M. KATJU, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition has been filed for quashing the order communicated vide D. O. letter dated 22. 1. 1997 (Annexure-6 to the petition) and order communicated by D. O. letter dated 14. 8. 1997 (Annexure-10 to the petition) and to retain the order communicated vide D. O. letter dated 16. 12. 1996 (Annexure-5 to the petition ). ( 2 ) WE have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned standing counsel as well as sri Sunil Ambwani for the High Court. ( 3 ) THE petitioner is a member of the subordinate judiciary of U. P. having been appointed as munsif in the year 1990. He was communicated an adverse remark by the then District Judge, varanasi vide letter dated 31. 5. 1994 Annexure-1 to the petition regarding the year 1993-94. The petitioner filed a representation against the said adverse entry vide Annexure-2. Subsequently, he was communicated the letter dated 22. 3. 1996 from the High Court (Annexure-3 to the petition)informing him that the adverse entries made in column Nos. 1 (a) and 1 (b) have been expunged and the rest of the representation had been rejected. This letter dated 22. 3. 1996 states that the integrity of the petitioner, which had earlier been withheld, was certified, and nothing adverse was found against the petitioner regarding fair and impartial dealings with the public and the bar. ( 4 ) SINCE only part of his representation had been allowed, the petitioner submitted another representation dated 27. 4. 1996 to the High Court with the prayer for expunging of the adverse remarks for the year 1993-94. True copy of the said representation is Annexure-4 to the petition. On this representation, the petitioner received a communication letter dated 16. 12. 1996 informing him that the adverse remarks have been expunged and it has been substituted by fresh remarks. True copy of the said letter dated 16. 12. 1996 is Annexure-5 to the petition. Thus, it is evident that the entire adverse entries had been expunged and substituted by the High Court. ( 5 ) IT is alleged that he was subsequently awarded another adverse remark by the Court on the basis of the adverse remark of 1993-94 and this was communicated vide letter dated 28. 1. 1997 to the petitioner. True copies of the letter dated 28. 1. ( 5 ) IT is alleged that he was subsequently awarded another adverse remark by the Court on the basis of the adverse remark of 1993-94 and this was communicated vide letter dated 28. 1. 1997 to the petitioner. True copies of the letter dated 28. 1. 1997 and the order of the High Court sent by the Joint Registrar are Annexures-6 and 7 to this petition. ( 6 ) IN paragraph 12 of the writ petition, it is stated that the petitioner made a representation on 13. 2. 1997 and in connection with the same, the District Judge. Banda informed the petitioner vide letter dated 4. 6. 1997 that the Joint Registrar of the High Court through his letter dated 29. 5. 1997 has informed him about the expunging of the following portion of the remarks by the court : "district Judge has directed one of the Addl. District Judge to make an enquiry which has not concluded so far. His integrity has been withheld. In view of the remarks in the annual confidential remarks, the integrity of the officer has to be withheld for time being. Matter may be reconsidered after report is received. " True copy of the letter dated 4. 6. 1997 is Annexure-8 to the petition. ( 7 ) IN paragraph 13 of the petition, it is alleged that against the adverse remarks by the High Court vide order dated 1. 8. 1994 for the year 1993-94 communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 22. 1. 1997 through letter dated 28. 1. 1997, the petitioner made a representation dated 13. 2. 1997 and in this representation, he stated that his earlier representation had been allowed by the High court and the adverse entry had been expunged and his integrity was certified and as such continuation of the same entry was uncalled for and hence the petitioner requested for expunction of the remark of the High Court. True copy of the representation dated 13. 2. 1997 is annexure-9 to the petition. In response to this representation, the petitioner was informed of the order of this Court communicated by the Joint Registrar of the High Court by letter dated 14. 8. 1997 through respondent No. 3 who informed the petitioner about it vide letter dated 22. 8. 1997 enclosing copy of the letter dated 14. 8. 1997. True copies of the letter dated 14. 8. 8. 1997 through respondent No. 3 who informed the petitioner about it vide letter dated 22. 8. 1997 enclosing copy of the letter dated 14. 8. 1997. True copies of the letter dated 14. 8. 1997 and 22. 8. 1997 are Annexures-10 and 11 to the petition. By the order dated 14. 8. 1997, the representation of the petitioner dated 13. 2. 