Honble CHAUHAN, J.–The instant petition unfolds factual matrix showing as how a citizen can become not only the law unto himself and succeeds to go out of the clutches of the rule of law, but disprove the trite law that ``be you ever so high, the laws are above you. More so, petitioner succeeded in reducing the administration of criminal justice to mockery. The petition has been filed for seeking direction to respondents to grant full retiral benefits as petitioner stood retired after reaching the age of superannuation as the same are not being paid to him because of the pendency of disciplinary proceedings against him; and for quashing the disciplinary proceedings initiated by issuing charge sheet dated 23.12.1992. (Annexure.8). (2). The matter was heard on 5.7.99 and the Court felt that gravity of charges, on which disciplinary proceedings were pending for long was of a very high magnitude and petitioner ought to have also been tried in criminal court also on the same charges. On inquiry, it was pointed out that an F.I.R. had been lodged in respect of the same incident but the learned Magistrate could not take cognizance as the Competent Authority refused to grant sanction for prosecution as required under Section 197 Cr. P.C. and the Magistrate accepted the police report (Annexure.10) and closed the case. The Court suo moto issued show cause notice to the petitioner as why the order of not taking cognizance and accepting the so-called final report be not quashed and the Magistrate be not directed to take cognizance even at this stage. (3). It may be pertinent to mention the facts of the case in brief. on 12/13.06.1985, F.I.R. No. 54/85 was lodged against the petitioner by one Staff Nurse Ku. Sarrama that on 12.6.85, petitioner, the then Chief Medical & Health Officer, Sirohi, came into hospital at mid-night in a drunken state and outraged her modesty and misbehaved with other Nurses on duty, viz., Shalini, Amul Triss, Illiama Thomas and he also slapped Staff Nurse Sejimul. He caught hold of Staff Nurse Sarrama, dragged her to the corner in the dark, pressed her hands and asked her to come to his residence within half an hour and also instructed to enter from back-door which would remain opened and in case she did not satisfy his lust, she would face dire consequences including transfer as her life was in his hands. He repeatedly told her that she had to go to his house and there was no one, even the peon. He pushed her in a room and tried his best to bolt the door but could not succeed as she had put foot between the doors. She was made free only on arrival of other Staff Nurses. He also asked her to pay Rs. 2000/-as he needed the money for arranging the marriage of his daughter. In pursuance of the F.I.R., a case was registered against the petitioner under Sections 354 and 323 I.P.C. and after completing the investigation, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, i.e. investigating officer came to the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence against the petitioner to face trial for the offences punishable under Sections 353, 354 and 323 I.P.C. On 24.7.1985, the investigating officer applied to the District Collector, Sirohi, for sanction purported to be required under Section 197 Cr. P.C. for petitioners prosecution. However, the same was declined on the ground that it was to be accorded by the State Government and accordingly the Government was asked to accord sanction vide letter dated 4.3.86. The Sanctioning Authority (for short, ``the Authority) vide letters dt. 12.3.86, 15.4.86, 19.4.86, 2.5.86, 22.6.86 and 14.7.86 asked the investigating officer to remain present before it, but in vain. Again vide letter dated 17.7.86, he was asked to remain present before the Authority on 1.8.86. In the meanwhile, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sirohi, wrote a letter to the Authority that he had also held an independent inquiry in the incident and on the basis of the same no case could be made out against the petitioner. The Authority asked the District Collector, Sirohi to furnish explanation that if the Sub-Divisional Officer did not find sufficient material against the petitioner, how sanction was sought to prosecute him. The Authority was informed that the Sub-Divisional officer had nothing to do with the investigation of a criminal case, therefore, sanction be accorded on the basis of the material placed before the Authority which had been collected during the course of investigation. The Authority was informed that the Sub-Divisional officer had nothing to do with the investigation of a criminal case, therefore, sanction be accorded on the basis of the material placed before the Authority which had been collected during the course of investigation. The Authority, for the reasons known to it, thought it proper that before according sanction, personal hearing be given to the petitioner and, therefore, petitioner was given an opportunity to appear before the Authority and for that purpose, for the convenience of the petitioner, several dates, i.e. 27.7.87, 21.9.87, 19.10.87, 5.12.87, 26.1.88, 15.5.88, 28.5.88, 23.6.88, 8.7.88 and 13.7.88 were fixed. However, the petitioner could not oblige the Authority be presenting himself for personal hearing inspite of these opportunities. Answering the reminder, the Authority informed the District Collector that to meet the requirement of principles of natural justice, it was necessary to hear the petitioner before according the sanction. As the Authority had adopted an entirely unknown procedure for according the sanction, which was not even