JUDGMENT 1. - The present case is a classic example of casual manner in which the Government briefs are handled and thereby the courts are misled.Petition challenging the no confidence motion contains the facts and grounds that (i) meeting of no confidence did not precede with fifteen clear days notice (ii) the competent authority did not preside over the meeting nor record any reasons for not doing so and, (iii) although the Sub Divisional Officer, Kotputali was nominated to preside over the meeting of no confidence was presided over Tehsildar, Kotputali. Petitioner Madan Lai (herein respondent No. 1) filed only two documents alongwith the petition in support of the allegation i.e. notice dated 13.10.1998 (Annexure No. 1) and the proceeding of the no confidence motion dated 23.10.1998 (Annexure No. 2), Obviously to support his contention to challenge calling of meeting of no confidence without fifteen clear days intervening between the day on which the notice was issued and day on which meeting was held. Respondents not file any return. Order sheet dated 2.12.1998 (sic.) that the counsel for the respondents submit that no reply is required and case be heard finally. In the absence of reply, allegations that the competent authority did not record and reason for not presiding over the meeting and the allegation that instead of nominated Sub Divisional Officer Kotputali, Tehsildar Kotputali presided over the meeting, has gone uncontroverted. It may be mentioned here that none of the members of the gram panchayat Paota who brought the no confidence motion against the respondent No. 1, were made parties to the writ petition. 2. The learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition and set-aside the no confidence motion passed against the respondent No. 1 on the grounds that the competent authority could not have delegated his powers to preside over the meeting without recording cogent reasons which is mandatory provision under Section 37(4) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and those reasons should also be known to the parties concerned. The court records that the Chief Executive Officer had only passed an order saying that the S.D.O. shall preside over the meeting and no reasons have been given in the order nor any reason has been brought on record by the respondents. The court records that the Chief Executive Officer had only passed an order saying that the S.D.O. shall preside over the meeting and no reasons have been given in the order nor any reason has been brought on record by the respondents. The court was of the view that since mandatory requirement was not complied with the entire proceedings in the meeting stands vitiated. Secondly, meeting was presided over by the Tehsildar Kotputali who was not nominated by the competent authority and, therefore, proceedings in no confidence cannot be given effect to. The learned Single Judge did not deal with the question of fifteen clear days notice as he allowed the writ petition of the respondent (in writ petition) on two grounds. 3. Eighteen panchas filed an application to permit them to file an appeal challenging the order of the leanred Single judge, as they were not parties to the writ petition. Alongwith the appeal the appellants have filed three documents. Annexure No. 1 is a letter dated 16.10.1998 sent by the S.D.O. Kotputali informing the competent authority that he shall not be available to preside over the no confidence motion meeting dated 23.10.1998 as 'teeka' ceremony of his brother is arranged on that date. Annexure No. 2 is an order dated 16.10.1998 passed by the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad Jaipur to the effect that the previous order nominating S.D.O. Kotputali is changed on account of his inability to attend the no confidence meeting and instead thereof Tehsildar Kotputali is nominated to preside over the meeting. Annexure No. 3 is the note-sheets of the proceedings recorded by the Chief Executive Officer, the competent authority right from the beginning of the no confidence motion proceedings under Section 37(2) onwards in which it was specifically recorded on 31.8.1998 that on account of on going 'samasya samaadhaan' camp and his supervisory duties it will not be possible for him to preside over the meeting of no confidence personally and thus in exercise of the powers under Section 37 he nominates S.D.O. Kotputali who will preside over the meeting. This Court has permitted by order dated 2.5.1999 the panchas to file appeal and the documents filed alongwith the appeal were also permitted to be taken on record. We have sent for the original record and perused the same during the course of arguments. This Court has permitted by order dated 2.5.1999 the panchas to file appeal and the documents filed alongwith the appeal were also permitted to be taken on record. We have sent for the original record and perused the same during the course of arguments. The appeal was registered as D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 479/99. The State has also filed an appeal which is registered as D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 194/99. 