1997 appears to have been rejected and some of the earlier entries were retained by the Court and the letter dated 16. 12. 1996 was withdrawn. In paragraph 16 of the writ petition, it is stated that no, reason has been given for withdrawing the letter dated 16. 12. 1996 by which all the adverse entries had been expunged and fresh entry in favour of the respondent No. 3 has been incorporated by the Court. Hence this petition. ( 8 ) A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the High Court. In paragraph 4 (b), it is alleged that while the petitioner was posted as Munsif Magistrate, Varanasi that Chakia Bar Association passed certain resolutions against the petitioner demanding transfer of the petitioner on the ground of lack of integrity. It was also mentioned therein that frequent adjournments were granted by the petitioner and disposal of cases was unsatisfactory. There were also complaints that he favoured lawyers of his own caste. Some other remarks were also made regarding his judgments, and his allowing the grant for purchase of library books to lapse. By the order dated 16. 3. 1996, the adverse remarks were partly expunged and the rest of the petitioners representation was rejected. Thereafter the petitioner made another representation and the administrative Committee passed a resolution dated 16. 5. 1997 which has been quoted in paragraph 4 (i) of the counter-affidavit which is as follows : "resolved that the adverse remarks of the District Judge. Varanasi, which were subsequently deleted by the Inspecting Judge. Varanasi, be deleted from the records of the Court. "the rest of the remarks be retained. The Administrative Committee has taken note of the fact that by inadvertence the representation submitted by the officer for deletion of certain remarks was erroneously sent to the Inspecting Judge. Banda, where the officer was posted on transfer. " ( 9 ) IN pursuance of the resolution of the Administrative Committee dated 16. 5. 1997, the District judge. The Administrative Committee has taken note of the fact that by inadvertence the representation submitted by the officer for deletion of certain remarks was erroneously sent to the Inspecting Judge. Banda, where the officer was posted on transfer. " ( 9 ) IN pursuance of the resolution of the Administrative Committee dated 16. 5. 1997, the District judge. Banda was requested through the D. O. letter dated 29. 5. 1997 to inform the petitioner that the following portion of the remarks for the year 1993-94 has been expunged by the Court : "the District Judge has directed one of the Addl. District Judges to make enquiry which has not been concluded so far. His integrity has been withheld. In view of remarks in annual confidential remarks integrity of the officer has to be withheld for time being. Matter may, be reconsidered after report is received. " ( 10 ) THROUGH another D. O. letter dated 14. 8. 1997, the petitioner has been informed through the district Judge. Banda, that the remarks recorded by the then District Judge. Varanasi, in certain columns have been retained by the High Court and hence letter dated 16. 12. 1996 was withdrawn. ( 11 ) WE sent for the personal file of the petitioner from the registry to ascertain why the entry for 1993-94 communicated to the petitioner vide D. O. letter dated 16. 12. 1996 had been withdrawn while D. O. letter dated 14. 8. 1997 has been sent to the petitioner. It appears that the reason for this was that at the relevant time, i. e. , 1993-94. the petitioner was posted at Varanasi but subsequently he was transferred to Banda and hence the entry which was communicated vide d. O. letter dated 16. 12. 1996 (Annexure-5 to the petition) was the entry given by the Honble inspecting Judge of Banda. However, earlier a policy decision had been taken by the High Court that if a judicial officer is posted in a particular district in the year in which the entry is to be given, then even if subsequently he has been transferred to some other district, the Honble Judge of the High Court who is the Inspecting Judge of the earlier district should give the entry and not the Inspecting Judge of the district where the officer was subsequently transferred. The Honble inspecting Judge who gave the entry for the year 1993-94 was the Inspecting Judge of district banda but the petitioner was not posted in Banda in 1993-94 but was at Varanasi. Hence according to the policy decision, only the Inspecting Judge of Varanasi should have given the entry. It was for this reason that the aforesaid D. O. communicated by letter dated 16. 12. 