Judgment : 1. In this writ petition, the petitioner, an employee of the respondent State Transport Corporation Unit-I, Kumbakonam prays for the issue of writ of mandamus directing the respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service with all attendant benefits including the continuity of service. 2. This court initially ordered Notice of motion on 2. 1999 and subsequently ordered issue of Rule Nisi on 7. 99. The sole respondent entered appearance and also filed counter. The writ petitioner has also filed a reply affidavit. With the consent of counsel for either side, the writ petitioner itself is taken up for final disposal, when the application filed by the writ petitioner for directions came up for consideration. 3. Heard Mr. R. Krishnamoorthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr.V. Ayyadurai for the petitioner and Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr. T. Arulraj. 4. In this case, the court has to consider the factual matrix in detail as well as certain earlier proceedings and therefore this Court has to set out the facts in detail. I. PETITIONER’S CASE: 5. The petitioner, a Junior Superintendent in the Accounts Section in the respondent Corporation was attending the work relating to repayment of loan to the Tamil Nadu Transport Development Finance Corporation and Provident Fund. However, he was directed to look after additional work of cash collection, whenever there was shortage of employees in that section. The petitioner was put in-charge of cash collection for about five working days during April/May, 1983 and there was no shortage nor there was any omission on his part in the said work. .6. Subsequently, it was found by the respondent management that one Rajagopalan, who is regularly in-charge of cash collection has defalcated cash accounts and misappropriated substantial funds. As the petitioner was in charge of cash collection for few days a charge memo was issued. The charge framed against the petitioner being that the petitioner had failed to find out and report the alleged fraud, misappropriation and malpractice committed by the said Rajagopalan. The petitioner was placed under suspension on 211. 1983 and charge memo was issued on 30.11.1983 for having neglected and failed to report about the defalcation of the said Rajagopalan. With respect to the said charge an enquiry was conducted and a penalty of dismissal from service was imposed in terms of the standing orders. The petitioner was placed under suspension on 211. 1983 and charge memo was issued on 30.11.1983 for having neglected and failed to report about the defalcation of the said Rajagopalan. With respect to the said charge an enquiry was conducted and a penalty of dismissal from service was imposed in terms of the standing orders. However, as an Industrial dispute was pending during the relevant period, before the Industrial Tribunal, the respondent filed I.D.No.622 of 82 and sought for approval from the said Tribunal under Section 33 (2)(b)1 of the Industrial Disputes Act for the imposition of punishment of dismissal from service. 7. After detailed enquiry, the said Industrial Tribunal by its order dated 17. 1984 refused to grant approval holding that no malpractice or misconduct been established against the petitioner and that there is no legal evidence to sustain the solitary charge and to conclude that the petitioner is guilty of the imputations. Instead of reinstating the petitioner, the respondent challenged the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal by filing W.P.No.8849 of 1984. Simultaneously the writ petitioner herein had also filed W.P.No.3318 of 1984 challenging the order of dismissal and for consequential relief of reinstatement. After contest, the writ petition filed by the employer was dismissed on 112. 1987 and the order of the Industrial Tribunal was confirmed by this Court. 8. This Court dismissed both the writ petitions. But in W.P.No.3318 of 1984 filed by the petitioner herein seeking to quash the order of dismissal dated 3. 1984 and to direct the respondent to reinstate the petitioner, this Court held that there is no need to quash the impugned order once over as the writ petition filed by the respondent management stands dismissed and that of the Industrial Tribunal stands confirmed. In that view this court held that it is not necessary to issue a separate order in the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner herein as the writ petition filed by the respondent stands dismissed and the order of the tribunal stands affirmed and as there is nothing further remains to be quashed. .9. The respondent -management preferred W.A.No.322 of 1988 before the Division Bench and the same was also dismissed confirming the common order passed in the writ petitions. .9. The respondent -management preferred W.A.No.322 of 1988 before the Division Bench and the same was also dismissed confirming the common order passed in the writ petitions. Pending the writ appeal, there was a direction to the respondent management to deposit a sum of Rs.40,000 and the petitioner was permitted to withdraw the same. The Division Bench ultimately dismissed the writ appeals by order dated 3. 1998. As against the judgment of the Division Bench in W.A.No.322 of 1988, the respondent also moved a special leave petition before the Apex Court and admittedly the same also stands rejected in limine. The respondent had not chosen to furnish the details of the order passed by the Supreme Court. 