S. K. Agarwal,j. ( 1 ) BY this application the appellants/applicants are seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal against the impugned judgment and decree dated 13th August, 1997 passed by Shri J. M. Malik, Additional District Judge, Delhi granting a decree of possession against them in two consolidated suits (No. 22/89 and 23/89) in respect of first floor and the second floor of the premises No. B-1/29 Hauz Khas, New Delhi, and a decree of damages/mesne profits of Rs. 3900. 00 and Rs. 2600. 00 respectively in the said suits: ( 2 ) FACTS giving rise to the above application briefly are that Vishwa Swaroop (respondent/plaintiff) instituted two above noted suits against the appellants/applications for recovery of possession of 1st floor and 2nd floor of the premises No. B-1/29 Hauz Khas, New Delhi and recovery of damages/mesne profits. Both suits were consolidated. Plaintiff died during the pendency of the suit. His widow, Smt. Kaushalya Devi, was substituted as the plaintiff by order dated 20. 3. 95. Vide impugned judgment and decree dated 13th August, 1997 Shri J. M. Malik, Additional District Judge, decreed both the suits against the appellants. Feeling aggrieved against the impugned judgment and decree, the applicant/appellants filed two appeals (RFA 294/97 and RFA 295/97 ). In the opening sheets of both the appeals respondent was described as "vishwa Swaroop (deceased)" and in the Memo of Parties respondent was described as Vishwa Swaroop (decreased) through Vidya Sagar. Both the appeals came up for preliminary hearing before a Division Bench of this Court on 13th October, 1997. While admitting the appeals notice on the stay applications was directed to be issued for 25th October, 1997. Interim stay against dispossession was also granted. The respondent was duly served for this date but nobody appeared. Consequently the order dated 13th October, 1997 granting stay was made absolute pending final disposal of the appeal. However, liberty was granted to the respondent to apply for variation. Interim stay against dispossession was also granted. The respondent was duly served for this date but nobody appeared. Consequently the order dated 13th October, 1997 granting stay was made absolute pending final disposal of the appeal. However, liberty was granted to the respondent to apply for variation. ( 3 ) N 7th January, 1999 Smt. Kaushlya Devi, Widow of the deceased, Shri Vishwa Swaroop moved an application (CM No. 5/99) in RFA 294/97, under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short Code), praying therein that she was the only legal representative of Vishwa Swaroop , which was within the knowledge of the appellants; that in the appeal she was not impleaded as a party and that the appeal filed against Shri Vidya Sagar, brother of her husband was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. Notice of this application was issued for 10th February, 1999 to the appellants. It appears that after receipt of the notice of this application, on 15th January, 1999 appellants moved an application (CM No. 102/99) under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code pleading therein that it was by sheer omission that the name of the legal representative of the deceased respondent was mentioned as Vidya Sagar, who is the real brother of the deceased/plaintiff, who had appeared as a witness and was his attorney. Notice of the appellants application was also issued for the date already fixed. On 10th February, 1999 when the matter was taken up for hearing, counsel for the applicant/appellant sought time to file reply to CM 5/99 of Smt. Kaushalya Devi and the matter was adjourned to 7th May, 1999, on which date her counsel took time to file a rejoinder and the matter was directed to be listed for hearing on 6th September, 1999. ( 4 ) ON 6th September, 1999 this Court observed that the appeal filed against Vishwa Swaroop (deceased) impleading Vidya Sagar, his brother, representing his estate, without impleading sole legal heir of the deceased, Smt. Kaushalya Devi, was not competent and the appellant s application (CM No. 102/99) seeking amendment of the memo of parties in appeal was also not maintainable. Learned counsel for the appellant prayed for adjournment and the matter was adjourned to 14th September, 1999, on which date learned counsel for appellants prayed that he may be permitted to withdraw the appeal to enable him to file separate appeal against Smt. Kaushalya Devi. Consequently both the appeals we dismissed as withdrawn. ( 5 ) THEREAFTER on 22nd September, 1999 the appellants has filed the above two appeals against the impugned judgment and decree dated 13th August, 1997, impleading Smt. Kaushalya Devi as the respondent along with applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. The respondent in her reply has stated that there was a long and inordinate delay of more than two years without any plausible reasons that there was utter negligence on the part of the appellants in filing appeal against a wrong person without impleading her as a party and that the applications being not bona fide were liable to be dismissed. ( 6 ) WE have heard Mr. B. S. Sherawat, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri K. N. Kataria, Sr. Adv. , learned counsel for the respondent and have been taken through the record. ( 7 ) AS per the settled law mistake of a counsel under certain circumstances can be