Judgment P.K.Deb, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 14-10-93 passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Katihar in Tit 19 Appeal No. 25/90 affirming the judgment and decree dated 24-8-90 passed in Title Suit No. 78/81 by the 1st Additional Munsif, Katihar. Thus, this appeal has been preferred against the concurrent findings of both the Courts below in respect of eviction of the plaintiff Ram Peyari Devi (her heirs have been substituted during the pendency of the appeal on her death) filed Title Suit No. 78/81 contending, inter alia, that she was the owner of a pucca building consisting of several rooms situated at Station Bazar (Mangal Bazar) Katihar in Mauza Mirchai, P.S. Katihar, District Katihar appertaining to Tauzi No. 1239, Thana No. 328, Khata No. 274, Plot No. 619, Holding No. 83, Ward No. 15 of Katihar Municipality. It was her further case that the appellant defendant was a tenant of two pucca rooms with pucca platform constructed by the plaintiff and was given in a rental of Rs. 110.00 per month under a separate tenancy. It is also the case of the plaintiff that the defendant appellant entered into a compromise to meet the personal need of the plaintiff of the said premises for her own occupation arrived at in Title Suit No. 129/67 instituted by the plaintiff earlier for eviction of the defendant-appellant from the said premises and the defendant vide compromise agreed to vacate the said premises by the end of May 1980. In the meantime it is the plaintiffs further case that the defendant approached the plaintiff to take a lease of the western pucca room 10 x 10 in measurement for specified period of 8 years and 8 months commencing from 1st October, 1971 to 31st May, 1980 at a rental of Rs. 720.00 in total to be paid at the rate of Rs. 60.00 per month. A lease deed was executed on 10-9-71 for one pucca room for specified period of 8 years and 8 months commencing from 1-10-71 to 31-5-80 and have jointly been executed by the plaintiff and the defendant. When the plaintiff wanted to get the premises vacated at the end of 31st May, 1980 then the defendant refused to give vacant possession and remained occupying the same in a wrongful manner. When the plaintiff wanted to get the premises vacated at the end of 31st May, 1980 then the defendant refused to give vacant possession and remained occupying the same in a wrongful manner. As such the present suit has been filed for eviction and also for damage at Rs. 840.00 for wrongful occupation of the suit premises from June, 1980 to July, 1981. Thus the suit was filed for ejectment of the defendant on expiry of the lease and also for award of damages as mentioned above. 2. The suit was contested by the defendant by filing written statement contending, inter alia, that the suit was not maintainable and the defendant has also disputed and denied the compromise petition and also the execution of the lease. But, the ownership of the plaintiff over the premises and the relationship of landlord and tenant have not been specifically denied. The parties adduced evidence and during the course of proceeding in the original Court as the signature was denied in the compromise petition and the lease deed those were sent to the hand-writing expert and the report was received against the defendant and the handwriting expert has also been examined. After considering the evidence on record the trial Court decreed the suit for eviction holding that there was a fixed term tenancy between the parties and on expiry the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of possession. Against that an appeal was preferred being Title Appeal No. 25/90 but the same was also dismissed affirming the judgment of eviction and damages passed by the original Court. Hence the present second appeal was preferred. While admitting this appeal under Order XLI, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. a Single Bench of this Court vide order dated 18-3-94 framed following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the finding of the appellate Court that the suit was maintainable under Sec. 12 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1977 even after expiry of this Act is legal? 2. Whether the appellate Court acted illegally in not getting the deposition of the plaintiff exhibited under the Provision of Order XXVI, Rule 8 of C.P.C. 3. 2. Whether the appellate Court acted illegally in not getting the deposition of the plaintiff exhibited under the Provision of Order XXVI, Rule 8 of C.P.C. 3. Of factual aspect that a lease was there between the two parties for a fixed term and that there was a compromise decree ending tenancy by the end of May, 1980 had been decided by both the Courts below concurrently and on that factual aspect there is nothing to be interfered by this Court. On the first point regarding the maintainability of the suit depending on the condition of eviction as per the Rent Control Act it is submitted that when the suit was filed practically. There was no existence of Rent Control Act in Bihar because the 1977 Act had already expired on 21-3-81 and the 1982 Act was enacted by Bihar Act No. 4 of 1983 and when the suit was filed practically there was no existence of any Control Act. Although the 1982 Act came in force in the year 1983 but it has specifically mentioned that besides Sec. 28, the remaining provision of the Act shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of April 1981 i.e., with a retrospective effect from the date of expiry of the previous Control Act, 1977. The virus of that retrospective effect of the Act 1982 had not been challenged anywhere up till now as submitted by Mr. Mazumdar but, according to him, such retrospective effect cannot be applicable specifically for the purpose of eviction on the ground of expiry of lease rather when the suit was filed the cause of action was for eviction only under the Transfer of Property Act and not under the Control Act and in that view of the matter the suit can only be filed for eviction after service of notice under Sec. 106 of the T.P. Act. It appears from Sec. 1 and the preamble of the Act 1982 that the previous two Acts of Rent Control of 1947 and 1977 were temporary Acts for certain period but the Act of 1982 has been made permanent and as such retrospective effect given is of total intention of the legislation to make continuation of the provision of two temporary Acts. The condition of ejectment of a tenant on the ground of expiry of tenancy was existing in both the previous Acts and in the Act of 1977, it was within the preview of Sec. 12 and the same have been as its semblance under Sec. 11 of the Act of 1982. The intention of the legislation is to be paramount while considering the effect of retrospective implementation of the Act. Continuation of the Rent Control Act since the 1947 till the coming of 1982 permanent Act all provisions were to be continued and as such during the temporary period when there was no Act, although there was an ordinance then the retrospective effect given have been for the purpose of fulfilling the object of rent control order. Mr. Mazumdar, senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants in support of his contention regarding first point has referred to a judgment of the apex Court as reported in 1985 SC 709 : Motiram Ghelabhai V/s. Jagan Nagar. The fact of that case was totally different from the present one. There the case arose in the Bombay province and the suit was originally filed for ejectment under the Transfer of Property Act but while the appeal was pending then the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act came into force and it was held that during the pendency of that appeal the provision of Sec. 12 of that Act to the discretion of the tenant cannot be made applicable. Here the provisions of Rent Control Act regarding the terms and conditions of ejectment remained intact in all the Rent Controls Act and as such to cover up the period while there was no Act except an ordinance the retrospective effect has been given. In that way, it cannot be said that the suit was not maintainable under the Rent Control Act and it ought to have been proceeded under the T.P. Act alone. The condition of Rent Control Act under Sec. 12 as contained in the Act of 1977 being reproduced in Sec. 11 of the 1982 Act would definitely be applicable in the present circumstance of the case. I find that the learned appellate Court has rightly decided the point in favour of landlord respondent. The condition of Rent Control Act under Sec. 12 as contained in the Act of 1977 being reproduced in Sec. 11 of the 1982 Act would definitely be applicable in the present circumstance of the case. I find that the learned appellate Court has rightly decided the point in favour of landlord respondent. The second point is with regard to the proper implementation of Order XXVI, Rule 8 of the C.P.C. In the present case, plaintiff a lady, admittedly an old one, was examined on commission at her house. Such commission was allowed on an application being made from the side of plaintiff and before the commission when the evidence was being recorded lawyer for the defendant tenant was also present and she was cross-examined. The only challenge was in respect of the fact that although the commission reported the Court but the deposition of the landlady was not taken in black and white after solemn affirmation. But, this was not the purpose for which Order XXVI, Rule 8 and the provisions have been included in Civil Procedure Code. If a deposition is. recorded on commission then while accepting the Commissioners report, it is required that the evidence should be tendered and accepted by the Court in presence of the opposite party but there is departure of this Rule and it has been found that in the State of Bihar, such Rules are not being followed. Here the Commissioners report was submitted and the same was accepted by the Court below. Order XXVI, Rule 8(b) says that the Court in its discretion may dispense with a proof of any circumstances mentioned in Clause (a) and authorise the evidence of any person being read as evidence in the suit notwithstanding proof that cause for taking such evidence by commission has ceased at the time of reading the same. In the present case Commissioners report was accepted long back in the presence of both the parties and during the course of evidence, the landlady had been cross-examined before the Commissioner and Commissioners report was accepted by the Court although there was no specific mention in the order that the evidence recorded by the Commissioner was also being accepted for the purpose of using as evidence in the trial. This ought to have been mentioned to satisfy the provisions of Order XXVI, Rule 8(b) as mentioned above but non-mentioning of such a fact would not make the evidence inadmissible even if it is a fact that at the time when the evidence was being read by the Court the witness was hale and hearty and was in a position to attend the Court. This point has been considered by the apex Court long back as reported in 1971 S.C. page 690 : Jogindra V/s. Markendeshwar, it was held by the apex Court that when a statement of the witness taken under a commission ceased on the ground of illness was admitted on the record and thereafter, there was no evidence that the witness could have attended the Court during the time the case was pending the evidence taken is not inadmissible. In the present case also, there is no allegation from the side of the defendant that the landlady was hale and hearty and was in a position to come to the Court to depose in the open Court. Only objection was there that her evidence was not recorded under solemn affirmation but the said evidence along with the report have been accepted by the Court in presence of both the parties and as such the discretion applied by the trial Court cannot be anulled by the superior Court when the discretion applied was within the permissible jurisdiction of the trial Court. Thus, I do not find any violation of Order XXVI, Rule 8 of the C.P.C. by accepting the evidence of the landlady recorded on commission. This point has also been considered by the appellate Court elaborately. Mr. Mazumdar, learned senior advocate for and on behalf of appellant has not much pressed on this point knowing fully well that even if there is some irregularity, the same cannot be taken as a point for brushing aside the factual aspect of the case as arrived in concurring by both the fact, finding Courts. Practically in this appeal, there is no other legal question although substantial questions of law as framed by a Bench of this Court have already been dealt with and mainly by the lower appellate Court and there is no legal lacuna or jurisdictional error on the finding of the appellate Court below. 4. Practically in this appeal, there is no other legal question although substantial questions of law as framed by a Bench of this Court have already been dealt with and mainly by the lower appellate Court and there is no legal lacuna or jurisdictional error on the finding of the appellate Court below. 4. In the result, this appeal has got no force and hence, the same is rejected but no order as to costs. However, as the tenant appellant is to find out a new accommodation to shift his business two months from this date is hereby allowed to the tenant appellant to vacate the suit premises after searching out an alternative accommodation with condition of payment of rent as per previous terms and conditions for these two months also, failure of which would make the landlord respondents to take delivery of possession of suit premises in execution of decree. Considering the facts and circumstances, no order as to costs.