10. Thereafter, the petitioner had been repeatedly demanding reinstatement and he had also been demanding for settlement of backwages. The petitioner had made repeated demands for reinstatement with backwages. The respondent had been keeping silent. The refusal on the part of the respondent to reinstate the petitioner despite the orders of the Labour Court and this Court is highly arbitrarily, illegal and abuse of law. In the absence of prior approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which is a mandatory provision, the order of dismissal, if any passed by the respondent stands quashed and the petitioner is deemed to be in continuous employment through out and therefore, he is also entitled for payment of backwages and arrears since the date of termination. The respondent instead of acting as a model employer has indulged in harassing the petitioner by putting him out of employment and arbitrarily denying his livelihood. Hence, the present writ petition. .11. Pending the writ petition, the petitioner had sought for a direction directing the respondent to pay backwages amounting to rupees Eight Lakhs as on 312. 1998 and continue to pay salary at the rate of Rs.9,000 per month. .RESPONDENT’S CASE: 12. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondent, there is no controversy with respect to the factual matrix narrated or particulars detailed above. In the counter it has been further stated that a criminal prosecution is pending and the petitioner is facing grave criminal charges under section 408, 420 477A read with Section 34 and 120 B of I.P.C. in C.C. No.28 of 1987, 325 of 1987 and 50 of 1988 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, even as of today. .13. .13. According to the respondent, the prosecution of the criminal case is nearing completion. It is incorrect to contend that the petitioner has nothing to do with the misappropriation by Rajagopalan and the petitioner’s plea of innocence cannot be accepted. It is further pointed out that the petitioner is not a worker under standing orders and therefore, the procedure adopted by the respondent management in moving for approval before the Industrial Tribunal in view of the pending industrial dispute I.D.No.6 2 of 1982 is uncalled for and inconsequential and the Tribunal should have dismissed the approval petition as not maintainable instead of rejecting it on merits as if it is maintainable. 14. It is also pointed out and contended by the respondent that the order passed by the learned Single Judge, Division Bench of this Court as well as the Supreme Court upholding the order of Industrial Tribunal are erroneous without jurisdiction and inconsequential. The order of dismissal, according to the respondent is valid and binding and there is no requirement at all to move the Industrial Tribunal for approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. Hence all the further proceedings are inconsequential and of no consequence. The petitioner is not entitled to reinstatement or for any direction in view of the pending criminal prosecution and he will be deemed to be under suspension. .15. The respondent further pleaded that in accordance with the rules, the suspension order can be passed when criminal charges are pending against an employee of respondent Corporation and the criminal prosecution which is under progress are grave and involve moral turpitude. The respondent prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. .in. DETAILS OF REPLY AFFIDAVIT: 16. The writ petitioner had filed a reply affidavit denying certain on the averments, set out in the counter-affidavit and in particular the alleged abatement or association with Rajagopalan. The petitioner succinctly reiterated the contentions set out in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition and further submitted that the petitioner had neither been placed under suspension nor had been paid any subsistence allowance and he is being harassed to unimaginable and untold hardship. .17. The respondent is estopped from contending that the approval proceeding is a nullity or invalid or inconsequential or there was no requirement at all. .17. The respondent is estopped from contending that the approval proceeding is a nullity or invalid or inconsequential or there was no requirement at all. It does not lie in the mouth of the respondent to contend that the approval applied for is misconception at this point of time and such contention is a clear mockery of the whole system. According to the petitioner he is deemed to have been restored and continue in service continuously and there is no justification to deny him the employment and the refusal to take him back to duty is illegal, arbitrary and uncalled for. 18. Further till this date no order of suspension had been passed after rejection of the approval petition on the ground that a criminal prosecution is pending against the petitioner. As a further consequence, it is claimed that the petitioner is deemed to be in service and he is entitled to all the benefits and such a direction has to be issued to the respondent to take the petitioner back to service with all arrears of salary, increment and attendant benefits. It is also contended by the writ petitioner that there is no justification for the respondent to deny employment and livelihood to the petitioner and that too without suspending him from service despite the judicial order passed by this Court. The earlier pronouncement and judicial pronouncement binding the parties are being flouted by the respondent. 19. Heard Mr. R. Krishnamoorthy, learned senior counsel for Mr. V. Ayyadurai, counsel for the petitioner and Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned senior counsel appearing for Mr. T. Arul Raj counsel for the respondents. 20. IV POINTS: The following points arise for consideration, .(A) Whether the petitioner is still an employee deemed to be in service with all rights and privileges attached to the post? .