JUDGMENT : Susanta Chatterji, A.C.J. 1. It is frequently said that life of law is no logic. it is experience. The present case is an illustration of such proposition. 2. Mahanadi Coalfields Limited, its Chief General Manager, Jagannath Area and three Project Officers of Balanda Colliery Ananta Open Cast Project and Jagannath Colliery, originally belonging to Mahanadi Coalfields in the district of Angul in Orissa have sought for the following reliefs In the circumstances it is humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be graciously pleased to issue a Rule Nisi in the nature of Writ of Certiorari and/or any other appropriate Writ or Writs calling upon the opp. parties to show cause as to why the Demand Notice Nos. 2056, 2059 and 2060, vide Annexure-3 series for Rs. 3,33,62, 858.00 shall not be quashed; And As to why it shall not be declared that the Dumpers as per list Annexure-1 series are not 'Motor Vehicles' within the meaning of Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Section 2(b) of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1975 and consequently they are not liable to tax under Sections 3 and 3-A of the Taxation Act, 1975; And As to why Mandamus shall not be issued restraining the opposite parties and each of them from demanding/ realising Motor Vehicles Tax against off-highway Dumpers belonging to the Petitioners; And As to why the opposite parties shall not be directed to refund the M. v. Tax amounting to Rs. 3,33,62,858.00 of 1997-98; And If the' opposite parties fail to show cause or show insufficient or false cause make the said Rule Nisi absolute; And Pass such other appropriate order/orders as deemed fit and proper. 3. This case has really a chequered background. In fact the Petitioners have challenged the demand for Motor Vehicles Tax against Dumpers belonging to Mahanadi Coalfields Limited and there is a prayer for direction to the opposite parties to refund the Motor Vehicles Tax amounting to Rs. 3,33,62,959.00 of the year 1997-98. 4. It is placed on record that in 1992 the State of Orissa through the Regional Transport Officer; Dhenkanal, opposite party No. 3, raised a demand of Rs. 3,33,62,959.00 of the year 1997-98. 4. It is placed on record that in 1992 the State of Orissa through the Regional Transport Officer; Dhenkanal, opposite party No. 3, raised a demand of Rs. 3,34.00,000.00 in respect of Dumpers possessed by six Projects of Mahanadi Coalfields Limited, such as, Jagannath Colliery, Ananta Open Cast Project, Balanda Colliery, Lingaraj Open Cast Project, Kalinga Open Cast Project and Bharatpur Colliery from the years of their commissioning up to 1992-95 on two foundations, such as (a) The judgment dated 29-4-1992 pronounced by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 868/77 in which the M.C.L's predecessor-in-interest was a party /appellant (Central Coalfields Ltd. v. State of Orissa) reported in A. 1. Rule 1992 S.C. 1371; and (b) The Notification dated 12-6-1989 by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 41(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 wherein 'Dumper' has been included as a type of medium and heavy motor vehicle. 5. It is further placed on record that Mahanadi Coalfields Limited and/or its Area authorities filed writ application bearing 0. J.C. No. 1389/93 in this Court was dismissed on 2-8-1993 relying on the decisions reported in Bolani Ores Ltd., and 1992 Supp. (3) S.C.C. 133. The SLP preferred in the Hon'ble Supreme Court was also dismissed in view of the aforesaid two decisions with liberty to approach the High Court in the event any vital evidence had not been considered. The Review Petition filed by Ib Valley Area, M.C.L. was also dismissed on 16-1-199, It is stated in the writ petition that the High Court of Orissa finally reached the conclusion in 1996 and by the judgment/order dated 10-4-96 in O.J. C. No. 811/94 filed by Jagannath Area, M.C.L. and the judgment/order dated 6-5-96 in O.J. c. No. 9330/95 filed by Ib Valley Area, M.C.L. that Dumpers were both registerable and taxable in law in view of the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in A. 1. Rule 1975 S.C. 17 (Bolani Ores case) and A. 1. Rule 1992 S.C. 1371 (Central Coalfields case). The Mahanadi Coalfields preferred two S.L. Ps. before the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide S.L.P.(C) No. 16476/96 and S.L. P.(C) No. 16596/96 against the judgments of the Orissa High Court in O.J. c. Nos. 811/96. Rule 1975 S.C. 17 (Bolani Ores case) and A. 1. Rule 1992 S.C. 1371 (Central Coalfields case). The Mahanadi Coalfields preferred two S.L. Ps. before the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide S.L.P.(C) No. 16476/96 and S.L. P.(C) No. 16596/96 against the judgments of the Orissa High Court in O.J. c. Nos. 811/96. and 9330/95 respectively and the said S.L. Ps were dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 20-9-1996 which decision is reported in (1996) 10 S.C. C. 676. 6. The present writ petition assails the levy of Motor Vehicles Tax up to 1997-98 on Dumpers of 35 tonnes and 35 tonnes used solely in the mining premises of the Petitioners on the ground that the said Dumpers are not Motor Vehices within the meaning of Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act and Section 2(b) of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1975 as held in the judgment dated 24-2-1997 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Good year India Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors. reported in A. 1. Rule 1997 S.C. 2038 (1997)5 S.C. C. 752. 