Honble MATHUR, J.–This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 3.12.98 passed by the learned Special Judge S.C./S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act Cases cum Addl. Sessions Judge, Pratapgarh, convicting the appellant of offence under Section 376 IPC and sentencing him to `seven years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. one thousand and in default, to further undergo three months rigorous imprisonment. The appellant has also been convicted for the offence under Section 366 IPC and sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. five hundred and in default, to further undergo two months rigorous imprisonment. He has further been convicted of offence under Section 3(2) (v) of the Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, hereinafter referred-to as `the S.C./S.T. Act and sentenced to imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. five hundred and in default, to further undergo two months simple imprisonment. All the substantive sentences have been ordered to run concurrently. (2). The brief facts of the case are that on 20.06.1992 at about 7.30 AM, one Mst. Laxmi lodged an oral First Information Report at Police Station, Pratapgarh, stating inter alia that on the last evening at about 8 PM, she alongwith three other girls namely Kanta, Bhuri and Kani were at the Bus Stand, Banswara awaiting bus for going to Surpur. At that time, the truck bearing No. NP41-A5271 arrived and the driver of the truck offered them to board the truck and assured that he would drop them at their respective destinations, Accordingly, they boarded and occupied the seats in the cabin of the truck. The driver did not stop the truck at Surpur inspite of their protest and proceeded towards Suhagpura. The truck was stopped on the way prior to Suhagpura. They were asked to get down. Another truck also arrived there. The accused persons asked Bhuri and Kanta to board the other truck. Then, both the trucks moved together and passed through village Suhagpura. They stopped near village Timarva. The driver of the truck accused Pappu Khan committed rape on her in the cabin of the truck. On resistance, she was being assaulted. She also stated that accused Balu Committed rape on Mst. Bhuri. After committing rape, they were being taken in unknown direction. They stopped near village Timarva. The driver of the truck accused Pappu Khan committed rape on her in the cabin of the truck. On resistance, she was being assaulted. She also stated that accused Balu Committed rape on Mst. Bhuri. After committing rape, they were being taken in unknown direction. At about 5 AM when truck stopped at Dhariavad Octroi Outpost, they saw some policemen standing. Seeing them, they raised cry which attracted the attention of the policemen. The driver and the Khalasi seeing the policemen jumped the truck and ran away. They got down from the truck and narrated the entire incident to the policemen. On this information, police registered a case of the offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of S.C./S.T. Act. Both the trucks were seized. The informant and the other girls were sent for medical examination. The accused persons were arrested. After usual investigation, police laid a chargesheet against the appellant Pappu Khan and accused Balu for the aforesaid offences. (3). The accused appellants denied the charge and claimed trial. The prosecution in support of its case examined as many as eight witnesses and produced number of documents. Both the accused persons in their statements u/Sec. 313 Cr.P.C. stated that they have been falsely implicated. As Mst. Bhuri did not appear in the witness box, the learned Judge found no evidence against the accused Balu and, therefore, acquitted him of the charges levelled against him. Relying on the testimony of prosecutrix Mst. Laxmi corroborated by medical evidence, the learned Judge convicted and sentenced the appellant as stated above. (4). Assailing the conviction it is contended by Mr. B.N. Kalla, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, that the learned trial Judge has committed error in convicting the appellant on the sole testimony of Mst. Laxmi without any corroborative evidence. Alternatively, it is submitted that it was case of consent and, as such, the conviction of the appellant for the offence u/S. 376 IPC and allied offences is not sustainable. In support of the proposition that the conviction cannot be sus-sustained for the offence under Section 376 IPC without corroboration of the statement of the prosecutrix, learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Harjibhai vs. State of Gujarat (1). (5). We have carefully gone through the said decision. In support of the proposition that the conviction cannot be sus-sustained for the offence under Section 376 IPC without corroboration of the statement of the prosecutrix, learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Harjibhai vs. State of Gujarat (1). (5). We have carefully gone through the said decision. In our view, the learned counsel has completely misread the decision. In para 11 repelling such contention, the court observed that on principle, the evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands at par with evidence of an injured witness. Just as a witness who has sustained an injury, is the best witness in the sense that he is least likely to excul-pate the real offender, the evidence of victim of sex offence is entitled to great weight even without corroboration. The court further observed that to insist on corroboration of the evidence of a victim of a sex offence is nothing but adding insult to the injury. The court held thus- ``We are, therefore, of the opinion that if the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity, and the `probabilities factor does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from the medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming, subject to the follo-wing qualification; Corroboration may be insisted upon when a woman having attained majority is found in a compromising position and there is a likelihood of her having levelled such an accusation on account of the instinct of self-preservation. Or