V. M. SAHAI, J. ( 1 ) THE question for consideration in this petition is whether the order dismissing the petitioner, amanager of a Cooperative Bank was in accordance with law. ( 2 ) THE petitioner was initially appointed as Typist-cum-Clerk in the bank on 1. 10. 1953 and was promoted as Branch Manager on 1. 1. 1972. He was suspended on 14. 1. 1986. On 27. 12. 1986 an enquiry officer was appointed who issued a charge-sheet to him on 25. 2. 1987. He was dismissed on 8. 5. 1989. He claimed that the copies of documents which were to be relied against him were not provided along with the charge-sheet, nor papers relating to loan given to Smt. Kailashi Devi and the vouchers of Sri A. K. Bajpayee were provided to him. He further claimed that he was not given opportunity to cross-examine the Bank Manager and the witnesses, therefore, he could not defend himself and the enquiry proceedings were contrary to principles of natural Justice. On 10. 8. 1988, a show cause notice was given to the petitioner which was replied by him on 17. 8. 1988. On 23. 8. 1988/9. 9. 1988. the bank sought concurrence from the U. P. Cooperative institutional Service Board (in brief Board) for dismissing the petitioner from service. The Board by its letter dated 27. 12. 1988 refused to grant concurrence as Regulations 85 (i) to 85 (iv) of the u. P. Co-operative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975 (in brief Regulations) had not been complied. It was further directed that a proper recommendation be sent by the respondents. On 2. 2. 1989, the bank reiterated that earlier recommendation for dismissal of petitioner made on 23. 8. 1988/ 9. 9. 1988 was in accordance with law. And in case no final decision is taken, then burden of paying heavy salary to the petitioner will come on the bank. The Board ultimately by it s letter dated 24. 4. 1989 granted concurrence to the dismissal of the petitioner from service, as provided by Regulation 87, and an order was passed on 8. 5. 1988 by respondent No. 3, dismissing the petitioner from service. A copy of the order has been filed as Annexure-1 to this writ petition. The Board ultimately by it s letter dated 24. 4. 1989 granted concurrence to the dismissal of the petitioner from service, as provided by Regulation 87, and an order was passed on 8. 5. 1988 by respondent No. 3, dismissing the petitioner from service. A copy of the order has been filed as Annexure-1 to this writ petition. ( 3 ) SRI Ashok Khare, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the Board refused to grant concurrence to the recommendation sent by the respondents to dismiss the petitioner from service on the ground that Regulations 85 (i) and 85 (iv) had not been complied with by the respondents. Therefore, it was necessary for the bank to follow the procedure prescribed under regulation 85 and make a fresh recommendation to the Board. He urged that it was not open to the bank to reiterate its earlier recommendation dated 23. 8. 1988/ 9. 9. 1988 without complying with the Regulation 85 as pointed out by the Board in it s letter dated 27. 12. 1988. And the Board acted illegally in granting concurrence on 24. 7. 1989 under pressure of financial liability. It amounted to review of the earlier order dated 27. 12. 1988 but since no power of review has been conferred, under the regulations, upon the Board, the concurrence granted by the Board was illegal and the order dismissing the petitioner was liable to be set aside. Further, the learned counsel urged that the order suffered from manifest error of law as it was passed without following the principles of natural justice as provided by the regulations. ( 4 ) SRI M. M. D. Agarwal. learned counsel for the respondents argued that the petitioner had an alternative remedy under Section 128 of the Act before the Registrar. He further argued that the order passed by the Board on 24. 4. 1989 did not amount to review and since the charge against the petitioner was of embezzlement of Rs. 12. 500 and tampering with the records of the bank, and embezzlement of Rs. 4,000. therefore, the petitioner was not entitled for any indulgence by this Court. ( 5 ) TO decide whether the petitioner had an alternative remedy, it is necessary to understand the constitution of Co-operative Societies and the scheme of disciplinary proceedings against the employees under it. There are basically three types of Co-operative Societies, namely. 