4. From the aforesaid documents, filed alongwith the appeal, it is manifest that there was specie order issued by the competent authority nominating Tehsildar to preside over the no confidence motion meeting and it is not a case of sub delegation by the delegate i.e. S.D.O. nominating Tehsildar. The competent authority has a power to nominate presiding officer under sub-section (4) of Section 37 of the Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 37 of the Act authorises the competent authority to change an officer to preside over a meeting. Secondly it is not a case where reasons for not presiding over the meeting has not been recorded by the competent authority as required under the proviso to sub-section(4) of Section 37 of the Act. The competent authority has specifically recorded the reasons for his inability to preside over the meeting of no confidence motion personally. On account of non-submission of the correct and complete facts by the petitioner in the petition added by non-submission of the returns by the respondents, the learned Single Judge was misled on facts and has arrived at the conclusion which on correct appreciation of the facts could not have been arrived at. The findings and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge are set-aside on the basis of the material brought on record in appeal. 5. In view of our decision on the points decided by learned Single Judge, we normally are not called upon to consider the interpretation given by the learned Single Judge to Section 37(4) of the Act, that recording of a reason and communication of the same to the members is mandatory in nature. But, the question being of frequent occurrence, we think it proper to decide it. To appreciate the controversy whether sub-section (4) read with its proviso in its entirety is mandatory or not, it will be appropriate to reproduce sub-section (4) - "(4) The competent authority shall preside at such meeting. But, the question being of frequent occurrence, we think it proper to decide it. To appreciate the controversy whether sub-section (4) read with its proviso in its entirety is mandatory or not, it will be appropriate to reproduce sub-section (4) - "(4) The competent authority shall preside at such meeting. ; Provided if, for reasons to be recorded in writing, he is unable to do so, the officer nominated by him shall so preside." After the meeting of no confidence motion is called, it is necessary that the competent authority shall preside over such meeting. Proviso permits the competent authority to delegate its powers if he is not in a position to preside over meeting after recording the reasons in writing. It is now settled law that in classifying a provision as mandatory or directory the court must look into its purpose and its relationship with the scheme, subject matter and objective of the statute in which it appears. It is broadly true that the provisions will more readily be held to be directory if they relate to the performance of statutory duty, specially if serious public inconvenience would result from holding them to be mandatory. The intend of this section appears to be, that normally the competent authority should preside over the meeting of no confidence being the officer holding the responsible post. This is to ensure the fair and free proceedings of meeting of no confidence. The proviso is being added permitting the competent authority to delegate his powers to an officer because the legislatures are well aware of the fact that the competent authority holding a responsible post in the State service would not always be available to peside over the no confidence motion meeting, but then no confidence motion meeting has to be called within thirty days from the date the notice under sub-section (3) of Section 37. Proviso requires reasons to be recorded in writing for delegation. Delegation to subordinate officer is more or less an administrative power to be exercised by the competent authority. Delegation of power is restricted under the proviso itself when the delegation is permitted only to an officer. The meeting of no confidence is to be presided over either by the competent authority or the officer nominated by him. Delegation to subordinate officer is more or less an administrative power to be exercised by the competent authority. Delegation of power is restricted under the proviso itself when the delegation is permitted only to an officer. The meeting of no confidence is to be presided over either by the competent authority or the officer nominated by him. If he fails to record the reasons for delegating the powers to the officer, it does not affect the proceedings in the meeting. In fact it has nothing to do with the no confidence motion. The recording of the reasons is provided so that the competent authority may not shirk from his responsibility and delegate the powers at his whims. In our opinion recording of the reasons by the competent authority for delegating his powers although is intended to be obeyed but the failure to obey does not render the thing duly done in disobedience to a nullity. Recording of the reasoning by the competent authority in our view is directory and non- performance of the same shall not vitiate the entire and non-performance