1996 was withdrawn and we see no illegality in this. ( 12 ) WE enquired from the learned counsel for the High Court, Sri Sunil Ambwani as to what precisely were the allegations against the petitioner for which he was awarded the adverse entry. Learned counsel stated that there was some resolution of the Chakia Bar Association that the petitioner was favouring members of the Bar of his own caste. In our opinion, this is a mere generalisation and cannot be accepted unless some specific instances have been pointed out. We asked the learned counsel again as to whether he could point out any particular case where the petitioner passed any order in favour of a lawyer of his own caste which was wholly illegal or absurd. Learned counsel could not point out any specific case. We are of the opinion that such a generalised allegation or imputation against a Judge without giving any specific instances must not be accepted, otherwise no Judge can be safe. Certain members of the Bar have a habit of making allegations almost against every Judge and if this practice is encouraged, the Judges will not be able to decide cases with a free mind. A Judge who does not succumb to the pressure of certain members of the Bar and does not pass orders in their favour can in this way be always pressurised by such members of the Bar who take to the agitational path whenever a Judge passes an order against them, and if this practice is permitted, the independence of the judiciary cannot be maintained. No doubt it is open to the learned members of the Bar to draw the attention of this Court on the administrative side regarding certain acts or orders of a Judge of the subordinate judiciary but then specific instances must be given and not sweeping generalisations. No doubt it is open to the learned members of the Bar to draw the attention of this Court on the administrative side regarding certain acts or orders of a Judge of the subordinate judiciary but then specific instances must be given and not sweeping generalisations. We cannot, therefore, accept such a vague and generalised charge against a judge that he is favouring members of the Bar of his own caste without giving specific instances. ( 13 ) IN view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the allegation that the petitioner was favouring members of his own caste is unsubstantiated and should not have been the basis of any adverse entry against the petitioner. ( 14 ) IT is evident from the D. O. dated 22. 3. 1996 Annexure-3 to the petition that the petitioners integrity has been certified by the High Court. Once the integrity is certified, we fail to understand how lack of integrity could be the basis of an adverse entry against the petitioner. After all, the allegation that the petitioner was favouring members of his caste relates to his integrity, which has already been certified. ( 15 ) A perusal of the D. O. dated 14. 8-1997 copy of which is Annexure-10 to the petition shows that certain entries made by the then District Judge, Varanasi, have been retained. The entry of the then District Judge, Varanasi, is contained in Annexure-1 to the petition and we have carefully gone through that part of the entry which has been retained. Broadly, the allegations against the petitioner fall in two categories : (i) Too many cases were fixed by the petitioner and only lesser number of cases were taken up for hearing and there were frequent adjournments. (ii) Relations of the petitioner with the Bar were not good. ( 16 ) AS regards the first allegation a Division Bench of this Court in Shiv Prakash Misra v. High court of Judicature at Allahabad, 1999 ACJ 927, has already observed that this Court should take into account the difficulties and adverse circumstances in which the Judges of the subordinate judiciary in this State are functioning. Against the norm of 300 cases which each judge is supposed to have at one time in fact most Judges have about 3,000 to 5,000 cases pending in their Courts. Against the norm of 300 cases which each judge is supposed to have at one time in fact most Judges have about 3,000 to 5,000 cases pending in their Courts. Against the norm of 75 sessions trials, about 600 to 700 or even more sessions trials are pending in many sessions courts. Thus, the Judges of the subordinate judiciary in the State are carrying a load 10 to 15 times greater than the normal load. Apart from this, judges of the subordinate judiciary are not provided with sufficient and proper facilities for discharging their duties. Many of them have to sit in dark and dingy court rooms where often there is no electricity and even the generator is not working and the Judge is holding Court while sweating profusely in a small dark court room working in almost inhuman conditions. For high quality Justice proper facilities, perquisites and working conditions must be given to the Judges of the subordinate judiciary. The truth of the matter is that such Judges are not provided proper facilities, and they have to carry a load 10 to 15 times greater than the normal load. After all a judge is not a super man. One