4,000. therefore, the petitioner was not entitled for any indulgence by this Court. ( 5 ) TO decide whether the petitioner had an alternative remedy, it is necessary to understand the constitution of Co-operative Societies and the scheme of disciplinary proceedings against the employees under it. There are basically three types of Co-operative Societies, namely. Primary society as defined in Section 2 (q-1 ). Central Society as defined in Section 2 (d-1) and apex aociety as defined in Section 2 (a-4 ). The area of operation of the primary society is within the district and is confined to one village or more than one villages only and they are maximum at the block level. The area of operation of Central Society extends to more than one district as the other co-operative societies can be made it s members. The area of operation of the apex society is in the entire State of Uttar Pradesh as the primary and Central societies and other societies are its members. To deal with recruitment, training and disciplinary control of employees of co-operative societies or a class of co-operative societies. Section 122 (2) of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (in brief Act) empowered the State Government to constitute an authority or authorities. In exercise of this power, the Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Institutional service Board was constituted which framed the U. P. Co-operative Societies Employees service Regulations. 1975. It was published in the U. P. Gazette, Extra Ordinary dated 6th of january, 1976 for apex level societies or central level societies, etc. On its promulgation, any regulation made under Section 121 of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965, stood superseded. It is not disputed that these regulations apply to the employees of the bank, except its managing Directors, for which there are different rules. ( 6 ) REGULATION dealing with disciplinary proceedings may now be examined. Regulation 84 contained in Chapter VII of the Regulations defines penalties, which are as follows : "penalties (a) censure, (b) withholding of increment, (c) fine on an employee of category IV (Peon. Chaukidar etc.) (d) recovery from pay or security deposit to compensate in whole or in part for any pecuniary loss caused to the cooperative society by the employees conduct, (e) reduction in rank or grade held subs tan lively by the employees, (f) removal from service, or (g) dismissal from service. Chaukidar etc.) (d) recovery from pay or security deposit to compensate in whole or in part for any pecuniary loss caused to the cooperative society by the employees conduct, (e) reduction in rank or grade held subs tan lively by the employees, (f) removal from service, or (g) dismissal from service. ( 7 ) MANNER of disciplinary proceeding to be drawn is given in further clauses of Regulations 84 and 85. An appeal is available against the order imposing minor punishments under Regulation 86. For major punishment in sub-clause (e) to (g) of Regulation 84, no appeal is provided because for Inflicting major punishment prior concurrence of the Board is required under regulation 87, which is the Supreme Body under the regulations. Sri Agarwal could not point out any provision under which an appeal could lie against an order inflicting major punishment. He relied vehemently on Section 128 of the Act and urged that the Registrar had ample power to pass appropriate order against the order dismissing petitioner from service. Section 128 of the act reads as under : "128. Registrars power to annul resolution of co-operative society or cancel order passed by an officer of a co-operative society in certain cases. The Registrar may (i) annul any resolution passed by the Committee of Management, or the general body of any co-operative society ; or (ii) cancel any order passed by an officer of a co-operative society : if he is of the opinion that the resolution of the order, as the case may be, is not covered by the objects of the society, or is in contravention of the provisions of this Act, the rules or the bye-laws of the society, whereupon every such resolution or order shall become void and inoperative and be deleted from the records of the society. " ( 8 ) THE power of the Registrar under Section 128 is not an appellate power against an order of the Board. Further, the notification constituting the Board provided that it would comprise of three senior a class officers having put in at least ten years of service. The senlormost was to be appointed Chairman. But what is most material is that the notification further provided that if any Additional Registrar was its Member or Chairman, he would be deemed to have been appointed as such. The senlormost was to be appointed Chairman. But what is most material is that the notification further provided that if any Additional Registrar was its Member or Chairman, he would be deemed to have been appointed as such. It is thus obvious that Registrar or any other officer notified under Section 3 (2) of the Act to assist the Registrar could be a Member or Chairman of the Board. Such