(B) What is the scope and effect of earlier inter party proceedings? .(C) Whether the writ petitioner is deemed to have been be placed under suspension pending criminal prosecution? .(D) Whether the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs prayed for? .(E) To what relief, if any? 21. As already pointed out there is no controversy with respect to the factual matrix and earlier proceedings between the parties and their finality. 22. All the above points could be considered together. .(D) Whether the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs prayed for? .(E) To what relief, if any? 21. As already pointed out there is no controversy with respect to the factual matrix and earlier proceedings between the parties and their finality. 22. All the above points could be considered together. Mr.R. Krishnamurthy, learned senior counsel reiterated the averments and advanced the contentions in support of the petition and submitted that the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs prayed for. It was further contended that all the five points are to be answered in favour of the petitioner. Mr.A.L. Somayaji learned senior counsel fairly stated that it is not open to the respondent at this point of time to contend that the order rejecting approval by Labour Court is either uncalled for or inconsequential or non-est of unwarranted, so also the further proceedings before this court and the Supreme Court. However, it was vehemently contended that the present writ petition seeking the relief of Mandamus directing the respondent Corporation to reinstate the petitioner with all service benefits is not maintainable and the relief of mandamus prayed for is misconceived. 23. As Mr.A.L. Somayaji, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent fairly stated that the earlier proceedings cannot be gone into or reopened nor it could be the subject matter of discussion. Hence, the first point has to be answered in favour of the writ petitioner and the earlier proceedings before the Labour Court and writ proceedings before this Court are binding on the parties and it is well open to the petitioner to work out his remedies on that basis in this writ petition. 24. The learned senior counsel further contended that even accepting that the order of rejection of approval application under Section 33(2)(b) is final and binding, it cannot be assumed nor it follows automatically that the petitioner is deemed to be in service or entitled to be taken back to duty or service and the petitioner has to work out his remedies under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act by instituting appropriate proceedings or raising a dispute. 25. According to Mr. 25. According to Mr. A.L. Somayaji, the learned senior counsel for respondent, the remedy of writ under Article 226 is misconceived and not maintainable nor it is a substitute for regular proceedings and this Court will decline to exercise the discretionary remedy of mandamus in favour of the petitioner, on the facts of the case and when he is still facing prosecution before the Criminal Court. .26. It is also further contended by Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned senior counsel for the respondent that the earlier writ petition filed by the writ petitioner having been dismissed by this Court the present writ petition is barred by the principle of res judicata. Mr. A.L. Somayaji, the learned senior counsel further contended that the order under section 33 (2)(b) declining approval is only on a prima-facie consideration either to grant or decline approval and it would be mean that the order of termination had been set aside or the petitioner has been restored or the petitioner is deemed to have been reinstated back to service with all benefits. 27. Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned senior counsel for the respondent also referred to the pending criminal case and as such the petitioner is not entitled to be reinstated at this point of time and this Court has to direct the writ petitioner to work out his remedies before the Labour Court or such other forum as may be available to the petitioner under the Industrial Disputes Act or any other provision of law. This contention of the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be sustained and it is born out of misconception or frustration. 28. As already pointed out there is no factual controversy. The charge framed against the petitioner being his alleged failure to report about the embezzlement or malpractice or the misappropriation by Rajagopalan, co-employee. The order of termination passed by the respondent has not been approved by the Industrial Dispute Tribunal and the approval applied for by the respondent management under Section 33(2)(b) stands dismissed. The writ petition filed by the respondent- management also stands dismissed and it had been confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court as well by the Apex Court. The order of termination passed by the respondent has not been approved by the Industrial Dispute Tribunal and the approval applied for by the respondent management under Section 33(2)(b) stands dismissed. The writ petition filed by the respondent- management also stands dismissed and it had been confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court as well by the Apex Court. Yet the respondent had neither reinstated the petitioner nor passed any orders or orders taking the petitioner back to duty or extinguishing the rights of the petitioner to the post in any manner known to law and thereafter suspending him nor even an order to the effect that the petitioner is deemed to be under suspension been communicated in view of pending criminal prosecution nor any order whatsoever had even been passed by the respondent until today. .29. Further even after filing this writ petition and service of notice, no such order has been passed by the respondent and the respondent till this date had declined to restore the petitioner or reinstate the petitioner nor it had chosen to pass orders of suspension nor it had paid subsistence allowance or any other emoluments since 3. 