required in the instant case, and prologned the matter for several years, the complainant herself felt disgusted and surrendered to the apathy and inaction of the so-called administration and wrote a letter on 15.5.88 that she had compromised the matter with the petitioner and did not want to proceed further. The District Collector again wrote to the Authority that it was as offence against the State; the offence was not compoundable and, therefore, sanction must be granted ignoring the letter of the complainant. Ultimately petitioner could oblige the Authority by appearing before it on 20.7.88. After hearing him, the Authority placed reliance on the letter written by one Staff Nurse Smt. Therrimma on 20.9.1987 that petitioner had falsely been implicated in the case he had not outraged the modesty of Miss Sarrama and letter of the victim that she had compromised the case with the petitioner and came to the conclusion that in such a peculiar circumstances it would be difficult for the prosecution to prove the case in Court, therefore, it refused to grant sanction vide order dated. 7.10.1988. Under these circumstances, the investigating officer submitted the police report before the Magistrate, Sirohi, stating that as the limitation for prosecution provided under Section 468 Cr. P.C. had already expired and sanction had not been accorded, it was not possible to prosecute the petitioner at such a belated stage. 7.10.1988. Under these circumstances, the investigating officer submitted the police report before the Magistrate, Sirohi, stating that as the limitation for prosecution provided under Section 468 Cr. P.C. had already expired and sanction had not been accorded, it was not possible to prosecute the petitioner at such a belated stage. The Magistrate accepted the said report vide order dated 5.3.1993. The order is very small and its true translation is as under:- ``Complainant has been served with the notice. She has sent a registered letter that she was not willing in any action beyond the Final Report. Perused the Final Report. The incident is of 1985. Complainant does not want any further action. Thus, the Final Report is accepted. (4). However, on the same charges, the Administration initiated the disciplinary proceedings under rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short ``the C.C.A. Rules) which remained pending though a period of about seven years elapsed. Petitioner completed his tenure of service and retired on reaching the age of superannuation. He filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4050/1995 before this Court for quashing the disciplinary proceedings. However, this Court vide order dated 12.12.95, refused to interfere with the proceedings, taking into account the magnitude and seriousness of the charges but directed the respondents to conclude the same within three months from submitting the copy of the order before the Disciplinary Authority. The second writ petition has, now, been filed for same relief on the same grounds. I am at complete loss to understand how the second petition on the same ground for the same relief can be maintained. It is barred by principle of res judicata. Petitioner, at the most, could urge that the order passed by this Court on 12.12.1985 was not complied with. But the remedy for the same could be sought only by filling a contempt application. (Vide Anwar Khan vs. State of Rajasthan (1). But the writ petition certainly could not be maintained. (5). At the time of hearing on 6.9.1999. petitioner filed a reply and therein he stated that the inquiry had been concluded and after holding petitioner guilty of mis-behaving with Staff Nurse Ms. Sarrama and slapping other Staff Nurse, punishment was imposed vide order dated 17.8.1999. It was further submitted that the petition had become infructuous and the petitioner be permitted to withdraw the petition. (6). petitioner filed a reply and therein he stated that the inquiry had been concluded and after holding petitioner guilty of mis-behaving with Staff Nurse Ms. Sarrama and slapping other Staff Nurse, punishment was imposed vide order dated 17.8.1999. It was further submitted that the petition had become infructuous and the petitioner be permitted to withdraw the petition. (6). The petition, as stated above, itself is not maintainable. Thus, the application for permission to withdraw the petition could be of no consequence. More so, sexual harassment of the working women at the places of their employment is an offence of very grave nature. Even seeking information which may cause embrassment to woman, has been dealt with seriously by the Honble Apex Court. In Neera Mathur vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others (2), giving false declaration regarding last mentrual period with a view to suppress her pregnancy was found not to be fatal at all and the Apex Court held that on the ground of such a suppression, her services could not have been terminated for the reason that asking such a declaration was not only embarrassing and improper but was against the dignity of womanhood. (7). In Vishaka & ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & ors. (3), sexual harassment of working woman in the place of employment was found to be against womans dignity and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution and guidelines were issued for preventing this menace. The Apex Court held that sexual harassment of working woman amounts to violation of rights of gender equality and right to life and liberty. It also leads to an logical conclusion that such harassment also amounts to violation