P. K. JAIN, J. ( 1 ) THE prosecution case in short is that between the night of 8/9-3-1998 at about midnight a dacoity was committed at the house of Smt. Bano in which besides looting the property, two persons were killed and some others were injured. It was alleged that around 13-14 persons armed with gun, pistol etc. entered the house of first informant and started ransacking the house. While leaving the house, one of the miscreants, namely Sabir Husain, the present applicant who was armed with a gun exhorted that he will teach a lesson today and thereafter he put the barrel of the gun on the eye of husband of the first informant and fired at him. Co-accused Ishaq fired a shot from his pistol on the chest of the deceased. Thereafter Laiq co-accused put the barrel of pistol on Mohammad Shafis chest and fired at him. On alarm several witnesses were attracted. The accused were identified in the light of electric as well as moon light. ( 2 ) FIRST bail application was pressed on the ground that Laiq co-accused assigned similar role has been granted bail by the High Court and that the applicant was falsely implicated since his cousin Rashid was murdered and a case Crime No. 132/94 was registered. Son of the first informant in the present case was an accused in that case. It was also one of the grounds that the intention prima facie was to commit dacoity. While rejecting the first bail application it was observed by this Court that the allegation is prima facie corroborated by the post mortem examination report and even though Laiq had been granted bail on the ground that his role is almost identical to the other accused persons but prima facie his case was distinguishable from others who were granted bail earlier. ( 3 ) THE second bail application was also pressed on the ground that Laiq co-accused assigned similar role had been granted bail by order dated 19-11-1998 and that even though accused were inimical to the complainant no precaution was taken by accused to conceal their identity, which is highly unnatural. While rejecting the second bail application, this Court observed that Laiq has been assigned the role of firing from pistol by putting barrel on the chest of Mohammad Shafi, the son of first informant. While rejecting the second bail application, this Court observed that Laiq has been assigned the role of firing from pistol by putting barrel on the chest of Mohammad Shafi, the son of first informant. Other accused were not assigned this specific role as was assigned to accused Sabir, Ishaq and Laiq. Therefore, the case of accused Sabir, Ishaq and Laiq cannot be said to be identical with remaining co-accused. However, it appears that when bail application of Laiq was pressed before the Honble Judge, the argument was that co-accused Nawab and others (not Sabir and Ishaq) assigned almost identical role have been granted bail. The fact that the case of Laiq is not identical to the case of those who were granted bail by order dated 8-6-1999 does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the Court and there appears to have been misrepresentation at the time of the pressing of the bail application of the applicant Laiq. This Court further observed that accused are also not said to have taken precaution to conceal the identity but if an accused is dare-devil and prefers to go for commission of crimes without concealing his identity, that cannot give him a licence for indulging in such activity. According to the first information report, it is the applicant, who in order to take revenge of the earlier murder exhorted to teach lesson and further actively participated by firing from point blank range along with co-accused Ishaq and Laiq. ( 4 ) AFTER the earlier two bail applications were rejected this third bail application is now being pressed on the ground that since after rejection of the second bail application, co-accused Ishaq who is assigned similar role has been granted bail by order dated 8-6-1999. Another ground taken is that while committing the case to the Court of Session, no order of remand under Section 209 (b) Cr. P. C. was passed by learned Committing Magistrate and thereafter even the Sessions Judge has not passed any order of remand under Section 309 Cr. Another ground taken is that while committing the case to the Court of Session, no order of remand under Section 209 (b) Cr. P. C. was passed by learned Committing Magistrate and thereafter even the Sessions Judge has not passed any order of remand under Section 309 Cr. P. C. ( 5 ) LEARNED A. G. A. for State submits that so far as grant of bail to co-accused Ishaq is concerned, this Court had already observed earlier that the bail of co-accused Laiq was obtained by misrepresentation of facts and from perusal of the order dated 8-6-1999 it would appear that the facts have again been concealed and there is no parity between the case of accused Laiq, Ishaq and Sabir Husain (present applicants) on one side with other co-accused who were granted bail earlier by order dated 8-6-1999. As regards second ground it is submitted that even though an order of remand was not passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate who has committed the case to the Court of Session but warrant under Section 209 (b) Cr. P. C. was sent to the Superintendent of district Jail, Moradabad authorising the detention of the accused in jail during and until conclusion of the trial before the Court of Session. It is further submitted that after the accused is remanded to judicial custody under Section 209 (b) Cr. P. C. during and until conclusion of the trial there is no necessity for passing of a fresh order of remand under Section 309 Cr. P. C. ( 6 ) IT is really unfortunate that even though the prosecution allegations so far as the applicant and co-accused Ishaq and Laiq were specific of firing from point blank range at the two deceased persons whereas other co-accused Nawab, Shakir, Nanhu, Rafiq, Nazir and Nasir etc. who were granted bail by order dated 8-6-1998 were assigned the role of committing dacoity only and the case of Laiq and Ishaq was not identical to that of Nawab etc. who were granted bail by order, dated 8-6-1998, learned A. G. A. did not bring this fact to the notice of the Court when bail applications of