1984 onwards excepting payment of Rs.40,000 as per the interim orders of the Division Bench of this Court. 30. It is useful to refer to the material portion of the orders passed by the learned single judge as well a the Division Bench of this Court as there is some controversy with respect to the fate of earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner herein. .31. Sathiadev, J. while disposing of the above writ petitions by a common order held that in respect of the imputations and the charge made against the writ petitioner herein no reasonable man could ever come to the conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of imputations or the charge framed against him. The learned judge held thus: .“Hence, under such circumstances, no reasonable man could ever come to the conclusion that this employee could be held guilty of the charges framed against him. That was the reason why Tribunal had held that no legal evidence exists to hold him guilty of the charges and refused to grant approval. This being a permissible approach which could be made by a Tribunal it had not committed any illegality, and therefore, W.P.No.8849 of 1984 is dismissed. No. Costs”. .32. That was the reason why Tribunal had held that no legal evidence exists to hold him guilty of the charges and refused to grant approval. This being a permissible approach which could be made by a Tribunal it had not committed any illegality, and therefore, W.P.No.8849 of 1984 is dismissed. No. Costs”. .32. Sathiadev, J. while holding that no reasonable person could hold that the petitioner is guilty of imputations and charge framed against him held that there is no need to pass separate order in W.P.No.3318 of 1984. This Court had upheld the order of the Tribunal and therefore, the impugned order of termination gets effaced. In this respect the learned Judge held thus: .“As for W.P.No.3318 of 1984 is concerned, in the light of the decision rendered in W.P.No.8849 of 1984, there is no need to quash the impugned order herein, because by upholding the order of the Tribunal, this impugned order gets effaced and as no court would pass a futile order, this writ petition is dismissed. No Costs”. .33. The above portion of the earlier order makes it abundantly clear that this court not only affirmed the proceedings of the Labour Court, but also held that the very order of dismissal passed by the first respondent gets effaced and therefore there is no necessity to issue a writ. The learned judge had used the expression “effaced” which means wiped out. The order of dismissal stands quashed and there is nothing further for the writ petitioner herein to work out or seek for any further remedy. In my consi dered view, the resultant position being that the petitioner is deemed to have been restored to the position that existed prior to 3. 1984 and since then onwards the writ petitioner herein is deemed to be in continuous service for all purposes as admittedly no order whatsoever had been passed by the respondent either suspending the writ petitioner herein or an order which would result in the petitioner being divested of his right to continue in the post in a manner known to law by the respondent. 34. Sathyadev, J. while dismissing the writ petition filed by the respondent and confirming the orders of the Industrial Tribunal, Madras and after going into the merits of the imputations or charge as well as the order of dismissal dated 3. 34. Sathyadev, J. while dismissing the writ petition filed by the respondent and confirming the orders of the Industrial Tribunal, Madras and after going into the merits of the imputations or charge as well as the order of dismissal dated 3. 1984 held that it is not required to allow the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner herein as they very order of dismissal dated 3. 1984 stands effaced and nothing survives for making the Rules Nisi absolute. 35. As against the orders of Sathyadev, J. in W.P.No.3318, 8849 and 8922 of 1984, the respondent Corporation preferred W.A.Nos.321 and 322 of 1988 etc., 36. The Division Bench of this Court while dismissing the Writ Appeals held thus: “In our view, the learned single judge has kept into account these principles also in analysing and appreciating the challenge made against the order of the Tribunal below, when the learned Judge categorically held that thee evidence sought to be relied upon is neither a legally acceptable material nor would they even if accepted, lead to the conclusion arrived at the management. As noticed earlier, the learned single judge also was of the view that the basis of the charge itself was not on a firm groun d; but on nebulous materials and assumptions and that any rate in respect of one of the workers, it as even a vague charge. Such indictions made by the learned single judge on considering the overall materials placed on record and also the orders of the Tribunal, which has been the subject matter of challenge before the learned single judge, cannot be a vitiating factor involving any excessive exercise undertaken to go into the merits of the charges themselves. In our view, what the Tribunal appears to have really and substantially done and the learned single judge ultimately did was to find out only the existence or otherwise of a prima facie case, including going into the manner of the framing of the charge as well as the basis of the charge and consequently, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that there has been any violation of any of the principles laid down in the rulings referred to and relied upon by the petitioners/appellant. Consequently, we see no merit in the se writ appeals and the writ appeals fail and shall stand dismissed.” 