Dr. M. K. Sharma ( 1 ) THIS revision petition is directed against the order dated 26. 2. 1998 passed by the Additional District Judge, Delhi in Suit No. 960/1996 dismissing the application filed by the petitioner/defendant under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 2 ) THE respondent herein instituted a suit against the petitioner herein seeking for a decree for recovery of possession and for payment of mesne profits/damages. The petitioner contested the aforesaid suit and filed his written statement contending inter alia that he is in lawful occupation of the suit premises in his right as a tenant. In the aforesaid suit the following issues were framed : (i) Whether suit has been signed and verified by duly authorised person? OPP (ii) Whether suit has not been properly valued for Court fee and jurisdiction? OPD (iii) Whether suit is barred under Section 50 of DRC Act? OPD (iv) Whether the defendant was a licensee of plaintiff and if so to what effect? OPP (v) Whether the defendant s status presently is of a trespasser? (vi) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property in question? (vii) Whether plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits/damages if so, at what rate and for what period? OPP iii) Relief? The petitioner, however, filed an application on 10. 2. 1998 under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure wherein he prayed that the trial of the Suit No. 960/1996 be stayed because the matter in issue is directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted Suit No. 604/1991. The said application was taken up for consideration and by order dated 26. 2. 1998 dismissed the application as against which the present revision petition has been preferred. ( 3 ) IN order to appreciate the contentions of the parties it would be necessary to state at this stage the background relating to the filing of the aforesaid application under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The petitioner herein filed a suit on 13. 11. 1991 against the respondent and her sons S. S. Gill and Joginder Singh Gill seeking for a decree for perpetual injunction restraining then from dispossessing the petitioner/plaintiff forcibly, illegally and wrongfully from the premises in his occupation i. e. the suit premises. The petitioner herein filed a suit on 13. 11. 1991 against the respondent and her sons S. S. Gill and Joginder Singh Gill seeking for a decree for perpetual injunction restraining then from dispossessing the petitioner/plaintiff forcibly, illegally and wrongfully from the premises in his occupation i. e. the suit premises. The aforesaid defendants including the present respondent contested the suit and on the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed: (i) Whether the plaintiff has a cause of action to file the present suit? Onus on parties? (ii) Whether the plaintiff is in legal possession of 3 rooms, kitchen and bath being the tenant of the defendant? (iii) Whether the plaintiff has unauthorisedly constructed one more room in the premises in question? OPD (iv) Whether the plaintiff is a trespasser in the defendant s premises? OPD (v) Whether the plaintiff is in legal occupation of 3 rooms as shown in the site plan since 1986? OPP (vi) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any equitable relief? (vii) Whether the defendants are entitled for cost? OPD (viii) Relief. The relief sought in the aforesaid suit was in the following nature: "that the plaintiff prays that a decree by issue of perpetual injunction may be passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants restraining the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiff forcibly, illegally and wrongfully from the premises in his occupation i. e. three rooms, kitchen, bath, toilet on the ground floor of house No. K-l, Lajpat Nagar-II, New Delhi as shown in red in the annexed plan. Costs of the suit be awarded to the plaintiff against the defendants. " In the aforesaid suit the statement of the petitioner/plaintiff has already been recorded. Subsequently, i. e. on 12. 12. 1996 the suit out of which the present revision petition arises was instituted by the respondent herein against the petitioner. ( 4 ) COUNSEL appearing for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order passed by the Trial Court is without jurisdiction inasmuch as the trial of the subsequently instituted suit shall have to be stayed as the matter in issue in the previously instituted suitnamely-Suit No. 604/1991 is directly and substantially in issue is the subsequently instituted Suit No. 960/1996. ( 4 ) COUNSEL appearing for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order passed by the Trial Court is without jurisdiction inasmuch as the trial of the subsequently instituted suit shall have to be stayed as the matter in issue in the previously instituted suitnamely-Suit No. 604/1991 is directly and substantially in issue is the subsequently instituted Suit No. 960/1996. He also submitted that the rights of the parties are to be decided in the previously instituted suit and whatever be the decision of the Trial Court any rights of the parties in the previously instituted suit would operate as res judicata between the parties. He also submitted that common question arising for consideration in both the suits is whether the petitioner is a tenant of the respondent or not and therefore, the issues are substantially the same. He submitted that the Trial Court was required to stay the subsequently instituted proceedings in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and while deciding the same the question of jurisdiction of the Court is immaterial and the same is an irrelevant consideration. In support of his contention the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of this Court in C. L. Tandon v. Prem Pal Singh Rawat, AIR 1978 Delhi 228 and a decision in Desk Bhushan Jain v. K. C. Mahajan, reported in (1997) 42 DRJ 93 =70 (1997) DLT 303. ( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel appearing for the respondent on the other hand submitted that issues involved in the two suits cannot be said to be directly and substantially the same and common, for according to her the scope of the suit filed by the respondent is much wider than that of the previously instituted suit by the petitioner. She also submitted that even the parties in the two suits are different and therefore, there is no identity of parties and issues except for the fact that only one issue could be said to be common in the two suits. She also submitted that even the parties in the two suits are different and therefore, there is no identity of parties and issues except for the fact that only one issue could be said to be common in the two suits. In support of her contention the learned Counsel for there spondent relied up on the decision and Others v. Pichika Veerraju and Others, reported in 1996 AIHC 2642; Adish Chandra Sinha v. Hindustan Gas and Industries Ltd. and Another, AIR 1985 Calcutta 154; M/s. Sankhla Industries v. Ad/s. Hiralal Pukhra, ASR 1973 Rajasthan 306; a decision of this Court in Ramesh Chand Sharma v. R. S. Aggarwal and Others, 22 (1982) DLT 356; and a decision in Channan Kaur and Others v. Sahdeo Singh, AIR 1929 Oudh 341. ( 6 ) THE reliefs sought for and the issues framed in both the suits have been extracted above. The same would indicate that the earlier suit which was instituted by the petitioner herein in the year 1991 was a suit seeting for a decree for perpetual injunction restraining the petitioner herein and her two sons from dispossessing the plaintiff forcibly, illegally and wrongfully from the suit premises in his occupation. The said suit, therefore, was a suit seeking for injunction against 3 defendants of which one was the respondent. On the other hand in the suit out of which the present revision petition arises, the relief soughtfor is for eviction of the petitioner from the suit premises and also for a decree for payment of mesne profits, damages alongwith interest. Therefore, the reliefs sought for in the two suits cannot be said to be directly and substantially the same and common. Even the parties in the two suits are different, for in the earlier instituted suit even the sons of the present respondent were also made parties. Therefore there is no identity of the parties and issues in the two suits and in my considered opinion the scope of the present suit is much wider than that of the earlier suit instituted by the petitioner. Even if the earlier suit is decided in favour of the respondent who has instituted the subsequent suit she would not get all the reliefs that she has sought for in the subsequent suit instituted by her. Even if the earlier suit is decided in favour of the respondent who has instituted the subsequent suit she would not get all the reliefs that she has sought for in the subsequent suit instituted by her. In my considered opinion, the aforesaid criteria is a very relevant and necessary criteria to decide as to whether the issues in the two suits are directly and substantially the same and common or not. When reference is made to the issues framed in the two suits it would be apparent that except for one or two issues rest of the issues are substantially different from each other. ( 7 ) THE two suits are also pending before different Forums, for the suit instituted by the petitioner is pending before the Civil Judge whereas the present suit is pending in the Court of the Additional District Judge. In Sankhla Industries case (supra) and Adish Chandra case (supra) it was held that in order to enable to stay a suit it is necessary that both the Courts in which the suits are pending must be of concurrent jurisdiction. The ratio of the aforesaid decisions in my considered opinion squarely apply to the facts of the present case also. In the decision in C. L. Tandon s case (supra) relied upon by the Counsel appearing for the petitioner, it was held in the facts of that case that a perusal of the two plaints would bring in full focus all the issues at which the parties are in conflict. In the facts and circumstances of the said case it was found that there being identity of the issues in both the suits provisions of Section 10 apply to the facts of the said case. In Desh Bhushan Jain s case (supra) it was held by this Court that it is a settled position of law that the object of Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to prevent the Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits in respect of the same matter in issue. It was propounded that the requirement of Section 10, Civil Procedure Code is also that the matter in issue in the subsequent proceedings directly and substantially in issue in the previously instituted suit. It was propounded that the requirement of Section 10, Civil Procedure Code is also that the matter in issue in the subsequent proceedings directly and substantially in issue in the previously instituted suit. It was reiterated that neither is the requirement that all issues in the suits be identical nor provisions of Section 10 are attracted if merely the suit is identical, for the decision in the previously instituted suit should be able to operate as res judicata for the subsequently instituted suit. The said decision also holds that provisions of Section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code would apply when the Courts dealing with the two cases are of concurrent jurisdiction. ( 8 ) IN my considered opinion, the law settled by various Courts is succinctly reiterated in the aforesaid paragraph of the decision. The present two suits with which I am concerned are not of concurrent jurisdiction nor the issues involved therein could be said to be directly and substantially identical and common. I find no infirmity in the order of the Trial Court and the revision, therefore, has no merit and is dismissed. Revision dismissed.