Honble SINGH, J.–Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners. (2). By this petition, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner Budh Ram has prayed that a Writ of Habeas Corpus be issued and Kum. Kamla daughter of Jagga Ram resident of Sadulsahar District Sri Ganganagar, who is presently lodged at Nari Niketan, Jaipur be set free. (3). The facts of the case may be briefly summarised below: (4). Kum. Kamla daughter of Jagga Ram resident of Sadulsahar, left the house of her father about four months before she was recovered by the police officer. A complaint was filed in the court of Civil Judge (JD) and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sadulsahar containing the allegations that she had left the house of her pare-nts and started living with Jaswant Singh. The complaint was sent to the Station House Officer of the Police Station, Sadulsahar, under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code and the First Information Report No. 120/99 was registered at the Police Station. During the investigation Kum. Kamla was recovered from the house of Jaswant Singh. She was produced before the Judicial Magistrate, Sadulsa-har. Jaswant Singh was also arrested by the police and he was remanded to the Judicial Custody. Medical examination of Kum. Kamla was got done and, according to Medical Report, Kum. Kamla was found to be between 15 to 16 years of age. However, when Kum. Kamla was produced before the Judicial Magistrate, she stated her age to be 18 years. She further stated that she had been living with Jaswant Singh for the last four months and that she was not prepared to return to the house of her parents as she apprehended danger to her life. She further expre-ssed her desire to go back to the house of Jaswant Singh. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the Judicial Magistrate, by his order dated 12.06.1999, directed that Kum. Kamla be kept at Nari Niketan, Jaipur. (5). The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that Kum. Kamla is 18 years old, according to her own statement made before the Judicial Magistrate, Sadulsahar and, therefore, she should be treated as a major lady. Regarding the Medical Report which states that Kum. Kamla be kept at Nari Niketan, Jaipur. (5). The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that Kum. Kamla is 18 years old, according to her own statement made before the Judicial Magistrate, Sadulsahar and, therefore, she should be treated as a major lady. Regarding the Medical Report which states that Kum. Kamla is 15 to 16 years old, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the opinion given by the medical expert regarding age may suffer from a marginal error of two years and, therefore, the medical report cannot be said to be sufficient to show that Kum. Kamla is a mi-nor lady. He has, therefore, requested that this Court should decide the question of age of Kum. Kamla in these proceedings. It is further submitted by him that Kum. Kamla being a major person, has unfettered right to take a decision about herself and the Judicial Magistrate, Sadulsahar and no legal power to direct that she be kept at Nari Niketan, Jaipur. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, even if Kum. Kamla is found to be a minor, the order dated 12.06.1999 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Sadulsahar, is without any jurisdiction because under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the Judicial Magistrate has no power to detain any witness against her will. In other words, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that detention of Kum. Kamla in the Nari Nike-tan, Jaipur in pursuance of the order dated 12.06.1999 is without jurisdiction and is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. He has, therefore, prayed that this petition should be admitted, a Writ of Habeas Corpus be issued and Kum. Kamla be set free so that she may go wherever she likes. (6). After careful consideration of the submissions made by the learned coun-sel for the petitioner, we are not inclined to admit this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (7). The age of Kum. Kamla has been found to be between 15 to 16 years of age, by the medical examination. No school certificate is available probably because she did not attend any school. The allegations made by her parents are that she is a minor and these allegations are prima facie supported by the medical report. (7). The age of Kum. Kamla has been found to be between 15 to 16 years of age, by the medical examination. No school certificate is available probably because she did not attend any school. The allegations made by her parents are that she is a minor and these allegations are prima facie supported by the medical report. In proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the disputed question of age cannot be decided by this Court. If any authority is needed for this view, a reference may be made to the decision of the Honble Apex Court in the State of Kerala & ors. vs. O.C. Kuttan and Ors. (1). In that case, the High Court, in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, determined the age of the girl and held that no offence had been committed by the accused-persons. The Honble Supreme Court observed:- ``....we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court committed gross error in embarking upon an inquiry by shifting of evidence and coming to a conclusion with regard to the age of the lady on the date of alleged sexual intercourse, she had with the accused persons and also in recording a finding that no offence of rape can be said to have been committed on the allegations made as she was never forced to have sex but on the other hand she willingly had sex with those who paid money. (8). We, therefore, decline to accept the prayer that we should decide the question of age of Kum. Kamla in the present proceedings instituted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (9). Since the question regarding age of Kum. Kamla cannot be decided by this Court in the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it would be proper to take into consideration the medical report regarding the age of the lady. The medical report, as noted by the learned Judicial Magistrate in his order dated 12.06.1999, shows that Kum. Kamla is 15 to 16 years old. In our opinion, the medical report is sufficient to prima facie establish that Kum. Kamla is 15 to 16 years old and is a minor unmarried female below 16 years. (10). In view of the conclusion that prima facie the age of Kum. Kamla is 15 to 16 years old. In our opinion, the medical report is sufficient to prima facie establish that Kum. Kamla is 15 to 16 years old and is a minor unmarried female below 16 years. (10). In view of the conclusion that prima facie the age of Kum. Kamla is below 16 years, the submission that Kum. Kamla is a major person and possessed of unfettered right to take decision about herself, is without any substance. For the purpose of disposing of this petition, Kum. Kamla must be treated as a minor unmarried Hindu female, below 16 years of age. (11). The submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order dated 12.06.1999 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Sadulsahar whereby Kum. Kamla has been ordered to be kept at Nari Niketan, Jaipur is devoid of any legal power, is also without any merit. This conclusion is based on two grounds; the first is that no act can be said to be in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India unless the act is calculated to deprive a person of his life and personal liberty or the dominant consequence of the act is to occasion the deprivation of a persons life and or/personal liberty. An act which is neither calculated to deprive any person of his life and personal liberty nor the dominant effect of which act is the deprivation of life and personal liberty of a person, cannot be said to be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In order the writ petition for issue of Writ of Habeas Corpus may be entertained, it is necessary for the petitioner to show that there is a violation of fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Unless a prima facie case of deprivation of life and personal liberty is made out, the petition for issue of Writ of Habeas Corpus cannot be entertained. In the instant case, there is nothing to suggest that the order dated 12.06.1999 was passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, with a view to deprive Kum. Kamla of her life or personal liberty nor there is anything to suggest that the dominant result of the impugned order is deprivation of the right of life and personal liberty. In the instant case, there is nothing to suggest that the order dated 12.06.1999 was passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, with a view to deprive Kum. Kamla of her life or personal liberty nor there is anything to suggest that the dominant result of the impugned order is deprivation of the right of life and personal liberty. Hence, we are not satisfied that the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution is threatened or violated. The second ground on which we propose to reject this petition is that the order dated 12.06.1999 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Sadulsahar cannot be said to be devoid of legal jurisdiction and, therefore, there is no ground for entertaining this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (12). It is true that every person, male or female and, minor or major, has a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution, which provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to proce-dure established by law. Under Article 226 of the Constitution this Court has constitutional right to enforce the fundamental rights, if the court is satisfied that the fundamental right of any person is threatened or has been taken away or curtailed otherwise than according to the procedure established by law. A bare reading of Article 21 of the Constitution shows that in order this Court may exercise its constitutional power under Article 226 of the Constitution to enforce the right to life and personal liberty, it must be shown that there is ``deprivation of any persons right to life and personal liberty. Unless there is deprivation of the right to life and personal liberty, the occasion for enforcing the right to life and personal liberty would not arise. (13). The expression ``deprivation has not been defined anywhere in the Constitution of India or the General Clauses Act. Therefore, the expression ``deprivation will have to be given the ordinary meaning and, if necessary, the rule of contextual interpretation will have to be applied. In Chamberss Twentieth Centuary Dictionary, the expression ``deprive has been defined in the following words:- ``Deprive, v.t. to take away from one his own: to take from : to dispossess: to degrade (a chergy-man) from office: to bereave-n. Deprivation, act of depriving: state of being deprived: degradation from office: loss: bereavement: suffering from hardship adj..... In Chamberss Twentieth Centuary Dictionary, the expression ``deprive has been defined in the following words:- ``Deprive, v.t. to take away from one his own: to take from : to dispossess: to degrade (a chergy-man) from office: to bereave-n. Deprivation, act of depriving: state of being deprived: degradation from office: loss: bereavement: suffering from hardship adj..... A bare reading of the definition of expressions ``deprive and ``deprivation shows that in order a person may be said to have been deprived of something, it must be shown that some other person has taken away from that person something of which he/she alleges to have been deprived of. The definition clearly suggests that before any act or omission may amount to deprivation, it must be shown that the dominant object of the person doing the act was to deprive another person of something (including a right) or that the dominant consequence of the act complained of is the deprivation of something. If the act complained of is neither intended/calculated to deprive any person of his/her life or personal liberty nor the dominant consequence of the act is to deprive the right to life or personal liberty, it would be difficult to say that any deprivation of right to life or personal liberty was intended, attempted or accomplished. (14). The expression ``deprivation as used in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, does not refer to any particular act or omission; it refers either to the intention behind the act or the dominant result of the act. Therefore, we hold that in order the action complained of may amount to deprivation of life and personal liberty, it must be shown that such act was calculated to deprive the right to life and personal liberty or the dominant result of such act is the actual deprivation of such persons right to life and personal liberty. (15). Every person male or female, is a part and parcel of our human society which is governed by the rule of law. The bonds amongst the members of the society, may be proximate or remote but there is an all prevailing bond of fraternity and consequential integrity referred in the preamble to the Constitution. Because of the bonds of fraternity, no one is completely secluded from the rest of the society. The bonds amongst the members of the society, may be proximate or remote but there is an all prevailing bond of fraternity and consequential integrity referred in the preamble to the Constitution. Because of the bonds of fraternity, no one is completely secluded from the rest of the society. On the other hand, the unseen bonds of fraternity, make every one, concerned about the welfare of other members of our society. This concern for the welfare of others, is manifested by several provisions of law. The Indian Penal Code confers right to defend the person as well as the property and this right is available to every person not only when his own life or property is in danger, but also, when the life or property of another person is in danger. There are several offences in respect of which a legal duty has been imposed on the persons who have information about the commission of offences, to give information to the police or the Magistrate, even though such offence is neither committed against their person or property nor is likely to affect them or their property in any manner. The concern for the welfare of the other persons, is manifested by number of activities in which the people willingly to take part not only to save their lives or properties but to save lives and properties of others. In other words, the life and personal liberty of every person is not only the concern of that person, it is also the concern of every other person in the society. This explains why people voluntarily and without there being any requ-est or compulsion, try to protect life and personal liberty of other persons when they apprehend any danger to them. The very object of such action is to protect the right of life and personal liberty rather than deprive any person of his/her right to life or personal liberty and it would not be proper to regard such actions as are intended to protect the right to life and personal liberty as violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. (16). It is true that every person enjoys a fundamental right to life and personal liberty by virtue of Article 21 of the Constitution of India but the right conferred by this Article is not absolute. This right may be curtailed in accordance with law. (16). It is true that every person enjoys a fundamental right to life and personal liberty by virtue of Article 21 of the Constitution of India but the right conferred by this Article is not absolute. This right may be curtailed in accordance with law. A person who enjoys the right under Article 21 of the Constitution, may himself or herself, intentionally or unintentionally indulge in acts or omissions which are likely to deprive him/her of life and personal liberty. In such cases, the rest of the society cannot be a passive spectator. Some action is necessary on the part of the society to prevent the deprivation of life or personal liberty in such cases. A person, who, deliberately wants to end his life by committing suicide, cannot be allowed to claim that other persons should not prevent him from committing suicide. The right to defend life and personal liberty is not only available to him, it is also available to the rest of the society. Therefore, if any person prevents a man from committing suicide, it cannot be said that there is any violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In the case of unintentional acts having a potential to cause deprivation of life or personal liberty, a person whose life and personal liberty is in perit may not be aware of the danger lying ahead and in such cases if any person informs him about the harm which is likely to be caused, it can hardly be said that there is any violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Similarly, if a person is not in fit state of mind or body and is incapacitated from taking a proper decision either because of tender age or because of any mental or physical ailment or because of any extraneous reason like terror, coercion, if any person tries to save such persons life or personal liberty by preventing such person from committing the act which has the potential of depriving the right of life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, it cannot be said that there is any violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. A person who has fallen on the ground and has become unconscious, needs assistance from his fellow beings for the protection of his life or personal liberty because he himself cannot take any decision about himself. A person who has fallen on the ground and has become unconscious, needs assistance from his fellow beings for the protection of his life or personal liberty because he himself cannot take any decision about himself. If any act is done which is intended to protect the life or personal liberty of such man, it can hardly be said that any violation of Article 21 of the Constitution has taken place. If a person of tender years, is attempted to be cheated by making false representations or by making false promises and there is danger to the life and personal liberty of such person, any action which is calculated as well as conducive to the protection of the life and personal liberty, cannot be branded as violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. These examples show that the deprivation of life or personal liberty may be caused in a variety of ways and a person may himself act in a manner which is detrimental to his/her life or personal liberty and in such cases any act which is not calculated to deprive such person of his right to life or personal liberty, can hardly be said to be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. (17). Having considered the meaning of the expression ``deprived as used in Article 21 of the Constitution, we proceed to consider whether in the instant case the order dated 12.06.1999 