often hears criticism of the subordinate Judiciary these days but nobody bothers to examine the adverse conditions in which they are working. The petitioner has mentioned in his representation, copy of which is Annexure-4 to the petition that there were 6,000 civil and criminal cases pending in his Court at the relevant time in the year 1993-94 and his disposal was 168%, but yet by the adverse entry he is being criticized for taking up lesser number of cases than those fixed and for granting frequent adjournments. In our opinion, this entry is wholly unjustified. If 6,000 cases are pending in the Court of a Judge when the norm is that only 300 cases should be pending before a Judge of the subordinate Judiciary, it is obvious that the petitioner was carrying 20 times the normal load which a Judge is expected to carry. Hence it is obvious that the petitioner had to grant adjournments and it is not fault of his that lesser number of cases than those fixed were heard by him. The petitioner had put in only about three years service, and this should have also been considered. Hence it is obvious that the petitioner had to grant adjournments and it is not fault of his that lesser number of cases than those fixed were heard by him. The petitioner had put in only about three years service, and this should have also been considered. ( 17 ) IN this connection, we would like to mention a historical incident. When the Second World war ended in 1945 although England and her Allies had defeated Germany, the economic condition of the English people had become very bad. By the time the war ended in 1945, most people in England did hot have enough food to eat and did not have electricity or coal and were hence shivering in cold weather. At that time, the Prime Minister Winston Churchill greatly increased the salary of the British Judges. There was a big hue and cry in the Parliament that the judges were being treated as a special or privileged class when the entire country was hungry and shivering in the cold. In reply to this. Prime Minister Winston Churchill gave a historical speech in the House of Commons. He said that people should realise that the life of a Judge is a very difficult life. He has to lead a very restricted social life, and even his wife has to lead a very restricted social life, and hence, they have to be compensated for this. Man is a social being and it is natural for men to socialize and mix about, but the nature of functions which a Judge has to discharge are such that he has to lead an unsocial life, which in a sense is an unnatural life, for only then can high quality justice be made available to the people. For this the Judges have to be compensated by giving them high salaries, perquisites and good working conditions otherwise high quality Justice will not be possible, and if high quality justice is not provided to the people, there will be no peace and law and order. This suggestion of the Prime Minister Winston churchill was accepted by the House of Commons as they realised its wisdom. ( 18 ) IN our opinion, we too must emulate the example of Winston Churchill and provide high salaries, perquisites and good conditions of service to the Judges otherwise it will not be possible to provide high quality justice to the people. ( 18 ) IN our opinion, we too must emulate the example of Winston Churchill and provide high salaries, perquisites and good conditions of service to the Judges otherwise it will not be possible to provide high quality justice to the people. Also the number of Judges has to be increased proportionate to the number of cases since it is almost impossible for a Judge to carry a load of 10 to 15 times than the normal load. Moreover, as pointed out in Shin Prakash Mishras case (supra), if certain orders of the petitioner were not as good as they should have been, the District judge could have been told to instruct the officer orally to be more careful, but passing adverse entry in such circumstances was in our opinion not justified. ( 19 ) THE second main charge against the petitioner on the basis of which he was awarded adverse entry was that he had not maintained good relations with the Bar. In our opinion, this is also not a ground to award adverse remark. There are many Judges who are very strict and who do not grant frequent adjournments or who reject frivolous and unreasonable prayers and hence become unpopular with the Bar. A Judge surely does not deserve an adverse entry for this. No doubt there are many learned, respected and honourable members of the Bar but that cannot be said about all lawyers. There are certain lawyers who take to the agitational path on the slightest pretext when any prayer is refused by the Judge. There are certain lawyers who will not allow criminal cases to proceed until the prosecution witnesses have broken