taken into account in condoning the delay, if the mistake is bona fide and is not a device to cover an ulterior purpose such as latches on the part of the litigant or an attempt to save litigation in an under hand way. Legal advice honestly sought and given has been held to be a sufficient cause, while considering an application under Section 5 of the Limitation act. Where a party had been bona fide pursuing a wrong remedy, it would be a fit case for applying the principles embodied in Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It is also well settled that Section 5 and Section 14 of the Limitation Act though independent are not mutually exclusive. Even in cases where Section 14 applies, the principles embodied in Section 5 are not excluded. It is also well settled that Section 5 and Section 14 of the Limitation Act though independent are not mutually exclusive. Even in cases where Section 14 applies, the principles embodied in Section 5 are not excluded. ( 8 ) IN Collector, Land Acquisition vs. Katiji 1987 0 RLR 132 while interpreting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, Supreme Court observed that the expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice and laid down the following six principles:- "i) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; II) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties; III) "every day s delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour s delay, every second s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner; IV) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because a nondeliberate delay; V) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk; VI) It must be grasped that judicially is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. " ( 9 ) NOW coming to the facts in hand, as noticed above, against the impugned judgment and order dated 13. 8. 97 appellants/applicants did file two appeals (RFA 294/97 and 295/97) within the period of limitation; vide order dated 13th October, 1997 both the appeals were heard and admitted by a Division Bench of this Court and a stay against dispossession was also granted, which was subsequently confirmed. 8. 97 appellants/applicants did file two appeals (RFA 294/97 and 295/97) within the period of limitation; vide order dated 13th October, 1997 both the appeals were heard and admitted by a Division Bench of this Court and a stay against dispossession was also granted, which was subsequently confirmed. Service was also effected on the brother of the deceased, Vishwa Swaroop living at the same address, who was admittedly his attorney. The error was detected on 7th January, 1999 i. e. after a lapse of more than a year when an application for dismissal of the appeal was moved by Smt. Kaushalya Devi widow of the deceased. Realising the mistake, counsel for the applicants/appellants moved an application (CM No. 102/99) under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code for amendment of the memo of appeal seeking to implead Smt. Kaushalya Devi as the respondent. Prima facie this Court felt that such an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code would not be maintainable, consequently on 14th September, 1999 two appeals (RFA 294/97 and RFA 295/97) were dismissed as withdrawn. ( 10 ) PERUSAL of the record reveals that on 15th September, 1999 court fee of more than Rs. 3000. 00 was purchased in each of the case by the appellants; on 16th September, 1999 certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree dated 13. 8. 97 was applied which was made available on 18th September, 1999; appeal was prepared on 20th September, 1999 and on 22nd September, 1999 both the appeals including the present appeal (RFA 608/99) was filed along with the above application for condonation of delay. ( 11 ) IT may be noticed that although the sole plaintiff/respondent (Vishwa Swaroop) had died, a perusal of the opening sheets of the earlier appeals (RFA 294/97 and 295/97) reveal that against the column "respondent (plaintiff or defendant)" name of "shri Vishwa Swaroop (Decd.)" was typed, however in the memo of parties, respondent is described as "shri Vishwa Swaroop (deceased) through Shri Vidya Sagar". If the registry was vigilant it would not have registered the appeals against a dead person. The error could have been detected at the filing stage itself. However, this fact escaped the notice of the registry also and the appeals were admitted. If the registry was vigilant it would not have registered the appeals against a dead person. The error could have been detected at the filing stage itself. However, this fact escaped the notice of the registry also and the appeals were admitted. It may be reiterated that the earlier two appeals were filed within the period of limitation and proper court fee was affixed thereon; appeals were admitted and stay was granted. The error was detected only after a period of about 14 months when the respondent, Smt. Kaushalya Devi, filed applications on 7th January, 1999 for dismissal of appeals. ( 12 ) UNDER the circumstances, we are of considered opinion that the delay in filing the present appeal was neither deliberate nor mala fide and was just accidental and for these reasons there is a sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the present appeal. ( 13 ) APPLICATION is allowed. Delay is condoned but subject to payment of costs of Rs. 2,500. 00 as costs.