Vikramajit Sen, J. ( 1 ) THIS application under Order 1 Rule 10 has been fjil by S. Gurcharan Singh, son of late S. Patwansingh, through his counsel Shri Kailash Chand Dewan. It is prayed that he should be impleaded as a party in the present proceedings which are for the grant of Letters of Administration with the Will attached, relating to the estate of Mrs. Raseel Kohli, the deceased mother of the Petitioner and her deceased brother, the original Respondent No. It has been pleaded that when the Applicant came to meet his uncle, S. Raja Singh he came to learn, in the course of conversation, of the pendency of these proceedings. He was then informed by his counsel that "he should move an application for becoming a party so that the Will dated 1. 10. 1987 executed by the testatrix Dr. (Mrs.) Raseel Kohli, now deceased in respect of properties mentioned as 7/29, Darya Ganj, New Delhi, and property No. 6-B, Mathura Road, New Delhi that the Applicant is moving the present application before this Hon ble Court for the purpose of determination of the right, title and interest which the Applicant has acquired by virtue of a Will dated 1. 10. 1987 executed in his favour by the testatrix Dr. Mrs. Raseel Kohli, now deceased". It has been further pleaded that the application is being moved from the date that he gained knowledge of the pendency of these proceedings. The legal submission that the Applicant is a necessary and proper party and has a right to be heard in the pending probate petition is thereafter made. ( 2 ) VARIOUS objections have been raised by the Petitioner but in my opinion these do not call to be dealt with in specific and separate detail. Admittedly, the alleged Will dated 1. 10. 1987 has not seen the light of day heretofore. Considering the fact that there was no blood relationship between late Dr. (Mrs.) Raseel Kohli and the Applicant and also because the Applicant is not in possession of property bearing No. 6-B, Jangpura Extension, Mathura Road, New Delhi, probate proceedings, for giving judicial imprimatur to the Will dated 1. 10. 87 ought to have been initiated much earlier. It would be reasonable to assume that any prudent person would immediately initiate probate proceeding of the alleged Will dated 1. 10. 1987. 10. 87 ought to have been initiated much earlier. It would be reasonable to assume that any prudent person would immediately initiate probate proceeding of the alleged Will dated 1. 10. 1987. It would also be further reasonable to presume against the genuineness of this Will since no proceedings have heithertofore been started by the present applicant. I am fully mindful of the fact that it is not mandatory that a probate be obtained in respect of Wills executed in and dealing with properties in Delhi, but this cannot be stretched to the extremity that even where there is a overwhelming probability of the Will being disputed there is still no obligation for initiating these legal steps. In the present case, numerous proceedings are pending between the petitioner, who is the daughter of late Dr. (Mrs.) Raseel Kohli and her late brother. Disputes are also pending between her and Smt. Harnam Kaur and Ors. since it is alleged that Mrs. Harnam Kaur, Mrs. Mahinder Kaur and Shri Jagjit Singh, all partners of M/s. Texla Service Centre, 6-B, Jangpura Extension, Mathura Road, New Delhi have trespassed into this property and have admitted to purchase titular rights thereof contrary to injunctions passed by this Court. The uncle of the Applicant, S. Raja Singh is a resident of this very property and it would, therefore, be fair to assume that the Applicant had full knowledge of the pendency of these conflagatory litigations. Yet no action has been taken by the Applicant, and no reason has been given why this action has not been taken. ( 3 ) I have taken this view after considering the decision in Ramanand Thakur v. Permanand Thakur, AIR 1982 Patna 87, where it was observed that the "right to apply for a probate accrues from day to day so long as the will remains unprobated. In other words, the right to apply accrues every day and the cause of action for an application for probate arises every moment so long as the will remains unprobated and, therefore, for such an application there is no period of limitation and for taking this view we find full support from the Calcutta case which also finds support from the view taken by the Madras High Court in the case of Gnanamuthu Upadesi v. Vana Koipillai Nadan, (1894) ILR 17 Mad 379 ). Therefore, while holding that the Art. 137 of the new Limitation Act applies to any petition or application filed under any Act, we do not feel any difficulty to come to the conclusion that so far as the application for grant of a Probate or Letters of Administration is concerned, they are not governed by any Article of the Limitation Act. The application accordingly fails and, is hereby dismissed but in the circumstances, we shall leave the parties to bear their own costs". ( 4 ) IT appears to me, with due deference to the Learned Judges, that while correctly appreciating in paragraph 4, that the Apex Court had overruled its earlier view that Article 137 of the Limitation Act applied only to applications made under the Civil Procedure Code, they were influenced by decision rendered on the basis of the old Limitation Act. ( 5 ) IN Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum v. T. P. Kunhaliumma, AIR 1977 SC 282 , Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was held to "apply to any petition: "the conclusion we read is that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court. With respect we differ from the view taken by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Athani Municipal Counsel case ( AIR 1969 SC 1335 ) (supra) and hold that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act is not confined to