down (due to intimidation or inducement ). They send adjournment applications on frivolous and false pretexts and if such applications are rejected, they start making complaints against the Judge. Every one must understand that the judiciary is made for serving the people and not for serving lawyers or judges. ( 20 ) IN this connection, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of U. P. Sales Tax Service Association v. Taxation Bar Association. Every one must understand that the judiciary is made for serving the people and not for serving lawyers or judges. ( 20 ) IN this connection, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of U. P. Sales Tax Service Association v. Taxation Bar Association. Agra 1995 15) SCC 716, in that case, the facts were that certain members of the Taxation Bar Association made complaints against the Deputy Commissioner, Agra accusing him of demanding illegal gratification in discharge of his duties and alleging that there was wide dissatisfaction against him among the lawyers and litigants. The Taxation Bar Association also passed a resolution against the Judge on 29. 9. 1993. Allegations and counter allegations were made and abuses hurled against each other resulting in violence, and the lawyers went on strike. The Advocates made representations to the governor and to other authorities and also approached the Advocate General to initiate contempt proceedings against the Judge. The Supreme Court found that the Judge had irked or incurred the displeasure of the Advocates and consequently they made imputations against him and went on strike. The Supreme Court observed : "the accusation of the judicial officer or authority of arbitrary and corrupt conduct undermines their authority and rudely shakes them and the public confidence in proper dispensation of justice. It is of necessity to protect dignity or authority of the judicial officer to maintain the stream of justice pure and unobstructed. The judicial officer/authority needs protection personally. Therefore, making wild allegations of corruption against the presiding officer amounts to scandalising the Court/statutory authority. Imputation of motives of corruption to the judicial officer/authority by any person or group of persons is a serious inroad into the efficacy of Judicial process and threat to judicial independence and needs to be dealt with the strong arm of law. " The Supreme Court referred to its own earlier Constitution Bench decision in Brahma Prakash sharma v. State of U. P. , AIR 1954 SC 10 , in which the Court held that "a resolution passed by the Bar Association expressing want of confidence in the Judicial officers-amounts to scandalising the Court to undermine its authority and thereby is contempt of the Court. " the Supreme Court in U. P. Sales Tax Service Association case (supra) also observed that :"it has been a frequent spectacle in the recent past to witness that advocates strike work and boycott the Courts at the slightest provocation overlooking the harm caused to the Judicial system in general and the litigant public in particular and to themselves in the estimate of the general public. An advocate is an officer of the Court and enjoys a special status in the society. " ( 21 ) IN Court of its own motion v. B. D. Kaushik, (1991) 4 Del Law 316, a Full Court of the delhi High Court was constrained to consider the outrageous conduct on the part of M/s. B. D. Kaushtk, Rajinder Kumar, Rajiv Khosla, Jugal Wadhwa, R. N. Vats Jatin Singh and P. S. Rathee, contemners in that case. The contemners, aided and abetted by others in large number stormed various courtrooms on 26. 9. 1991 at about 10. 30 a. m. when Judges were transacting their judicial functions ; they individually and collectively stood on the chairs, tables and dais of the Court masters and acted in a menacing manner, shouted abuses and slogans such as "chief Justice and judges Hai Hai, Murdabad. " They also prevented various lawyers from discharging their Judicial functions as officers of the Court and also stopped the litigants from conducting their cases in the court. In a threatening tone, they also shouted at the Judges saying : "stop the work, we will not allow the Courts to function and you should retire to your chambers. " They insisted upon the chief Justice in his Court to listen to that memorandum to be read by Rajiv Khosla, which was read by B. D. Kaushik, the President of the Association. The contents of the memorandum scandalised or tended to lower the authority of the High Court. This outrageous and unbecoming episode continued to linger on and hover in the High Court till almost 12. 30 p. m. The conscience of the Court was shocked due to the contumacious conduct of the contemners for initiation of the courts suo motu action under Article 215 of the Constitution. This outrageous and unbecoming episode continued to linger on and hover in the High Court till almost 12. 