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Sadulsahar can be said to be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. The impugned or-der has been passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, against whom there is no allegation whatsoever casting reflection on his intention behind the passing of the impugned order. After carefully perusing the impugned order dated 12.06.1999 and keeping in view the facts of the case, as revealed by the petition and the impugned order, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated 12.06.1999 is neither calculated to deprive Kum. Kamla of her right to life or personal liberty nor its dominant result is to deprive her of her right to life or personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. The impugned order, appears to have been passed with a view to ensure the welfare of Kum. Kamla, who is prima facie a minor and was found living in the house of the accused Jaswant Singh. The impugned order, appears to have been passed with a view to ensure the welfare of Kum. Kamla, who is prima facie a minor and was found living in the house of the accused Jaswant Singh. In view of this con-clusion there is no violation of the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of Kum. Kamla. (18). We now propose to deal with second ground for rejecting the present petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Judicial Magistrate, Sadulsahar had no legal right to himself detain or direct the detention of Kum. Kamla in Nari Niketan, Jaipur, against her will. We have already dealt with the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the age of Kum. Kamla and, in our opinion, there is sufficient prima facie evidence in the form of medical report that Kum. Kamla is 15 to 16 years old and is a minor unmarried Hindu female. In view of this finding, the question which arises for decision is whether the Judicial Magistrate had any legal power to detain or direct the detention of Kum. Kamla in the Nari Niketan, Jaipur with a view to ensure her welfare and promote the ends of justice. Since Kum. Kamla is prima facie an unmarried minor Hindu female, we deem it fit to restrict our discussion to the case of minor children only. (19). The distinction between a child and a grown-up person is real and substantial inasmuch as, a child is considered to be in need of protection and certain amenities for his her welfare whereas a fully grown-up person, is expected to lookafter his/her interest carefully by applying due diligence, care and caution. As early as in 1895, the Legislature enacted Indian Majority Act, 1895 which makes a distinction between persons who are minors and those who are regarded as major or grown-up persons. When the Indian Penal Code was enacted, the Legislature did not omit to take into consideration that in fact the children were of immature minds and understanding and, therefore, they could not be visited with legal sanction in the same manner in which an adult may be visited. Consequently, all children below the age of 7 years, were completely saved from the legal punishment. Consequently, all children below the age of 7 years, were completely saved from the legal punishment. Persons between the age range 7 to 12 years, were made liable for punishment only if it is shown that they have sufficiently matured understanding about the nature of their act. Thus when Indian Penal Code was enacted, persons below the age of 12 years were considered entitled to protection against the punishment prescribed by law. The age of minority was, however, increased when the Indian Majority Act, 1895 was enacted. Initially, the age of minority for the purpose of Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code was 12 years but later on it has been raised to 16 years as it was realised that females below the age of 16 years are not mature enough to decide the questions affecting their own life and activities relating to sex. When Hindu Marriage Act was enacted, the Legislature deemed it fit to prohibit marriage of Hindu males and females unless they have attained the prescribed age. The minimum age for marriage of Hindu female is 18 years under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. These facts clearly indicate that there is a growing awareness of the fact of immaturity of the human children and also of the necessity of providing them statutory protections. It would be useful to refer, two important Acts, namely, Indian Guardianship Act nd Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act which have been enacted with a view to ensure the welfare of the minor males and females by placing them under the guardianship of their natural relatives and, if ne-cessary, under the guardianship of a person appointed by the court. (20). One of the most important features of the enactments dealing with the welfare of the minors is that the minors are presumed to be wanting in sufficient information, experience, foresights and maturity necessary for taking important decisions about themselves and affairs concerning them. The minors are required to be placed under the guardianship or protective custody of some person or institution capable of looking after them properly so that such children may not suffer and may develop into responsible citizens by obtaining proper education and schooling and without being subjected to any exploitation or victimization. In the case of minors, it is their welfare which is a paramount importance, their right to take decisions about themselves, becomes secondary. In the case of minors, it is their welfare which is a paramount importance, their right to take decisions about themselves, becomes secondary. The fundamental right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, in the case of minor males and females, means the right to obtain such protection, amenities, care, education in schools as is necessary for their welfare and development, without being exploited or victimized. (21). The concern for the welfare of human children has attracted the attention of the Legislature, the executive, the judiciary, private citizens and the non-Government organisations at several levels, national and international, so as to draw the attention of the concerned authorities for improving the conditions in which the minors have to live and act. (22). In Gaurav Jain vs. Union of India (2), the Honble Supreme Court, considered the question of welfare of children in detail. At page 30 of the judgment, their Lordships observed:- ``Equally, the right of the child is the concern of the society so that fallen women surpass trafficking of their person from exploitation; contribute to bring up their children; live a life with dignity; and not to continue in the fould social environment. Equally, the children have the right to equality of opportunity, dignity and care, protection and rehabilitation by the society with both hands open to bring them into the mainstream of social life without pre-stigma affixed on them for no fault of her/his. The convention on the Right of the Child, the Fundamental Rights in Part III of the Constitution, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Directive Principles of State Policy are equ-ally made available and made meaningful instruments and means to ameliorate their condition-social, educational, economic and culture, and to bring them into the social stream by giving them the same opportunities as had by other children. Thus, this case calls for a careful and meaningful consideration with diverse perspectives, to decide the problems in the light of constitutional and human rights and directions given to the executive to effectuate them on administrative side effectively so that those rights become real and meaningful to them. At page 32 of the judgment, their Lordship pointed out that the child by reason of his or her physical or mental immaturity needs safeguards and care. At page 32 of the judgment, their Lordship pointed out that the child by reason of his or her physical or mental immaturity needs safeguards and care. Their Lordships observed: ``The preamble to the Declaration of the Rights of the Child adopted by the UNO on 20.11.1959, provides that the child by reason of his or her physical or mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care including appropriate legal protection before as well as after birth. Recalling the provisions of the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to Protection and Welfare of the Children with Special Reference to Foster or Placement and Adoption Nationally or Internationally; the General Assembly Resolution 41/85 of 3.12.1986; the United Nations adopted Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules) dated 29.11.1985. India is a signatory to the Declaration and has ratified the same and effectively participated in bringing the Declaration in force. Article 3(1) postulates that in all actions concerning children, whether unde-ta-ken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interest of the child shall be the primary consideration. Article 3(2) enjoins to ensure to the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her pa-rents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally and all the appropriate measures in that behalf shall be taken by the State. Article 3(3) postulates that the State shall ensure the availability of institutional services and facilities responsible for the care or protection of children, shall conform to the standards established by competent authorities, particularly in the area of safety, health in the number and suitability of their self as well as