Laiq and Ishaq were pressed before the Court and they were granted bail on the ground that their cases were identical to that of Nawab and others who were granted bail by order dated 8-6-1998. It is really shocking that even though this Court while rejecting first and second bail applications of present applicant Sabir had categorically pointed out that the cases of Laiq, Sabir and Ishaq are distinguishable on facts from remaining accused persons as these accused persons were specifically assigned the role of firing from point blank range such a distinction was not brought to the notice of the Court when bail application of Ishaq was pressed on the ground of parity with Laiq whose bail was obtained by concealment of fact. ( 7 ) IN my view, grant of bail to co-accused Ishaq after rejection of the first bail application will not make any difference. Since bail by accused Ishaq and Laiq has been obtained by misrepresentation of the fact it is for the prosecution or State Government to move for cancellation of the bail granted to them or the Honble Judge concerned may issue suo motu notice for cancelling of bail of accused Laiq and Ishaq. Accused-applicant Sabir Husain is not entitled to bail on the ground that co-accused Ishaq has been released on bail after rejection of applicants earlier bail applications. ( 8 ) THE second submission of Sri Mishra, learned counsel for the applicant is that the detention of the applicant in jail is illegal and unauthorised. Therefore, he is entitled to be released on bail. His submission is that while committing the case to the Court of Session, the Committing Magistrate was required to pass an order under Section 209 of the Cr. P. C. remanding the accused to judicial custody during and until the conclusion of the trial which order has not been passed by the Learned Magistrate. It is further submitted that even the Sessions Court has not passed any order directing the applicant to be remanded to judicial custody in accordance with provisions of Section 309 of the Cr. P. C. Hence, the custody of the applicant in jail is illegal. It is further submitted that even the Sessions Court has not passed any order directing the applicant to be remanded to judicial custody in accordance with provisions of Section 309 of the Cr. P. C. Hence, the custody of the applicant in jail is illegal. Sri Mishra has relied upon a decision of this Court in Deepak Shom v. Superintendent District Jail, Lucknow, Writ Petition No. 236 (HC) of 1992 decided by a Division Bench in which similar question arose before the Court and the matter was referred to a larger Bench of five judges and the decision of a Division Bench of the Lucknow Bench of the High Court in Ran Vijay Singh v. Superintendent District Jail, Faizabad reported in 1993 UP Criminal Reporter 394 and the decision of this Court in Mashooq Ahmad v. State of U. P. 1986 (23) ACC 538 : (1987 All LJ 329 ). Learned Additional Government Advocate, however, submits that so long as the Full Bench decision of this Court in Urooj Abbas v. State of U. P. , 1973 Criminal Law Journal 1458 is not overruled it would remain binding. His submission is that if the accused has been remanded by a valid warrant under Section 209 (b) Cr. P. C. then the absence of order remanding the accused to custody at the time of commitment would not be invalid. 8a. Before the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties are considered, it would be relevant to advert to certain facts. The case was committed to the Court of Session by the Magistrate concerned vide order dated 30-6-98, copy of which has been filed by learned counsel for the applicant as Annexure-5 to this application. The relevant extract of the committal order is as follows :- It is not in dispute that while committing the case to the Court of Session the accused were remanded to judicial custody by warrant dated 30-6-98 which is reproduced below : From perusal of the back of the Warrant it would appear that the accused was produced before the Court of Session from time to time and was produced before the Court of Session on the date fixed. It is also not disputed that either on 14-7-98 or on subsequent dates when the accused was produced before the Court of Session no specific order of remand was passed by the Court of Session as is evident from Annexure-6, photocopy of the order sheet filed by the learned counsel for the applicant along with the affidavit. ( 9 ) IN Urooj Abbass (supra) the Full Bench has referred to the case of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. The Superintendent Central Prison, AIR 1955 All 193 wherein following observations of the Honble Supreme Court were referred to :-"in the warrant directing the Superintendent of the Central Jail to keep him in custody, the Magistrate has ordered that he should be produced before him in Court on 19-7-1954. It amounts to his authorising the applicants detention in jail custody. Ordinarily Magistrates write in the order sheet of the case, when adjourning it to the next date that the accused should remain in custody as before, but Sri P. R. Gupta or rather his clerk did not say in the order passed on 6-7-1954 that the applicant should remain in custody up to 19-7-1954. That omission does not matter when the warrant contains the Magistrates authority for the detention. One authority for detention is enough. . . "relying upon the said observation of the Honble Supreme Court the Full Bench has held that the case does show that a warrant remanding the accused would be sufficient and no additional order recording the fact of the accused being remanded will be necessary. The Court has also referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Vasu Deo Ojha v. State of U. P. , ( AIR 1958 All 578 : (1958 Cri LJ 988)) and the case of Ram Narayan Singh v. The State of Delhi, AIR 1953 SC 277 : (1953 Cri LJ 1113 ). The observation of the Supreme Court with regard to these cases was that in that case the warrants of custody which were in form of some slips were not taken into consideration when filed belatedly. Apart from those slips which were said to be warrants, there was no indication on the record of the Court that the accused had been remanded by warrant signed by the Magistrate when he adjourned the case