30 p. m. The conscience of the Court was shocked due to the contumacious conduct of the contemners for initiation of the courts suo motu action under Article 215 of the Constitution. The Full Bench, per majority, held that the contempt committed by the contemners is the gravest and that it could not be imagined that any contempt worse than that was possible, as the contempt was committed not by laymen but by those who are officers of the Courts. ( 22 ) WE are of the opinion that giving adverse entry to a Judge because the members of the Bar are displeased with him or that he had not maintained good relations with the Bar is wholly unjustified. If entries are given in this manner, then those members of the Bar who are displeased with any Judge can always try to browbeat him and deter him from discharging his duties without fear and favour. It is not the main Job of a Judge to maintain good relations with the Bar. His duty is to do Justice and he has not to bother whether the Bar is happy about this or unhappy. Of course if while dispensing Justice good relations with the bar are also maintained that would be the best, but sometimes that may not be possible. The Judge has often to pass orders which displease the bar (or a section of it) arid make him unpopular but he should not bother about this. He should do justice whatever the consequences. ( 23 ) HENCE on the allegation that the petitioner did not have good relations with the Bar the petitioner should not have been awarded an adverse entry. ( 24 ) THE allegation that the petitioner allowed the grant of library to lapse can also not be a ground to award adverse entry. Such lapses sometimes happen for various reasons, and in fact even in the High Court some times the grant of the library has lapsed. ( 25 ) IN Shiv Prakash Misras case (supra), an adverse entry had been given to the petitioner and the Administrative Committee of the High Court had rejected his representation but on the judicial side a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 4368 of 1998, decided on 17. 5. ( 25 ) IN Shiv Prakash Misras case (supra), an adverse entry had been given to the petitioner and the Administrative Committee of the High Court had rejected his representation but on the judicial side a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 4368 of 1998, decided on 17. 5. 1999 : 1999 ACJ 927, quashed the adverse entry given by the Honble Inspecting Judge as well as the order of the Administrative Committee. In that decision the Division Bench observed that this Court should not be too harsh to Judges of the subordinate Judiciary and should take into account the tremendous difficulties and pressures under which they are working and only in extreme cases where there is total lack of integrity or there is some other serious allegation which is found true that the Court should give an adverse entry, because adverse entry given too readily spoils the career of a Judge and causes demoralisation in the subordinate judiciary. ( 26 ) THE Division Bench relied on the decision of Supreme Court in K P. Tiwari v. State of madhya Pradesh, AIR 1994 SC 1031 , where the Supreme Court observed : "it has also to be remembered that the lower Judicial officers mostly work under a charged atmosphere and are constantly under a psychological pressure with all the contestants and their lawyers almost breathing down their necks more correctly upto the nostrils. They do not have the benefit of a detached atmosphere of the higher courts to think coolly and decide patiently. Every error, however, gross it may look, should not, therefore, be attributed to improper motive. " The Supreme Court in the same decision also observed :"it must be remembered that the officers against whom such strictures are publicly passed, stand condemned for ever in the eyes of their subordinates and of the members of the public. No better device can be found to destroy the Judiciary from within. The Judges must, therefore, exercise self-restraint. There are ways and ways of expressing disapproval of the orders of the subordinate courts but attributing motives to them is certainty not one of them. That is the surest way to fake the judiciary downhill. " ( 27 ) IN view of the above, this petition is allowed. The impugned order communicated by the d. O. letter dated 22. 1. That is the surest way to fake the judiciary downhill. " ( 27 ) IN view of the above, this petition is allowed. The impugned order communicated by the d. O. letter dated 22. 1. 1997 and the order communicated by the D. O. letter dated 14. 8. 1997 (Annexure-10 to the petition) as well as the adverse entry copy of which is Annexure-1 to the petition for the year 1993-94 are hereby quashed. No order as to costs.