competent supervision. Article 4 obligates by appropriate legislative, administrative or other measures, implementation of the right recognised in the Convention. The State has undertaken to implement economic, social and cultural rights, such mesures to the maximum extent of the available resources and where needed within the framework of international cooperation. Article 4 obligates by appropriate legislative, administrative or other measures, implementation of the right recognised in the Convention. The State has undertaken to implement economic, social and cultural rights, such mesures to the maximum extent of the available resources and where needed within the framework of international cooperation. Article 6 postulates that State parties recognise that every child has the inherent right to life which is already granted by Article 21 of the Constitution of India which has been interpreted expansively by this Court to make the right to life meaningful, socially, culturally, economically, even to the deprived segments of the society with dignity of person and in pursuit of happiness. Article 6(2) enjoins to ensure development of the child and Article 7(2) postulates that the State shall ensure implementation of these rights in accordance with law and their obligations. Article 9(3) envisages that the State shall respect the right of the child who is separated from her parents to maintain personal relations and contact with her parents on regular basis. Article 14(2) provides that the State shall respect the rights and duties of the parents, and when applicable, legal guardians, to provides direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child. Article 17(2)(e) enjoins the State to encourage the development of appropriate guidelines for the protection of the child from information and material injurious to his or her well-being bearing in mind the provisions of Article 13 and 18. Article 18(1) provides that the State shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents and State have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of the child should be their basic concern. Sub-para (2) postulates that for promoting the rights set forth in this Convention, parents, legal guardians or the State in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities shall ensure the development of institutions, facilities and services for the care for children. The best interests of the child should be their basic concern. Sub-para (2) postulates that for promoting the rights set forth in this Convention, parents, legal guardians or the State in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities shall ensure the development of institutions, facilities and services for the care for children. Article 19(1) provides that the State Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation including sexual abuse, while in the care of parents, legal guardians or any other person who takes care of the child. Equality, sub-para (2) of Article 19 postulates that protective measure, as may be appropriate, should include effective procedure for the establishment of social programmes to provide necessary support for the child and for those who have the care of the child as well as for other forms of prevention etc. Article 20 which is material for the purpose postulates as under: ``1. A child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment, or in whose own best interest cannot be allowed to remain in that environment, shall be entitled to special protection and assistance provided by the State. 2. State Parties shall in accordance with their national laws ensure alternative care for such a child. 3. Such care could include, inter alia, foster placement, Kafala or Islamic law, adoption, or if necessary placement in suitable institutions for the care of children. When considering solutions, due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in a childs unpringing and to the childs ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background. 3. Such care could include, inter alia, foster placement, Kafala or Islamic law, adoption, or if necessary placement in suitable institutions for the care of children. When considering solutions, due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in a childs unpringing and to the childs ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background. Article 28 recognizes the right of the child to education and with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, the State shall in particular: (a) make primary education compulsory and available free to all; (b) encourage the development of different forms of secondary education, including general and vocational education, make them available and accessible to every child and take appropriate measures such as the introduction of free education and offering financial assistance in case of need; (c) make higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every appropriate means; (d) make educational and vocational information and guidance available and accessible to all children; and (e) take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and the reduction of drop-out rates. Article 29 envisages the State Parties to agree that the education of the child shall be directed to: (a) the development of the childs personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential; (b) the development of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and for the principles enshrined in the Chapter of the United Nations; (c) the development of respect for the childs parents, his or her own cultural identity, languages and values, for the national values of the country in which the child is living, the country from which he or she may originate, and for civilizations different from his or her own; (d) the preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all people, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin; and (e) the development of respect for the natural environment. Article 32 recognises the right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the childs education or to be harmful to the childs health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development. Article 34, 36 and 37(a) are equally relevant and read as under: ``34. Article 34, 36 and 37(a) are equally relevant and read as under: ``34. State Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. For these purposes, State Parties shall in particular take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent: (a) the inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity; (b) the exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices; (c) the exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials, 36. State Parties shall protect the child against all other forms of exploitation prejudicial to any aspects of the childs welfare. 37. State Parties shall ensure that: (a) No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by persons below 18 years of age. (23). In Gaurav Jains (supra), at page 36, the Honble Supreme Court further observed:- ``Human Rights are derived from the dignity and worth inherent in the human person. Human rights and fundamental freedoms have been reiterated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and have mutual reinforcement. The human rights for women, including girl child are, therefore, inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights. The full development of personality and fundamental freedoms and equal partici-pation by women in political, social, economic and cultural life are concomitants for national development, social and family stability and growthcultural, social and economic. (24). In view of the observations of the Honble Supreme Court, it can be said without any hesitation that protection of the children against abuse and exploitation and taking of proper steps for the proper development, is a constitutional, social and moral obligation of the State as well as of the entire society. Unless the children are protected from abuse and exploitation and deprivation adversely affecting their proper growth and development and they are placed in an environment which is congenial to the welfare and proper development, there would be no compliance of the mandatory provisions of the Constitution conferring the fundamental rights on the children. (25). The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 has been enacted by the Legislature with a view to make provisions for providing protection to juveniles delinquent as well as neglected juveniles. (25). The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 has been enacted by the Legislature with a view to make provisions for providing protection to juveniles delinquent as well as neglected juveniles. In Gaurav Jains case (supra), at page 36, the Honble Sup-reme Court observed:- ``The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (For short ``the JJ Act) was enacted to provide for the care, protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation of neglected or delinquent juveniles and for the adjudication of such matters relating to disposition of delinquent juveniles. The pre-existing law was found inadequate to tie over social knowledge, instrument, delinquency or improvement of the child. The Act sought to achieve a uniform legal framework for juvenile justice in the country as a whole so as to ensure that no child, in any circumstances, is lodged in jail and police lock-up. This is being ensured by establishing Juvenile Welfare Boards and Juvenile Courts to deal adequately with the subject. The object of the Act, therefore, is to provide specialised