JUDGMENT : G.S. CHAUBE, J. This Second Appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the judgment and decree of the third Additional District Judge of Chaibasa (West Singhbhum) passed in Title Appeal No. 37/50 of 1998/91 whereby and whereunder the judgment and decree in Title Suit No. 32 of 1972 passed by the Munsif at Seraikela has been affirmed. By the judgment and decree impugned in the lower appellate court, the suit of the plaintiffs for title and possession respecting 28 decimals land of plot no. 802 of Khata no.237 has been dismissed. The suit had been instituted by the sale plaintiff Raghunath Mahato, son of late Jag Mohan Mahato against the lone defendant Gobardhan Lal Malvya, son of late Pundit Nandlal Malavya. Both the plaintiff and the defendant above named died during the pendency of the suit. Consequently, their heirs and legal representatives were/got substituted in their places as the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit. The substituted plaintiffs having lost in both the courts below are appellants herein and the heirs of the original defendant Gobardhan lal Malvya are the respondents. 2. The facts on which the plaintiffs founded their claim for title and possession respecting plot no. 802 above mentioned, situated at mauza Kandara within Adityapur Police Station in the district of West Singhbhum, are that old Survey Plot No. 486 of Khata no. 45, measuring 1 bigha 11 kathas and 07 dhurs situated at mouza kandra belonged to three sons of late Baikunth Biswas, named Fakir Chandra Biswas, Satish Chandra Biswas and Suresh Chandra Biswas, and was recorded along with some other lands in their names in the record of rights prepared and published in course of survey and settlement of 1925-27. Out of the total area of the said plot no. 486, an area of 9 Katha and 2 Dhurs had been acquired by the then Seraikela State in 1944 and amalgamated in a road running adjacent to east of it. The remaining 1 Bigha 2 Kathas and 5 Dhurs of plot no. 486 was sold by the said Fakir Chandra Biswas, Satish Chandra Biswas and Suresh Chandra Biswas to Raghunath Mahato for a sum of Rs.27001only on the basis of a registered sale deed dated 8.11.1948. The vendee was put in possession of the vended land. The remaining 1 Bigha 2 Kathas and 5 Dhurs of plot no. 486 was sold by the said Fakir Chandra Biswas, Satish Chandra Biswas and Suresh Chandra Biswas to Raghunath Mahato for a sum of Rs.27001only on the basis of a registered sale deed dated 8.11.1948. The vendee was put in possession of the vended land. While in possession, Raghunath Mahato leased out an area of 3 kathas-equivalent to 7 decimals,-out of 1 bigha 2 kathas 5 dhurs of plot no. 486 to Gobardhan Lal Malvya on an annual ground rent of Rs. 1811- for a period of two years with effect from 1.4.1961 and a document to this effect was brought into existence. The lease was taken by Gobardhan Lal Malvya for installing a sawmill on the lease-hold property. However, according to the plaintiffs, in course of new survey settlement operation commencing from 1958, a part of the old plot no. 486 was recorded in the name of one B.K. Chatterjee and the remaining portion thereof carved out as a new plot nO.802 (which is the subject matter of the present litigation) was recorded in the name of the State of Bihar, shown to be in possession of one Guhi Kalundi. As the said plot nO.302 purported to be recorded in the name of the State of Bihar, the local revenue authorities initiated two land encroachment proceedings respecting the same; one against the plaintiff Raghunath Mahato (being L.E. Case No. 26/1963-64). Raghunath Mahato lost the proceeding upto the revisional authority, i.e., Commissioner of South Chotanagpur Division. It is alleged that Gobardhan Lal Malvya also lost before the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms (LRDC), but his appeal to the Additional Dy. Collector of Chaibasa was allowed and the matter remitted to the L.R.D.C. for re-hearing. Meanwhile, on a petition having been filed by Gobardhan Lal Malvya under section 90 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Art (C.N.T. Act) for correcting the record of right which had already been published in 1961 in respect of the suit plot no. 802 measuring 28 decimals. The said plot was recorded in his name by order of the settlement officer made in case No. 107 of 1966. Taking advantage of this situation, the defendant Gobardhan Lal Malvya refused to pay rent respecting 3 Kathas of the said plot leased out to him and claimed the entire suit plot as his own. 802 measuring 28 decimals. The said plot was recorded in his name by order of the settlement officer made in case No. 107 of 1966. Taking advantage of this situation, the defendant Gobardhan Lal Malvya refused to pay rent respecting 3 Kathas of the said plot leased out to him and claimed the entire suit plot as his own. Hence, the suit was instituted on 25.3.1972 for 'decree for declaration of plaintiffs' right, title and interest over the suit land described in the Schedule-A below and for recovery of possession thereof after evicting the defendant therefrom.” Of course, a decree for cost of the suit was also prayed for. In the schedule to the plaint, the land in question has been described as plot no. 802 under khata no. 237 measuring 28 decimals corresponding to a portion of old plot no. 486 at mouza Kandra, Thana No.45. 3. The defendants contested the suit by filing written statement. A written statement was filed by the original defendant Gobardhanlal Malvya. After his death and substitution of his son, the widow and the son also filed written statement adopting the written statement filed by his father with some specific averments respecting old plot no.486. In their written statement, the defendants denied the allegations and averments of the plaintiffs regarding Raghunath Mahato acquiring 1 bigha 3. 