under Section 344 (1a), Criminal Procedure Code. Apart from those slips which were said to be warrants, there was no indication on the record of the Court that the accused had been remanded by warrant signed by the Magistrate when he adjourned the case under Section 344 (1a), Criminal Procedure Code. It was for that reason that the custody of the accused was held illegal. It was nowhere laid down that a separate order otherwise than a warrant was required for the purpose of remanding the accused. In Vasu Deo Ojhas case the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Narayan Singhs case appears to have been interpreted to mean that an order in writing was required for remanding the accused. But, with respect, we are unable to agree with that interpretation of the Supreme Court decision. The Supreme Court had no occasion to consider at all the question whether if proper warrants had been issued reminding the accused, a separate order to that effect would still be required to be recorded on the file. ( 10 ) THE decision of the Full Bench in Urooj Abbass case has not yet been overruled by a larger Bench of this Court. It is true that in case of Madhu Limaye, In the matter reported in AIR 1969 SC 1014 : (1969 Cri LJ 1440) in para 14 the Honble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of remand the Magistrate should direct detention in jail custody after applying his mind to all the relevant matters. The remand orders are patently routine and appear to have been made mechanically. It was held that the orders of remand are not such as would cure the constitutional infirmities. The Honble Supreme Court, therefore, allowed the writ petition filed by Madhu Limaye. At this stage, it may be pointed out that the facts in the case of Madhu Limaye referred to above, were quite different. Prohibitory orders under Section 144 Cr. P. C. were passed by the Committal Magistrate on 2/11/1968 whereby the Public meetings were prohibited. On 5/11/1968 Madhu Limaye and others held a public meeting of about 400 persons at the Railway ground in defiance of the order under Section 144 Cr. P. C. On 6/11/1968 Madhu Limaye and others with 200 persons arrived at the Lakshisarai Railway Station where the Magistrate and Police Officers were present. On 5/11/1968 Madhu Limaye and others held a public meeting of about 400 persons at the Railway ground in defiance of the order under Section 144 Cr. P. C. On 6/11/1968 Madhu Limaye and others with 200 persons arrived at the Lakshisarai Railway Station where the Magistrate and Police Officers were present. These persons in spite of the warnings forcibly entered the platform and violated the order under Section 144 Cr. P. C. The Magistrate on duty directed the Police Officers present to arrest them. Madhu Limaye and others were arrested. They were produced before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate who on 6/11/1968 remanded them to judicial custody till 20/11/1968 as they had refused to furnish the bail bonds. The Honble Supreme Court on these facts found that no cognizable offence was said to have been committed at the time of arrest and therefore, arrest was illegal and it was also illegal on account of violation of the provisions of Article 22 (1) of the Constitution of India. The remand order was passed under Section 167 Cr. P. C. which has to be passed after application of judicial mind and after considering the facts of the case whether the accused should be remanded to judicial custody or not. In the instant case the Court had found that once it is shown that the arrests made by the Police Officer were illegal it was necessary for the State to establish that at the stage of remand the Magistrate directed the detention in jail after applying his mind to all the relevant matters. ( 11 ) IN the case in hand, the accused-applicant was remanded to judicial custody under Section 209 (b) Cr. P. C. by a warrant, the language of which has been quoted above. The direction in the remand warrant was specific that the accused is remanded to judicial custody during and until conclusion of the trial. In this view of the matter the remand of the applicant cannot be said to be invalid so long as Full Bench decision in Orooj Abbass case is overruled by a larger Bench. No infirmity in the warrant has been pointed out. ( 12 ) THE controversy which has been raised in this case has arisen from time to time in a large number of cases and the Court has to deal with it time and again. No infirmity in the warrant has been pointed out. ( 12 ) THE controversy which has been raised in this case has arisen from time to time in a large number of cases and the Court has to deal with it time and again. Unnecessary litigation arises on account of slackness and negligence on the part of Committing Magistrates. As a rule of caution it is highly desirable for the Magistrates while committing the case to the Court of Session that they pass an order of remand under Section 209 (b) of the Cr. P. C. so that such litigation may be avoided. ( 13 ) AS regards submission of the learned counsel for the applicant that no remand order under Section 309 Cr. P. C. was passed, in my view, once the accused has been remanded to judicial custody by a warrant at the time of committal of the case to the Court of Session for a period during and until conclusion of the trial, no fresh order of remand is needed under Section 309 Cr. P. C. What is required by the Court of Session or the trial Court is that while adjourning the case it should give reasons for doing so. ( 14 ) IN this view of the matter there is no force in the second submission of the learned counsel for the applicant. Bail application is, therefore, rejected. ( 15 ) SINCE it has been observed above that as a rule of caution it is highly desirable for the Committing Magistrates to pass an order of remand under Section 209 (b) Cr. P. C. while committing the case to the Court of it would be proper that this observation of the Court is brought to the notice of the Magistrates so that the situation arising out of non-passing of such order is avoided. ( 16 ) LET a copy of this order be sent to all the Sessions Judges and Chief Judicial Magistrates for bringing it to the notice of the Magistrates. Application dismissed. .