7. It is the specific case of the Petitioners that the latest decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has given a new direction and has thrown light to find out a different way to assert that Dumpers are not 'Motor Vehicles', and even if they are called so, they are not taxable and the new interpretation as to reckon in the definition of 'Motor Vehicle' as adapted for use on public road/public place in respect of those used in mining area should be looked into. The concept of 'dominant use' within a mining area or within a specific premises and the incidental use on road, if any, should not be lost sight of. The ratio of the. decision in Goodyear India case(supra) has given a fresh life to consider the problem in the new perspective and the Petitioners can ask for remitting the matter to the authorities again and to permit the Petitioners to raise such facts and points of law for necessary reliefs as prayed for. 8. The ratio of the. decision in Goodyear India case(supra) has given a fresh life to consider the problem in the new perspective and the Petitioners can ask for remitting the matter to the authorities again and to permit the Petitioners to raise such facts and points of law for necessary reliefs as prayed for. 8. It is specifically averred in the writ petition that now a Three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court by judgment dated 24-2-97 in the aforesaid Goodyear India case(supra) has re-declared the law and has concluded that heavy moving vehicles such as Dumpers and Earth Movers are not adapted for use upon roads. The judgment of the Hon'bJe Supreme Court read with the Rules of 1989 makes it clear that off-highway Dumpers belonging to Mahanandi Coalfields Ltd. are fit for use within the colliery area only and are prohibited to go upon road by operation of law, i. e. the Rules of 1989 and those are neither motor vehicles nor registerable or taxable. 9. It is claimed that after the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid Goodyear India case Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. submitted application on 27/29-9-97 for refund of the amount deposited by it on account of Motor Vehicles Tax on off-highway Dumpers to the concerned R.T.O., but the authority, i. e. opposite party No. 3, refused to receive the same on 3-10-1997. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. filed further application for refund in form 'F' u/s II and Rule 17(ii) of the Act of 1975 and the Rules of 1976 respectively, which were not dealt with or disposed of in accordance with law. The grievance of the Petitioners is that the words 'adapted for use upon road' have now been differently interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as per the decision in Goodyear India case (supra) and in view thereof the Petitioners are entitled to ask for reliefs and the previous decisions do not stand in the way. It is submitted that having no alternative remedy, the Petitioners have sought for the reliefs as already indicated. 10. The writ petition is seriously contested by the opposite parties and there is comprehensive counter affidavit sworn by the Regional Transport Officer concerned. It is submitted that having no alternative remedy, the Petitioners have sought for the reliefs as already indicated. 10. The writ petition is seriously contested by the opposite parties and there is comprehensive counter affidavit sworn by the Regional Transport Officer concerned. The allegations made in the writ petition so far as the facts are concerned are denied and disputed and specific stand is taken to assert the right on the basis of the decisions of this Court as also of the Hon'ble Supreme Court between the parties as reported in Bolani Ores Ltd. Central Coalfield case reported in A. 1. Rule 1992 S.c. 1371 and Chief General Manager, Jagannath Area and Others Vs. State of Orissa and Another, . 11. Raising similar dispute, a group of other cases were listed for hearing of all the matter together, the numbers being: 1. OJ.C. No. 1100 of 1998 (Mahanadi Coalfields Limited and Ors. v. State of Orissa and Ors.. 2. O.J.C.. No. 666 of 1998 (Mahanadi Coalfields Limited and Anr. v. State of Orisra and Ors.. 3. O.J.C. 7529 of 1998 (Project Officer, Ananta Open Cast Project, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. State of Orissa and Ors.. 4. O.J.C. 7403 of 1998 (Project Officer Jagannath Colliery v. State of Orissa and Ors.. 5. O.J.C. No. 550 of 1998 (Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Orissa and Ors. As suggested and agreed by the learned Counsel for the parties, all the matters are taken up simultaneously and by this comprehensive judgment all the cases are disposed of. 12. Mr. Sidhartha Sankar Ray, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ Petitioners with Shri. Sanjit Mohanty has strongly agreed for days together on the following points for appreciation of the Court to grant reliefs to the Petitioners as prayed for. He argues inter alia that to be a Motor Vehicle within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1975, it must be adapted for use upon public road and such use must be its principal and dominant use, not merely incidental or ancillary. He has laid much emphasis upon the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court at to the expression "use upon roads" and not upon "adapted for use". He has developed his argument by highlighting the principle that under Tax Jurisprudence the concept of res judicata nay constructive res judicata is absent. He has laid much emphasis upon the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court at to the expression "use upon roads" and not upon "adapted for use". He has developed his argument by highlighting the principle that under Tax Jurisprudence the concept of res judicata nay constructive res judicata is absent. According to him, the ratio of the decisions in the case of Bolani Ores (A.I. Rule 1975 S.C. 17), Central Coalfields case, (A. 1. Rule 1992 S.C. 1371) and Chief General Manager, Jagannath Area and Others Vs. State of Orissa and Another, are no longer good law. The latest decision in Goodyear India case (1997) 5 S.C. C. 752 brings a new concept and thus there is no bar for the Petitioners to challenge the demand of tax for the subsequent years. 