2 kathas and 5 dhurs of old plot no. 48. from the recorded tenants Fakir Chandra Biswas and his brothers in 1948 and of leasing out 3 kathas out of the same to Gobardhanlal Mavlya in 1961 for two years on yearly ground rent of Rs. 181/-. They contended that, a matter of fact, in land acquisition case NO.1 /1943-44, the entire area of 1 bigha, 11 kathas and 7 dhurs of plot no. 146 along with some other lands of other tenants had been acquired by then Seraikella State for establishing a colony at Kandra, called Narendra Nagar, on the basis of a declaration published under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and took possession of those lands in 1945. Therefore, nothing was left with the recorded owners of old plot no. 486 to be conveyed to Raghunath Mahato on the basis of the document of 1948. Consequently, the plaintiffs had no title and interest in any portion of plot no. 486, much less in the suit land belonging to new plot no. 802. Therefore, nothing was left with the recorded owners of old plot no. 486 to be conveyed to Raghunath Mahato on the basis of the document of 1948. Consequently, the plaintiffs had no title and interest in any portion of plot no. 486, much less in the suit land belonging to new plot no. 802. According l to them, Gobardhanlal Malvya was in possession of the land of the suit plot for the last 25 years or so by installing thereon saw-mill and running business in timbers Somehow or the other, the land was recorded in the name of the State of Bihar showing & possession of Guhi Kalundi in course of recent survey settlement operation. When Gobardhanlal Malvya came to know of such incorrect preparation of the record of rights, he filed an objection under section 90 of the C.N.T. Act for correction of the entries in the record of rights and after due inquiry by the survey settlement authorities, the mistake, was rectified and the entries respecting the suit plot no. 802 was corrected and the same stood recorded in his name. The defendants also denied that to their knowledge any land encroachment proceeding had been initiated against Gobardhan lal Malvya and he appeared therein and contested it upto the appellate stage, as alleged by the plaintiffs. On this ground the defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit with cost. 4. In course of hearing in the suit, the trial court raised as many as 10 issues. The main issue being whether Raghunath Mahato had purchased the suit property from Fakir Chandra Biswas and his brothers on the basis of the sale deed dated 8.11.1948; whether their plea of possession and dispossession as set lip in the plaint is correct? whether the suit land or any portion thereof had been leased out to the defendants? whether there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendants; and whether the suit was barred by limitation? 4(a). Both the plaintiffs and the defendants adduced oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective cases. The plaintiffs produced, ill particular, registered sale deed dated 8.11.1948 (Ext.5) and a document dated 1.4.1961 purporting to be the document of lease in respect of three kathas land in favour of Gobardhan lal Malvya (Ext.6). 4(a). Both the plaintiffs and the defendants adduced oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective cases. The plaintiffs produced, ill particular, registered sale deed dated 8.11.1948 (Ext.5) and a document dated 1.4.1961 purporting to be the document of lease in respect of three kathas land in favour of Gobardhan lal Malvya (Ext.6). Some rent receipts, original and certified copies of old and new Khatians (Ext.7 and 8 series), besides certified copies in two petitions purporting to have been filed by and on behalf of Gobardhan lal Malvya in L.E. Case No. 26/1963-64 (Ext.9/C) and B.L.E. Appeal No. 52/65-67 (Ext. 10) were also filed by them. The defendants also filed certified copy of the corrected Khatian in respect of plot no. 802 (Ext.F/1), order dated 5.11.1966 made in Case No. 107/66 under section 90 of the C.N.T. Act (Ext.E); declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (Exts. G series), besides, some documents to show that portion of the old plot no. 486 was carved out and recorded in the name of one Prafulla Kumar Chatterjee and objections taken by Raghunath Mahato in respect thereof in course of preparation of record of rights were negatived and the record of rights finally prepared and published in his name on 13.12.1961 (Ext.F). 5. On consideration of the pleadings of the parties and evidence adduced on their behalf, the trial court came to the conclusion that the entire area of 1 bigha 11 kathas 7 dhurs of old plot no. 486 along with some other lands had already been acquired by the then ruler of Seraikella in 1945 for establishing a housing colony known as Narendra Nagar in the township of Kandra on the basis of declaration u/s.6 of the Land Acquisition Act published in Seraikella Gazette on 22.7.1944. Therefore no title was left with the owners of plot no. 486. Therefore, the alleged vendors of the plaintiffs could convey no title on the basis of Ext.5. The trial court also found that the document of sale was shrouded with suspicion, inasmuch as the witness identifying the executants thereof hailed from a distant place in Dhanbad and there was endorsement regarding payment of consideration on the back of the document in somebody else's pen and the discrepancies remained unexplained. The trial court also found that the document of sale was shrouded with suspicion, inasmuch as the witness identifying the executants thereof hailed from a distant place in Dhanbad and there was endorsement regarding payment of consideration on the back of the document in somebody else's pen and the discrepancies remained unexplained. The trial court also held that the plaintiffs having lost their claim against the State in respect of the suit plot in L. E. Case No. 27/1963-64 could not have brought the suit in view of the bar of section16 of the Bihar Public land Encroachment Act (BPLE ACT), and that too, without impleading the State which is a necessary party. The trial court held, on evidence, that the plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit land at any point of time within 12 years before the institution of the suit; that partly of the and claimed by the plaintiffs on the basis of Ext.5 had been recorded in the record of rights in the name of Prafulla Kumar Chatterjee (an admitted position), and part in favour of the State of Bihar during the survey settlement operation, which commenced in 1958 and objection (Tanaza) filed by the plaintiff Raghunath Mahato was rejected by the survey settlement authorities in January 1960. It was also found by the trial court that the story as propounded by the plaintiffs respecting leasing out of three kathas of plot no. 486 to Gobardhan lal Malvya is not correct in view of the plaintiffs failing to prove the execution of the lease deed by the said Gobardhanlal Malvya in the teeth of denial by him and his descendants that such document had ever been executed by him. The learned Munsif also held that the document of lease being compulsorily registerable, because it purported to be for a fixed period of two years and for non-agricultural and horticultural purposes, was inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, according to him, there was positive evidence that Gobardhan lal Malvya was doing timber business on the suit land much prior to 1961 when the land was allegedly leased out to him. Therefore, the trial court held that the plaintiffs having no subsisting title when the suit was instituted, as it was barred by limitation, could not succeed in getting the reliefs sought for. Therefore, the trial court held that the plaintiffs having no subsisting title when the suit was instituted, as it was barred by limitation, could not succeed in getting the reliefs sought for. It was also held by the trial court that at no point of time there existed relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendants who appear to have brought into existence Ext.6 after having lost the battle before the survey and settlement authorities in January 1960 itself. Consequently, the suit was dismissed by the trial court with costs. 6. Appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial court dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs having been preferred before the District Judge of Singhbhum at Chaibasa, after hearing the parties, the third Addl. Dist. Judge of Chaibasa relying on an entry in the old khatian respecting plot no. 486 came to the conclusion that as a matter of fact, only 9 kathas and 5 dhurs of the said plot had been acquired by the erstwhile ruler of Seraikella in L.A. NO.1/1943-44 and, not the entire area of 1 bigha 11 7 dhurs, as contended by the defendants- respondents before him. Therefore, according to him, the vendors of Raghunath Mahato had property in plot no. 486 of village Kandra to be conveyed to the vendee. However, he concurred with the finding of the trial court that the execution was shrouded with suspicion and that the document executed was never acted upon so much so that the plaintiffs never came in possession of any part of the plot no. 486, including 28 decimals of the suit plot no. 802. The lower appellate courts declined to draw a presumption regarding the genuineness of Ext.5 on the ground that it was more than 30 years old. For the reasons stated in the judgment the lower appellate court also concurred with the trial court that the plaintiffs/appellants had failed to prove the execution of the document of lease dated 1.4.1961 (Ext.6) by Gobardhanlal Malvya, and if in any event being unregistered, it was inadmissible in evidence. The lower appellate court also held that in view of the encroachment proceeding under the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act (BPLE ACT) commenced against Raghunath Mahato, and he having lost in the said proceeding, the suit was barred by section 16 of the said Act. The lower appellate court also held that in view of the encroachment proceeding under the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act (BPLE ACT) commenced against Raghunath Mahato, and he having lost in the said proceeding, the suit was barred by section 16 of the said Act. In the result, the appellate court dismissed the appeal with costs. 7. In consequence of dismissal of the appeal by the lower appellate court, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellants. In view of the mandate of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the following substantial questions of law were formulated at the time of admitting this appeal (i) whether in view of the facts and the circumstances of this case, section 16 of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act creates a bar with regard to the maintainability of the suit so far as the suit for declaration of the plaintiffs' title is concerned? (ii) whether in view of the fact that the sale deed (Ext.5) was 30 years old, a presumption of genuineness thereof as envisaged under section 90 of the Evidence Act could have been drawn? (iii) whether unregistered deed of lease was admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving the relationship of landlord and tenant? 8. Mr. L.K. Lal, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the bar of section 16 of the B.P.L.E. Act is applicable only to suits instituted against an order of Collector u/s 6 thereof in respect of a public land. According to him, a suit against a third person for declaration of title and possession on the ground that the defendant is a trespasser does not attract the mischief of section 16 of the BPLE Act. Therefore, he has contended that both the courts below committed and error in holding that the suit instituted by the plaintiffs against the defendants for declaration of title and recovery of possession respecting the suit plot no. 802 was barred by provisions of section 16 of the B.P.L.E. Act. Regarding the admissibility or non-admissibility in evidence of the lease deed (Ext.6) on the ground that it was not registered, the learned counsel has submitted that -both the courts lave committed error in taking the view that the document could not be looked into In support of the case of the plaintiffs. Regarding the admissibility or non-admissibility in evidence of the lease deed (Ext.6) on the ground that it was not registered, the learned counsel has submitted that -both the courts lave committed error in taking the view that the document could not be looked into In support of the