of the same shall not vitiate the entire no confidence motion proceedings. Further proviso to Section does not speak of, that the reasons recorded by the competent authority should also be known to the parties concerned, even liberal construction of the section does not call for such an interpretation. There is no reason to interpret this section to the extent that the reasons should be intimated or should be known to the members concerned. It is not a case where the individual's right being affected by an order passed by an authority wherein recording of reason is held to be mandatory. In catena of cases recording of reason is held to be mandatory where the right and interest of an individual person or public in general is affected by the order passed by an authority. But that is not case here, recording of the reason is only for the purpose of delegating the powers to some other officer by the competent authority. At the same time we are of the view that presiding over the meeting by the competent authority or by his delegate, by the person who is an officer, is a mandatory requirement. The meeting of no confidence is to be presided over by the competent authority or by the officer nominated by him and none else. At the same time we are of the view that presiding over the meeting by the competent authority or by his delegate, by the person who is an officer, is a mandatory requirement. The meeting of no confidence is to be presided over by the competent authority or by the officer nominated by him and none else. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the provision that the competent authority or his delegated officer shall preside over the no confidence motion meeting is a mandatory requirement of law. Non-compliance of the same would vitiate the proceedings of the no confidence motion and the motion of no confidence itself. However the provision of recording the reasons by competent authority for delegation of his power in writing is directory and non-compliance of the same will not vitiate the entire proceedings unless it is shown that serious prejudice is caused to the party by non-compliance of directory provision. 6. This brings us to the third submission that fifteen clear days notice was not given before the meeting and, therefore, proceedings of no confidence motion meeting and the resolution passed therein are void and inoperative in law. The gram panchayat Paota consists of twenty one members. Madan Lai, the respondent No. 1, was elected as its Sarpanch. The requisite number of panchas have moved a written notice before the competent authority expressing their intention to bring the no confidence motion against Madan Lai Sarpanch. The competent authority took requisite steps and issued notice on 24.8.1998 and the meeting was scheduled to be held on 18.9.1998. Respondent No. 1 Madan Lal challenged the notice and constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Act in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4746/98. The High Court vide its order dated 17.9.1998 directed the parties to maintain status quo till 10.10.1998. However, the stay order granted by the court was vacated on 7.10.1998. Thereafter a fresh notice was issued on 13.10.1998 fixing the meeting of no confidence on 23.10.1998. It is this notice which is challenged by the respondent No. 1 Madan Lal which, according to him, is invalid because it does not give fifteen clear days notice of the meeting of no confidence. 7. To appreciate the submission in the facts of the case, it would be necessary to appreciate the scheme of Section 37 of the Act. It is this notice which is challenged by the respondent No. 1 Madan Lal which, according to him, is invalid because it does not give fifteen clear days notice of the meeting of no confidence. 7. To appreciate the submission in the facts of the case, it would be necessary to appreciate the scheme of Section 37 of the Act. Under Section 37(1) a procedure to be followed for want of confidence in the Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson of the Panchayati Raj Institution is indicated. Sub-section (2) of Section 37 lays down that for moving the machinery into action for no confidence motion, a written notice of intention to make the motion of no confidence signed by not less than one-third of the directly elected members of the panchayati raj institution together with a copy of the proposed motion should be delivered in person by any signatory members to the competent authority. Sub-section (3) of Section 37 enjoins upon the competent authority to forward the copy of notice together with a copy of the proposed motion to the panchayati raj institution. The competent authority is required to convene a meeting for consideration of the motion at the office of the concerned panchayati raj institution on a date fixed by him which shall not be later than thirty days from the date on which the notice under sub-section (1) was delivered to the competent authority. Sub-clause (iii) of section 37(3) requires that the competent authority shall give to the members a notice of not less than fifteen clear days of the meeting.Explanation to sub-section (3) says that in counting the period of thirty