JUDGMENT: These three petitioners have filed these three petitions under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. to give effect to the G.Os. issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu for remission of sentence passed against each one of them. 2.Crl.O.P.No.10722 of 1998: The petitioner Periyalwar was convicted by learned VI Additional Special Judge (now IV Additional Special Judge), Chennai in C.C.No.22 of 1989 for alleged offences under Secs.7 and 13(1)(d) read with Sec.13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and learned Judge found the petitioner guilty under the above sections convicted and sentenced him to undergo rigourous imprisonment for 2 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000 in default to undergo rigourous imprisonment for 3 months. The petitioner has filed Criminal Appeal No.804 of 1990 before this Court and the appeal was dismissed with the observation that the jail authorities to take into account the various G.Os. in respect of remission. The petitioner has claimed remission as under: (1) G.O.Ms.No.279, Home (Prisons-IV) Dept., dated 23.2.1992 for 6 months. (2) G.O.Ms.No.296, Home (Prisons-IV) Dept. dated 22.2.1993 for 6 months. (3) G.O.Ms.No.205, Home (Prisons-IV) Dept. dated 23.2.1994 for 6 months. (4) G.O.Ms.No.1342, Home (Prisons - IV) Dept. dated 12.9.1996 for 6 months. (5) G.O.Ms.No.1163, Home (Prisons-IV) Dept. dated 12.8.1997 for 4 1/2 months. 3.Crl.O.P.No.17137 of 1998: The petitioner one Parthiban, an accused in S.C.No.8 of 1989 on the file of the Special Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kumbakonam, for offences under Secs.5(2) read with 5(1)(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Learned Special Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate found him guilty under the said section convicted and sentenced him to undergo rigourous imprisonment for 2 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000. The petitioner has paid the fine amount. The petitioner has filed Criminal Appeal No.158 of 1992 on the file of this Court and his sentence was reduced and modified to rigourous imprisonment for 1 year by an order dated 10.8.1998. The petitioner has claimed remission granted under the Government Orders: (1) G.O.Ms.No.296, Home (Prisons-IV) Dept., dated 20.2.1993, 6 months (2) G.O.Ms.No.205, Home (Prisons-IV) Dept., dated 23.2.1994, 6 months (3) G.O.Ms.No.1163, Home (Prisons-IV) Dept., dated 12.8.1997, 3 months 4.Crl.O.P.No.21467 of 1998: The petitioner Sheik Abdullah is an accused in C.C.No.536 of 1989 on the file of the Special Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sivagangai for offence under Sec.7 read with Secs.13(1)(d) and 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act. Learned Special Judge-cum Chief Judicial Magistrate found the accused guilty under the above section convicted and sentenced him to undergo rigourous imprisonment for 1 year and to pay a fine of Rs.200. Further, it was ordered that the sentences should run concurrently. The petitioner has preferred an appeal in Criminal Appeal No.367 of 1992 and the same was dismissed by this Court on 2.11.1998 confirming the conviction and sentence. The petitioner has claimed remission of the sentence under: (1) G.O.Ms.No.296, Home (Prisons-IV) Dept. dated 20.2.1993, for 6 months (2) G.O.Ms.No.205, Home (Prisons-IV) Dept. dated 23.2.1994. for 6 months (3) G.O.Ms.No.1163, Home (Prisons-IV) Dept for dated 12.8.1997.3 months 5. All these 3 petitioners pray for remission of their respective sentences under the above G.Os. 6. There is no dispute regarding the other G.Os. However, the respondent police raised an objection for the remission pleaded by the petitioners on the basis of G.O.Ms.No.1762, Home (Prisons-IV) Department, dated 20.7.1987. The relevant portion in the said G.O. is as follows: "ORDER: In para 17.2 of Chapter XX of its report, the All India Committee has recommended that the following categories of prisoners should not be eligible for consideration of premature release: (i) Prisoners convicted of rape, forgery, dacoity, terrorist crimes, offences against the State and prisoners sentenced under Secs.224, 376, 396 to 400, 402, 467, 471, 472, 474, 489-A, 489-B and 489-D of the Indian Penal Code; (ii) Prisoners convicted of economic offences, black marketing, smuggling and misuse of power and authority; (iii) Prisoners sentenced under Prevention of Corruption Act, Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, Drugs Act and Prevention of Food Adulteration Act." 7. The petitioners concerned in all these 3 Crl.O.Ps. were convicted and sentenced for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. learned Public Prosecutor, State of Tamil Nadu, has contended that in view of the specific provision in G.O.Ms.No.1762, Home (Prisons-IV), dated 20.7.1987 hereinafter called the said G.O. the petitioners are not eligible for grant of remission. This question raised on the basis of the said G.O. the petitioners are not eligible for grant of remission. This question raised on the basis of the said G.O. had been a question arose consistently in earlier petitions filed by the parties for similar relief. Therefore, it becomes necessary to consider the earlier pronouncements before coming to any conclusion in this matter. 