case of the plaintiffs. According to him, no claim was founded by the plaintiffs on the strength of that document respecting the land in question. The document was sought to be used only for collateral purposes to ascertain the nature and character of the possession of the defendants. Therefore, Ext.6 could not have been altogether ignored as has been done by both the courts below. In course of his contention he has placed reliance on a decision of this court reported in AIR 1930 Patna 110 and AIR 1974 Patna 195. Mr. Lal has also contended that since Ext.5 was a registered document and purported to have been brought into existence more than 30 years before, under section 90 of the Evidence Act, a presumption of its genuineness was permissible, but both the courts committed an error in declining to draw such presumption on same irrelevant and extraneous consideration regarding passing of the consideration and distant abode of the identifying witness. According to him, once it was found by the lower appellate court that at the time Ext.5 was executed, the executants (vendors) had conveyable property in plot no. 486, there was no reason to hold otherwise than that on the basis thereof the vendee Raghunath Mahato had acquired valid title to the suit land. 9. On the other hand, Mr. N.K. Prasad, learned senior counsel for the respondents submitted that the presumption of genuineness of execution attaching to a thirty years old document is not absolute. If the court finds suspecting circumstances surrounding the execution of the document, it may decline to draw the presumption arid call upon the party relying on that document to prove it by adducing evidence. According to him, in the present case the plaintiffs did endeavour to prove the bringing into existence of the document and execution thereof, but they failed. Therefore, they could not be permitted to fall back on section 90 of the Evidence Ad for drawing a presumption that the document was genuinely executed by Fakir Chandra Biswas and his brothers. According to him, in the present case the plaintiffs did endeavour to prove the bringing into existence of the document and execution thereof, but they failed. Therefore, they could not be permitted to fall back on section 90 of the Evidence Ad for drawing a presumption that the document was genuinely executed by Fakir Chandra Biswas and his brothers. Therefore, both the courts below have rightly declined to draw such a presumption. As regards contention that Ext.6 even if unregistered, can be admitted and looked into to find out the nature of possession of the defendants over the suit land, he has submitted that in view of the concurrent findings of both the courts below that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that the said document bears the signature of Gobardhanlal Malvya in token of execution thereof, Ext.6 is of no consequence for the appellants. He has fairly conceded that in the facts and circumstances of the case, section 16 of the B.P.L.E. Act is not attracted. 10. It is undisputed at the bar that at the relevant point of time, plot no. 802 measuring 28 decimals had been recorded in the name of State of Bihar. In other words, the land was shown to be a 'public land' within the meaning of section 2(3) of the B.P.O.L.E. Act, 1956. The said Act was enacted for removal and prevention of the encroachment of public land. According to sub-section (3) of section 2 thereof, the public land means any land, inter alia, vested in the State of Bihar. Section 3 of the said Act empowers Collector to initiate an ejectment proceeding, if it appears to him from an application made by any person or upon information received from any source, that any person has made or is responsible for continuance of any encroachment upon any public land. If upon hearing the person concerned and taking evidence, he is satisfied of the allegation, the Collector is empowered under section 6 of the said Act to direct the person concerned to remove the encroachment within a specified period. The proceedings are required to be of a summary nature (section 8). 11. Section 11 provides for an appeal against an order of Collector and section 13 provides for a review. Earlier, there was also provision for revision, but that provision was subsequently deleted. The proceedings are required to be of a summary nature (section 8). 11. Section 11 provides for an appeal against an order of Collector and section 13 provides for a review. Earlier, there was also provision for revision, but that provision was subsequently deleted. 11 (a) Section 16 of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act lays down that no suit or other legal proceedings shall lie in any court in respect of any order passed under this Act. In other words, if in the proceeding initiated under section 3, the Collector finds after hearing the parties that the land is of the nature of a public land within the meaning of section 2(3) and the concerned person has made an encroachment thereon and on that score, he direced to remove the encroachment, no suit can be brought challenging that order. Even such bar is not absolute. The bar is applicable only if it conclusively found that the land respecting which such order has been made is a public land. A suit can be brought by a person who has lost the proceeding on the ground that the land in question is not a public land as defined in the Act. 12. In the present case, the suit has not been instituted challenging the order of the Collector confirmed by the courts of appeal and revision. On the other hand, the suit has been filed for declaration of title of the plaintiffs and recovery of possession as against the defendants, on the ground that the latter are trespassers. No doubt, initially, the land in question was recorded as belonging to the State of Bihar, but at a later stage, in view of the petition under section 90 of the C.N.T. Act having been filed by Gobardhan Lal Malvya claiming that land as belonging to him, his plea was accepted and the land was transferred in the name of the said Gobardhan Lal Malvya, the original defendant. In other words, even the semblance of title of