days specified in this sub-section (3) the period during which the convening of the meeting is stayed by the court shall be excluded. Sub-section (4) requires that the competent authority shall preside over the meeting or he may delegate his powers to the officer nominated by him for the reasons to be recorded. Sub- section (5) is to the effect that a meeting convened under sub-section (3) shall not be adjourned. Sub-section (6) lays down that as soon as the meeting is convened under this section is commenced the presiding officer shall read to the members present the motion which has been moved, for their consideration and declare that the debate is open. Sub- section (5) is to the effect that a meeting convened under sub-section (3) shall not be adjourned. Sub-section (6) lays down that as soon as the meeting is convened under this section is commenced the presiding officer shall read to the members present the motion which has been moved, for their consideration and declare that the debate is open. Sub-section (7) lays down a condition that the debate on motion shall not be adjourned i.e. to say that once the debate is open it has to be completed. Sub- section (8) fixes the maximum time limit in which the debate has to be concluded which is two hours. The presiding officer on conclusion of the debate or on the expiry of two hours whichever is earlier shall put the motion for vote. The other provisions are not very much material for deciding the present question raised before us. 8. From the scheme of Section 37 it is clear that the no confidence motion brought against the Sarpanch has to be concluded within thirty days of the written notice of intention to make the motion of no confidence is presented before the competent authority. The only laxity is to the effect that the period which is spent on account of the stay order granted by the court shall be excluded. The competent authority or any other authority do not have a power to fix up the meeting after thirty days of the written notice submitted under sub-section (2) of Section 37 of the Act. Meeting has to be completed within thirty days. Sub-section (5) put further embargo that a meeting once convened under sub-section (3) shall not be adjourned. The competent authority or any other authority do not have a power to fix up the meeting after thirty days of the written notice submitted under sub-section (2) of Section 37 of the Act. Meeting has to be completed within thirty days. Sub-section (5) put further embargo that a meeting once convened under sub-section (3) shall not be adjourned. Proceedings of no confidence has to be terminate within the time frame, legislative intention is manifest when provision is made that meeting cannot be fixed later than thirty days of intention of no confidence express by members, meeting convened cannot be adjourned, limiting the time for debate, duty cast on presiding officer to put for vote of no confidence motion, immediately on conclusion of debate, urgency will be lost if every subsequent notice calling for meeting would require fifteen days clear notice, in the scheme of Section 37 it does not appear to be what legislature meant.On plane reading of clause (iii) of sub-section (3) of Section 37 of the Act it is apparent to us that legislative intention is, that there should be fifteen clear days notice. The legislature provided this so that the members who have to attend the very important meeting could adjust their schedule for attending it. Further they can give serious thought to the proposed no confidence motion moved against the Head of the panchayati raj institution who is holding a very important position. The said purpose of the legislation has been accomplished when the first notice of the meeting was given on 24.8.1998. It is because of the status quo order granted by the High Court the meeting could not be held and further notice issued informing that in place of the old date, on a future date the meeting shall be held. The second notice is not the notice under clause (iii) of Section 37(3) of the Act. In fact the meeting was convened in accordance with law but because of the order of status quo it could not be held. The second notice issued on 13.10.1998 fixing the meeting 23.10.1998 is in furtherance of the notice issued on 24.8.1998 changing the date of the meeting only. There is no requirement of law of giving fifteen clear days notice for intimation of change of date of meeting 9. The second notice issued on 13.10.1998 fixing the meeting 23.10.1998 is in furtherance of the notice issued on 24.8.1998 changing the date of the meeting only. There is no requirement of law of giving fifteen clear days notice for intimation of change of date of meeting 9. For the aforesaid reasons we are of the view that the meeting held on 23.10.1998 complies with the mandatory requirement of law. No confidence motion passed against the respondent No. 1 Madan Lal by eighteen members is upheld. The appeals are allowed with cost of Rs. 5000/-(Rupees five thousand) to be paid by respondent No. 1. The cost shall be paid to the appellants in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No 479/99.Appeal allowed with costs of Rs. 5000/-. *******