, the husband is not liable to pay maintenance to his ex-wife and if she is unable to maintain herself, she may claim maintenance from her other relations or the Waqf Board. He relied on the cases of Ramzan vs. Smt. Salma (4) and Abid Ali vs. Mst. Rasia Begum (5). (8). I have given the contentions my anxious thought. It is true that a husband should not divorce his wife at his whims and caprice and the divorce must be on some reasonable cause. It is also true that an attempt should be made to arrive at a settlement. However, it cannot be accepted that without an attempt of settlement or pre-divorce conference `Talaq given by a Muslim husband to his wife becomes invalid. A Muslim husband has been given powers to divorce his wife even by uttering the words `Talaq thrice and no written Talaqnama is required. As such, there may not be time to have recourse to pre-divorce conference. This fact cannot be lost sight of that under the Muslim Law, marriage is not a sacrament; it is only a civil contract and the contract of marriage can be brought to an end like any other contract. (9). In the case of Abid Ali (supra) which is Division Bench decision of this Court, the relevant verses of Quoran have been reproduced but it has not been laid down that pre divorce conference is a condition precedent for `Talaq. (9). In the case of Abid Ali (supra) which is Division Bench decision of this Court, the relevant verses of Quoran have been reproduced but it has not been laid down that pre divorce conference is a condition precedent for `Talaq. In my opinion, on the ground that there was no attempt of settlement prior to `Talaq or that there was no pre divorce conference, the `Talaq given by the non-petitioner to the petitioner cannot be held to be invalid. The petitioner has not been able to cite any authority in which it has been held that a `Talaq without pre divorce conference or an attempt of settlement, is not valid. (10). It is fully established that the non-petitioner had divorced the petitioner by written Talaqnama. It is not disputed that even the petitioner, on the basis of the `Talaq made a demand of `Mehar etc. Thus there is hardly any force in the conten-tion that there was no valid Talaq. (11). Coming to the second contention of the petitioner, we may read Section 3(a), Sec. 4 and 5 of the Act of 1986 which read as under:- ``Section 3 : Mehar or other properties of Muslim woman to be given to her at the time of divorce: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a divorced woman shall be entitled. (a) a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the Iddat period by her former husband; xxxxx ``Section 4: Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, where a Magistrate is satisfied that a divorced woman has not remarried and is not able to maintain herself after the iddat period, he may make an order directing such of her property on her death according to Muslim Law to pay such reasonable and fair maintenance to her as he may determine fit and proper, having regard to the needs of the divorced woman, the standard of life enjoyed by her during her marriage and the means of such relatives and such maintenance shall be payable by such relatives in the proportions in which they would inherit her property and at such periods as he may specify in his order. ``Section 5: Option to be governed by the provisions of Secs. ``Section 5: Option to be governed by the provisions of Secs. 125 to 128 of Act 2 of 1974-If, on the date of first hearing of the application under sub-Section (2) of Sec. 3, a divorced woman and her former husband declare, by affidavit or any other declaration in writing in such form as may be prescribed, either jointly or separately that they would prefer to be governed by the provisions of Sec. 125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), and file such affidavit or declaration in the Court hearing the application, the Magistrate shall dispose of such application accordingly. (12). The opening words of Section 4 indicate that it has over-riding effect and even if there is provision in the Criminal Procedure Code for the grant of maintenance to a divorced woman, maintenance cannot be allowed to a divorced Muslim woman, after the expiry of the `Iddat period. A provision has been made that after the expiry of Iddat period the divorced Muslim woman can claim maintenance from the relation who would be entitled to inherit her property on her death, and if such relations do not have means to pay the same, she can claim maintenance from the State Waqf Board established u/S. 9 of the Waqf Act, 1954. It is obvious that Section 4 of the Act of 1986 absolves the Muslim husband from paying maintenance to his wife after he divorces her and the `Iddat period expires. Obviously, the case does not come under Sec. 5 of the Act, as the respondent has not made declaration that he wanted to be governed by Sec. 125 to 128 Code of Criminal Procedure. (13). A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ramzan (supra) has clearly held that after divorce the Muslim wife is entitled to maintenance only for a period of `Iddat i.e. for three calendar months from the date of divorce. This case was decided taking into consideration the provisions of the Act of 1986. (14). In the case of Abid Ali (supra) also the Division Bench has taken a similar view that a divorced Muslim wife is not entitled to maintenance from her husband after the expiry of `Iddat period. (15). This case was decided taking into consideration the provisions of the Act of 1986. (14). In the case of Abid Ali (supra) also the Division Bench has taken a similar view that a divorced Muslim wife is not entitled to maintenance from her husband after the expiry of `Iddat period. (15). This question was considered by the Karnataka High Court in the case of Rukiya vs. Mohammed (6) wherein it has been clearly laid down that divorced Muslim woman is not entitled to maintenance u/S. 125 Cr. P.C. after coming into force of the Act of 25 of 1986. (16). To the same effect are the observations of the M.P. High Court in the case of Mohd. Umar Khan vs. Gulshan Begam (7). (17). The Allahabad High Court had also occasion to consider the same controversy in the case of Mohammad Yameed vs. State of U.P. (8). It was held that after the coming into force of the Act of 25 of 1986 an application by a divorced Muslim woman u/S. 125 Cr. P.C. is not maintainable. (18). A Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Usman Khan Bahamani vs. Fathimunnisa Begum (9) has considered the question of grant of maintenance to a divorced Muslim woman u/S. 125 Cr. P.C. in great detail. Their lordships have held that a divorced woman cannot claim maintenance u/S. 125 Cr. P.C. after passing of the Act of 1986. (19). The cases relied on by the petitioner do not lay down the principle that a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to maintenance from her husband u/S. 125 Cr. P.C. after expiry of `Iddat period. The case of Noor Saba (supra) pertains to maintenance allowance of a minor child. Their being clear provision u/S. 3(1) of the Act of 1986, the Apex Court held that children born out of the wedlock are enti-tled to claim maintenance for a period of 2 years from the date of birth of such children. This ruling does not help the petitioner in her contention that she is entitled to maintenance u/S. 125 Cr. P.C. or fair and reasonable provision for her maintenance in post Iddat period. (20). In the case of Smt. Hamidan vs. Mohd. Rafiq (supra) though there is re-ference of the provisions of the Act of 1986 in the Head Note but the provisions have not at all been discussed in the judgment. P.C. or fair and reasonable provision for her maintenance in post Iddat period. (20). In the case of Smt. Hamidan vs. Mohd. Rafiq (supra) though there is re-ference of the provisions of the Act of 1986 in the Head Note but the provisions have not at all been discussed in the judgment. It is, therefore, difficult to appreciate the logic which has prevailed with their lordships to allow maintenance even after the expiry of the Iddat period. (21). In the case of Kunhammed Haji vs. Amina (supra) a view has been taken that divorced Muslim woman, apart from her right to maintenance is entitled to get maintenance for her livelihood for post Iddat period. In view of the Division Bench decision of our own High Court, this ruling does not help the petitioner. (22). The result of foregoing discussion is that the petitioner, who had been divorced by the non-petitioner in 1986, is not entitled to maintenance u/Sec.125 Cr. P.C. and the Family Court has rightly rejected her application. (23). There being no merit in this petition, it is hereby dismissed.