the State in respect of the suit land disappeared by virtue of the order of the settlement officer as evidenced by Exts. E and F/1 therefore, when the suit was instituted, the land in question was no more a public land; Moreover, the proceeding against Raghunath Mahato in L.E. Case No. 27/1963-64 was respecting 3 decimals of land only of plot no. E and F/1 therefore, when the suit was instituted, the land in question was no more a public land; Moreover, the proceeding against Raghunath Mahato in L.E. Case No. 27/1963-64 was respecting 3 decimals of land only of plot no. 802, and not in respect of the entire area of 28 decimals. Therefore, I find that the State already having accepted before the Settlement authorities the title of the defendant respondents in plot no. 802, the land lost the character of public land to invite the provisions of the B.P.L.E. Act. Therefore, I find that both the courts below committed an error in holding that the suit was barred by section 16 of the B.P.L.E. Act. 13. Respecting rejection of the lease deed dated 1.4.1961 (Ext.6) on the ground that it is not registered, one finds that both the courts below have held that the document was compulsorily registrable and in view of the same not having been registered, it was inadmissible in evidence. Bare perusal of the document shows that the lease was for nonagricultural purposes for a fixed period of two years reserving an annual rental of Rs.181/-. In view of the provisions of section 17 of the Indian Registration Act and section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, the document was compulsorily registrable. Therefore, even if it is found to have been executed by Gobardhan lal Malavya as alleged by the plaintiffs, the document cannot be read in evidence if the suit was for enforcing the terms and conditions thereof or the claim of the plaintiffs hinged on the lease. In the present case the suit is not for enforcing any term or condition of the purported lease. The suit is for declaration of title and recovery of possession on the ground that the defendants are trespassers. The document in question is sought to be read in evidence to show that earlier the defendants had taken lease of a portion thereof, precisely 3 kathas =7 decimals the document was executed to evidence the transaction. In other words, the document is sought to be used for collateral purpose to show how and when the persons found in possession of the land in question had come to possess the same. 14. In AIR 1930 Patna 110 (Banamali Bauli and another Vs. In other words, the document is sought to be used for collateral purpose to show how and when the persons found in possession of the land in question had come to possess the same. 14. In AIR 1930 Patna 110 (Banamali Bauli and another Vs. Gaya Ram Mahato) it has been held that a document inadmissible for the purposes mentioned in section 49 of the Registration Act may, nevertheless be admitted for collateral purposes. It has also been held that where a lease is required to be registered under section 17 of the Registration Act, if not registered, it might be received in evidence for the, purposes other than those specified in section 49, but not as affecting any movable or immovable properties mentioned in it or as evidence of transaction affecting such properties. 14(a). Similarly, in AIR 1974 Patna 195 (Rameshwar lal Sharma Vs. Sirdar Amrik Singh) it has been held that the proviso to section 49 of the Indian Registration Act itself lay down that an unregistered document may be received as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered document. In other words, it cannot be looked into for any purpose except for the purpose of ascertaining the nature and character of the possession of the person concerned. Therefore, it is manifest that even if Ext.6, though compulsorily registrable and was not registered, it could be read in evidence for ascertaining the nature and character of the possession of the defendants over the suit land in view of the allegation by the plaintiffs that 3 kathas thereof had been leased-out to Gobardharn Lal Malvya with effect from 1.4.1961 for a period of two years on ground rent. It is another matter whether relying on that document history is found acceptable or not. However, even if this document is permitted to be read in evidence in support of the case of the plaintiffs appellants, they derive little benefit therefrom in view of the concurrent findings by both the courts below that the document has not been proved to be executed by Gobardhan lal Malavya. In the teeth of the denial by the defendants that the document was executed by Gobardhan lal Malavya and the same bears his signature, no attempt was made by the plaintiffs to establish by cogent evidence that it was executed by him. In the teeth of the denial by the defendants that the document was executed by Gobardhan lal Malavya and the same bears his signature, no attempt was made by the plaintiffs to establish by cogent evidence that it was executed by him. An attempt made by the plaintiffs to prove the factum of lease by relying on the admission as contained in petitions filed in L.E. Case No. 26/1963-64 has been negatived by both the courts below on the ground that neither loss or destruction •.of the originals was properly proved, nor it was established that the alleged documents had in fact, been filed by, and under the signature of, Gobardhanlal Malavya. In view of such adverse finding by the courts below, Ext.6 cannot be taken to prove the case of the plaintiffs that Gobardhanlal Malavya had been ever inducted over part of the suit land as a lessee on the basis of the said document. 