13. Mr. Ray starts with the proposition that under the Tax Jurisprudence there is no concept of res judicata as found in the case Broken Hili Proprietary Company v. Broken Hill Municipal Council reported in (1926) A.C. 94. This decision was followed in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Sneath as Committee of a Lunatic reported in (1932) All E.R. 739. At page 744 of the said decision, it is observed: The Broken Hill Proprietary Company v. Broken Hill Municipal Council was decided on Nov. 10, 1925, in between the above two decisions. It was there held that a previous decision of the High Court of Australia which related to a valuation and a liability to tax in a previous year did not provide an estoppel as res judicata. The decision of the board affirmed that, in the year for which the decision was reached it could not be disputed, but the judgment went on (1926) A.C. 100: The present question relates to a new question, namely the valuation for a different year and the liability for that year. It is not eadem question and therefore the principle of res judicata cannot apply. This principle is followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in A. 1. Rule 1964 S.C. 818. 14. According to Mr. Ray, the ratio of the decision in Bolani Ore case A.1. R. 1975 S.C. 17 followed in Central Coalfields case reported in A: 1. This principle is followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in A. 1. Rule 1964 S.C. 818. 14. According to Mr. Ray, the ratio of the decision in Bolani Ore case A.1. R. 1975 S.C. 17 followed in Central Coalfields case reported in A: 1. Rule 1992 S.C. 1371 and Jagannath Area case reported in (1996) 10 S.C. C. 676 are confined to the liability of the Petitioners so far as the relevant years were concerned. The present case is for separate year and in view of the decision in Goodyear India case (supra), the matter is to be viewed afresh and new decision may be arrived at. 15. Mr. Ray develops his submission that in all the above four cases emphasis was on the expression "adapted for use" and not on "use upon road". They do not say that the use must be principally or dominantly upon public road and not incidentally or ancillarily. The Goodyear India case (supra) must therefore be taken to have overruled impliedly the ratio of the previous four cases as well as Dunlop case reported in 1994(2) S.C. C. 335. 16. Attention of the Court is drawn by Mr. Ray that there is no denial of the following facts: (a) The Dumpers are not registered u/s 39 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. In fact they are not registerable having regard to the specific provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and/or the Rules framed thereunder, particularly Rules 92-95. (b) There is no Certificate of Fitness u/s 56 of the Motor Vehicles Act with regard to any of the Dumpers. This makes the registration, if any, invalid. It is also specifically stated in para-6 of the counter affidavit that the Petitioners themselves had purchased different parts of the Dumpers from different manufacturers and manufactured and assembled the parts at Talcher giving the shape which made it into a Dumper. Since the manufacturers do not sell a complete Dumper, the issue of Road Worthiness Certificate does not arise and that shows that any attempted registration will be invalid. c) There is no permit u/s 66 of the Motor Vehicles Act. This prohibits the Dumpers which are admittedly transport vehicles, from using in public place (which of course includes using public roads). c) There is no permit u/s 66 of the Motor Vehicles Act. This prohibits the Dumpers which are admittedly transport vehicles, from using in public place (which of course includes using public roads). (d) The height and width of the Dumper and also the size of the tyres are not in accordance with Rules 92-95. (e) It is admitted impliedly that the principal or dominant use or in fact any use of Dumpers was not, and indeed could not be, "use on the public roads", and (f) The Dumpers are of special type made by the Petitioners after assembling parts from various manufacturers and adapted for use and in fact are used only within the enclosed mining premises where strangers.are prohibited from entering. 17. It is submitted that the Goodyear case (supra) will prevail over the said four other cases as it is the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court and is by Three Judges. Under Article 141, it represents the law today as declared by the. Supreme Court. 18. He has also submitted that the Goodyear case judgment is one with regard to a statute/statutory provision in pair material, such as Central Excises and Salt Act, Schedule I item 34(3-A) in connection with 'Motor Vehicle' and its meaning. It is the same 'Motor Vehicle', the tyres of which were being subjected to an Excise Duty as 'Motor Vehicle' on which a road tax is attempted to be levied. For all purpose the definition of item 34 of Motor Vehicle in the Excise Act Schedule is the same as in the O.M.V.T. Act, Section 2(b). Therefore, the interpretation of the definition of 'Motor Vehicle' in the 1997 Goodyear case will prevail. 19. Mr. Ray has drawn attention of the Court to the decisions reported in 97 E.R. 394; The State of Madras Vs. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer State of Assam and Another Vs. Deva Prasad Barua and Another Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, New Delhi Vs. K.T. Kosalram and Others, and Sirsilk Ltd. Vs. Textiles Committee and Others, . 20. He has elaborately argued that in any event, Dumpers are not Motor Vehicles within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the O.M.V.T. Act, 1975 as they are specifically excluded being of a special type adapted for use only in the mining premises/areas which are enclosed premises and where no outsiders/strangers are allowed. Textiles Committee and Others, . 