JUDGMENT Ms. Kamlesh Sharma, J.—The petitioner is the plaintiff whereas respondent is defendant and they will be referred as such in this judgment. The plaintiff is aggrieved by the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court whereby his application under Order 6, Rule 17, CPC for amendment of the plaint is dismissed. 2. The brief facts are that on 4.7.1992 the plaintiff filed a civil suit for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from obstructing the passage comprised in Khasra No. 297, as stated in relief clause of the plaint. The defendant has contested the suit mainly on the ground that there has been no common passage as claimed by the plaintiff, though there are other common passages as stated in Paragraph-8 of the written statement available to the plaintiff. On the pleadings of the parties, issue No. 1 is as under:— "Whether there exists a passage comprised in Khasra No. 297 which is passage of easement of necessity, as alleged?" OPP 3. In the application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC ad-interim injunction was granted on 6.7.1992 restraining the defendant "from creating any sort of obstructions upon disputed path leading from Khasra Nos. 297, 274 to the Mall Road Shimla which is in peaceful use of the petitioner, "which, after hearing the defendant, was made absolute on 2.1.1993. The appeal filed by defendant against the interim injunction order dated 2.1.1993 was also dismissed by Additional District Judge on 27.6.1995. Both the trial Court and appellate Court, while affirming the interim injunction order, relied upon revenue record, including Misal Haquiat, to come to the conclusion that prima-facie there exists common path on Khasra Nos. 297 and 274. After recording the evidence of the parties, the trial Court was at the stage of recording rebuttal evidence when the plaintiff filed application under Order 26, Rule 9, CPC on 23.7.1998 for appointment of the Local Commissioner to visit and inspect the spot and make report on the alleged obstruction caused by the defendant on the common passage. Another application was also filed on 23.7.1998 for seeking police assistance to enforce the interim injunction order dated 6.7.1992 confirmed on 2.1.1993. Both these applications were dismissed by a common order dated 15.9.1998. The stand of the defendant in these applications was that he has been making construction of his house as per sanctioned plan and debris are placed on Khasra Nos. Both these applications were dismissed by a common order dated 15.9.1998. The stand of the defendant in these applications was that he has been making construction of his house as per sanctioned plan and debris are placed on Khasra Nos. 276 and 277 of which he is the owner and he has not dis-obeyed the interim order of injunction in any manner. He had also pointed out that in fact there is no path from Khasra No. 297 and Khasra No. 274 for which interim order of injunction has been granted. 4. It was in this background that the plaintiff filed application under Order 6, Rule 17, CPC for amendment of his plaint on 12.10.1998. The amendment sought for is to delete Para-3 and substitute a new para in its place. These are:— Para-3 of the plaint Proposed amended Para-3 1 2 "That there is a common passage leading to the houses of the plaintiff as well as the defendant as also other property holders in the immediate vicinity and they have been using it from time immemorial as common passage /approach to their premises. "That the building of the plaintiff known as Talbot Cottage is connected with the Mall Road, Shimla through a common passage which common passage starts from Khasra No. 273 at the Mall Road end and passes through Khasra Nos. 274, 277, 284, 288, 297, 309 and terminates at the said property of the plaintiff comprised in Khasra Nos. 312, 313 etc. The said path is clearly visible in the photograph and also in the Aksh Latha Upmohal, U.S. Club, Mohal Station Ward, Chhota Shimla. The plaintiff has been openly, peacefully and without any interruption been using this passage for the last more than 30-35 years. The defendant or any other person claiming through or under him has no right, title or interest to obstruct the plaintiff of the said user of the passage described above. The defendant, however, immediately prior to filing of the suit started interfering with the plaintiffs said passage and further threatened to block the said passage." Another amendment proposed is to add Khasra Nos. 312, 313, 314 etc. to the Khasra Nos. of the property of the plaintiff as stated in Paragraph-1. 5. The defendant, however, immediately prior to filing of the suit started interfering with the plaintiffs said passage and further threatened to block the said passage." Another amendment proposed is to add Khasra Nos. 312, 313, 314 etc. to the Khasra Nos. of the property of the plaintiff as stated in Paragraph-1. 5. The defendant has opposed the amendment application mainly on the ground that it is mala fide as it has been filed at the fag end of the trial of the suit of delay its decision and it will prejudice the case of the defendant by changing the very character of the suit. The application has been dismissed by the impugned order which is under challenge in this revision petition. 6. This Court has heard learned Counsel for the plaintiff and the defendant, who has appeared in person. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff has urged that the amendment sought for is only clarificatory and will not change the character of the suit as stated by defendant. According to him, defining the passage by Khasra Nos. is necessary for the decision of the controversy, more specifically, in view of the changing stand of the defendant in respect of the common passage leading from the Mall to the property of the plaintiff. It is also stated by learned Counsel for the plaintiff that no further evidence will be adduced by the plaintiff if the proposed amendment is allowed, as the site plans of Talbot house Ext. PW-3/A and Ext. PW-3/B have already been placed and proved on record. It is also urged that the grounds as given by the trial Court in the impugned order for rejecting the proposed amendment such as delay and improvement in the case of the plaintiff are not tenable. Learned Counsel has also cited some judgments in support of his submission with which this Court will deal later. 