approach towards the delinquent or neglected juvenile to prevent recurrence of juvenile delinquency in its full range keeping in view the developmental needs of the child found in the situation of social maladjustment. That aim is secured by establishing observation homes, juvenile houses, juvenile homes for neglected juveniles and special homes for delinquent or neglected juveniles. The JJ Act is consistent with the rights of the child to development; the established norms and standards for the administration of juve-nile justice and special mode of investigation, prosecution, adjustment and disposition of the juvenile. The JJ Act provides for care, treatment and rehabilitation by developing appropriate linkage and cooperation between formal system of juvenile justice and voluntary agencies engaged in the welfare of the neglected or socially maladjusted children; it specifically defines the areas of the responsibilities etc. Section 2(a) defines ``begging. Section 2(b) defines ``Board to mean a Juvenile Welfare Board constituted under Section 4. The terms ``brothel, ``prostitute, ``prostitution and ``public place have been adopted as defined in ITP Act. ``Competent authority or ``Juvenile Court as the case may be, is defined under Section 2(d). Section 2(a) defines ``begging. Section 2(b) defines ``Board to mean a Juvenile Welfare Board constituted under Section 4. The terms ``brothel, ``prostitute, ``prostitution and ``public place have been adopted as defined in ITP Act. ``Competent authority or ``Juvenile Court as the case may be, is defined under Section 2(d). Section 2(f) defines ``fit person or ``fit institution to mean any person or institution (not being a police station or jail) found fit by the competent authority to receive and take care of a juvenile entrusted to his or its care and protection on the terms and conditions specified by the competent authority. ``Guardian; in relation to a juvenile has been defined under Section 2(g). ``Juvenile has been defined under Section 2(h) to mean a boy who has not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who has not attained the age of eighteen years. ``Juvenile Court and ``Juvenile Home have been defined in Section 2(i) and 2(j) respectively. (26). Regarding the definition of ``Neglected Juvenile the Honble Apex Court observed in Gaurav Jains case (supra):- ``Neglected Juvenile which is more relevant for the purpose of this case, has been defined in Section 2(1) to mean a juvenile who (i) is found begging; or (ii) is found without having any home or settled place of abode and without any ostensible means of subsistence and is destitute; (iii) has a parent or guardian who is unfit or incapacitated to exercise control over the juvenile; or (iv) lives in a brothel or with a prostitute or frequently goes to any place used for the purpose of prostitution, or is found to associate with any prostitute or any other person who leads an immoral, drunken or depraved life; (v) who is being or is likely to be abused or expoited for immoral or illegal purposes or unconscionable gain. (27). Regarding the meaning of expression ``abuse, in Gaurav Jains case (supra), the Honble Supreme Court observed:- ``The word ``abuse has a very wide meaning everything which is contrary to good order established by usage amounts to abuse. Physical or mental maltreatment also is an abuse. An injury to genital organs in an attempt of sexual intercourse also amounts to sexual abuse. Any injury to private parts of a girl constitutes abuse under the JJ Act. (28). Physical or mental maltreatment also is an abuse. An injury to genital organs in an attempt of sexual intercourse also amounts to sexual abuse. Any injury to private parts of a girl constitutes abuse under the JJ Act. (28). In Gaurav Jains case (supra), the Honble Supreme Court also considered the provisions of Section 13 of the Juvenile Justice Act which empower the police officer or any other person or organisation authorised by the State Government in this behalf to deal with the neglected juvenile. The Honble Supreme Court observed:- `` Under Section 13 in Chapter III, if any police officer or any other person or organisation authorised by the State Government in this behalf, by general or special order, is of opinion that a person is apparently a neglected juvenile, such police officer or other person or organisation may take charge of that person for bringing him before a Board for rehabilitation, care and protection of the child. Section 14 deals with special procedure to be followed when a neglected juvenile has parents. Section 15 regulates inquiry regarding the neglected juvenile, the details of which are not material. (29). Regarding the children, the Honble Supreme Court observed, at page 44:- ``Children of the world are innocent, vulnerable and dependent. They are all curious, active and full of hope. Their life should be full of joy and peace, playing, learning and growing. Their future should be shaped in harmony and cooperation. There childhood should mature, as they broaden their perspectives and gain new experience. Abandoning children, excluding good foundation of life for them, is a crime against humanity. The children cannot wait till tomorrow; they grow everyday; along with them grows their sense of awareness about the surroundings. Tomorrow is no answer; the goal of their present care, protection and rehabilitation is the need of the hour. We have already dealt with the rights assured to them by the Constitution, the Directive Principles and the Convention on the Right of the Child. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child made on 20.11.1959, has formulated and given 10 principles in that behalf. (30). The principle 6 postulates that the child, for the full and harmonious de-velopment of his personality, needs love and understanding. A child of tender years shall not, save in exceptional circumstances, be separated from his/her mother. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child made on 20.11.1959, has formulated and given 10 principles in that behalf. (30). The principle 6 postulates that the child, for the full and harmonious de-velopment of his personality, needs love and understanding. A child of tender years shall not, save in exceptional circumstances, be separated from his/her mother. Society and the public authorities shall have the duty to extend particular care to children without a family and to those without adequate means of support. Principle 9 is very important. Regarding the Principle 9, the Honble Supreme Court at page 45 observed:- ``Principle 9 is most important in this behalf which provides that the child shall be protected against all forms of neglect, cruelty and exploitation. He shall not be the subject of traffic, in any form. The child shall not be admitted to employment before an appropriate minimum age; he shall in no case be caused or permitted to engage in any occupation or employment which would prejudice his health or education, or interfere with his physical, mental or moral development. (31). Regarding the neglected child, the Honble Supreme Court further obser-ved at page 47 of the judgment:- ``In this behalf, it is necessary to take aid of the definition of ``neglected child defined in the JJ Act. It is already seen and is reiterated for continuity that ``neglected juvenile means one found begging; or found without having any home or settled place of abode and without any ostensible means of subsistence and is destitute; or has a parent who is unfit or incapacitated to exercise control over the juvenile; or lives in a brothel or with a prostitute or frequently goes to any place used for the purpose of prostitution or is found to associate with any prostitute or any other person who leads an immoral, drunken or depraved life; or who is being or is likely to be abused or exploited for immoral or illegal purposes or unconscionable gain. The JJ Act makes distinction between ``delinquent juvenile and ``neglected juvenile attributing to a delinquent juvenile an act or omission punishable by law to identify him as a delinquent juvenile. The JJ Act makes distinction between ``delinquent juvenile and ``neglected juvenile attributing to a delinquent juvenile an act or omission punishable by law to identify him as a delinquent juvenile. A neglected juvenile is one who is of the age of 16 years in the case of a boy and 18 years in the case of a girl, or whose parents are unfit because of living in prostitution, or the child born to a prostitute, or one who frequents or associates with prostitution becomes a neglected juvenile. (32). After considering the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act, the Honble Sup-reme Court expressed conclusion in the following words: ``Therefore, all the types of juveniles defined within the ambit of neglected juvenile, though attached with certain acts or omission, are puhishable under law, they still remain to be neglected juveniles and should be dealt with by the Welfare Board and be brought within the protective umbrella of the juvenile home established under Sec. 9." (33). The Honble Supreme Court further pointed out that the definition of the ``neglected juvenile as given in Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 should be interpreted liberally. The Honble Supreme Court observed at page 48:- ``The definition of ``neglected juvenile, therefore, should be interpreted broadly which is an important function for the purpose of identifying the groups of children who need care and attention and protection for rehabilitation. Their withdrawal from the protective umbrella of