DR. M. K. SHARMA, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition has been preferred by the petitioner under Section 109 (2) of thetrade and Merchandise Marks Act as against the Order dated 27. 7. 1998 passed bythe Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks allowing the review petition filed by respondentno. 1 daied 13. 7. 1995 and recalling the order dated 29. 6. 1995. ( 2 ) ON 31. 5. 1989 Shri Jagdish Pershad and 0m Prakash Gupta trading in thename of M/s. Sunbeam Food Products Company, petitioner herein applied forregistration of trade mark in the form of device of lal QILA with the words lal QILABRAND vide application No. 511110 in respect of Moong Dhova Dal (pulse)included in class 30. The aforesaid application was accepted for registration andwas accordingly advertised in the Trade Marks Journal No. 1066 dated 1. 11. 1993. ( 3 ) THE respondent No. 1 opposed the registration of the trade mark advertised byfiling their notice of opposition. On 1. 11. 1994 the petitioner contested the aforesaidnotice of opposition by filing their counter statement in accordance with the provisionsof Section 21 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1988. The respondent No. 1thereafter sought for extension of time for filing their evidence and they were grantedextension of time upto 23. 5. 1995. As no evidence of respondent No. 1 was broughton record of the proceedings it was held by the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks thatthe opposition of respondent No. 1. was deemed to have been abandoned and to thateffect an order dated 29. 6. 1995 was passed. Being aggrieved by the said orderdated 29. 6. 1995 the respondent No. 1 filed a review petition on 13. 7. 1995 whichpetition was taken up for consideration and disposal and the said petition wasallowed by the impugned order. Consequently, the order dated 29. 6. 1995 holdingthat the respondent No. 1 was deemed to have abandoned the opposition wasrevoked and recalled. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the aforesaid orderpassed by the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks reviewing the earlier order is bad. In law and contrary to the records of the case. Consequently, the order dated 29. 6. 1995 holdingthat the respondent No. 1 was deemed to have abandoned the opposition wasrevoked and recalled. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the aforesaid orderpassed by the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks reviewing the earlier order is bad. In law and contrary to the records of the case. Learned counsel appearing forrespondent No. 1 however, while reputing the submission of the counsel for thepetitioner submitted that the aforesaid order was passed after considering therecords of the case and on consideration of the statutory provisions laid down in thatregard and therefore, there is no error in the order which would justify interference bythis Court. ( 5 ) IN the light of the aforesaid submissions I have considered the records availablebefore me. It transpires from the records that the time for filing the evidence in supportof the opposition was extended at the request of respondent No. 1 upto 23. 5. 1995. Itis the specific case of respondent No. 1 that within the aforesaid extended period oftime for filing their evidence respondent No. 1 sent their evidence by way of anaffidavit dated 31. 3. 1995 in the name of Shri Kartar Singh, partner of respondentno. l exhibiting photographs of some supporting documents under their forwardingletter dated 15. 9. 1995. It is also stated that the aforesaid evidence alongwith theaforesaid forwarding letter dated 15. 9. 1995 was handed over in the office of thetrade Marks Registry, New Delhi and in token of receipt of aforesaid evidencealongwith letter dated 15. 9. 1995 initial of the staff member in the office of theregistry was also obtained and the rubber stamp of the Trade Marks Office was alsoaffixed under the initial. It is also stated that the copy of the aforesaid affidavit and theexhibits thereto were also sent separately to the attorney, of the applicants, inaccordance with the provisions of Rule 53 (1) of the Rules, under the certificate ofposting dated 16. 5. 1995. A photo copy of the aforesaid certificate of posting as alsothe originals thereof were placed on record. It is submitted by the counsel appearingfor the respondent that in view of the aforesaid documentary evidence it is established that respondent No. 1 submitted its evidence within the extended period of time upto23. 5. 1995 in terms of the provisions of Rule 53 (1) of the Rules framed under thetrade and Merchandise Marks Act. It is submitted by the counsel appearingfor the respondent that in view of the aforesaid documentary evidence it is established that respondent No. 1 submitted its evidence within the extended period of time upto23. 5. 1995 in terms of the provisions of Rule 53 (1) of the Rules framed under thetrade and Merchandise Marks Act. Counsel appearing for the respondent accordinglysubmitted that in the light of the aforesaid documentary evidence the Assistantregistrar was justified in recalling the earlier order dated 29. 6. 