20. He has elaborately argued that in any event, Dumpers are not Motor Vehicles within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the O.M.V.T. Act, 1975 as they are specifically excluded being of a special type adapted for use only in the mining premises/areas which are enclosed premises and where no outsiders/strangers are allowed. The principal and dominant use of the Dumpers in fact is upon private roads in mining premises built by the Petitioners and for activities connected with mining principally carrying huge quantities of earth and dumping them into very large gaping pits. 21. An alternative argument has been made by Mr. Ray that even if Dumpers are termed as Motor Vehicles, those are not exigible to tax under the Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. He submits inter alia that even if a Dumper is a Motor Vehicle because it is adapted for use upon road as held in the earlier four Supreme Court decisions, it may at best be a vehicle which is registerable, but not taxable. It is contended that the taxable event u/s 3 of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act is not the ownership of the registerable Dumber of its being a Motor Vehicle, but either for its use upon public road or for keeping it for use. By referring to the decision reported in International Tourist Corporation and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others it is pointed out that the two taxing events must be present. He has also referred to the case reported in State of Mysore and Others Vs. T.V. Sundaram Iyengar and Sons (P) Ltd., as to appreciate that there is no taxability for keeping in transit or no keeping if there is short stay. Mr. Ray has also argued by referring to the decision reported in AIR 1959 Rajasthan 80 that there must be prove aliendi if there is no presumption and keeping and keeping for use is not same thing. He lays much emphasis on the fact that the case of the opposite parties is not of use but of keeping for use. He points out that in the absence of registration u/s 39 or a certificate of fitness u/s 56, there is no presumption of keeping the Dumper for use under the Explanation to Section 3 of the Orissa Act can arise. 22. The entire thrust of argument of Mr. He points out that in the absence of registration u/s 39 or a certificate of fitness u/s 56, there is no presumption of keeping the Dumper for use under the Explanation to Section 3 of the Orissa Act can arise. 22. The entire thrust of argument of Mr. Ray is that proof aliendi is necessary of which there is not a shred of evidence like the Rajasthan case reported in AIR 1959 Rajasthan 80 (supra). 23. Mr. Ray also submits that in the instant case there is no registration of Dumper u/s 39 or permit u/s 66 of the M. v. Act, 1988 and the Petitioners are forbidden to use the Dumpers in any public place. In any event there is no certificate of fitness and the registration, if any, will be invalid u/s 56 of the Act. The question of keeping the Dumpers for use in public road cannot and does not arise. All that can be said by the opposite parties is that the Dumpers have been kept, but not that they are kept for use on public road which use is totally prohibited and will lead to criminal prosecution. Mr. Ray adds that there are penal provision for using vehicles on public road without registration or without a permit and as such no one can use the Dumpers on public road without be prosecuted or punished. He refers to Section 39 as to registration and Section 56 as to certificate of fitness and Section 66 as to permit. Besides, the law as it stands now as per the Goodyear case(supra), List II, item 57 the words "suitable for use on roads must be read or interpreted to mean "suitable for dominant or principal use on public roads". Anention of the Court is drawn to the decisions reported in (1980)3 S.C. C. 619 (Travancore Tea Estates Company Ltd. v. State of Kerala and Ors., A. 1. Rule 1987 S.C. ] 911 (State of Karnataka v. K. Gopalakrishna) and A. 1. Rule 1988 S.C. 2062 (State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Balkrishna Baidya). 24. The entire spirit of argument of Mr. Rule 1987 S.C. ] 911 (State of Karnataka v. K. Gopalakrishna) and A. 1. Rule 1988 S.C. 2062 (State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Balkrishna Baidya). 24. The entire spirit of argument of Mr. Ray is that the ratio of decision in Goodyear case, vide 1997(5) S.C. C. 1338(supra) should be appreciated by this Court and even if the Dumpers may be termed as motor vehicles, their taxable event does not come unless those are used or kept for use on public road which should be the dominent or principal purpose. The ratio of the decisions cited above may convince this Court that the matter should be remitted back to the opposite parties who should give opportunity to the Petitioners to raise such new facts and the matter cannot be construed as a closed chapter by following the decisions of the previous years with closed eyes and the matter should be viewed and reviewed afresh and the reliefs prayed for may be granted to the Petitioners. 25. Mr. Jayat Das, learned Advocate General appearing for the opposite parties has strongly reacted to the submissions made by Mr. Ray. Mr. Das draws attention of the Court to the definition of "Motor Vehicle" as per Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Section 2(b) of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. The Dumpers in question, according to him, have been held to be Motor Vehicles as per Section 2(b) of the Orissa. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act starting from Bolani Ore case (A. 1. Rule 1975 S.C. 17) to Jagannath Area case (1996) J.T. (Vo1.8) 530). Once a type of vehicle (Dumper) is' held to be a 'Motor Vehicle', it is registrable and accordingly there is no escape from tax liability u/s 3 of Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. He draws attention of the Court to the provisions of Section 3 of the O. M. V. T. Act as to levy of tax. The concept of assessment is not available in the O.M. V. T. Act and under the provisions of the said Act, a vehicle would be taxed u/s 3 once it is a Motor Vehicle within the meaning of section 2(b) thereof. The owner or the person having control or possession over the vehicle will pay tax in advance as provided u/s 4 of the O.M.V.T. Act at the rate specified in Schedule-I to the said Act. 26. Mr. The owner or the person having control or possession over the vehicle will pay tax in advance as provided u/s 4 of the O.M.V.T. Act at the rate specified in Schedule-I to the said Act. 26. Mr. Das argues straightway that Dumpers are chargeable to tax under item 3 of Schedule-I to O.M.V.T. Act as goods carriage vehicle and the amount.or rate of tax is fixed according to the unladen weight of such vehicle. On a plain reading of Sections 2(b). 3 and 4 coupled with Schedule-I of M.V.T. Act. it can be safely concluded that the O.M. v. T. Act cannot be compared with other taxation statutes like Income Tax. Sales Tax, etc. where there is an assessment year and demand of tax varies from year to year depending upon income and volume of sale etc.. Therefore in those statutes assessment is necessary. But in case of Motor Vehicle Taxation statute, there is no question of assessment and the owner/possessor of a Motor Vehicle shall pay the tax in advance at the specified rate as prescribed in Schedule-I. The concept of computation or determination or assessment of tax is alien to the provisions of the O.M. v. T. Act and in that regard it cannot be compared with any other taxing statute. 27. Mr. Das further adds that the vehicle can be kept, but 'not kept for use' by the owner or possessor only as prescribed under Sub-section (1) to Section 10 of O.M. v. T. Act which provides: Whether any motor vehicle is intended.not to be used for any period, the registered owner or person having possession or control thereof shall on or before the date of expiry of the term for which tax has been paid, deliver to the taxing officer, an undertaking duly signed and verified in the prescribed form and manner specifying the period aforesaid and thee where the motor vehicle is to be kept along with such other particulars as may be prescribed and the registration, certificate, fitness certificate, permit and tax token, then current and shall from time to time by delivering, further undertakings' give prior intimation to the concerned taxing officer of the extension, if any, of the said period and the changes, if any, of the place where the motor vehicle shall be kept. xx xx But if the owner or possessor of the Motor Vehicle fails to exercise option available to him under Sub-section (1) to Section 10 of the O.M. v. T. Act, it shall be presumed under Sub-section (3) thereof that the vehicle has been used or 'kept for use' within the State and liable to be taxed under the said Act. 28. Mr. Das has explained the provisions of Sections 39, 40, 56 and 66 of the Motor Vehicles Act. He submits that a plain reading of the provisions of the aforesaid sections makes it abundantly clear that 'Dumper' being a motor vehicle is registrable and the onus of applying for such registration lies with the owner and being a transport vehicle it must carry a valid certificate of fitness and non-compliance with the said provisions would make the owner liable for prosecution u/s 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Once Dumper is classified as a transport vehicle, meant solely for carriage of goods, it would require a permit as per Section 66 read with Section 77 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 29. It is also argued by Mr. Das that once a vehicle falls within the definition of 'Motor Vehicle' and specially when the Hon'ble Supreme Court had the occasion to examine the issue in the earlier cases, it is no longer open to the Petitioners to distinguish the said earlier decisions and ask for relief on the basis of Goodyear case, (1997) 5 S C.C. 1338. The said case relates to the Central Excise Act, 1944 and related Tariff Act. In that case the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the issue of classification of 'tyres' and as Entry 16 does not have a definition of Motor Vehicle, resort had been made to Entry 34 which deals with impost Central Excise on Motor Vehicles. The definition of 'Motor Vehicle' under tariff item No. 34 is not pair material with the definition of Section 2(b) of the O.M.V.T. Act. The purpose and object of the Central Excise Act and the related Tariff Act is to cause an impost on mainly 'Goods' and in that context the expression 'Motor Vehicle' could be defined in its own way. The purpose and object of the Central Excise Act and the related Tariff Act is to cause an impost on mainly 'Goods' and in that context the expression 'Motor Vehicle' could be defined in its own way. Similarly, in the context of a Motor Vehicle tax in terms of Entry 57, List II of Schedule VII to the Constitution of India, the expression 'Motor Vehicle' to defined keeping in mind the object and intent of the impost on Motor Vehicles Act. In other words, under the Motor Vehicles Act, the capability of being used on public roads is itself a sufficient condition precedent to attract the ab initio exigibility to tax. It would be appropriate to draw a distinction at this stage between the ab initio exigibility to tax and the quantification of monetary burden of tax which may be year to year; whereas ab initio exigibility to tax once decided by the competent Court would bind under Article 141 of the Constitution. 