15. As has been held by the apex court in (1999)2 SCC 471 , whether a finding of fact reached by the courts below is against the weight of evidence or not is a question which will remain in the realm of appreciation of evidence and does not project any question of law, much less any substantial question of law, which can enable the High Court in Second Appeal to upset such a finding of fact. 15(a). In (1999) 3 SCC 722 also, the apex court has held that the concurrent findings of fact howsoever erroneous, cannot be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The apex court has further held that it is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which findings were arrived at by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court, and the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for the opinion of the first appellate curt unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of the pronouncements made by the apex court or was based on inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. Certainly, it was not so in the present case. Certainly, it was not so in the present case. Both the courts below have rightly held on an appraisal of the evidence, that the plaintiffs failed to prove that Gobardhanlal Malavya had taken 3 kathas of the suit land on lease from Raghunath Mahato for installing a saw mill with effect from 1.4.1961 and in course of the land encroachment proceeding, admitted the title of the said Raghunath Mahato respecting the same. On evidence it has been found that the said Gobardhan Lal Malavya was running his sawmill and timber business on the suit land even prior to 1961. Therefore, I find and hold that even if Ext.6 is permitted to be looked into evidence for the limited purpose of ascertaining the nature and character of the possession of the defendants over the suit land, in view of the concurrent finding that the document has not been established to have been executed by Gobardhanlal Malavya by whom it purports to have been executed, this document is nothing but a waste paper. 16. The case of the plaintiffs is that on 8.11.1948, Fakir Chandra Biswas and his brothers executed sale deed in favour of Raghunath Mahato transferring 1 bigha 2 kathas and 5 dhurs of plot no. 486 on receipt of consideration of Rs.2700/- and put him in possession. The document was registered and has been admitted in evidence as Ext.5. However, both the courts below have held that execution of the document is shrouded with suspicion. They have also held that from the evidence on record and the facts and circumstances of the case, it has transpired that the document was never acted upon, inasmuch as the vendee never came in possession. In the trial court, a witness was examined by the plaintiffs to prove the writing of the scribe thereof, but he failed to so when he admitted in course of cross-examination that he was not aware of the hand-writing of the scribe. On this ground, the courts below declined to raise presumption regarding execution of the document as permissible under section 90 of the Evidence Act. 17. In appeal an attempt was made again to persuade the appellate court to draw presumption in view of the fact that the document had emanated from the custody of the plaintiffs and was more than 30 years old when sought to be adduced in evidence. 17. In appeal an attempt was made again to persuade the appellate court to draw presumption in view of the fact that the document had emanated from the custody of the plaintiffs and was more than 30 years old when sought to be adduced in evidence. The lower appellate courts has held that once the plaintiffs made an attempt to prove the execution of the document independently of the presumption available under section 90 of the Evidence Act and failed in their attempt, it is not permissible for them to rely on such presumption at a subsequent stage. For coming to such conclusion the trial court placed reliance on a decision of Andhra High Court reported in AIR1956 (Andhra) page 1. In that case, a document purporting to be a deed of gift was sought to be proved by examining a witness, but the attempt faile. As the document purported to be more than 30 years old, an attempt was made to persuade the High Court to draw a presumption of execution under section 90 of the Evidence Act. It was in this context that Andhra High Court held that an anonymous document is not within section 90. Evidence aliunde cannot be availed of. If the proof adduced to establish the hand writing of a particular person is inadequate, the presumption cannot be invoked. A person can either seek to establish the handwriting to be in a particular person's hand or does not prove or invoke a presumption permissible under section 90 in his favour. If he seeks to prove it and fails, there can be no question of invoking the presumption under section 90." Relying on this decision, the learned Addl. District Judge declined to draw presumption that the document of sale (Ext.5) was a genuine document executed in favour of Raghunath Mahato by Fakirchandra Biswas and his brothers. 18. Mr. Lal, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, has submitted that the lower appellate court fell in error in applying the said decision in the present case. The document was duly registered and no attempt was made by the plaintiffs to prove the execution thereof by adducing evidence. Only the contents were sought to be proved by proving the handwriting of the scribe thereof and the attempt failed. The document was duly registered and no attempt was made by the plaintiffs to prove the execution thereof by adducing evidence. Only the contents were sought to be proved by proving the handwriting of the scribe thereof and the attempt failed. He has stated that in the circumstances, even if some evidence was led to prove the document, the presumption permissible under section 90 of the Evidence Act ought to have been drawn. Reliance has been placed by him en a decision of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Rao Raja Tej Singh and Ors. Vs. Hastimal & Ors. (AIR 1972 Rajasthan 191). In that case also, a witness had been examined to prove the signature of the executant of the document. But it was found not proved. Thereafter, an & application was made in the , trial court for raising a presumption u/s. 90 of the Evidence Act in view of the fact that the document was 30 years old and a registered one. Presumption was drawn. In appeal it was contended that once the party seeks to prove a document, then he cannot fall back on the presumption that may arise u/s. 90 of the Evidence Act regarding the document which is more than 30 