the JJ Act foils the goals set out; besides all measures to bring the neglected juvenile into the mainstream of the social status end up in failure and frustration. (34). We have reproduced in extensio the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court regarding the necessity of protecting children from abuse and exploitation and providing them necessary amenities, due care and environment conducive to their development and well being as well as the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act 1986 and the Constitution of India as well as the declaration of rights of children, to show that in the case of children, the object of ensuring their welfare and proper development, is of paramount importance and, therefore, any act which is intended for the benefit of the child, cannot be condemned as violative of the right of the child. In other words, in case of children, the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution means the rights against the abuse, exploitation, deprivation and unlawful exploitation of the children who are of immature understanding and are unable to lookafter their own interest. If this aspect is ignored and Article 21 of the Constitution is interpreted in a narrow sense as if the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution is merely to set the child free to do whatever the child likes or may be persuaded to do it, would in place of providing any protection to life and personal liberty of the child, amount to exposing the child to the hazards of deprivation, abuse, exploitation and denial of the fundamental right to live a meaningful life. (35). The learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that Kum. Kamla, is not a neglected juvenile and, therefore, the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act have no application to her. We do not find any merit in this submission. (36). Section 2(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 the ``neglected juvenile in the following words: ``neglected juvenile means a juvenile who- (i) is found begging; or (ii) is found without having any home or settled place of abode and without any ostensible means of subsistence and is destitute; (iii) has a parent or guardian who is unfit or incapacitated to exercise control over the juvenile; or (iv) lives in a brothel or with a prostitute or frequently goes to any place used for the purpose of prostitution, or is found to associate with any prostitute or any other person who leads an immoral, drunken or depraved life; (v) who is being or is likely to be abused or exploited for immoral or illegal purposes or unconscionable gain. (37). (37). A bare perusal of ``neglected juvenile shows that for the purpose of defining ``neglected juvenile, the Legislature has taken into consideration six important features, namely, (1) absence of ostensible means of subsistence and consequently, being a destitute (Clause ii); (2) begging as a means of living (Clause (i); (3) absence of any suitable home or settled place of abode for the juvenile (clause ii); (4) absence of any parent or guardian capable of exercising control over the juvenile; (5) association with any person or persons who lead immoral, drunken or depraved life including the children who -(a) live in a brothel; (b) live with a prostitute; (c) frequently go to a placed used for the purpose of prostitution; (d) found to associate with a prostitute; (e) found to associate with any other person who leads an immoral, drunken or depraved life and (6) a juvenile who is being or is likely to be abused or exploited for immoral or illegal purposes or unconscionable gain (clause v). (38). In the instant case, Kum. Kamla who appears to be a minor unmarried Hindu lady, is prima facie neglected juvenile on account of the following reasons: (1) after abandoning the house of her parents, she has no home or settled place of abode. The house of Jaswant Singh cannot be said to be a home of Kum. Kamla nor the house of Jaswant Singh where she was found to be living, can be regarded as a settled place of abode for Kum. Kamla. (2) After abandoning the house of her parents, Kum. Kamla has no ostensible means of subsistence and is a destitute. Whatever temporary means of living has been provided to her by Jaswant Singh, can neither be regarded as obstensible means of subsistence nor it can be regarded as sufficient for her subsistence. A woman who is provided, food and shelter, by any other persons other than the husband, in return for the sexual favour which she grants to the provider can hardly be said to be possessed of obstensible means of subsistence and she continues to be a destitute. (3) After abandoning the house of her parent and refusing to go back to her parents house, Kum. Kamla, by her own conduct, incapacita-ted her parents from exercising control over her actions. She is, therefore, a neglected juvenile within the meaning of sub-clause (iii). (4) Kum. (3) After abandoning the house of her parent and refusing to go back to her parents house, Kum. Kamla, by her own conduct, incapacita-ted her parents from exercising control over her actions. She is, therefore, a neglected juvenile within the meaning of sub-clause (iii). (4) Kum. Kamla was recovered from the house of Jaswant Singh. Jaswant Singh is neither her relative nor her husband or legal guardian. He claims to be engaged to Kum. Kamla and, in the circumstances of the case, it is proper to presume that he is living a depraved and immoral life by associating with Kum. Kamla otherwise than in accordance with the norms laid down by the Indian society. (5) After abandoning the house of her parents, she started living with the house of Jaswant Singh who claims to be her `mangetar and, in the circumstances of the case, it is proper to presume that she was being abused and exploited for immoral purposes by Jaswant Singh within the meaning of sub-clause (v) of Section 2(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act. (39). During the arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that since Jaswant Singh is the `mangetar of Kum. Kamla, the association between Kum. Kamla and Jaswant Singh cannot be regarded as immoral or resulting in any kind of use of abuse or exploitation of Kum. Kamla. We are not impressed by this argument. Before the insertion of Article 51A of the Constitution, it could be argued that unless there is a law enacted by the legislature, nothing could be regarded as depraved or immoral even if it was against the norms and tradition of the Indian society. The logic was that under Article 21 of the Constitution, every person had a right to do anything which such person wanted to do, unless the liberty do such act was curtailed or taken away in accordance with the procedure established by law. As a result, sex relation between the parties who were not married to each other by wedlock, was regarded by some persons as permissible because no law in force prohibited the same if the parties were not minors, but, after the insertion of Article 51A which prescribes fundamental duties of every citizen of India, the position has changed. As a result, sex relation between the parties who were not married to each other by wedlock, was regarded by some persons as permissible because no law in force prohibited the same if the parties were not minors, but, after the insertion of Article 51A which prescribes fundamental duties of every citizen of India, the position has changed. The fundamental prescribed by Article 51A in part IV of the Constitution must be read with the fundamental rights enshrined in part III of the Constitution as well as with the directive principles contained in part IV. In fact the fundamental rights, directive principles and the fundamental duties must be read together to reach correct conclusions about the activities which are permissible and which are impermissible for the citizens as well as the State. (40). Article 51A of the Constitution of India reads: 51A. It shall be the duty of every citizen of India- (a) to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideal and institutions, the National Flag and the National Anthem; (b) to cherish and follow the noble ideals which inspired our national struggle for freedom; (c) to uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India; (d) to defend the country and render national service when called upon to do so; (e) to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious; linguistic and regional or sectional diversities; to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women; (f) to value and preserve the rich heritage of our composite culture; (g) to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for living creatures; (h) to develop the scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform; (i) to safeguard public property and to abjure violence; (j) to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement. (41). Clause (f) of Article 51A is relevant for the purpose of present case. Article 51A prescribes several fundamental duties of every citizen of India and one of them is to value and preserve the rich heritage of our composite culture (clause(f)). (41). Clause (f) of Article 51A is relevant for the purpose of present case. Article 51A prescribes several fundamental duties of every citizen of India and one of them is to value and preserve the rich heritage of our composite culture (clause(f)). The expression ``heritage in clause (f) of Article 51A has not been defined in the Constitution or the General Clauses Act and, therefore, ordinary grammatical meaning has to be given to this expression. Chamberss