8. This question raised on the basis of the said G.O. had been a question arose consistently in earlier petitions filed by the parties for similar relief. Therefore, it becomes necessary to consider the earlier pronouncements before coming to any conclusion in this matter. 8. In P.V.Bakthavatchalam v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1991 Crl.L.J. 1870, a Division Bench of this Court considered similar question in respect of this similar G.O. and held- "It is argued, though such a point has not been raised in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, that the Government Order is discriminatory and offending Art.14 of the Constitution. But those sentences awarded for offences which are heinous in character such as rape, forgery, dacoity, terrorist crimes and offences against the State; and prisoners convicted of economic offences, black-marketing, smuggling and misuse of power and authority; and prisoners sentenced under Prevention of Corruption Act, Suppression of Immoral Traffic and Women and Girls Act, Drugs Act and Prevention of Food Adulteration Act only have been made not eligible for premature release. May be the Government thought that the prisoners who have committed the said offences should not be shown any mercy and that if they are released they may again be a menace to the society. Therefore, the Government Order is quite reasonable and certainly there is no discrimination offending Art. 14 or any other Article of the Constitution. Thus, we find no merit in this petition.“ 9. In Raji v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Inspector of Police, Vellore North Police Station, Crl.R.C.No.433 of 1990 and Crl.R.P.No.431 of 1990, dated 7.7.1995, this Court considered the said question and held- "I have considered the effect of G.O.Ms.No.1762, dated 20.7.1987 and the subsequent plethora of remissional Government Orders. Even in the subsequent Government Orders, remission of sentences, to certain categories of prisoners stands excluded. It is easily possible to comprehend that such exclusion is on the basis of the nature of the offence allegedly committed and the impact that it would have on the social fabric. If that should be the criterion governing the remissions, I am unable to understand as to why G.O.Ms.No.1762, dated 20.7.1987 would cease to have any application so long as it has not been rescinded. If that should be the criterion governing the remissions, I am unable to understand as to why G.O.Ms.No.1762, dated 20.7.1987 would cease to have any application so long as it has not been rescinded. By applying the provisions in the aforesaid Government Order, it has to be necessarily held that prisoners sentenced under the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act will not be entitled to the remissions subsequently notified by the Government." 10. In Usha and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, H.C.P.Nos.1795 to 1801 of 1994, dated 7.12.1994, a Division Bench of this Court by order granted special leave to agitate the refusal or remission to certain persons convicted of certain offences under the said G.O. 11. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) Nos.1202 to 1228 of 1995 by order dated 10.4.1995, held as follows: "Though a question of law does arise with regard to G.O. Ms.No.1672, dated 20th July, 1987 being considered in these matters, we do not think that we should disturb the status quo as resorted to by the High Court of Madras. Leaving the question of law open, we dismiss the Special Leave Petition." 12. While considering the view taken by some of the learned Judges of this High Court granting remission to persons convicted of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on certain decisions. 13. In R.Dhason, In re., 1991 L.W. (Crl.) 523, it was held: "The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 though passed by the Parliament, is not in List I and is traceable only to Entry (1) of List III extracted above. The State Government therefore, can remit the sentences imposed both under Sec.161, I.P.C., as well as under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947." 14. In Sriramulu and others v. Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu and another, (1995)2 L.W. (Crl.) 670, a convict for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act prayed for remission of sentence and this Court while considering the said G.O. held- "Once this Court has held that the petitioners are entitled to remission, unless and until the order is set aside, it is not open to the respondents to contend that the petitioners are not entitled to remission in view of G.O.Ms.No.1762, Home (Prisons) Department, dated 20.7.1987. It is not disputed by the counsel for the respondents that the learned single Judge has taken into consideration this Government Order also while he passed the orders in the Criminal Original Petitions." 15. In Padma v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1998 Crl.L.J. 4335, the said G.O. was considered by this Court and was held that exemption to remission to certain person convicted of certain offences including the conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act was held invalid and further direction was given to the appropriate Government to release the petitioners forthwith. 