37. Consequently, we see no merit in the se writ appeals and the writ appeals fail and shall stand dismissed.” 37. In other words, the Division Bench confirmed the orders passed by Sathyadev, J. in all the writ petitions. Resultantly, the order passed by Sathyadev, J. on all fours is in favour of the writ petitioner herein, and there was no occasion for the writ petitioner herein to take up the matter on appeal. As against the Division Bench Judgment of this Court, the Special Leave Petition by preferred by the respondent herein has been rejected in limine. Hence, the above proceedings reached finality and it is binding on the parties to the present writ petition. 38. Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned senior counsel also contended that the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner herein stands dismissed and therefore, the present writ petition is barred by principles of resjudicata as well. As already pointed out in the earlier round of litigation this Court had sustained the contention putforward by the petitioner herein and also held that the impugned proceedings therein against the writ petitioner herein stands effaced and therefore, there is nothing further remains to be quashed. The effect of such declaration is that the writ petitioner is never deemed to have been dismissed from service and therefore, it is unsustainable to contend that the present writ petition is barred by the earlier order, muchless by the principles of res judicata. 39. It is unsustainable to contend that the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner herein was dismissed or rejected. But on the other hand, the decision of the learned single judge as affirmed by the Division Bench will not constitute rejection of the petitioner’s claim and in fact whatever the petitioner claimed had been upheld as the impugned order of dismissal stands effaced. 40. On a consideration, this Court holds that the earlier order passed by this Court holds good and binds the parties herein and the writ petitioner who is deemed to be in service is entitled to the reliefs prayed for by him. 41. It was nextly contended that the petitioner cannot seek the relief of mandamus by approaching this Court and seek for restoration or restitution of his earlier position prior to the order of dismissal dated 3. 41. It was nextly contended that the petitioner cannot seek the relief of mandamus by approaching this Court and seek for restoration or restitution of his earlier position prior to the order of dismissal dated 3. 1984 and also seek for consequential directions for payment of service benefits such as arrears of salary, revision of pay, promotion etc., as criminal prosecutions are pending against the petitioner. Further it was pointed out that the petitioner has to work out his remedies by invoking the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. 42. It was lastly contended that the petitioner is deemed to have been placed under suspension in view of the pending criminal prosecutions against him, which prosecution is nearing completion. The above contentions could now be taken up for consideration together. 43. Concedingly, after the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal refusing to approve the dismissal of the writ petitioner as well as after the order passed by Sathyadev, J. in the earlier round of writ petitions as affirmed by the Division Bench of this Court, no further step had been taken by the respondent all these years nor an order had been passed either suspending the petitioner or keeping the petitioner away from officer or atleast intimating the petitioner that he is deemed to have been suspended in view of the pending criminal prosecutions. 44. It is to be pointed out that the respondent had chosen to frame charges for alleged mis-conduct and had also imposed the maximum penalty of dismissal from service, which had since been effaced by judicial pronouncements in the earlier round of litigation. No service rule or standing order had been pointed cut by Mr.A.L. Somayaji, learned senior counsel that consequent to the orders of the Industrial Tribunal or this Court holding that the penalty of dismissal stands effaced, the petitioner is not restored to position anterior to dismissal. No such provision exist and therefore, the counsel for the respondent is unable to sustain his plea that the petitioner is deemed to have been placed under suspension. .45. Interestingly, the petitioner had been prosecuted simultaneously and the prosecution is still going on. No such provision exist and therefore, the counsel for the respondent is unable to sustain his plea that the petitioner is deemed to have been placed under suspension. .45. Interestingly, the petitioner had been prosecuted simultaneously and the prosecution is still going on. Having dismissing the petitioner which had since been effaced by the earlier orders passed by this Court, it is also not open to the respondent to place the petitioner under suspension or proceed against him and it is not as if this Court had given liberty to the respondent to proceed afresh or denovo from a particular stage. As such the order of penalty imposed against the writ petitioner herein stands effaced and therefore, the petitioner cannot be once again proceeded in respect of the same imputations or charges. 