years old. Repelling the contention the learned single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court held as under: "In the present case, an application was filed by the defendant for raising presumption under section 90 (Evidence Act). The cited case did not bear out a broad argument like one advanced before me that regardless of the document no presumption can be drawn once the party has attempted to prove document by direct evidence and has failed. In my humble view, law is not to be construed in this regard as a penal provision. Once the party has made it known that he wants to rely on presumption under section 90 of the Evidence Act and the document and the surrounding circumstances are such that a presumption under section 90 of the Evidence Act may justifiably be raised, then the mere fact that the party has a witness or two in addition for proving the signature or the writing of the alleged executant will not always be a sufficient reason for not drawing the presumption." 18(a). In other words, the ratio of the decision in AIR 1972 Rajasthan 91 is that even an attempt is made by a party propounding a document to prove execution thereof by adducing evidence, if the said document is 30 years old and the facts and circumstances of the case permit it, the presumption regarding due execution thereof can be drawn by the court in accordance with the provisions of section 90 of the Evidence Act. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, it is true that such presumption is not absolute. It is entirely in the discretion of the trial court to draw such presumption or not; if the trial court finds certain suspicious circumstances attending the document, it may decline to draw presumption and call upon the party propounding the document to prove its due execution. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the AIR 1993 Patna 129; AIR 1975 Madras 88; and 1996 B.B.C.J (SC) 45. 19. In AIR 1975 Madras 88, a Division Bench of Madras High Court has held that the rule in section 90 is not absolute one and even in cases where document is produced from the proper custody, the court has the discretion to draw presumption referred to in the section or require the proof of the execution. The section itself states that the court may draw presumption referred to in that section and not that it must draw the presumption. It would be most dangerous to draw presumption that a document was genuine merely because it was 30 years old and came from the proper custody. The court must have regard to the evidence and surrounding circumstances and apply its mind as to whether the presumption will have to be drawn or not. 20. In AIR 1993 Patna 129 (Haradhan Mahta & Ors. Vs. Dukhi Mahta) a Division Bench of this court has held that the principle underlying section 90 is that if a document 30 years old or more is produced from proper custody and is, on its face free from suspicion, the court may presume that it has been duly executed and attested. The reason for incorporating section 90 is founded on necessity and convenience. It is extremely difficult, and some times impossible to prove handwriting, signature and execution and attestation of ancient document after lapse of many years. The reason for incorporating section 90 is founded on necessity and convenience. It is extremely difficult, and some times impossible to prove handwriting, signature and execution and attestation of ancient document after lapse of many years. Further reason for incorporating this provision is that if the two conditions enumerated in section 90 are fulfilled, then in relation to document the execution and attestation of which are not denied, the necessity of formal proof is waived and thereby court's time is saved. However, in cases where genuineness of a document is disputed and the executant or attesting witnesses are alive and available, or if they are dead, or not available, but evidence is available for proving the document in regard to the mode prescribed under section 69 of the Act, then the court should not raise presumption under section 90 of the Act and admit the document under each evidence, but direct the parties to prove the document by leading evidence. 21. In Sri Lakhi Baruah & Ors. Vs. Padma Kanta Kalita & Ors. (1996 BBCJ 45 (SC), the apex court has held that section 90 of the Evidence Act is founded on necessity and convenience, because it is extremely difficult and sometimes not possible to lead evidence to prove handwriting, signature or execution of the old document after lapse of 30 years. In order to obviate such difficulty or improbabilities to prove execution of an old document, section 90 has been incorporated in the Evidence Act, which does away with the strict rule of proof of private document. The presumption of genuineness may be raised if the document in question is produced from proper custody. It is, however, the discretion of the court to accept the presumption flowing form section 90. Such discretion should not, however, be exercised arbitrarily and uninformed by reasons. In other words, in either raising presumption or in declining to do so, the court is not required to act arbitrarily; the discretion has to be exercised judicially. 22. On going through the judgment of the trial court, I find that the learned munsif declined to draw presumption respecting execution of the document (Ext.5) primarily on the ground that he noticed certain discrepancies and suspicious circumstances regarding passing of consideration money, averments made in the document respecting the same and endorsement on the back thereof in support thereof. 