1995 holding that theopposition was deemed to have been abandoned by respondent No. 1. ( 6 ) COUNSEL appearing for the petitioner however, submitted that a certificate ofposting could be manufactured at any point of time and therefore, no reliance shouldhave been placed on such document by the Trade Marks Registry as was done in theinstant case. In support of the aforesaid contention learned counsel relied upon adecision of the Supreme Court in Mst. L. M. S. Ummu Saleema Vs. B. B. Gujral;reported in AIR 1981 SC 1191 . He also submitted that the signature/initial and dateplaced under the rubber stamp were illegible and were not the initial/signature of thestaff member of the Trade Marks Registry and therefore, no reliance should havebeen placed by the Registry on such receipt indicating furnishing of the evidence interms of Rule 53 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rules. ( 7 ) IN this connection reference may be made to the provisions of Rule 53 layingdown the procedure as to how the evidence in support of the opposition is to bereceived by the Registry. It provides that within two months from the service of a copyof the counter statement by the Registrar on the opponent, he shall either leave withthe Registrar such evidence by way of affidavit as he may desire to adduce in supportof his opposition or shall intimate to the Registry or to the applicant in writing that hedoes not desire to adduce evidence in support of his opposition but intrnds to rely onthe facts stated in the notice of opposition it is also provided that the opponent hasdeliver to the applicant copies of any evidence that he leaves with the Registrar underthe aforesaid sub-rule. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 53 also provides that if an opponenttakes no action under sub-rule (1) within the time prescribed, he shall, unless theregistrar otherwise directs, be deemed to have abandoned his opposition. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 53 also provides that if an opponenttakes no action under sub-rule (1) within the time prescribed, he shall, unless theregistrar otherwise directs, be deemed to have abandoned his opposition. ( 8 ) IN terms of the provisions of the aforesaid rule, therefore, a person who is theopponent in a trade mark registration matter may file such evidence by way ofaffidavit as he may desire to adduce in support of his opposition leaving the samewith the Registrar and copies thereof are to be furnished to the applicant. Even if theopponent fails to furnish such evidence the Registrar has to consider as to whatwould be the effect of the same and thereafter pass necessary orders in terms ofrule 53 (2) holding that the opposition is deemed to have been abandoned. In thepresent case as no evidence was available on record the Deputy Registrar of Trademarks proceeded to hold that the opponent would be deemed to have abandonedhis opposition. When however, the respondent No. 1 proved to the satisfaction of theregistrar that he had left such evidence with the Registrar and furnished a copy ofreceipt thereof which contained the initial and rubber stamp of the Registry it washeld by the Assistant Registrar that there was sufficient compliance with sub-rule (1)of Rule 53 by the opponent and being so satisfied reviewed the earlier order,accepted the evidence filed and recalled the earlier order dated 29. 6. 1995. Theassistant Registrar has considered the records for coming to the aforesaid conclusionand in the light of the provisions of Section 53 analysed the record namely thereceipts and the certificate of posting under which the opponent sent the copies ofsuch evidence to the petitioner and no such scrutiny was satisfied that there wassufficient compliance of Rule 53 of the Rules. The respondent No. 1 placed on recordthe receipt issued by the office of the Registrar of Trade Marks indicating filing of theevidence by way of affidavit. The said receipt contains rubber stamp of the Registryand is also initialled by an official. The said receipt therefore, has to be accepted astrue and correct and authenticity of the same when accepted by the Registrar cannotbe challenged. The said receipt contains rubber stamp of the Registryand is also initialled by an official. The said receipt therefore, has to be accepted astrue and correct and authenticity of the same when accepted by the Registrar cannotbe challenged. The submission of the counsel for the petitioner that the allegedcommunication of copies of such evidence to the petitioner by certificate of postingwas not legal and valid in view of the decisidn of the Supreme Court in M/s L. M. S. Ummu Saleema (supra ). The said decision was rendered by the Supreme Courtwhile dealing with a case of detention under Conservation of Foreign Exchange andprevention of Smuggling Activities Act. Such a detention is a matter relating topersonal liberty of a person. In the context of the aforesaid facts it was held that therehave been case in the past, though rare, where postal certificates and even postalseals have been manufactured. In the facts and circumstances of the said case inparagraph 6 of the said judgment the Supreme Court held that no such letter ofretraction was posted as claimed by the detenu. In my considered opinion, in thepresent case no such evidence has been led by the petitioners to prove and establishthat the postal certificate as placed in the present case has in any manner beenmanufactured or tempered with by respondent No. 1. ( 9 ) IN the aforesaid circumstances I find no error in the impugned order passed bythe Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks. The petition has no merit and is dismissed accordingly.