46. Even accepting that the petitioner is facing criminal prosecution and it is for specific criminal offences. Assuming that the writ petitioner could be placed under suspension on that score there cannot be deemed suspension unless the respondent had passed a specific order placing the petitioner under suspension, after the rejection of the Special Leave Petition by their Lordships of the Apex Court. Hence, it is clear that the respondent had not passed any order nor issued any directions to keep the petitioner away from office nor it could be held that the petitioner is placed under suspension and his right to the office had been suspended nor he has no right to attend the office. Such a contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be countenanced. 47. Right from the date of the order passed by Sathyadev, J. the petitioner had been writing and demanding the respondents to forthwith take him back to continue. But the respondents always kept the petitioner out of office and had not chosen to either take him back to duty nor had chosen to place him under suspension, which course, if at all would have been the accepted choice. Unfortunately, the respondent had not done either of them. The Criminal prosecution is under progress and continue to be pending even as on today. Merely because there is criminal prosecution, it cannot be said that the petitioner is deemed to be under suspension or he has to be kept out of office automatically when no orders of suspension or alike had been passed by the respondent in this behalf. .48. Merely because there is criminal prosecution, it cannot be said that the petitioner is deemed to be under suspension or he has to be kept out of office automatically when no orders of suspension or alike had been passed by the respondent in this behalf. .48. One of the contentionsthat was vehemently argued and pressed by Mr.A.L. Somayaji, learned senior counel being that the writ petitioner should be directed to raise an industrial dispute and work out his remedies and the petitioner cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226. Such a contention cannot be countenanced as the petitioner who has got the right to continue in office or post had been illegally and arbitrarily deprived of his right to hold the post and continue in office and discharge the functions by refusal on the part of the respondents to restore him to duty and the respondent also declined to accept the services offered by the petitioner herein. It is true that the writ petitioner could raise an industrial dispute but it is not a must nor it is an essential requirement or a must on the facts of the case and in the light of earlier proceedings. 49. The writ petitioner is an employee of Government undertaking and it is amenable to writ jurisdiction of this court. This court could very well issue appropriate writ and it is not only unjust but also hypertechnical to direct the petitioner to raise an industrial dispute at this point of time and moreover when the respondent is amenable to writ jurisdiction and the acts of the respondent is highly arbitrary, ex facie illegal and in excess of jurisdiction. 50. On the facts of the case, the writ of mandamus prayed for is the appropriate writ. For the issuance of writ of mandamus, two pre-conditions namely a clear legal right to the performance of a particular act or duty at the hands of the respondents and it must appear that the law affords no other adequate or specific remedy to secure the enforcement of the right and the performance of the duty which it is sought to be enforced. If positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the same could be enforced by raising an industrial dispute, which is a long drawn process. 151. If positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the same could be enforced by raising an industrial dispute, which is a long drawn process. 151. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting rights of the people should not be put into water-tight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. 152. The mandamus is not only discretionary but it is a very wide remedy which should be made easily available to reach injustice wherever it is found and technicalities should not come in the way of granting relief. The very object of mandamus is to prevent disorder from a failure of justice and it should be granted in all cases where law has established no specific remedy and where injustice warrants the writ of mandamus is regarded as one of the highest and speediest remedies, which is provided for under Article 226. 153. It is true that a mandamus is not a writ of right but its issuance unquestionably lies on the sound judicial discretion of the court. The mandamus is classed as a legal remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles. Nothing has been pointed out by the respondent to deny the discretionary remedy of mandamus on the facts of the present case nor the petitioner is guilty of suppression or misstatement of material facts nor there is a particular remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act. Further, despite the earlier orders passed under Article 226, the respondent had not chosen to implement the same and being a public authority, the respondent should have acted reasonably and fairly and restored the petitioner to duty or taken back him to duty. Thus the respondent had deliberately failed and hence the relief of writ of mandamus prayed for in the present writ petition is the proper and just remedy. 