applications contemplated by or under the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition in the present case was to the District Judge as a court. The petition was one contemplated by the Telegraph Act for judicial decision. The petition is an application failing within the scope of Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act". ( 6 ) THE decision in Shobha Kshirsagar v. Smt. Janki Kshirsagar and Anr. , AIR 1987 MP 145 , in which a Learned Single Judge held that Art. 137 cannot apply to an application for probate, with respect, cannot be reconciled with the decision of the Apex Court in the Kerala State Electricity Board s case (supra ). The Learned Judge proceeded on the foundation of the decisions rendered by some High Court, which decisions were predicated on the old Limitation Act. The Learned Judge proceeded on the foundation of the decisions rendered by some High Court, which decisions were predicated on the old Limitation Act. Therefore, reliance on precedents prior to the rendering of the decision in the Kerala State Electricity Board s case (supra) would be inappropriate. For these very reasons I feel constrained not to follow the ratio in Balwant vs. Mainabai, AIR 1991 MP 11 . ( 7 ) IN a decision of a Division Bench rendered in Hari Narain vs. Subhash Chander, AIR 1985 Pandh 211, the argument that no limitation had been prescribed in filing of an application for revocation of a probate granted under the Succession Act was referred to as an "astounding proposition of law put forth by the learned counsel for the Applicant". After discussing the law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, it was held by the learned Division Bench that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to any petition or application filed in a Court where no other period of limitation had been prescribed. After careful consideration I would extend the ratio of this decision mutatis mutandis to also cover cases pertaining to the grant of probate, where it can be fairly assumed that the Petitioner had knowledge that the Will was likely to be disputed. Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under: Description of suit period of limitation time from which period begins to run 137. Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Division three years when the right to apply accrues. ( 8 ) THE period of three years would surely commence atleast from the date on which a legatee under a Will could be justifiably ascribed with the knowledge that the Will on which his claim is founded is likely to be disputed by other persons especially the natural heirs of the Testatrix. By way of adumbration, hypothetically, a Will may have been executed in Delhi in 1950. The bequests made and dealt with therein may not have come into any dispute for several decades. It could be that some legatees were in possession of the properties with the tacit permission or approval of the other legatees, which approval was subsequently withdrawn. By way of adumbration, hypothetically, a Will may have been executed in Delhi in 1950. The bequests made and dealt with therein may not have come into any dispute for several decades. It could be that some legatees were in possession of the properties with the tacit permission or approval of the other legatees, which approval was subsequently withdrawn. So long as the rights of any particular legatee are to emanate and flow from the Will, probate proceedings ought to be filed atleast within three years from this conjectured withdrawal of permission. That would then be the latest date on which "the right to apply accrues". This would be the most appropriate and meaningful interpretation given to the words "when the right to apply occurs" The applicant in the present case must surely have been well aware that the Will would be indefaticably contested. His right to apply surely accrued on the death of the alleged Testatrix Dr. Raseel Kohli on 11. 10. 1987. Yet he chose not to initiate probate proceedings, and over a decade has passed thereafter. ( 9 ) THERE are other considerations which have weighed in my mind for rejecting the application. As has been mentioned, the present petition is for the grant of probate of a Will dated 23. 9. 1987 stated to have been executed by the mother of the petitioner. The Applicant is not a Class I heir of the deceased late Dr. (Mrs.) Raseel Kohli and would not be a necessary party to these proceedings. Even if the case of the Applicant is presumed to be correct, this does not necessarily mean that the present petition would be automatically rejected since the Will on which the petition is founded may well be held to be genuine. The only question would be whether it is a last Will and Testament of the deceased. ( 10 ) IT would, however, be of advantage of refer to the cases of Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum and Ors. , AIR 1958 SC 886 and K. S. Abraham v. Mrs. Chandy Rosamma and Ors. , AIR 1989 Ker 167 . In the former case it was established that only if a party had a direct interest in the litigation, in contradistinction to a commercial interest, would it be justified to implead it, thereby transgress the universally accepted legal concept of the Petitioner/plaintiff being dominus litis. Chandy Rosamma and Ors. , AIR 1989 Ker 167 . In the former case it was established that only if a party had a direct interest in the litigation, in contradistinction to a commercial interest, would it be justified to implead it, thereby transgress the universally accepted legal concept of the Petitioner/plaintiff being dominus litis. The latter case is one amongst many others where the distinction laid down by the Apex Court has been followed. Whether a person propounding another Will should be considered to have a direct interest in the probate and administration petitions is a question which