Honble CHAUHAN, J.–The instant writ petition has been filed against the impugned Award dated 17.9.1996 (Annexure 12), by which claim of respondent-workman has been accepted and the order of reinstatement with consequential benefits has been passed. (2). The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that respondent No.1, a Junior Engineer, was employed on daily wages for a period of 100 days vide order dated 22.9.1988 (Annexure 1) in a particular scheme known as NREP/RLEGP. On completion of 100 days, his service, though could have been terminated automatically without any order, came to an end by a specific order of the Authority dated 29.12.88 (Annexure 2). Respondent No.1 was offered appointment for 29 days in another Scheme known as Jeevan Dhara, vide order dated 17.1.89 (Annexure 3) and it was extended from time to time upto 12.6.89. The last order of appointment for a period of seven days was issued on 24.6.89 which came to an end on 30.6.89. Respondent-workman filed a writ petition No. 2338/1989 praying therein that the order of termination of his services with effect from 1.7.89 be quashed with all con-sequential benefits and his appointment for 100 days or subsequently for a specific period be declared illegal and void and ignoring it, he may be treated in continuous service w.e.f. 22.9.88. This Court, while entertaining that writ petition, passed an interim order dated 18.7.89 in the following terms:- `` . . . Meanwhile, operation of the order dated 13.1.1989 shall remain ineffective and if the petitioner already relieved, shall be taken back in service. (3). On the strength of interim order, respondent-workman was re-employed and allowed to continue in service. However, order dated 7.5.91 (Annexure 11) was passed terminating the services of respondent-workman and other similarly situa-ted persons on the ground that the posts stood abolished. Various writ petitions were filed and this Court decided the same in Pawan Kumar and others vs. State of Rajasthan and others (1), wherein the Court considered that the Junior Engineers had been employed under different Schemes and ultimately all these Schemes were merged into Jawahar Lal Nehru Yojna which subsequently came to be known as Jawahar Rozgar Yojna. Various writ petitions were filed and this Court decided the same in Pawan Kumar and others vs. State of Rajasthan and others (1), wherein the Court considered that the Junior Engineers had been employed under different Schemes and ultimately all these Schemes were merged into Jawahar Lal Nehru Yojna which subsequently came to be known as Jawahar Rozgar Yojna. The Court observed as under:- ``It is apparent that the relief of reinstatement to the petitioners for the posts under Jawahar Rozgar Yojna in the present case, cannot be granted as a consequence of abolition of the posts under Jawahar Rozgar Yojna, which has been held to be bonafide.....The question of regularisation and grant of equal pay for equal work in the context of appointments made under Jawahar Rozgar Yojna by the D.R.D.As. on the anvil of right to livelihood and guarantee of employment under Article 41 of the Constitution of India was not tenable. (4). While deciding the case, the Court placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jaipal & others vs. State of Haryana and others (2), wherein it had been held that where the Government Schemes, under which appointments were made, were themselves temporary, no order for regularising the temporary services of such appointees could be made. (5). Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgment in Pawan Kumar and others (supra), the petitioners therein went in appeal before a Division Bench of this Court and ultimately to the Honble Supreme Court and the Honble Supreme Court decided the matters in Rajendra and others vs. State of Rajasthan and others (3) by holding that if the posts have been abolished for any reason whatsoever, employees working on the said posts cannot be permitted to continue as the posts are not available. The Honble Supreme Court observed as under:- ``The foot-note inserted in the letters of appointment stated that app-ointment was purely temporary and the services of the Agencies were not transferable in any other Department of the Government, though the period of appointment could be extended after putting-in satisfactory services during the period of initial appointment, i.e. six months. Such appointments were extended from time to time but on similar terms and conditions. Such appointments were extended from time to time but on similar terms and conditions. Inasmuch as need for the work was partially over and the Government was finding it difficult to provide funds for administrative expenses which it found to be non-productive and unnecessary, an Expert Committee was appointed to review the situation. Decision for abolition of the posts was taken consisten-tly with the findings and recommendations of such committee....The decision taken by the respondent-State to abolish the posts was a bonafide decision taken after due application of mind by appointing an Expert Committee which went deep into all relevant consideration and made recommendation in the interest of rationalisation. (6). The Honble Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Junior Engineers and further observed that it was not possible to issue any direction that they may be accommodated/absorbed in some other Schemes. (7). In the instant case, reference was made whether termination of workman with effect from 7.5.1991 was valid, if not, to what relief he was entitled for. In fact, during this period he had been working under the order of this Court as he stood terminated w.e.f. 1.7.89. Moreso, the impugned Award runs counter to the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Rajendra and others (supra) as the reference before the Labour Court had been regarding the same date of termination, i.e. 7.5.91. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was some extraneous consideration in abolition of the posts or the order was passed to deprive the respondent-workman and other similarly situated persons of their continuation in service. Moreso, this Court, in Pawan Kumar (supra) did not find fault with the abolition of posts. I am at complete loss to understand how the findings in Award could be given contrary to those recorded by this Court and once this Court had decided the issue what was the occasion for the Labour Court to decide the same. (8). There is another aspect of the matter. The Labour Court had taken into account the entire service rendered by the respondent No.1 from 22.9.88 to 7.5.91 while computing the period for the purpose of determining the application of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, ``the Act, 1947). (8). There is another aspect of the matter. The Labour Court had taken into account the entire service rendered by the respondent No.1 from 22.9.88 to 7.5.91 while computing the period for the purpose of determining the application of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, ``the Act, 1947). The Labour Court failed to appreciate that the services rendered by respondent No.1 from 22.9.88 for a period of 100 days was entirely in a different Scheme and it could not have been clubbed with the services rendered by him under another Scheme with effect from 17.1.89. The Labour Court further failed to appreciate that the ser-vices of respondent No.1 stood terminated with effect from 30.6.89 and he was allowed to work under the interim order of this Court and admittedly, the writ petition ultimately stood dismissed. (9). There can be no quarrel to the legal proposition that no party can suffer by the action of the Court and when the High Court is exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralised. The institution of litigation by a party should not be permitted to confer an unfair advantage on the party responsible for it. (Vide Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer and others (4); Ram Krishna Verma vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (5); State of Madhya Pradesh vs. M.V. Vyavsaya & Company (6) and Smt. Rampati Jayaswal and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (7). (10). It is, also, settled law that no litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of case in a Court of Law, as the interim order always merges in the final order to be passed in the case and if the writ petition is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs by getting interim order and thereafter blame the Court. The fact that the writ is found, ultimately, devoid of any merit, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The maxim ``Actus Curie neminem gravabit is applicable in such a case, which means that the act of the Court shall prejudice no-one. The fact that the writ is found, ultimately, devoid of any merit, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The maxim ``Actus Curie neminem gravabit is applicable in such a case, which means that the act of the Court shall prejudice no-one. In such a situation the Court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the Court. Thus, any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralised as institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a suitor from delayed action by the act of the Court. (Vide Dr. A.K. Sircar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (8); Shiv Shanker and others vs. Board of Directors, Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and another (9); the Committee of Management, Arya Inter College vs. Shree Kumar Tiwari (10); Kanoria Chemicals & Industries Ltd. vs. U.P. State Electricity Board (11); G.T.C. Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India and others (12); M/s. Kanoria Chemicals & Industries Ltd. vs. U.P. State Electricity Board (13) and Ugam Singh vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (14). (11). The Honble Supreme Court in the cases of N. Mohanan vs. State of Kerala and others (15) and Bileshwar Khan Udyog Khedut Shahkari Mandi Ltd. vs. Union of India and others (16) has held that the appointment/continuation in service by interim order, does not create any legal right in favour of the appointee. In State of U.P. and others vs. Raj Karan Singh (17) the Honble Apex Court has categorically held that interim order cannot disturb the position in law and if a person is in service by virtue of the interim order of the Court, he cannot agitate the issue that his continuation in service in such a condition has improved his claim to regularisation. A Division Bench of this Court (to which I was a Member), has taken the same view in Aqueela vs. State of Rajasthan and others (18). (12). A Division Bench of this Court (to which I was a Member), has taken the same view in Aqueela vs. State of Rajasthan and others (18). (12). Thus, the Labour Court has erred in giving the benefit in computing the period for which respondent No.1 had served under the interim order of this Court as had there been no interim order of the Court, the services of respondent No.1 would have stood terminated with effect from 1.7.1989 and he could not have com-pleted 240 days service in a calendar year. In fact, reference, if any, ought to have been made in respect of termination w.e.f. 1.7.89. Thus, the reference itself was bad. The petitioner has to be allowed on this sole ground. (13). There is yet another aspect of the matter which requires consideration. The Government had framed various Schemes of giving employment to unemplo-yed rural persons living below the poverty line. Undoubtedly, the Schemes were meant to carry out certain development programmes but the dominant factor in floating the Scheme was to save the needy persons of starvation. This Court, in State of Rajasthan and another vs. Babu Khan (19), had an opportunity to consider the aspect of employment under the Famine Relief Scheme and held that when the famine relief works came to an end, the services of the employees automatically stood terminated. Therefore, the question of application of provisions of the Act, 1947 was not there for the reason that the Government