154. This Court while exercising the writ jurisdiction could very well infer that there is gross miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law and render justice. The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary relief and it is intended to be issued for a definite act fruitful purpose being rendering substantial justice. It is not as if the relief prayed for in the present case is for trifling reasons. 155. The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary relief and it is intended to be issued for a definite act fruitful purpose being rendering substantial justice. It is not as if the relief prayed for in the present case is for trifling reasons. 155. The administrative decision on the part of the respondent not to restore back the petitioner is not only an illegality but also an irrationality and processual impropriety as the respondent endeavours to defeat the earlier orders passed by this court and renders the earlier adjudication a futile one, which is not permissible. This Court will not be justified in allowing the petitioner to be defeated or allow the respondent to by pass or circumvent the earlier orders and indirectly render it futile or nugatory. 156. As a rule of practice and it has been the consistent view of this court that mandamus will not ordinarily be issued where there is another adequate, specific and legal remedy competent to afford relief upon the same subject matter. To deny or refuse the mandamus there must exist a specific remedy and adequate remedy too. 157. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Comptroller and Auditor - General of India, Gian Prakash, New Delhi and another v. K.S. Jagannathan and another , 1986 (2) SCC 679 laid down that in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the Court may itself pass an order or give directions. 20.58. In Sri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shre Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and others v. V.R. Rudani and others , AIR 1989 SC 1607 it has been held that when once there is no other equally convenient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied and the law relating to mandamus has made the most spectacular advance. In this respect, the Apex Court held thus: “The law relating to mandamus has made the most spectacular advance. It may be recalled that the remedy of prerogative writs in England started with very limited scope and suffered from many procedural disadvantages. In this respect, the Apex Court held thus: “The law relating to mandamus has made the most spectacular advance. It may be recalled that the remedy of prerogative writs in England started with very limited scope and suffered from many procedural disadvantages. To overcome the difficulties, Lord Gardiner (the Lord Chancellor) in pursuance of Section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commission Act, 1965, requested the Law Commission to review the existing remedies for the judicial control of administrative acts and commission with a view to evolving a simpler and more effective procedure.” The Law Commission made their report in March 1976 (Law Com No.73). It was implemented by Rules of Court (Order 53) in 1977 and given statutory force in 1981 by Section 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. It combined all the former remedies into one proceeding called Judicial review. Lord Denning explains the scope of this “Judicial review”. “At one stroke the courts could grant whatever relief was appropriate. Not only certiorari and mandamus, also declaration and injunction. Even damages. The procedure was much more simple and expeditious. Just a summons instead of writ. No formal pleadings. The evidence was given by affidavit. As a rule no cross-examination, no discovery and soforth. But there were important safeguards. In particular, in order to qualify, the applicant had to get the leave of a judge. The statute is phrased in flexible terms. It gives scope for development. It uses the words “having regard to”. Those words are very indefinite. The result is that the courts are not bound hand and foot by the previous law. They are to have regard to it. So the previous law as to who are and who are not public authorities, is not absolutely binding. Nor is the previous law as to the matters in respect of which relief may be granted. This means that the judges can develop the public law as they think best. That they have done and are doing”. (See The Closing Chapter - by R.No. Rt. Hon. Lord Denning P. 122)”. There, however, the prerogative writ of mandamus confirmed only to public authorities to compel performance of public duty. The public authority or them means every body which is created by statute and whose powers and duties are defined by statute. So Government departments, local authorities, police authorities and statutory undertakings and corporations as all public authorities. There, however, the prerogative writ of mandamus confirmed only to public authorities to compel performance of public duty. The public authority or them means every body which is created by statute and whose powers and duties are defined by statute. So Government departments, local authorities, police authorities and statutory undertakings and corporations as all public authorities. But there is no such limitation for our High Courts to issue the writ in the nature of mandamus. Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure from the English law. Under Article 226, Writs can be issued to any person or authority. It can be issued “for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose”. 59. When the order of termination had already been effaced by a judicial pronouncement of this Court, it follows that the order of penalty of dismissal is deemed never to have been made and the petitioner is deemed to be in service for all purposes with all consequential and attendant benefits and rights. 