Twentieth Century Diction-ary defines the ``heritage in the following words: ``Heritage, n. that which is inherited: inherited lot, condition of ones birth:. (42). The expression ``heritage means that which has been inherited. It is well known that the institution of marriage is one of those institutions which Indians have inherited from their ancestors. The institution of marriage is primarily intended to grant approval for sexual intercourse between a male and a female who are adults, subject of course to the condition that in accordance with the law in force, they are eligible for the proposed marriage and do not suffer from any such dis-qualification which dis-entitles them to marry each other. A marriage is, there-fore, regarded as social approval for sexual activities between the parties who are married to each other. Not only this, the children who are born out of such sexual relationship are regarded as their own children in respect of which they have a legal right to act as their guardians and in respect of whom they have the legal duty to provide shelter, food, protection and all other necessary amenities and, in turn, re-ward in the form of a social relation between such parents and the children. It may be further pointed out, that according to the definition given under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, sexual intercourse with ones own wife who is not below 12 years of age does not amount to rape even if it is against her will or without her consent. Sexual relationship between the parties who are not married to each other is regarded as immoral and impermissible according to the heritage of Indian people as referred in clause (f) of Article 51A of the Constitution. Consequently, the sexual activity between the parties who are not married to each other must be re-garded as immoral, impermissible, depraved and against the heritage referred in Article 51A of the Constitution of India. (43). Consequently, the sexual activity between the parties who are not married to each other must be re-garded as immoral, impermissible, depraved and against the heritage referred in Article 51A of the Constitution of India. (43). The provisions of Article 51A of the Constitution prescribe fundamental duties which are binding on every citizen of India irrespective of age, religion, place of residence, profession, occupation, status or economic position. In our opinion, the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution must be read with Article 51A of the Constitution which prescribes the fundamental duties. In other words the right to life and personal liberty protected by Article 21 of the Constitution, cannot be regarded as absolute and is subject to the restriction imposed by Article 51A of the Constitution. We therefore, have no hesitation in co-ming to the conclusion that the institution of marriage is one of the most important institutions constituting the heritage of the Indian people within the meaning of Article 51A (f) and it is the fundamental duty of every citizen to honour this institution. One of the necessary consequences of the institution of marriage is that sex relations between the parties not legally married to each other is regarded as base and immoral. In view of this conclusion, the submission that since Jaswant Singh is the `mangetar of Kum. Kamla therefore, the act of establishing sexual relations by him with Kum. Kamla, does not amount to doing a immoral act, is not correct. So long Article 51-A forms part of the Indian Constitution, nothing which is in violation of the fundamental duties prescribed by this Article can be regarded as a socially approved act. It is for the Parliament to make laws to enforce the fundamental duties by providing punishment to those who violate them but it does not mean that if the Legislature does not make law for the enforcement of the fundamental duties the fundamental duties shall not be binding. (44). It is for the Parliament to make laws to enforce the fundamental duties by providing punishment to those who violate them but it does not mean that if the Legislature does not make law for the enforcement of the fundamental duties the fundamental duties shall not be binding. (44). Apart from the provisions contained in Article 51A of the Constitution, there is sufficient evidence in the form of definition of neglected juvenile given in Section 2(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 to indicate that any sexual activity, by any person, involving the juvenile, brings the juvenile within the purview of the definition of neglected juvenile if such activity is likely to produce the consequences indicated in the definition clause. The Honble Supreme Court considered the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and held that the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 deserve to be interpreted liberally. It means that the definition clauses including Section 2(1), deserve to be interpreted liberally so as to provide protection to the maximum number of juveniles who are undergoing deprivation, destitution, abuse and exploitation by undesirable persons, in any manner at any place. The Honble Supreme Court has held that the word ``abuse has a very wide meaning-everything which is contrary to good order established by usages amounts to abuse. Physical or mental maltreatment also is an abuse. An injury to genital organs in an attempt to sexual intercourse also amounts to sexual abuse. In view of this, meaning of the word ``abuse given by the Honble the Supreme Court, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that even an attempt to commit sexual intercourse with a minor, amounts to abuse her within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. We have already dealt with the meaning of the word ``immoral by referring to the provisions contained in Article 51A of the Constitution and we hold that sexual relations between the parties who are not legally married to each other does amount to a base and immoral act and no citizen of India has any right to regard such act as permissible and moral. (45). The provisions of Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and the necessity of providing protection to neglected juvenile was considered by this Court in Manju (Smt.) vs. State of Rajasthan & anr. (3). (45). The provisions of Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and the necessity of providing protection to neglected juvenile was considered by this Court in Manju (Smt.) vs. State of Rajasthan & anr. (3). In that case, Manju who was a minor, but a married lady, developed illicit relationship with Amba Lal who was already married. Smt. Manju wanted to live with Amba Lal and the question before this Court was whether Smt. Manju could be regarded as a neglected juvenile. In para 38 of the order, this Court observed: ``The home of Amba Lal cannot be called the home of the petitioner Smt. Manju, nor the income or the means of income or property which are available to Amba Lal can be called the means of subsistence available to Smt. Manju. She does not want to live with her father and brother. She does not want to live with her legal husband Jagdish. She does not appear to possess any property of her own, nor she appears to have any independent income to maintain herself. She has developed illicit intimacy with Amba Lal as is evident by the affidavit dated 27.10.1996. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that Smt. Manju falls within the definition of ``neglected juvenile as defi-ned in Clause (1) of Sec. 2 of the Juvenile Justice Act. (46). At the cost of repetition, it may be reiterated that, in view of the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in Gaurav Jains case (supra), the provisions contained in Section 2(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, defining a ``neglected juvenile should be interpreted in such a manner so as to provide pro-tection to the maximum number of neglected children covered by the definition clauses. In the instant case, we are satisfied that Kum. Kamla is a neglected juvenile and we are further satisfied that she had been abused and exploited by allurement and seduction calculated to make her leave the house as well as protection of the parents and to live with Jaswant Singh from whose house she had been recovered. (47). We now proceed to consider in brief the powers of the Judicial Magistrate. Section 8 of the Juvenile Justice Act prescribes the procedure to be followed by a Magistrate not empowered under the Act. The section reads: ``8. (47). We now proceed to consider in brief the powers of the Judicial Magistrate. Section 8 of the Juvenile Justice Act prescribes the procedure to be followed by a Magistrate not empowered under the Act. The section reads: ``8. Procedure to be followed by a Magistrate not empowered under the Act.