needs to be answered. Various courts have no doubt accepted that these actions relating to the succession to an Estate are on a different footing to a civil suit. The rationale must substantially be because of these proceedings having an efficacy in rem rather than in persona. Third party interests may not be in jeopardy because, inter alia, because of the application of the principles of res judicata in the latter category. Public citation, for this among other reasons is therefore carried out in probate/administrative/succession petitions. It must be borne in mind, as enunciated by the Apex Court in Ishwardas vs. Kanta Devi, ALR 1954 SC 280, that "the Court of Probate is primarily concerned with the question as to whether the document put forward as the last Will and Testament of a deceased person was duly executed and attested in accordance with law and whether at the time of such execution the testator had sound disposing mind". This principle was also extended to Letters of Administration by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Dhane Ali v. Sobhan Ali, AIR 1978 Cal 399 . ( 11 ) SHRI Mahinder Rana, Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff, has relied on a number of judgments in support of his contention that the applicant is not a proper or necessary party to the present proceedings. In most of the cases, the Court had to consider the applicants being impleaded as the Petitioners, and from this stand-point, the relevant concern was whether they had the requisite locus standi. The answer given by the Court was in the negative. This ratio would not apply where the applicant wishes to be impleaded in the petition as a Respondent or Objector in order to resist the grant of probate to the Will. The answer given by the Court was in the negative. This ratio would not apply where the applicant wishes to be impleaded in the petition as a Respondent or Objector in order to resist the grant of probate to the Will. The cases relied upon are as follows:- ( 12 ) (I) Raja Ram Adult v. Lakshmi Narain Adult, AIR 1958 Allahabad 149; (ii) Inder Chand Nayyar v. Sarvadeshik Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and Anr. AIR 1977 Delhi 34; (iii) Edward Waston Coleston v. Mrs. Theresa Chitty and Ors. , AIR 1934 Allahabad 1053; (iv) Durga Charan v. Sm. Bhudibala Naskar and Ors. , AIR 1985 Calcutta 264; (iv) Sarat Chandra Banerjee Vs. Naian Mohan Banerjee Vol. XXXVI Calcutta Services (1909) 799; (vi) Hari Pada vs. Gobinda Chandra 1948, ILR Calcutta 300; (vii) Mahatma vs. Thakur Prasad 1950 ILR Calcutta 653; (viii) Sm. Sulochana Debi v. Mt. Puranjaya, AIR (35) 1948 Patna 419; (ix) Hari Bhushan Datta v. Manmatha Nath Datta and Ors. , AIR 1919 Calcutta 197; (x) Bhupati Charan Basu v. Chandi Charan Basu Mallick, AIR 1935 Calcutta 154. I also do not consider it necessary to refer to the numerous precedents cited before me by Learned Counsel for the Petitioner on the general considerations for impleading parties under Order I Rule 10. These decisions are so many and manifold that it would meaninglessly multiply the discussion. ( 13 ) THE Applicant has no direct interest in the present controversy. Till date no petition has been filed for the grant of probate of the Will dated 1. 10. 1987 propounded by the Applicant. In the present case, at the very least, an adverse inference as to the authenticity and genuineness of the Will dated 1. 10. 1987 should be drawn. There would be no justification, therefore, to permit an interpolar, who has not even bothered to take requisite steps for obtaining judicial approval for the Will propounded by him to be permitted in proceedings between siblings, pertaining to the estate of their mother. The correct approach, in consonance with justice, fair play and good conscience, would be to grant probate, if the Will is found to be genuine. Otherwise a grave miscarriage of justice would occur directly resulting in inordinate delay being caused. The correct approach, in consonance with justice, fair play and good conscience, would be to grant probate, if the Will is found to be genuine. Otherwise a grave miscarriage of justice would occur directly resulting in inordinate delay being caused. Thereafter if good cause is shown to the Court to stay the judgment if a subsequent Will has been put in for approval in the judicial pipeline. The following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Elizabeth Antony vs. Michel Charles John Chown Lengera, AIR 1990 SC 1576 is relevant in this regard: "the learned Counsel, however, lastly submitted that the petitioner in spite of having substantial interest in the estate is losing her right to prove that the alleged Will by Miss Zoe Enid Browne (sic) is not a genuine one an that it is a fictitious one. We must point out that by granting a probate, the Court is not deciding the disputes to the title. Even with regard to a probate granted, it can be revoked as provided under Section 263 of the Act in any one of the cases mentioned therein. But the learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the findings of the Sub-Court and the High Court regarding the caveatable interest will come in the petitioner s way in seeking revocation of the grant of probate. It is needless to say that the findings regarding the caveatable interest of the petitioner have a limited effect and are relevant only to the extent of granting of probate. But they cannot deprive his right, if he has any, to invoke Section 263 of the Act it is up to the petitioner to satisfy the Court. " ( 14 ) IT will also be relevant to mention that despite several opportunities granted for the filing of the original Will dated 1. 10. 1987, this document has not seen the light of day. The application is, therefore, dismissed and since it is vexatious and calculated to cause delay it is dismissed with exemplary cost of Rs. 5000. 00.