60. It would have been sufficient, if the writ petitioner had initiated contempt proceedings immediately after the termination of the earlier writ but the petitioner had been approaching the respondent, which the respondent had taken advantage of. As the earlier orders had not been carried out a fresh writ could very well be issued to the respondent. Hence the writ petition is also maintainable. It is a denial of his right not only to employment but also denial of livelihood. 61. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner also persuaded this court not only to allow all consequential directions but also award substantial damages and a compensation to the writ petitioner. It is further prayed by the writ petitioner that as has been held by the Apex Court in Victor Oil Company Ltd. v. Amarnathdas and others , 1961 (II) LLJ 113, wherein it has been held that the failure to reinstate the workman concerned, the workman is entitled to salary from the date of illegal orders of termination or dismissal and compensation for forced unemployment from the said date of illegal dismissal or termination. 62. 62. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner also referred to a decision of this court in The Director of School Education and Others v. V. Gnanaraj and others , 1991 W.L.R. 94 where the Division Bench held that this Court while exercising the powers under Article 226 is not scuttled down to the exact prayer projected in the writ petition and it could always take note of subsequent events for purpose of giving complete, affective and appropriate reliefs to the parties and the facts exposed and the points involved and resolved can certainly guide the court to give the appropriate reliefs to the parties and the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 is involved only in furtherance of justice. 63. Though the learned counsel for the writ petitioner relied upon the decision of the Apex Court reported in Abhijit Tea Company Pvt. Ltd., v. Terai Tea Co. (P) Ltd. and others , 1996 (1) SCC 589 , wherein the Apex Court came down heavily on a party who had failed to implement the orders of the Supreme Court. 64. In Comptroller and Auditor-General of India v. Gian Prakash, New Delhi and another , 1986 (2) SCC 679 the Apex Court held thus:- “Under Article 226 of the Constitution, every High Court has the power to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate case, any Government, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, directions, orders, or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto and certiorari or any of them, for the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose. In Dwarkanath v. ITO , AIR 1966 SC 81 this court pointed out the Article 226 is designedly couched in a wide language in order not to confine the power conferred by it only to the power to issue prerogative writs as understood in England, such wide language being used to enable the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found and to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. In Hochtief Gam men v. State of Orissa , AIR 1975 SC 2226 this Court held that the powers of the courts in England as regards the control which the judiciary has over the Executive indicate the minimum limit to which the courts in this country would be prepared to go in considering the validity or orders passed by the Government or its officers. There is thus no doubt that the High Courts in India exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and give necessary directions where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion mala fide or on irrelevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which such discretion has been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit and a proper case a High Court can, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, issue of a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority, and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the Court may itself pass an order or give directions which the Government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion. 65. In the result, all the points (A) to (D) are answered in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent. This Court further holds that the petitioner is deemed to have been in service continuously since 3. 1984 onwards and deemed to be discharging his functions as an employee of the respondent and he is entitled to all arrears of salary with annual increments and all attendant and concomitant benefits for the said period and till date of reinstatement. There will be a direction directing the respondent to work out the money value of the same and pay the arrears within 12 weeks from today. 66. There will be a direction directing the respondent to work out the money value of the same and pay the arrears within 12 weeks from today. 66. In the circumstances, there will be a further direction directing the respondent to forthwith reinstate the petitioner in service with all attendant and consequential benefits. However, at the same time as criminal prosecution is pending against the writ petitioner, liberty is given to the respondent to place the petitioner under suspension subject to payment of full salary at the present rate of scales payable. 67. Further liberty isgiven to the writ petitioner to institute appropriate proceedings before a Competent Court or forums or file a writ petition for damages after termination of the pending criminal prosecution and work out his remedies. 68. The writ petition is allowed with costs of Rs.3500. Consequently, W.M.P.No.2118 of 1999 is closed.