when the `probabilities factor is found to be out of tune. (6). Thus, as a general rule, the evidence of a victim of sexual assault, does not require any corroboration unless the evidence of the victim suffers from any basic infirmity or in a case, where a woman having attained the majority, is found in a compromising position and there is a likelihood of her having levelled such an accusation on account of the instinct of self-preservation or in a case when the `probabilities factor is found to be out of tune. (7). We have scanned the prosecution evidence. PW 7 Mst. Laxmi in her statement has given the narration of the incident as given in the F.I.R. which we have already stated. (7). We have scanned the prosecution evidence. PW 7 Mst. Laxmi in her statement has given the narration of the incident as given in the F.I.R. which we have already stated. Thus, it is not necessary to re-state the same. In the cross examination, there is no suggestion that the appellant indulged in sexual inter-cou-rse with her consent. She of-course admitted that she alongwith other girls boarded the truck on their own but this can not be construed as consent to sexual intercourse. They boarded the truck as the accused had told that he will drop them at their respective places. Nothing has been elicited in the cross examination on the basis of which it can be said that her evidence suffers from any infirmity, much less the basic infirmity. Thus, in our view, her statement is credit worthy. (8). PW 1 Govindlal Tiwari, a police constable, has stated that on 20.6.92, he was posted at Octroi Outpost of Dhariavad alongwith some other police personnels. At that time, two trucks arrived and they stopped at the barrier of the Octroi Outpost. They heard the cries for help of some girls from the truck. They rushed to the truck. Seeing them, the truck driver and the Khalasi ran away leaving the truck on the spot. The girls were in distress and weeping. He alongwith other police constables brought them down from the truck. The girls disclosed that the accused persons committed rape on them. On a specific question, it was disclosed by Mst. Laxmi that Pappu had committed rape on her. Mst. Bhuri also disclosed that she was being raped by Balia. He brought the girls to the Police Station. Nothing has been elicited in the cross examination to discredit the statement of this witness. PW 2 Narainlal has stated almost in the same line. PW 3 Ashok Kumar and PW 4 Narainlal did not support the prosecution case and, as such, they were declared hostile. (9). PW 5 Dr. Sukesh Sharma has stated that on 20.6.92 on the request of the police, he medically examined Mst. Laxmi and Mst. Bhuri. He opined that as per the report of Dr. K.L. Porwal, Radiologist, Mst. Laxmi was 22 years of age and she was habitual to sexual intercourse. He also proved the injury report Ex. P.5. He noticed following injuries on her person: ``1. Laxmi and Mst. Bhuri. He opined that as per the report of Dr. K.L. Porwal, Radiologist, Mst. Laxmi was 22 years of age and she was habitual to sexual intercourse. He also proved the injury report Ex. P.5. He noticed following injuries on her person: ``1. Swelling 15cm x 10.5cm on the lest elbow; 2. Swelling 12.5cm x 4.5cm on the right shoulder; 3. Swelling 5cm x 4cm on the right leg upper 1/2 ant. aspect. (10). The injuries of resistance provides corroboration to the statement of prosecutrix PW 8. She has also stated that at the first opportunity when they saw the policemen at the Octroi Outpost at Dhariavad, they made a cry for help. This statement is corroborated by the statement of PW 1 Govindlal Tiwari and PW 2 Narainlal. Thus, the prosecution has succeeded in establishing charge of kidnapping and rape against the accused appellant. The trial court has rightly convicted the appellant of offence u/S. 366 and 376 IPC. (11). Turning to the conviction of appellant of offence under Section 3(2) (v) of the S.C./S.T. Act, the core question which falls for consideration is- ``Whether simply because victim of I.P.C. offence punishable for ten years or more belongs to scheduled caste or scheduled tribe and the offender is not a person of scheduled caste or scheduled tribe, the offence under Sec. 3(2)(v) of S.C./S.T. Act punishable with imprisonment of life, is constituted? (12). Before we analyse Section 3(2)(v) to answer the question posed, it would be apt to acquaint in brief the provisions and purpose of the S.C./S.T. Act. The S.C./S.T. Act, 1989 has been enacted with twin objects, firstly to prevent the commi-ssion of offences of atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes and secondly to provide special courts for trial of such offences and for the relief and rehabilitation of the victim of such offences. The S.C./S.T. Act, 1989 has been enacted with twin objects, firstly to prevent the commi-ssion of offences of atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes and secondly to provide special courts for trial of such offences and for the relief and rehabilitation of the victim of such offences. Disturbed with the trend of commission of atrocities which are derogatory to human dignity like, forcing to remove the clothes, parading naked, land grabbing etc., and of late incr-ease of instances of mass killings of helpless persons of SC/ST and rape on women belonging to said caste or tribe and having realised that existing laws like Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 and normal provisions of Indian Penal Code are inadequate, the S.C./S.T. Act has been enacted to check and prevent crime against persons of S.C./S.T. Chapter II of the S.C./S.T. Act sets out not only the various acts of Atrocities constituting the offence under the Act but also sets out various offences under Indian Penal Code in aggravated form with more deterrent punishment. Offences under Indian Penal Code, which are punishable for term of ten years or more, are punishable under Sec. 3(2)(v) in aggravated form, when such an offence is committed by a Non S.C./S.T. person on a person of S.C./S.T., on the ground that such a person is member of S.C./S.T. Section 3(2) (v) reads as follows- ``Sec. 3 Punishment of offences of atrocities- (1) xxxxxxx (i) xxxxx (ii) xxxxx (iii) xxxxx (2) Whoever, not being a member of scheduled caste or scheduled tribe- (i) xxxxx (ii) xxxxx (iii) xxxxx (iv) xxxxx (v) commits any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine; (13). Thus, on analysis, it clearly appears that in order to bring home an offence within clause (v) of Section 3(2) beside proving the ingredients of the respective offences under Indian Penal Code, it will further have to be shown that offence has been committed- (i) by a person who is not a member of S.C./S.T.; (ii) on the ground; (iii) that the victim is a member of S.C./S.T. (14). In sub clause (v) of Section 3(2), the use of words ``on the ground is of great significance. It is the cardinal principle of interpretation that Statute rules out redundancy. Effect must be given if possible to all the words used. The Legislature deemed not to waste its words. The rule of strict construction of penal Statute requires that language of the Statute is to be construed in a sense which it best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object it has in view, and that no clause, sentence or word is used which is superfluous or insignificant. The word ``on the ground used in sub clause (v) of Section 3(2) is of significance. On a proper construction of the offence u/Sec. 3(2)(v) beside proving the ingredients of respective offence under Indian Penal Code, and the offender being a person of non S.C./S.T., the prosecution is further required to prove that the target of crime was selected on the ground that he/she belongs to S.C./S.T. For illustration, facts of the case of Kannan vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2) can be referred. In the said case, some persons of non S.C./S.T. resolved to catch hold of Harijans of Peria Colony and teach them a lesson. The identified persons of Harijan Community tied them with the poles and assaulted on account of which they died. Thus, it was a case of atrocity on the ground of racial prejudice falling within the ambit of Sec. 3(2) (v) of the Act. Thus, for offence u/S. 3(2)(v) of the S.C./S.T. Act beside the ingredients of respective offence of Indian Penal Code, the prosecution is further required to establish that accused being a person of non S.C./S.T. has committed the crime on person of S.C./S.T. for the reason that such person belongs to such community or tribe. (15). We are fortified in our view by a Division Bench judgment of this court and the decisions of Gujarat and Kerala High Court. (16). This court in Kishore alias Kishore Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (3) found that the basic ingredient of Sec. 3(2)(v) of the Act has not been proved by the prosecution inasmuch as there was no evidence to show that the prosecutrix, who belonged to the Scheduled Caste, was subjected to sexual assault on the ground that she was a member of Scheduled Caste. Thus, the conviction under Sec. 3(2)(v) of the Act was quashed and set aside. (17). The Gujarat High Court in Lalubha Keshrisingh Garasia vs. State of Gujarat (4) held that for the offence under Sec. 3(2) (v) of the Act, it is not sufficient that the injured person should be a member of either caste but it is further required to be proved that the offence is committed on the ground of victim being a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The court further held that in absence of such material, the accused cannot be convicted merely because the injured person happens to be a person of S.C./S.T. (18). The Kerala High Court in Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala (5) while considering one of the important ingredients of the offence u/S. 3(2)(v) of the Act i.e. commission of the offence on the ground that such member is a person of S.C./S.T., held that a cause for offence must contain an element of racial prejudice. (19). The learned Public Prosecutor has referred to a recent decision of the Apex Court in Kumudi Lal vs. State of U.P. (6) wherein the conviction of the accused for the offence u/S. 3(2)(v) of the Act has been upheld. In the said case, the accused committed rape on a minor girl and when she started resisting, raising shouts, the accused strangulated and killed her by tying her Salwaar around the neck. The accused in the said case was convicted for the offence u/S. 376 and 302 IPC and also of the offence u/S. 3(2)(v) of the Act and sentenced to death. The Apex Court found no infirmity in the evidence of the eye witnesses and as such upheld the conviction of the appellant for the offences of rape and murder. The main contention raised in the said case was as to whether it was a fit case for death sentence or not? In the facts of the case, while upholding the conviction of the accused appe-llant in the said case for the offences u/Secs. 376 and 302 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the Apex Court modified the order of imposing death sentence and altered the same to imprisonment for life. In the facts of the case, while upholding the conviction of the accused appe-llant in the said case for the offences u/Secs. 376 and 302 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the Apex Court modified the order of imposing death sentence and altered the same to imprisonment for life. Though conviction u/S. 3(2)(v) of the Act has been upheld in said case, but as the provision has not been analysed and considered, it does not provide any guidance to answer the question posed. (20). In the instant case, the only evidence is that accused appellant Pappu Khan committed rape on Mst. Laxmi knowing that she is a lady belong to Scheduled Tribe, but there is no evidence that he committed rape on her for the reason that she belonged to Scheduled tribe. He raped her without prejudice of caste to which she belongs only to satisfy his sexual desire. Thus, in our view, the conviction of the appellant u/Sec. 3(2)(v) is not sustainable and the same is liable to be quashed. (21). In view of the aforesaid discussion, this appeal is partly allowed. The conviction and sentence of the appellant for the offence u/S. 3 (2)(v) of the Act is quashed and set aside. The conviction and sentence of the appellant for the offence under Sections 366 and 376 IPC is upheld.