Judgment 1. This writ petition has been filed for quashing of the entire proceedings in Sessions Trial No. 733 of 1977 arising out of Jagdishpur P.S. Case No. 16/76 pending in the Court of 7th Additional Sessions Judge, Bhojpur at Arrah. The quashing is sought on the ground of delay in concluding the trial. The facts of the case, so far as relevant, may be stated as follows : 2. Jang Bahadur Singh lodged first in formation report alleging commission of various offences at the hands of the four named accused including the petitioner on 21.4.1976. A formal case i.e. Jagdishpur P.S. Case No. 16 of 1976 was instituted on 22.4.1976 in which after conclusion of the investigation charge-sheet was submitted on 4...1977. On 22.8.1977 cognizance was taken and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions on 30.11.1977. On 21.1.1981 charges were framed for various offences including Sections 302 and 307 of the Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. At the trial which followed, the prosecution had examined ten witnesses before the petitioner approached this Court in the present application seeking quashing of the prosecution on the ground that the period of ten years has passed and in view of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Madheshwardhari Singh and another v. State of Bihar, AIR 1986 Patna 324 : 1986 East Cr C 17 (FB) entire prosecution was fit to be quashed. 3. Since the quashing is sought on the ground of delay, I have considered it unnecessary to state the factual aspects of the case. 4. The decision in Madheshwardhari Singhs case was challenged by the State of Bihar in Cr Appeal No. 126 of 1987 before the Supreme Court. The said appeal was decided along with other appeals involving identical point entitled as Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, AIR 1992 SC 1701 :1992 East Cr C 360 (SC). Dealing with the decision in Madheshwardhari Singhs case (supra) and the propositions laid down therein vide para 47 of the judgment, the Supreme Court held that it is not possible in the very nature of things and the present day circumstances to draw a time limit beyond which a criminal proceeding cannot be allowed to go.
Dealing with the decision in Madheshwardhari Singhs case (supra) and the propositions laid down therein vide para 47 of the judgment, the Supreme Court held that it is not possible in the very nature of things and the present day circumstances to draw a time limit beyond which a criminal proceeding cannot be allowed to go. Wherever a complaint of infringement of right to speedy trial is made the Court has to consider all the circumstances of the case and arrive at a decision whether in fact the proceeding is pending unjustifiably for long period. The Court noted that in every case the prosecution may not be blamed for the delay, in many cases the accused has to be blamed, in some other cases it is the system which is to be blamed, but that does not mean that merely by efflux of time, the prosecution could come to a grinding halt. 5. Counsel for the petitioner does not dispute that the principle laid down by this Court in Madheshwardhari Singhs case has been substantially diluted by the Supreme Court and, therefore, merely on the ground of passage of particular period, prosecution cannot be quashed, not only the facts of the case but also the attending circumstances have to be seen. Counsel accordingly submitted that the petitioner being an old person of 90 years of age by now and the occurrence having taken place on 20.4.1976, it will not be proper to compel him to face trial which has by now remained pending for more than 22 years including the period spent in investigation, etc. Counsel pointed out that the petitioner has been assigned the role of traditional order giver and, therefore, compared to other accused, stands on far lesser footing. The submissions of the counsel generally speaking are attractive, but we are afraid, we are unable to pass any firm positive order in favour of the petitioner at this stage. The writ petition was filed on 28.4.1987 and while admitting the same on 18.5.1987 further proceedings in Sessions Trial No. 733/77 in the Court below were stayed. As a result of the said interim order the proceedings have remained pending in a state of suspended animation for more than 12 years. It would not be far-off the point if it is said that if the proceedings had not been stayed, the trial would have been over by now.
As a result of the said interim order the proceedings have remained pending in a state of suspended animation for more than 12 years. It would not be far-off the point if it is said that if the proceedings had not been stayed, the trial would have been over by now. As stated above, ten prosecution witnesses had already been examined before the petitioners came to this Court and the proceedings were stayed. It is not possible to put the clock behind. In this view of the matter, the order that commends to us is to fix a time-frame for conclusion of the trial. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the period of 9 months from the date of receipt of copy of this order should be sufficient. In other words, on expiry of the said period of 9 months reckoned from the date of receipt of copy of this order the Court will close the prosecution case provided the prosecution does not file any application to do so at an earlier stage and, thereafter, give an opportunity to the defence to examine his witness, if any, in the case. Although it hardly need be emphasised that any further delay to the proceedings will be on account of the accused, we are of the view that it would be appropriate to fix a time-frame of further three months for the purpose. In other words, after the said extended period of three months expires the Court shall close the defence case provided the defence does not file an application to do so at an early stage, and thereafter proceed to hear the final arguments of the parties and deliver the judgment at the earliest. The above period of 9 months it must be clarified, will be subject to petitioner and other accused co-operating with the Court in conclusion of the trial. 6. In the result, that writ petition is dismissed, but subject to observations and directions as mentioned above.