30. Mr. Das develops his submission by pointing out the expression adapted for use upon roads' as appears under item No. 34 of the Central Excise Tariff Act and u/s 2(b) of the O. M; v. T. Act. The interpretation of the same expression for the purpose and in the context of an impost of Central Excise, i. e. import and manufactured goods, have a different connotation in the context of a Motor Vehicle. The definition or interpretation of the definition under the Central Excise Act cannot ipso facto be merged into the arena of Motor Vehicles Act which is compensatory and regulatory in nature. It was not necessary for the Apex Courts to notice the decisions in Bolani Ores case to Jagannath Area case (supra) for the purpose of interpreting an expression under the Central Excise Tariff Act. He has submitted that reliance on the Rajasthan High Court decision as reported in A. 1. Rule 1959 Raj. 80 (supra) is of no relevance to the present case. According to Mr. Das, the Rajasthan High Court decision related to exigibility to Motor Vehicles Tax for vehicle in transit through a State and in that context it has been held that what is in transit could not be said to be "kept for use" on public roads in that State. 31. To meet the point of res judicata, Mr. According to Mr. Das, the Rajasthan High Court decision related to exigibility to Motor Vehicles Tax for vehicle in transit through a State and in that context it has been held that what is in transit could not be said to be "kept for use" on public roads in that State. 31. To meet the point of res judicata, Mr. Das has drawn attention of the Court to the decisions reported in A. L Rule 1961 S.C. 1457 (Daryao v. State of U.P.), A. 1. Rule 1971 S.C. 2355 (Mathura Prasad v. Dossibai), Forward Construction Co. and Others Vs. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.), Andheri and Others, and A. 1. Rule 1990 S.C. 1607 (Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. v. State of Maharashtra). 32. Patiently we have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties. Diligently we have tried to considered the points of law and facts as argued by both sides in support of their respective cases. We have rightly appreciated the decisions cited from the Bar in support of the cases of the respective parties. 33. Regard being had to the facts of the case and the points of law as involved, we decide the matter giving the reasons as hereunder. 34. To refer to the related cases, we find that O.J. C. No. 1222 was dismissed by this Court rejecting all the contentions made by the Petitioner. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also dismissed the Civil Appeal No. 868 of 1977 arising out of that holding that Dumpers and Rockers are Motor Vehicles as per Section 2(b) of the O.M. v. T. Act, 1975 and run on rubber tyres are vehicles adapted or suitable for use on roads and being Motor Vehicles per se are liable to taxation on the footing of their use or kept for use on public roads the network of which the State spreads maintains and keeps available for use of motor vehicles and hence entitled to regulatory and compensatory tax. In such a case, the mere fact the motor vehicles are required at places to run at a particular speed is not to detract from the position otherwise clear that they are adapted for use on roads. The very nature of the vehicles make it clear that they are not manufactured or adapted for use only in factory or enclosed premises. The very nature of the vehicles make it clear that they are not manufactured or adapted for use only in factory or enclosed premises. The mere fact that the Dumpers and Rockers are heavy and cannot move on roads without damaging them is not to say that they are not suitable for use on roads. Such observation is clearly made in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in A. 1. Rule 1992 S.C. 1371 (Central Coalfield Ltd. v. State of Orissa). 35. We again find that another writ petition, i.e. O.J.C. No. 1398 of 1993 was also dismissed by this Court on 2-8-1993 holding that Dumpers must be held to be Motor Vehicles being liable to be registered under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and also being liable to tax u/s 3 of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1975. After dismissal of the said writ application, the Petitioners therein preferred S.L. P. before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which was numbered 6068 of 1994 and by judgment dated 11-4-1994 the said S.L. P. was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court holding: On the findings of fact recorded by the High Court the question of law raised in SLP does not require consideration in view of the decision of this Court. Sri Ganguli, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, however, submitted that the facts recorded in the High Court's judgment ignored certain vital evidence which was available on record. That does not arise for our consideration in this SLP and if so may be available only in the appropriate remedy before the High Court. The SLP is therefore dismissed, 36. Thereafter Civil Review No. 73 of 1994 was preferred in this Court. After hearing the matter at length and considering all the relevant points this Court dismissed the said Civil Review on 16-1-1996. 37. The same Petitioners again filed another writ application being O.J.C. No. 811 of 1996 challenging the same points which were decided earlier by this Court as also the Hon'ble Supreme Court. By judgment dated 10-4-96 a Division Bench of this Court dismissed the O.J.C. No. 811 of 1996 holding clearly that Dumpers and Rockers are adaptable and suitable for use on public roads and being Motor Vehicles per se are liable to taxation on the footing of their use or being kept for use on public roads. By judgment dated 10-4-96 a Division Bench of this Court dismissed the O.J.C. No. 811 of 1996 holding clearly that Dumpers and Rockers are adaptable and suitable for use on public roads and being Motor Vehicles per se are liable to taxation on the footing of their use or being kept for use on public roads. This judgment has since been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide judgment dated 20-9-1996 reported in (1996) 10 S.C.C. 76. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that Dumpers used in mining areas are taxable as Motor Vehicles. The tax 794 THE CUTTACK LAW TIMES [ 1999 MAHANADI COALFIELDS LTD. v. STATE of ORISSA imposed on Motor Vehicles is basically a tax for the use on roads within the State. Such levy of tax for keeping a Motor Vehicle for use on public roads is compensatory tax but does not violate Article 301 of the Constitution. Dumpers are motor vehicles run on tyres and are taxable within the ambit of the Taxation Act. 38. With this background the present writ petition is to be considered. A new point is raised that in the Goodyear case reported in 1997 (5) S.c.c. 1338, a new interpretation has been made. In that case, item No. 34 as to Motor Vehicles of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 was considered. For better appreciation and ready reference the said item No. 34 is quoted below; Item No. 34 Motor Vehicles ---..-.---- Item No. Tariff description Rate Duty 34 Motor Vehicles "Motor Vehicles" means all mechanically propelled vehicles adapted for use upon roads, and includes a chassis and a trailer, but does not include a vehicle, running upon fixed rails (1) Auto cycles, motor cycles, scooters, auto-rickshaws and any other three wheeled motor vehicles, Rate of Duty 10% ad valorem (2) Motor vehicles of not more than 16 HP by Royal Automobile Club (RAC) rating. Rate of Duty 25% ad valorem (3) Motor cars at more than 16 HP by Royal Auto mobile Club (RAC) rating constructed or adapted to carry out not more than 9 persons. Rate of Duty 40% ad valorem (3-A) Tractors, including agicultural tractors. Rate of Duty 15% ad valorem (4) Motor vehicle, not otherwise specified. Rate of Duty 25% ad valorem (3) Motor cars at more than 16 HP by Royal Auto mobile Club (RAC) rating constructed or adapted to carry out not more than 9 persons. Rate of Duty 40% ad valorem (3-A) Tractors, including agicultural tractors. Rate of Duty 15% ad valorem (4) Motor vehicle, not otherwise specified. Rate of Duty 15% ad valorem of ORISSA Explanation-For the purpose of this item where a motor vehicles is mounted fitted or fixed with any weight lifting, earth moving and similar specified materials handling equipment then such equipment other than the chassis shall not be taken into account. 39. On perusal of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Goodyear case, we do not find that the decisions in Boani Ores case A. 1. Rule 1975 S.C. 17. Central Coalfields case A. 1. Rule 1992 S.C. 1361. Chowgule's case (1992) Supp. 3 S.C. C. 146 and Jagannath Area case (1996) 10 S.C. C. 76 were either referred to or considered. Although Mr. Ray has strongly argued that Section 2(b) of the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act and item No. 34 of the Central Excise and Salt Act are pair material and when the Hon'ble Supreme Court has interpreted the expression "adapted for use" for principal and for dominant purpose a new law of the land has come into force and in view of the judgment law as it stands there should be rereading of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act and the earlier decisions may not trouble this Court as a new journey for the Petitioners may start. This Court may not have any hesitation to interpret properly that Dumpers and Rockers are not Motor Vehicles for being registered or being taxed. 40. An argument has been made on behalf of the Petitioners that even if Dumpers and Rockers are reckoned as Motor Vehicles there cannot be any demand of tax unless two taxing events take place. There is no exigibility to tax in the absence of any statutory requirement of registration, obtaining certificate of fitness and permit. 40. An argument has been made on behalf of the Petitioners that even if Dumpers and Rockers are reckoned as Motor Vehicles there cannot be any demand of tax unless two taxing events take place. There is no exigibility to tax in the absence of any statutory requirement of registration, obtaining certificate of fitness and permit. Further because of the peculiar feature of the machines being not Motor Vehicles as per Rules 92 to 95, there is no possibility of using the same on road and the dominent use being not on road there cannot be any demand of tax as made and there is no bar for the Petitioners to obtain the relief. 41. We have tried our best to appreciate the argument of Mr. Rayon behalf of the Petitioners. A part of the argument becomes fallacious to us for the following reasons. We accept the proposition that under Tax Jurisprudence there is no ordinary sense of applicability of the principle of res judicata as envisaged u/s 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the domain of writ cases the principle of res judicata is however not fully ruled out; but so far as taxing statute is concerned, the reasons for assessment of the previous years may not be deemed to be conclusive for assessment for the subsequent years. There may be now openings on the score of facts and may be on points of law. There is no longer any debate nor any dispute, on the concept of such principle. But at the same time, it has to be remembered, and we cannot forget that if a particular statute and its different provisions are interpreted by the Apex Court with proper reasons, the same should not be reopened again, as it is termed as a Taxing Statute and it is not open that it will not be binding under Article 141 of the Constitution. In this regard, we quote para-23 of the decision reported in A. 1. In