-(1) When any Magistrate not empowered to exercise the po-wers of a Board of a Juvenile Court under this Act is of opinion that a person brought before him under any of the provisions of this Act (otherwise than for the purpose of giving evidence) is a juvenile, he shall record such opinion and forward the juvenile and the record of the proceeding to the competent authority having jurisdiction over the proceeding. (2) The competent authority to which the proceeding is forwarded under sub-Section (1) shall hold the enquiry as if the juvenile had originally been brought before it. (48). A bare reading of Section 8 shows that the Magistrate before whom juve-nile delinquent or neglected juvenile is produced is not totally powerless in the matter of dealing with such juveniles. Section 8 provides that such Magistrate shall record his opinion and forward the juvenile and the record of the proceeding to the competent authority having jurisdiction over the proceeding. Word ``competent authority as defined in Section 2(d) means, in relation to neglected juveniles, a Board and, in relation to delinquent juveniles, a Juvenile Court and where no such Board or Juvenile Court has been constituted, includes any Court empowered under sub-Section (2) of Section 7 to exercise the powers conferred on a Board or Juvenile Court. The definition clause clearly contemplates that where no Board or Juvenile Court has been created under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, the powers of the Board or the Juvenile Court may be exercised by the officer on whom such powers have been conferred. The Judicial Magistrate may, exercise the power of the Board or the Juvenile Court, if such powers have been conferred on him under the Act as envisaged by Section 2(d) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. (49). Section 13 of the Juvenile Justice Act prescribes the procedure regarding production of neglected juveniles before the Boards. The Section reads: ``13. The Judicial Magistrate may, exercise the power of the Board or the Juvenile Court, if such powers have been conferred on him under the Act as envisaged by Section 2(d) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. (49). Section 13 of the Juvenile Justice Act prescribes the procedure regarding production of neglected juveniles before the Boards. The Section reads: ``13. Production of neglected juveniles before Boards.-(1) If any police officer or any other person or organisation authorised by the State Government in this behalf, by general or special order, is of the opi-nion that a person is apparently a neglected juvenile, such police officer or other person or organisation may take charge of that person for bringing him before a Board. (2) When information is given to an officer-in-charge of a police station about any neglected juvenile found within the limits of such station, he shall enter in a book to be kept for the purpose the substance of such information and take such action thereon as he deems fit and if such officer does not propose to take charge of the juvenile, he shall forward a copy of the entry made to the Board. (3) Every juvenile taken charge of under sub-Section (1) shall be bro-ught before the Board without any loss of time but within a period of twenty-four hours of such charge taken excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place where the juvenile had been taken charge of the Board. (4) Every juvenile taken charge of under sub-Section (1) shall, unless he is kept with his parent or guardian, be sent to an observation home (but not to a police station or jail) until he can be brought before a Board. (50). Section 14 of the Juvenile Justice Act is also important. It reads: `` 14. Special procedure to be followed, when neglected juvenile has parents.-(1) If a person, who in the opinion of the police officer or the authorised person or organisation is a neglected juvenile, has a parent or guardian who has the actual charge of, or control over, the juvenile, the police officer or the authorised person or the organisation may, instead of taking charge of the juvenile, make a report to the Board for initiating an inquiry regarding that juvenile. (2) On receipt of a report under sub-Section (1), the Board may call upon the parent or guardian to produce the juvenile before it and to show cause why the juvenile should not be dealt with as a neglected juvenile under the provisions of this Act and if it appears to the Board that the juvenile is likely to be removed from its jurisdiction or to be concealed, it may immediately order his removal (if necessary by issuing a search warrant for the immediate production of the juvenile) to an observation home or a place of safety. (51). Sections 15, 16 and 17 empower the Board as well as the officer exercis-ing power of the Board to make suitable orders regarding neglected juvenile including the uncontrollable juveniles. It reads: ``17. Uncontrollable juveniles.-Where a parent or guardian of a juvenile complains to the Board that he is not able to exercise proper care and control over the juvenile and the Board is satisfied on inquiry that proceedings under this Act should be initiated regarding the juvenile, it may send the juvenile to an observation home or a place of safety and make such further inquiry as it may deem fit and the provisions of Section 15 and Section 16 shall, as far as may be, apply to such proceedings. (52). Sections 13 to 17 of the Juvenile Justice Act deserve to be read together because they are complimentary to one another. The object of the Legislature appears to be to make comprehensive provisions for dealing with all kinds of neglected juveniles. Section 13(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act empowers not only the police officer, it empowers the private person as well as the organisation authorised by the State Government in this behalf to take charge of neglected juveniles with a view to bring him her before the Board. In the instant case, it appears that Kum. Kamla, after her recovery from the house of Jaswant Singh accused, was taken charge by the police officer who made the recovery. The act of recovering Kum. Kamla was, therefore, permissible under Section 13 of the Juvenile Justice Act. When she was produced before the Magistrate, she refused to go with her parents. Her refusal to go with the parents and live under their care, attracted the provisions of Section 17 which deals with uncontrollable juveniles. When Kum. The act of recovering Kum. Kamla was, therefore, permissible under Section 13 of the Juvenile Justice Act. When she was produced before the Magistrate, she refused to go with her parents. Her refusal to go with the parents and live under their care, attracted the provisions of Section 17 which deals with uncontrollable juveniles. When Kum. Kamla was produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Sadulsa-har, the learned Magistrate, Sadulsahar had legal jurisdiction under Section 8 of the Juvenile Justice Act to pass suitable orders in accordance with Section 8. Section 8 requires the Magistrate to record his opinion and forward the juvenile and the record of the proceeding to the competent court having jurisdiction over the proceedings. For the purpose of recording his opinion under Section 8 of the Juve-nile Justice Act, 1986, the Magistrate is required to conduct some kind of enquiry in order to satisfy himself that the person before him is a neglected juvenile. Sub-Section (4) of Section 13 of the Juvenile Justice Act provides that every juvenile taken charge of under sub-Section (1) shall, unless he is kept with his parent or guardian, be sent to an observation home (but not to a police station or jail) until he can be brought before a Board. The learned Judicial Magistrate has passed the impugned order dated 12.06.1999 under sub-Section (4) of Section 13 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and directed that Kum. Kamla be kept at Nari Niketan, Jaipur. In these circumstances, it is difficult to hold that the learned Judicial Magistrate, Sadulsahar had no jurisdiction at all to pass the impugned order. (53). We, therefore, hold that no case for entertaining this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arises in this case. Consequently, this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issue of a writ of Habeas Corpus deserves to be rejected and is hereby rejected. Under the circumstances, the learned Judicial Magistrate, Sadulsahar, is expected to pass suitable order under Section 8 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, if he himself does not possess the powers of the Board. Under the circumstances, the learned Judicial Magistrate, Sadulsahar, is expected to pass suitable order under Section 8 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, if he himself does not possess the powers of the Board. However, for the removal of doubt, we deem it fit, to direct the learned Judicial Magistrate, Sadulsahar, in exercise of the powers conferred on this Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, that the Judicial Magistrate, Sadulsahar shall, without unnecessary delay, pass suitable orders under Section 8 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 for production of Kum. Kamla before the competent authority so that the question relating to age of Kum. Kamla may be decided by such competent authority under Section 32 of the Juvenile Justice Act and all other questions relating to her may be decided by the competent authority and suitable order may be passed with a view to provide her protection against the abu-se and exploitation to which she has been subjected to, if the allegations made by the prosecution are true. (54). While parting with this case, we deem it fit to observe that filing of writ petitions of this kind by persons who are either parties to the seduction, abuse and exploitation of the juveniles or who are interested in promoting the interest of those who indulge in seduction, abuse and exploitation of the juveniles, can hardly be said to be the persons at whose instance the Court should exercise its constitutional powers when the very object behind the petition by such persons is not only to defeat the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act and escape punishment but further to obtain a seal of approval on the illegal and immoral acts. The petition is rejected.