a person cannot once act as Chairman or Member of the Board and grant or refuse concurrence under regulation 87 and then exercise the power under Section 128 of the Act. He cannot sit in judgment over his own order. The arguments of Sri M. M. D. Agrawal that against the concurrence given by the Board under Regulation 87 and consequent dismissal order, the petitioner could have approached the Registrar under Section 128 of the Act does not, therefore, appear to be correct. Under Section 128, the Registrar can annul any resolution passed by the committee of Management or the Board of Cooperative Societies or can cancel any order passed by an officer of a cooperative society. It does not provide any remedy against the orders passed by the Board. Section 128 of the Act has got no application as it applies only if any resolution of a society is either against the object of the Act or the resolution is against the provisions of the act, Rules or Bye-laws. The Registrar has got no power to annul the concurrence granted by the board. Therefore, the argument that the petitioner has an alternative remedy under Section 128 of the Act has got no substance. ( 9 ) THE next question is whether the order dismissing the petitioner from service can be upheld. To decide, it appears necessary to extract the relevant portion of the or der passed by the Board on 27. 12. 1988 : ^^m- iz- lgdkjh lalfkkxr lsok eamyandy[ku 27-12-88 i;k vius i=kad fe- fnukad 23-8-88@9-9-88 dk voyksdudjsa tks fd Jh nkl fuyfecr ofj"b kk[kk izcu/kd dhmkj iznsk lgdkjh lfefr dezpkjh lsok fofu;ekoyh 1975ds fofu;e la[;k 87 ds izkfo/kkuksa ds vurxzr lsok lekirls lecfu/kr gs A bl fo"k; eas eq> s ;g dgus dk funszk gqqqvk gs fd Jhnkl ds fo:) dh xbz vuqkklukred izf;k esas fofue; la[;k 85 1 85 4 dk ikyu u fd;s tkus ds dkj. k csadjh nkl ds lsok lekir lecu/kh izlrko ij eamy }kjk 1975ds fofu;e la[;k 87 ds vurxzr lgefr iznku djuk lehko ughgs A ekeys ds fulrkj. k gsrq iqu% fof/kor izlrko Hksts A g-larks"k dqekj Jhoklro lsok eamy A** ( 10 ) THE order is clear and explicit that due to non-compliance of Regulations 85 (i) and 85 (iv) of the Regulations, it was not possible to grant concurrence under Regulation 87. The non-concurrence was final and complete for the reasons of not following the procedure. The direction to send fresh proposal in accordance with law was made to remove the defects pointed out by the Board. But the bank on 2. 2. 1989 reiterated that the proposal was sent after , complying Regulations 85 (i) and 85 (iv ). The relevant portions of the letter is extracted below : ^^dk;kzy; ftyk lgdkjh csad fyiz/ kku dk;kzy; bvkok i=kad izkklu 88and89 fnukad 2-2-1989 lfpo] m- iz- lgdkjh lalfkkxr lsok e. My y[ku A egksn;] vkids i= fnukad 27-12-1988 ds lunhkz esa fuosnu djrkgsa fd fofue; 85 1 vksj 85 4 dk iw. kzz:i ls ifjikyufd;k x;k gs] bl lecu/k eas fueufyf[kr olrq flfkfr lsli"v gks tkrk gs A 1- Jh ?ku;ke nkl dks vkjksiandi= fnukad 25-2-87 dks i= la[;k 7952 ds }kjk fn;k x;k A 2- Jh ?ku;ke nkl us mijksdr vkjksiandi= dk Li"vhdj. kcgqr le; ckn fnukad 24-12-87 dks fn;k gs A 3- budk Li"vhdj. k lurks"ktud u ik;s tkus ij vkxs tkpdh izf;k viuk;h x;h A 4- ;g fd tkap vf/kdkjh us dbz volj tkp esa miflfkrgksus ds fn;s ysfdu Jh ?ku;ke nkl ldlsuk tkp esamiflfkr ugha gq;s rnqijkur tkp vf/kdkjh us fnukad2-2-88 dks viuh vk[;k lfpo csad dks izsf"kr dj nh A 5- tkpkf/kdkjh dh fu;qf l{ke vf/kdkjh }kjk fnukad27-12-86 i= la[;k 6310-16 ds }kjk l{ke vf/kdkjh }kjk dh x;h A mlds mijkur Jh ?ku;ke nkl ldlsuk dks dkj. kcrkvksa uksfvl fn;k x;k] ftldk Hkh dkbz lurks"ktud mkjugha fn;k A mijks i= fn;s tkus ls vc rd yxhkx 3 o"kzdk le; O;rhr gks pqdh gs vksj bl ij le; O;rhr gks pqdkgs vksj bl ij mppkf/kdkfj;ksa }kjk rduhdh dkj. kksa lli"v dksbz vfure fu. kz; ugha fy;k tk ldk A vxj vc Hkhbl ij dksbz fu. kz; ugh fy;k tkrk gs rks osru lecu/khhkkj Hkfo"; esa csad ij im+us dh iw. kksa lli"v dksbz vfure fu. kz; ugha fy;k tk ldk A vxj vc Hkhbl ij dksbz fu. kz; ugh fy;k tkrk gs rks osru lecu/khhkkj Hkfo"; esa csad ij im+us dh iw. kz lehkkouk gs A hkonh; lfpo@egkizcu/kd] ftyk lgdkjh csad fy-] bvkok-** ( 11 ) THIS recommendation was accepted. The only additional reason in this letter was that three years have elapsed and it would saddle the bank with heavy financial liability. The concurrence was granted by the Board on 24. 4. 1989. No attempt was made by the respondent to remove the procedural irregularities pointed out by the Board. The recommendation only narrated the dates when notice was given and that the authority was not satisfied with the reply. That was not sufficient. In reiterating the recommendation without removing the defects, the respondent acted in disregard of the order passed by the Board. And the Board failed to discharge its duty under regulation 87 in granting concurrence without removal of procedural violations under regulation 85. The Board has been constituted of senior and responsible. officers and entrusted with responsibility of discharging important duty that the recommendation for major punishment was made after following the procedure provided under the Regulations. Yet the Board on the latter occasion appears to have succumbed to the financial responsibility pointed out in the letter dated 2. 2. 1989. When it asked for fresh recommendation, then it, in according concurrence on the same material on which it had refused concurrence earlier, failed to discharge it s responsibility in accordance with Regulation 87. Since the Board is the supreme body and comprises of the senior members, the regulations have not provided any remedy by way of appeal against major punishments which is normally available in service rules. Once the Board refused to accord concurrence under Regulation 87 and the bank was directed to submit fresh recommendation, the earlier recommendation stood nullified and fresh proceedings should have been taken in accordance with law. The bank could not sit over Judgment on it in the garb of clarifying. The word, ^iqu%* in Hindi means again. Read in the context of the earlier expression used in the order dated 27. 12. 1988 that it was not possible to grant concurrence, the word ^iqu%* could only mean fresh recommendation in accordance with law and not the reiteration of earlier which was found contrary to the regulations. The word, ^iqu%* in Hindi means again. Read in the context of the earlier expression used in the order dated 27. 12. 1988 that it was not possible to grant concurrence, the word ^iqu%* could only mean fresh recommendation in accordance with law and not the reiteration of earlier which was found contrary to the regulations. ( 12 ) I may now point out some grave procedural violations committed by the inquiry officer to determine whether the concurrence granted by the Board was in accordance with Regulation 87 or it suffered from manifest error of law as argued by Sri Khare. In paragraph 7 of the writ petition, it is stated that the respondent did not give any opportunity of personal hearing even though it was demanded. It is not denied in the counter-affidavit. In paragraph 27 (2) of the counter-affidavit, vague assertion is made that after submitting his reply on 17. 8. 1988, the petitioner did not claim that he wanted further hearing. Personal hearing is a right given by the regulations. The failure to give it was in complete disregard of Regulation 85 (i) (b) of the regulations, which specifically provides that an employee shall be given not only opportunity of cross-examination but also be given an opportunity of hearing if he so desired. It further appears that the. Board before refusing to grant approval heard the petitioner as is mentioned in paragraph 37 of the counter-affidavit, yet the respondent did not care to grant personal hearing to the petitioner once the matter came back to it. This was the least the bank should have done. ( 13 ) FROM the counter-affidavit, it is clear that the enquiry officer appointed earlier was changed on objection of the petitioner and the new enquiry officer served the charge-sheet and directed the petitioner to file his reply by 15. 3. 1987. This time was extended. In paragraph 13 of the counter-affidavit, it is stated that the petitioner inspected all the documents and took copies of statements as was clear from Annexures-CA-2 and CA-3. Yet he did not file his reply. A perusal of CA-2 and CA-3 Indicates that the averment is not accurate as the petitioner clearly mentioned in CA-2 that on 6. 8. 1987. he could only get statements of employees mentioned at serial No. 4 in his application. Yet he did not file his reply. A perusal of CA-2 and CA-3 Indicates that the averment is not accurate as the petitioner clearly mentioned in CA-2 that on 6. 8. 1987. he could only get statements of employees mentioned at serial No. 4 in his application. It was mentioned that copy of the audit objection, which was the basis for starting the proceedings, has not been made available. In CA-3, it is mentioned that he has not still seen documents mentioned at serial Nos. 1, 3, 9 and 10. He requested for another date and demanded that attendance register of Shri A. K. Bajpayee of 83-84 may also be made available on next date. No other date was fixed. In paragraph 9 of the rejoinder-affidavit, the allegations of paragraphs 11. 12. 13. 14 and 15 of the counter-affidavit are not accepted to be correct as stated. The petitioner has stated that he was never served copy of the preliminary report and statement of witnesses recorded during preliminary enquiry and other relevant documents mentioned in the charge-sheet and during inspection, he failed to find relevant papers on record. In paragraph 10, it is stated that the petitioner submitted his reply on 24. 