7. On the other hand, the defendant has urged that the proposed amendments are mala fide having been sought at the fag end of the trial of the suit and will change the character of the suit inasmuch as in the plaint the claim pertains to common passage comprising in Khasra No. 297 for which Issue No. 1 was framed and the interim order for injunction was for common passage comprising in Khasra Nos. 297 and 274 whereas by the proposed amendment claim for common passage comprising in Khasra Nos. 273, 274, 277, 284, 288, 297 and 309 is intended to be made. It is also pointed out that as per the averments made in the plaint and Issue No. 1 the suit was for a common passage comprising of one Khasra No. i.e. 297 whereas by the proposed amendment it is extended to seven Khasra numbers which may affect the rights of other persons who are owners of these Khasra numbers, except Khasra No. 277 which belongs to the defendant alongwith Khasra No. 276, or who are having their properties in the vicinity touching these Khasra Nos. which will not only prolong the trial of the present suit but will lead to multiplicity of litigation to the prejudice of the defendant. 8. After giving its best consideration to the respective contentions of learned Counsel for the plaintiff and the defendant in person this Court holds that in the background, stated hereinabove, the proposed amendments sought for after about seven years from the institution of the suit and at the fag end of the trial are not bona fide. There can be no dispute that amendments, if bona fide, can be sought for and allowed at any stage of the litigation but in the present case the plaintiff sought for the amendment only after his application for appointment of Local Commissioner was dismissed by order dated 15.9.1998 in which proceedings the defendant took the stand that the alleged debris have been placed by him during the course of construction on Khasra Nos. 276 and 277 which belong to him and he had not dis-obeyed the interim order for injunction by obstructing the passage on Khasra Nos. 297 and 274 as there does not exist any passage on these Khasra numbers. Though prima facie it appears that the amendment sought for will only define the passage but on further examination it becomes clear that it will change the nature of the suit inasmuch as the suit is only for common passage comprising in Khasra No. 297 for which Issue No. 1 has been framed and the interim order for injunction was passed for common passage comprising in Khasra Nos. 297 and 274 and if the proposed amendment is allowed it will be for altogether new common passage going through Khasra Nos. 297 and 274 and if the proposed amendment is allowed it will be for altogether new common passage going through Khasra Nos. 273, 274, 277, 284, 288, 297 and 309. Not only this the plaintiff also intends to change his claim for use of common passage by way of easement of necessity to the easement of prescription by inter alia adding the following averments that, "The plaintiff has been openly, peacefully and without any interruption using this passage for the last more than 30-35 years. The defendant or any other person claiming through or under him has no right, title or interest to obstruct the plaintiff of the said user of the passage described above. The defendant, however, immediately prior to filing of the suit started interfering with the plaintiffs said passage and further threatened to block the said passage." As these Khasra numbers except Khasra No. 277 are not owned by the defendant and are owned by other persons, therefore claim of the plaintiff made by way of proposed amendment may adversely affect the rights not only of the owners of these Khasra Numbers but also all those who are having their properties touching these Khasra numbers. Therefore, the statement of learned Counsel for the plaintiff that if the proposed amendment is allowed plaintiff will not lead any further evidence and the trial of the suit will not prolong as apprehended by the defendant cannot be accepted; rather not only the trial of the present suit will prolong as the defendant will file written statement to the amended plaint which may necessitate the amendment of Issue No. 1 and further evidence by the defendant but also lead to multiplicity of litigation. In this view of the matter, the amendment sought for has rightly been rejected by the trial Court. 9. In Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil and others, AIR 1957 SC 363, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have approved the principles enunciated by Batchelor J. in his judgment in Kisandas Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba, 33 Bombay 644 at pages 649-650 that:— "All amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions (a) of not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties...... , but I refrain from citing further authorities, as, in my opinion, they all lay down precisely the same doctrine. That doctrine, as I understand it, is that amendment should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. It is merely a particular case of this general rule that where a plaintiff seeks to amend by setting up a fresh claim in respect of a cause of action which since the institution of the suit had become barred by limitation, the amendment must be refused; to allow it would be to cause the defendant an injury which could not be compensated in costs by depriving him of a good defence to the claim. The ultimate test therefore still remains the same; can the amendment be allowed without injustice to the other side, or can it not?" It was concluded that the amendments should not really introduce a new case and opposite party should not be taken by surprise to meet a new claim set up for the first time after the expiry of the period of limitation. This judgment has further been relied upon in A.K. Gupta and sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corporation, AIR 1967 SC 96. It is explained in M/s. Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, AIR 1978 SC 484, in Paragraphs No. 2, 4 and also in paragraph-5 that:— "2. Procedural law is intended to facilitate and not to obstruct the course of substantive justice. Provisions relating to pleadings in civil cases are meant to give to each side intimation of the case of the other so that it may be met, to enable courts to determine what is really at issue between parties, and to prevent deviations from the course which litigation on particular causes of action must take. 4. It is clear from the foregoing summary of the main rules pf pleadings that provisions for the amendment of pleadings, subject to such terms as to costs and giving of all parties concerned necessary opportunities to meet exact situations resulting from amendments, are intended for promoting the ends of justice and not for defeating them. 4. It is clear from the foregoing summary of the main rules pf pleadings that provisions for the amendment of pleadings, subject to such terms as to costs and giving of all parties concerned necessary opportunities to meet exact situations resulting from amendments, are intended for promoting the ends of justice and not for defeating them. Even if a party or its counsel is inefficient in setting out its case initially the shortcoming can certainly be removed generally by appropriate steps taken by a party which must no doubt pay costs for the inconvenience or expense caused to the other side from its omissions. The error is not incapable of being rectified so long as remedial steps do not unjustifiably injure rights accrued. 5. It is true that, if a plaintiff seeks to alter the cause of action itself and to introduce indirectly, through an amendment of his pleadings, an entirely new or inconsistent cause of action, amounting virtually to the substitution of a new plaint or a new cause of action in place of what was originally there, the Court will refuse to permit it if it amounts to depriving the party against which a suit is pending of any right which may have accrued in its favour due to lapse of time.” 10. In Suraj Prakash Bhasin v. Smt Raj Rani Bhasin and others, AIR 1981 SC 485, it is held in paragraph-6 that:— "The liberal principles which guide the exercise of discretion in allowing amendments have been laid down in numerous decisions of this Court. Multiplicity of proceedings being avoided is one criterion. Amendments which do not totally alter the character of the action are readily granted while care is taken to see that injustice and prejudice of an irremediable character are not inflicted on the opposite party under pretence of amendment of pleadings. The Court must be guided by the rule of justice expressed by the Privy Council in Ma Shwe My a v. Maung Po Hnaung, AIR 1922 PC 249 at pp. 250-51 : See P-1283-84 of AIR Comm. CPC (1908) 9th Edn. Vol. 2. The Court must be guided by the rule of justice expressed by the Privy Council in Ma Shwe My a v. Maung Po Hnaung, AIR 1922 PC 249 at pp. 250-51 : See P-1283-84 of AIR Comm. CPC (1908) 9th Edn. Vol. 2. All rules of Court are nothing but provisions intended to secure the proper administration of justice and it is, therefore, essential that they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose, so that full powers of amendment must be enjoyed and should always be liberally exercised, but nonetheless, no power has yet been given to enable one distinct cause of action to be substituted for another, nor to change, by means of amendment, the subject matter of the suit/ And in paragraph-8 that:— "Counsel also urged that there had been gross remissness, to say the least, on the part of the plaintiff-respondent in seeking amendment at a late stage and with a tricky touch. In such cases we must remember the power of the Court to resort to the universal panacea for the pathology of negligence, indifference, slipshodness and other delinquencies of litigants. The Court, while allowing amendments, will, in such cases, order heavy costs/ 11. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff has referred to the judgment of this Court in Amar Singh v. Kehar Singh, 1984 Sim.L.C. 268, in Paragraph-5 of which it is observed that:— “......The law as regards granting of amendment is well settled. No amendment would be disallowed which is necessary for determining the real issue in controversy between the parties and the grant of which would not cause an injury to the other party which cannot be compensated in terms of money." There cannot be any quarrel in respect of the proposition of law laid down in this judgment. He has also relied upon the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Singh v. Kartar Singh and another, 1989 Civil Court Cases 324, wherein plaintiff was permitted to incorporate certain Khasra numbers, which were left out earlier and for which the objections were taken by the defendant in his written statement by over ruling the objection of delay. This judgment is on its own facts and has no application in the case in hand. This judgment is on its own facts and has no application in the case in hand. In another Judgment of Karnataka High Court in S. Narayana Rao v. R. Narsingha Rao, 1995 (1) Civil Court Cases 270, the learned Judge has held in paragraph-14 that since both the parties have understood the pleadings and have led evidence, no prejudice would be caused by allowing the application for amendment of the pleadings. Again these observations have been made in the context of facts and circumstances of that case and have no application in the case in hand in which it cannot be said that the parties have led their evidence by understanding that the dispute pertains to the passage which the plaintiff now intends to plead by way of proposed amendments. 12. After examining the present case in the light of law of amendment of pleadings, more specifically the plaint, laid down in the above cited judgments of Supreme Court, this Court does not find it a fit case to allow the proposed amendments by setting aside the impugned order of the trial Court for the reasons given in Paragraph-8 herein above. 13. In the result, there is no merit in this petition and it is rejected. CMP No. 121/99: In view of the order of the day passed in the revision petition, this application is also disposed of and interim stay dated 3.5.1999 stands vacated. Petition dismissed.