this regard, we quote para-23 of the decision reported in A. 1. Rule 1964 S.C. 1013 (Amalgamated Coalfields v. Janapada Sabha) as under: In considering this question, it may be necessary to distinguish between decision on questions of law which directly and substantially arise in any dispute about the liability for a particular year, and questions of law which arise incidentally or in a collateral manner, as Lord Radcliffe himself has observed in the case of the Society of Medical Officers of Health, 1960 A.C. 531 that the effect of legal decisions establishing the law would be a different matter If, for instance, the validity of a taxing statute is impeached by an Assessee who is called upon to pay a tax for a particular year and the matter is taken to the High Court or brought before this Court and it is held that the taxing statute is valid it may not be easy to hold that the decision on this basic and material issue would not operate as res judicata against the Assessee for a subsequent year. That, however, is a matter on which it is unnecessary for us to pronounce a definite opinion in the present case. In this connection, it would be relevant to add that even if a direct decision of this Court on a point of law does not operate as res judicata in a dispute for a subsequent year, such a decision would under Article 141, have a binding effect not only on the parties to it, but also on all courts in India as a precedent in which the law is declared by this Court. The question about the applicability of res judicata to such a decision would thus be a matter of merely academic significance." 42. An argument has also been made both by Mr. Ray as also by Mr. Das on the point of appreciating the decision in the Goodyear case (supra) on the theory of per incuriam or sub silentio. With great respect to the learned Counsel, we are afraid we need not distinguish the decision In the aforesaid Goodyear case by stretching the principle of per inquitium or the theory of sub silentio. It is a difficult track to resort to such concept and distinguish any decision of the Apex Court in disposing of a case with relevant facts involved. 43. It is a difficult track to resort to such concept and distinguish any decision of the Apex Court in disposing of a case with relevant facts involved. 43. The facts disclosed in the present case convince us beyond doubt that in between the parties there is a clear and unequivocal decision of the Apex Court by interpreting the definition of "Motor Vehicles" within the scope of Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act and its charging section that Dumpers are Motor Vehicles, as they are registrable and are taxable. It will be in futility to go into any other taxing statute on the score of pair material and to draw a different conclusion. More so, in the Goodyear case, tariff item No. 34 and ad valorem Excise duty to be paid were on the heading of Motor Vehicle tyres or on the head of residuary. Therefore, the observation as to principal or dominant use in interpreting item No. 34 cannot take away the decision of the self-same Apex Court in earlier cases clearly holding under the Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act the position of Dumpers and Rockers as Motor Vehicles which are liable to be registered and also liable to be taxed. 44. Attention of the Court is drawn to the fact that in Bihar and Madhya Pradesh, the R.T. As have given exemption of tax so far as vehicles like Dumpers are concerned, but those exemptions and/or concessions given by Bihar and Madhya Pradesh authorities do not have any Impact upon the interpretation of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act and its Rules. 45. In spite of our best effort, we cannot persuade ourselves to a different conclusion by ignoring the direct and unequivocal decisions in the earlier cases which have set at rest the dispute between the parties that Dumpers and Rockers are Motor Vehicles liable to be registered and taxed. We cannot persuade ourselves to make an adventure to accept the argument of Mr. Ray to travel differently. Such adventurous attempt will, according to us, would be Don Quixotic and may not be appreciated in the world of law where precedents have certain meaning, and particularly decisions of the Apex Court have certain binding force under Article 141 of the Constitution. 46. We have greatly appreciated the novelty of argument of Mr. Ray to travel differently. Such adventurous attempt will, according to us, would be Don Quixotic and may not be appreciated in the world of law where precedents have certain meaning, and particularly decisions of the Apex Court have certain binding force under Article 141 of the Constitution. 46. We have greatly appreciated the novelty of argument of Mr. Ray appearing for the Petitioners, but we add that the freedom available to a counsel at the Bar to make arguments seeking to find new vistas is not equally available to the Bench. There is restraint by way of judicial discipline and also checks and binding of precedents and citations. It is always to be remembered that 'Wisdom is preferable to Learning'. So far as facts disclosed and laws involved, we have not been able to persuade ourselves that the, Petitioners are entitled to make a new case that the decision in Goodyear case is a sheet anchor to the present case to give a new life with a new name. 47. We find no merit in the writ application although the case is presented with much curiosity and novelty. For the foregoing reasons we dismiss this writ application being 0. J.C. No. 1090 of 1998,and also dismiss all the connected writ applications being 0. J.C. Nos. 550/98, 666/98,.1100/98, 7403/98 and 7529/98 and vacate,all the interim orders. We make no order as to costs. P.K. Mohanty, J. 48. I agree. Writ application dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed