JUDGMENT 1. - Accused Khema Ram has filed this petition under Section 482 Cr.RC. for quashing the FIR No. 22/89 recorded by the Forest Department. 2. Mr. Singh contended that the petitioner had cut the trees from his own agricultural land No. 318/436 after obtaining permission of the Tehsildar on 25.9.1998 and therefore, the F.I.R. should be quashed. 3. The learned RR, on the other hand, contended that the petitioner is Khatedar of land No. 318/436 in Chak No. 22- AA whereas he had cut the trees from pasture land of Chak No. 22-A, and therefore, the F.I.R. should not be quashed. His contention was that it may be the defence of the petitioner that he had not cut trees from the Government land meant for grazing but on that ground the F.I.R. should not be quashed. His further contention was that the F.I.R. discloses the commission of cognisable offence and hence it should not be quashed. 4. I have considered the above contentions, in the F.I.R., it is_alleged that the petitioner has cut 'Kikar' trees on 10.10.1998 from the forest land meant for grazing in Chak No. 22-A and he has thus committed an offence under Secs. 30 and 32 of the Forest Act. Under Section 30 of the Rajasthan Forest Act, 1953 the State Government is empowered to declare any particular or class of trees in protected forest to be reserved and prohibit the removal of any forest produce from such forest. Under Section 32 the State Government may make Rules to regulate the forest matters stated in that section. Under Section 33 of the Act of 1953 any person committing any of the offence under Section 30 of the Act shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to 6 months or with fine. 5. The prosecution case is that Chak No. 22-A was reserved for developing it as pasture land, and therefore, the trees could not be cut from that area. The papers reveal that the petitioners were found cutting trees in that area. The case for the petitioner is that he had cut the trees from his own Khatedari land situate in Chak No. 22- AA on the basis of the permission accorded by Tehsildar, Anupgarh dated 25.9.1998. A reading of the permission shows that the petitioner was permitted to cut 8 to 10 trees from his land bearing No. 318/436 in Chak No. 22-AA. A reading of the permission shows that the petitioner was permitted to cut 8 to 10 trees from his land bearing No. 318/436 in Chak No. 22-AA. It may be the defence of the petitioner that he had cut the trees from Chak 22-AA and not from Chak No. 22-A but this cannot be a ground to quash the F.I.R. It is the subject matter of investigation that whether the petitioner had cut the trees from Chak No. 22-A or Chak No. 22-AA. In the F.I.R. No. 526 relied upon by the petitioner also there is reference of Chak No. 22-AA and not of No. 22-A. 6. Though the offence under Section 33 of the Forest Act is punishable with six months imprisonment only yet the offence is cognizable because of Section 64 of Rajasthan Forest Act wherein a Forest Officer of Police Officer can arrest, without a warrant from Magistrate, a person against whom a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been concerned with any forest offence punishable with imprisonment for one month. It is thus obvious that the offence under Section 33 of the Forest Act is cognizable and the Forest Department can register the F.I.R. and proceed with the investigation. 7. It is noticed that under Section 69 of the Act of 1953 there is presumption that the forest produce is the property of the State Government. Of course, the accused can rebut that presumption. Wood is certainly a forest produce. In view of the provisions of the Act, there cannot be any cause to quash the F.I.R. 8. It is now well settled that an F.I.R. can be quashed only when the allegations therein do not disclose the commission of cognizable offence or the allegations are so absurd and inherently improbable, on the basis of which, no prudent person can ever reach a just concussion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused : Vide State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992 SC 604) . Certainly, this is not a case which falls in any of the seven categories of cases, illustrated by their lordships. 9. There being no merit in this petition, it is hereby dismissed. *******