12. 1987 even though he was not provided the relevant documents. In reply to the show cause notice issued by the inquiry officer, the petitioner in respect of the charge No. 1 had stated in the end that the allegations were concocted and he would like to cross-examine not only the persons who made the statement but also Sri shatrughan Misra. The petitioner further stated that if during cross-examination, he felt it necessary to examine any witnesses, he would inform. In paragraph 12 of rejoinder-affidavit, the petitioner stated that the enquiry officer submitted the report without affording any opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses or producing the defence evidence. In paragraph 13 of the rejoinder-affidavit, it is stated that the enquiry officer submitted the report to the administrative committee without affording any opportunity to defend. ( 14 ) WHAT is clear that the petitioner submitted his reply to show cause notice on 24. 12. 1987. The enquiry officer submitted his report on 2. 2. 1988. There is no whisper in the counter-affidavit that the enquiry officer fixed any date for examination of witnesses between 24. 12. 1987 and 2. 2. 1988. ( 14 ) WHAT is clear that the petitioner submitted his reply to show cause notice on 24. 12. 1987. The enquiry officer submitted his report on 2. 2. 1988. There is no whisper in the counter-affidavit that the enquiry officer fixed any date for examination of witnesses between 24. 12. 1987 and 2. 2. 1988. The total period was approximately one month, yet the letter dated 2. 2. 1989 says many opportunities were given by enquiry officer to appear but the petitioner failed. This does not appear to be correct statement of fact. The Board was, therefore, right when it did not grant concurrence earlier. The enquiry officer after submission of reply did not fix any date for appearance of the petitioner. The enquiry officer under the regulations was duty bound to. follow the procedure of natural Justice. He could not have submitted the report without examining the witnesses mentioned in the charge-sheet and affording opportunity to petitioner to cross-examine. Even if the petitioner did not appear, the enquiry officer was bound to fix the date to examine the witnesses mentioned in the charge-sheet and then record the findings. The enquiry was thus against the Regulations and principle of natural justice. It is true as argued by sri Agarwal that the scope in the writ jurisdiction is very limited, yet it is obligatory on the Court to ensure that the disciplinary proceedings are held in accordance with rules and principle of natural justice. I have looked into the allegations not with a view to reappraise the material on record to come to a different conclusion but to determine whether the recommending and concurring authorities acted in accordance with principles of natural justice as envisaged in the regulations. The argument of Shri Agarwal, therefore, that this Court should not interfere under article 226 of the Constitution thus has no merits. Even the submission that the petitioner being guilty of embezzlement of huge amount, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction does not appear to have much substance as from Annexure-7 filed with the writ petition, it appears that the law officer while giving his opinion has observed that since sri G. D. Saxena has managed to get all the amounts returned to the bank. . . . . . it may be difficult to prove the charges like the attempt to misappropriate banks money. . . . . . it may be difficult to prove the charges like the attempt to misappropriate banks money. ( 15 ) IN these circumstances, the recommendation dated 2. 2. 1989 being contrary to the directions of the Boards order dated 27. 12. 1988 cannot be maintained. Since I am satisfied that the impugned order suffers from manifest error of law. I do not propose to examine the larger issue as to whether the Board could not have reviewed its earlier order on same material. ( 16 ) IN the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The orders dated 2. 2. 1989, 24. 4. 1989 and 8. 5. 1989, recommending dismissal of the petitioner, its concurrence by the Board and consequential order of dismissal, respectively, are quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to his salary and all consequential benefits till the date of retirement. He shall also be entitled to his post retirement benefits. The aforesaid directions shall be compiled within a period of three months from the date a certified copy of the judgment is produced before the respondents. The petitioner shall be entitled to costs.