provided relief to the persons affected by draught and scarcity conditions and the Relief Section of the Collectorate could not be held to be an `industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j), nor a person employed under such Scheme can be said to be a `workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) and his retrenchment cannot be said to be violative of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act, 1947. While deciding the said case, the Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Dewa Ram vs. State of Rajasthan and others (20). But there may be a distinguishing feature between the said cases, i.e. Babu Khan and Dewa Ram (supra) and the instant case. The said cases had been considered under the statutory provisions of Rajasthan Famine Relief Works Employees (Exception from the Labour Laws) Act, 1964. But there may be a distinguishing feature between the said cases, i.e. Babu Khan and Dewa Ram (supra) and the instant case. The said cases had been considered under the statutory provisions of Rajasthan Famine Relief Works Employees (Exception from the Labour Laws) Act, 1964. Thus, one can urge that as the employment itself was under the Act which provided for non-application of the provisions of the Act, 1947, the said cases stood entirely on a different footing and are distinguishable. (14). The purpose of floating Jawahar Rozgar Yojna was considered by the Honble Supreme Court in Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union vs. Delhi Administration, Delhi and others (21), wherein the Court has held as under:- ``In 1988-90 the Central Government announced a new scheme for intensive employment in backward districts where acute poverty and unemployment prevailed. In all 120 districts were identified for the purpose and the new scheme was named as `Jawaharlal Nehru Rozgar Yojna. The Government of India then decided to merge Rural Employment Programme and Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme as well as the Jawaharlal Nehru Rozgar Yojna into one rural employment programme to be known as `Jawahar Rozgar Yojna. Under this programme, the assistance received from the Central Government as well as the State Governments/Union territories was required to be given to the village panchayats to increase the coverage of the programme and to ensure fuller participation of the people in its implementation...They were not employed in the Horticulture Department of the Delhi Administration. The Yojna has not and cannot have by its very nature any sanctioned strength of posts or workers...They had to decide the rural works which they would undertake in the next month and for that purpose to estimate in the last week of the preceding month the number of workers required for the same. The works by their very nature had to be under taken on daily wages basis and as soon as the works at particular sites were over, the workers were required to be shifted to other sites....There was no scope for regularisation since there were no sanctioned posts or the sanctioned strength of workers. The works by their very nature had to be under taken on daily wages basis and as soon as the works at particular sites were over, the workers were required to be shifted to other sites....There was no scope for regularisation since there were no sanctioned posts or the sanctioned strength of workers. Viewed in the context of the facts of the present case it is apparent that the schemes under which the petitioners were given employ-ment have been evolved to provide income for those who are below the poverty line and particularly during the periods when they are without any, source of livelihood and, therefore, without any income whatsoever. The schemes were further meant for the rural poor, for the object of the schemes was to start tackling the problem of poverty from that end. The object was not to provide the right to work as such even to the rural poor-much less to the unemployed in general. The above figures show that if resources used for the Jawahar Rozgar Yojna were in their entirety to be used for providing full employment throughout the year, they would have given employment only to a small percentage of the population in need of income, the remaining vast majority being left with no income whatsoever. No fault could, therefore, be found with the limited object of the scheme given the limited resources at the disposal of the State. Those employed under the Scheme, therefore, could not ask for more than what the scheme intended to give them. To get an employment under such scheme and to claim on the basis of the said employment, a right to regularisation, is to frustrate the scheme itself. No court can be a party to such exercise. It is wrong to approach the problems of those emplo-yed under such schemes with a view to providing them with full employment and guaranteeing equal pay for equal work. These concepts, in the context of such schemes are both unwarranted and misplaced. They will do more harm than good by depriving the many of the little income that they may get to keep them from starvation. They would benefit a few at the costs of the many starving poor for whom the schemes are meant. That would also force the State to wind up the existing schemes and forbid them from introducing the new ones, for want of resources. They would benefit a few at the costs of the many starving poor for whom the schemes are meant. That would also force the State to wind up the existing schemes and forbid them from introducing the new ones, for want of resources. This is not to say that the problems of the unemployed deserve no consideration or sympathy. This is only to emphasise that even among the unemployed a distinction exists between those who live below and above the poverty line, those in need of partial and those in need of full employment, the educated and uneducated, the rural and urban unemployed etc. Ultimately, it is the people who bear the heavy burden of surplus labour. The other equally injurious effect of indiscriminate regularisation has been that many of the agencies have stopped undertaking casual or temporary works though they are urgent and essential for fear that if those who are employed on such works are required to be continued for 240 or more days, they have to be absorbed as regular employees although the works are time-bound and there is no need of the workmen beyond the completion of the works undertaken. The public interests are thus jeopardised on both counts. (15). It is not that the work under every scheme will not be subject to the provisions of the Act. In Punchgaon Maruti Scheme framed by the Government on taking the policy decision in 1976 for forestation was held to be covered by the provisions of the Act in Chief Conservator of Forest & Anr. vs. Jagannath Maruti Kondhara & ors. (22). But in State of West Bengal & ors. vs. Monirujjaman Mulick & ors. (23) and K.S. Mahalingegowda & ors. vs. Secretary to Government, Department of Vocational Education, Karnataka & ors. (24), the Honble Supreme Court held that a person cannot claim more than what the Scheme provided for, and, in fact, it is the contents of the Scheme which have to be understood for determination whether the provisions of the Act can be made applicable or not. The Honble Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board vs. A. Rajappa (25) and N. Nagendra Rao & ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (26) has impressed upon the sovereign and regal functions of the State. The dictomy of sovereign and non-sovereign functions of the State does not exist. The Honble Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board vs. A. Rajappa (25) and N. Nagendra Rao & ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (26) has impressed upon the sovereign and regal functions of the State. The dictomy of sovereign and non-sovereign functions of the State does not exist. Whether a particular function of the State is or not a sovereign function, depends on the nature of power and manner of its exercise. Where a scheme provides for a particular function which fully or partly can be alienable, that may fall within the definition of `industry. In the instant case it appears to be inescapable function of the State for the reason that the scheme provides for saving the persons living below poverty line from starvation and no person, real, legal or juristic, would be willing to get it alienate in its favour nor anybody can be forced to take it by the State. (16). Thus, it is apparent that Jawahar Rozgar Yojna has been created to save the down-troden and living below poverty line from starvation and the purpose is to give the employment to a maximum number of persons. Where the dominant object of floating the Scheme is to give employment to those living below poverty line and that too for a maximum number of persons and the object of Scheme is not to provide regular employment, and the product/manufacturing/construction etc. is merely incidental/ancillary or dormant to the main purpose. Jawahar Rozgar Scheme cannot be held to be an `industry nor the persons employed therein can be termed as `workmen and provisions of the Act, 1947 are not attracted. (17). The submission made by Mr. Shishodia that a party cannot be permitted to agitate a new plea first time before the Writ Court which requires any kind of investigation, cannot be repelled. It is settled proposition of law that a pure question of law, which does not require any investigation of fact, can be raised first time in writ jurisdiction. An issue which requires investigation of facts, cannot be allowed to be agitated. (Vide Ratan Lal Sharma vs. Managing Committee (27); St. Arunchal-lai Pillai vs. Southern Roadways Ltd. (28); A.M. Allison vs. State of Assam (29); Cantonment, Ambala vs. Pyare Lal (30); State of U.P. vs. Dr. An issue which requires investigation of facts, cannot be allowed to be agitated. (Vide Ratan Lal Sharma vs. Managing Committee (27); St. Arunchal-lai Pillai vs. Southern Roadways Ltd. (28); A.M. Allison vs. State of Assam (29); Cantonment, Ambala vs. Pyare Lal (30); State of U.P. vs. Dr. Anupam Gupta (31); Bhanwar Lal vs. T.K.A. Abdul Karim (32); Rajeshwari Amma vs. Joseph (33); Commissioner of Income Tax vs. U.P. Forest Corporation (34); P.R. Deshpande vs. Maruti Balaram Haibatti (35); State of Punjab vs. R.N. Bhatnagar (36); Oil & Natural Gas Commission vs. M.C. Chelland Engineers S.A. (37) and Rajasthan Agriculture University vs. Ram Krishna Vyas (38). (18). Mr. Bishnoi has contended that raising the said issue before Labour Court was meaningless as the said Court cannot travel beyond the terms of reference. The submission is full of substance as it stands fortified by the judgments of the Honble Supreme Court in Hochtief Gammon vs. Industrial Tribunal, Bhabaneshwar, Orissa & ors. (39) and Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat vs. The Perfect Pottery Co. Ltd. & Anr. (40). Be that as it may, the contention raised by Mr. Shishodia that the present petitioner did not agitate the issue whether Jawahar Rozgar Yojna is an ``industry or not, before the Labour Court, is of no substance. Once the issue has been decided by the Honble Supreme Court and the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution, it merely remains a pure question of law and there is no bar to agitate a legal question first time in writ jurisdiction though not taken before the Labour Court. The judgments cited by Mr. Shishodia, particularly Secretary, Urban Improvement Trust, Bikaner vs. Karamchari Sangh, U.I.T. (41) and the recent judgment delivered by Honble the Chief Justice in State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Jesa Ram & Anr. (42) are distinguishable for the reason that the Supreme Court has already adjudicated upon the nature of Jawahar Rozgar Yojna. (19). In view of the above, the reference made by the appropriate Government is inconsequential and the Award made by the Labour Court herein is liable to be set-aside as petitioner cannot be fastened with liability for which the Scheme certainly did not provide. The petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.