16. The State of Tamil Nadu have preferred an appeal before the Honourable Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal Nos.958 to 960 of 1999 in S.L.P.(Crl). Nos.2720 to 2722 of 1998, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held- "Special Leave granted. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, in our opinion, it is not for the High Court itself to order to grant of remission. The High Court could only require the Government to consider the cases of the respondents for the grant of remission in accordance with law. Individual facts will have to be investigated and decision taken whether and to what extent the remission can be granted and whether the orders on which reliance was placed are applicable. We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the High Court, The High Court is directed to consider the matter afresh and issue appropriate directions. The appeals are disposed of accordingly." 17. When we apply our mind to the said orders of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) Nos.1202 to 1228 of 1995 dated 10.4.1995, it is clear that their Lordships expressed the view that a tough question of law does arise with regard to the said G.O. and leaving the question of law open, the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed. 18. In the later order by their Lordships in State of Tamil Nadu v. Padma and others, Criminal Appeal Nos.958 to 960 of 1999 dated 17.9.1999, (stated supra) their Lordships have held that the High Court could only require the Government to consider the case of the respondents for the grant of remission in accordance with law. While considering, the individual facts have to be investigated and a decision has to be taken whether and to what extent the remission can be granted. While considering, the individual facts have to be investigated and a decision has to be taken whether and to what extent the remission can be granted. Since this Court has ordered the release of the convict by holding that the said G.O., cannot over ride the earlier G.Os. and the later G.Os. granting remission to the persons convicted under the offences excluded in the said G.Os., their Lordships have set aside the judgment of this Court and further directed this Court to consider the matter afresh and issue appropriate directions. 19. The Apex Court, while considering the power of Governor in Nanavati v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 112, held- "Though the court will not enter into the propriety or sufficiency of the reasons for the exercise of the power in a particular case, the court may interfere if the Governor exceeds his powers under the Constitution, e.g. (i) If he exercises the power in respect of an offences against a law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State does not extent (Godse v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 600) or in a case of punishment by a court Martial. (ii) If the power of remission or suspension of sentence is exercised at a time when the matter is subjudice before the court under Art.142 of the Constitution or Sec.426 of the Criminal Procedure Code." 20. The said G.O. is issued in the name Governor, However, the other reasons stated by the petitioners herein to show that it is not a G.O. issued under Art.161 of the Constitution of India have to be considered in the following paragraphs. At this juncture, it is pertinent to cite two more decisions of the Apex Court relied on by the parties. 21. In State of Punjab v. Joginder Singh, (1990)2 S.C.C. 661 ), their Lordships have considered certain paragraphs and Notes in the Manual for Superintendence and Management of Jails in Punjab. In that decision their Lordships have considered the earlier decision in Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharastra, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 600 and Maru Ram v. Union of India, (1991)1 S.C.C. 107 and held- “Remissions by way of reward or otherwise cannot cut down the sentence awarded by the court except under Sec.432 of the Code or in exercise of constitutional power under Art.72/161 of the Constitution. Remission cannot detract from the quantum and quality of the judicial sentence except to the extent permitted by Sec.432 of the Code, subject of course to Sec.433-A, or where the clemency power under the Constitution is involved.” In paragraph 9 at page 66, their Lordships have further held- “Remission Schemes are introduced to ensure prison discipline and good behaviors and not to upset sentences.” 22. From this decision it is clear that the remission scheme is not for upsetting the sentence passed by the competent court for various offences and it is for the purpose of ensuring discipline and good behaviour among prisoners. In the said judgment, the observation made by their Lordships in Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 600 has been stated thus- “Lastly it observed that the question of remission was exclusively within the province of the appropriate Government.” 