22. On going through the judgment of the trial court, I find that the learned munsif declined to draw presumption respecting execution of the document (Ext.5) primarily on the ground that he noticed certain discrepancies and suspicious circumstances regarding passing of consideration money, averments made in the document respecting the same and endorsement on the back thereof in support thereof. The learned appellate court below declined to draw presumption merely on the ground that an attempt was made to prove the execution of the document and it failed in view of the fact that the witness produced for proving handwriting of the scribe failed to 90 so. Both the courts below lost sight of the fact that in the present case, execution of the sale deed dated 8.11.1948 (Ext. 5) by the Biswasas no where was in dispute or challenge by the defendants either in their pleadings or in course of the evidence. What the defendants had disputed was the passing of title to the vendee on the basis of that document in respect of the suit land on the ground that the entire area of plot no. 486 had already been acquired by the erstwhile ruler of Seraikella State in accordance with the provisions of Land Acquisition Act. 22(a). A bare perusal of the document discloses that besides an area of 1 bigha 2 kathas and 5 dhurs of plot no. 486, the vendors purported to transfer and convey to the vendee Raghunath Mahato several other lands. The defendants nowhere disputed the transfer of those lands, nor have they whispered anywhere that the document in question is a forged and fabricated document. Their only plea is that the vendor had no property in plot no. 486 to convey to the vendee on the basis of that document. The defendants nowhere disputed the transfer of those lands, nor have they whispered anywhere that the document in question is a forged and fabricated document. Their only plea is that the vendor had no property in plot no. 486 to convey to the vendee on the basis of that document. Therefore, the defendants in fact, not disputing the execution of the sale deed (Ext.5) by Fakir Chandra Biswas and his brothers more than 30 years old, there was no occasion for doubting the execution thereof and refusing to draw presumption, permissible under section 90 of the Evidence Act, that it was, in fact, executed by Fakir Chandra Biswas and his brothers Therefore, I find that in view of the fact that the document dated 8.11.1948 (Ext.5) being more than 30 years old and registered in accordance with the provisions of law and execution thereof not specifically denied in the• pleading of the defendants there was absolutely no need to get the same proved by independent evidence. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the document has to be presumed to be executed by Fakir Chandra Biswas and his brothers in favour of Raghunath Mahato. 23. However, even if the document (Ext.5) is presumed to be executed by the original owners Fakir Chandra Biswas and his brothers, there is no presumption to the correctness of what has been contained therein. In the case of Ghorhu & Ors. Vs. Shiv Ratan & Ors. (AIR 1981 Allahabad page 3), it has been held that, in fact, section 90 dispenses with the proof of document as required under sections 67 and 68 and what is required to be done is deemed to have been done by operation of law. But the proof of signature of handwriting does not establish that whatever is stated in the document is also correct. That has to be proved not only by production of document, but by proving its contention as well. In section 90 of the Evidence Act apart from the presumption of due execution, there is no presumption that the document has that legal effect which it purports to have. Even if there is presumption regarding execution of 30 years old document in that section, its execution cannot be said to be proved if such document is shown to have been never acted upon. Even if there is presumption regarding execution of 30 years old document in that section, its execution cannot be said to be proved if such document is shown to have been never acted upon. Both the courts below have concurrently held that in spite of the fact that 1 Bigha 2 kathas and 5 dhurs of plot no. 486 out of which the suit plot as carved out purported to be transferred on the basis of Ext.5, the document appears not given effect to, at least, in respect of the said plot. For coming to such conclusion, both the courts relied on a number of circumstances including the one that a major portion of the said plot was found in possession of one Prafulla Kumar Chatterjee and recorded in his favour in the record of rights for which no explanation was available from the plaintiffs. Even though they lost the battle against the said Prafulla Kumar Chatterjee as far back as in 1960, no attempt was made by the plaintiffs to get their title declared and possession recovered. Similarly, according to the plaintiffs only an area of 3 katha = 7 decimals was allegedly leased out to Gobardhan lal Malavya, but admittedly he was found in possession of an area of 28 decimals and there was no explanation how and when it so happened. On the contrary, there was evidence that the said Gobardhan lal Malavya was in possession of the suit land much prior to the date on which he was allegedly inducted as a tenant. No attempt was made by the vendee to get his name mutated and obtain rent receipts respecting the land in question. Rent receipts were obtained for the first time in 1976 as per Ext. 1/L. Earlier receipts used to be issued in the name of Fakir Chandra Biswas himself. Even though the plaintiff lost the proceeding in the land encroachment case, no attempt was made to get the land retrieved by resorting to legal remedy. Rent receipts were obtained for the first time in 1976 as per Ext. 1/L. Earlier receipts used to be issued in the name of Fakir Chandra Biswas himself. Even though the plaintiff lost the proceeding in the land encroachment case, no attempt was made to get the land retrieved by resorting to legal remedy. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, even if Ext.5 is presumed to be executed by Fakir Chandra Biswas and others in favour of Raghunath Mahato, the plaintiffs/appellants cannot succeed in getting the relief sought by them in view of the concurrent finding of both the courts below that inspite of bringing into existence of the said document, they never came in possession of the land of plot no. 486 including the suit land. 24. In the result, I find no merit in the present appeal and the same is hereby dismissed with cost. The appellants shall pay to the respondents a consolidated sum of Rs.250/- (rupees two hundred fifty) only by way of cost.