23. In State of Punjab v. Kesar Singh, (1997)1 L.W. (Crl.) 157, their Lordships have considered the direction given by the Punjab and Haryana High Court and directed the State of Punjab to release the said prisoners. Against the said direction given by the High Court, the State of Punjab filed an appeal before the Supreme Court of India and while considering the said direction given by the punjab and Haryana High Court, their Lordships have held- “The direction of the High Court therefore to prematurely release the respondent and set him at liberty forthwith could not have been made. That apart, even if the High Court could give such a direction, it could only direct consideration of the case of premature release by the Government and could not have ordered the premature release of the respondent itself.” 24. From the catena of decisions shown above, it is clear that time and again, their Lordships have held that if at all direction is given by the High Court, the same should be given to the Government to consider the case of the Prisoner for premature release or remission, etc., and the court cannot order release of the petitioners directly. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the said G.O. is not passed under Art. 161 of the Constitution of India, and the said G.O. is passed on the basis of the letter of the Director General of Prison, Madras in letters No.l4477/M/86-1 dated 8.3.1986 and 27.2.1987. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the said G.O. is not passed under Art. 161 of the Constitution of India, and the said G.O. is passed on the basis of the letter of the Director General of Prison, Madras in letters No.l4477/M/86-1 dated 8.3.1986 and 27.2.1987. A perusal of the said G.O. would go to show that All India Committee on Prison Reforms has requested in para 17.2 of Chapter XX of its report, some categories of prisoners should be exempted for consideration of premature release. The prisoners sentenced under the Prevention of Corruption Act are also exempted from premature release. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioners further argued that the said G.O. was issued for the purpose of carrying out amendment to Rule 341 of Tamil Nadu Prison Manual Volume II and as such, it is not a G.O. under Art. 161 of the Constitution of India or Sec.432, Crl.P.C. and therefore, applying the said G.O. the respondent cannot refuse to grant remission to the petitioners. When we peruse the said G.O., it is clear that it is not issued under Art.161 of the Constitution of India. The said G.O. was issued for making amendment in the Tamil Nadu Prison Manual Volume II, as per the report of the All India Committee on Prison Reforms. 27. The purpose of the G.O. was to make amendment in the concerned Rule and it is not clear whether the Director General of Prison had sent necessary draft amendment as stated in the said G.O. If draft amendments have been sent, that must have been approved and the said Rule 341 of the Tamil Nadu Prison Manual Volume II would have been amended. No draft was shown that the said rule was amended in consequence of the said G.O. As the G.O. gives a direction to the Inspector General of Prison and as there is no evidence as to whether the said amendment remission was carried out, the applicability of the said G.O., has not been proved by the State. No draft was shown that the said rule was amended in consequence of the said G.O. As the G.O. gives a direction to the Inspector General of Prison and as there is no evidence as to whether the said amendment remission was carried out, the applicability of the said G.O., has not been proved by the State. If at all Rule 341 of the Tamil Nadu Prison Manual, Volume II was amended as per the said G.O., nothing prevented the State to show that on the basis of the amended Rule 341 of the Tamil Nadu Prison Manual, Volume II, the prisoners convicted for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act are not eligible for remission or for premature release. Nothing has been shown and in such circumstances, we have to hold that the petitioners are entitled for remission under various G.Os. as claimed by them. 28. Learned Public Prosecutor has argued that ‘remission’ is different from ‘premature release’ and the G.O. contemplates ‘premature release’ and not ‘remission’ and therefore, the petitioners are not eligible for any remission. 29. No doubt, remission is different from premature release and what is stated in the said G.O. is premature release. In case, if the G.O. was passed only for premature release and not for remission, nothing prevents the authorities to grant remission to the petitioners herein and vice versa. Therefore whatever angle it is argued, it does not in favour of the respondent state. 30. All the decisions stated supra, uniformly held that the High Court cannot give any direction to give remission to the prisoners and to release them and on the contrary, the court can give direction to the Government to consider their case and release them on remission. While applying the said principle, in all these petitions, a direction has to be given accordingly. 31. In the result in Crl.O.P.Nos.10722, 17137 and 21467 of 1998, the respondent, State are directed to consider the case of these petitioners for remission and pass orders according to law.