of right to practice any profession, occupation or trade and infringes the human dignity It violates the mandate of Articles 14,15,19 (1) (g) and 21 of the Constitution. (8). Similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Apparel Export Promotion Council vs. A.K. Chopra (4), wherein the Honble Supreme Court has held that in such matters, the Court should try to enforce the international covenants in addition to the statutory provisions. (9). (8). Similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Apparel Export Promotion Council vs. A.K. Chopra (4), wherein the Honble Supreme Court has held that in such matters, the Court should try to enforce the international covenants in addition to the statutory provisions. (9). In Bodhi Sattwa Gautam vs. Miss Subhra Chakraborty (5), the Honble Supreme Court held that rape is a crime against the basic human right and violates the right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution and issued direction for awarding compensation to the prosecutrix in the case. (10). In a case where allegations of sexual harassment or molestration is there, the Courts are required to examine the broader probability of a case and should not be swayed by significant discrepancies or technicalities involved in a case. The Court must examine the entire material to determine the genuinenses of the complaint. In such a case, statement of the complainant is to be given due consideration and in case the evidence of the victim inspires confidence, the Courts are obliged to rely upon it. In such case, the Court should deal the case with great sanctity and sympathy. In Rupan Deol Bajaj & Anr. vs. K.P.S. Gill & Anr. (6), The Honble Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of its power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. (11). Therefore, such as action can be held violative of the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution and also the fundamental duties enshrined in the provisions of Article 51-A of the Constitution. (12). In view of the above and the order dated 5.7.1999 and passed subsequently, by which the record of the Magistrates Court was summoned and on the basis of the contents of the record, the Court considered it proper to examine the case further, as petition being not maintainable, the application for withdrawal of the same was meaningless and liable to be ignored. (13). Mr. Kala has submitted that this Court lacks competence to pass an order suo moto for quashing the order of the Magistrate passed long ago. (13). Mr. Kala has submitted that this Court lacks competence to pass an order suo moto for quashing the order of the Magistrate passed long ago. There seems to be no substance in the submission for the reason that the magnitude/gravity of the charges against the petitioner is of such a high magnitude and in case where the so-called administration and investigating agency failed to perform their duties and the Magistrate failed to appreciate the law in correct perspective, this Court is duty bound not to close its eyes when an offence of a stinking magnitude comes to its notice by any source and this is a fit case where this Court should suo moto exercise its powers to revive the criminal proceedings in exercise of its power under Section 397 read with Section 401 Cr. P.C. This view is fortified by the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar vs. State of Maharastra (7), wherein the Honble Court held that High Courts power in an appropriate case, by exercising suo moto the revisional power is still extant under Section 397 read with Section 401 Cr. P.C. inasmuch as the High Court can by itself call for the record of proceedings of any inferior criminal court under its jurisdiction and pass appropriate order. (14). In Ramesh Chandra vs. A.P. Jhaveri (8), the Supreme Court held that High Court was right in exercising the revisional power suo moto and quashing the order of the trial Court acquitting the accused on the basis of compounding the offence though the offence was not compoundable. (15). In the State of Kerala vs. Narainyani Amma Kamala Devi (9), the Apex Court had held that the High Court, can exercise the revisional power suo moto on the basis of its own knowledge derived from any source whatsoever without being moved by any person at all. All that is necessary to bring the High Court power of revision into operation is such information as makes the High Court think that an order made by a subordinate court is fit for the exercise of its power of revision. (16). In Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Girdharilal Sapru & ors. All that is necessary to bring the High Court power of revision into operation is such information as makes the High Court think that an order made by a subordinate court is fit for the exercise of its power of revision. (16). In Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Girdharilal Sapru & ors. (10), the Supreme Court considered the issue of delay and limitation and observed as under:- ``We may notice that Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enables the High Court to exercise power of revision suo moto and when the attention of the High Court was drawn to a clear illegality, the High Court could not have rejected the petition as time-barred, thereby perpetuating the illegality and mis-carriage of justice.....Section 397 (1), in turns, confers power of suo moto revision on the High Court, and if the High Court exercises suo moto revisional power, the same cannot be denied on the ground that there is some limitation prescribed for the exercise of the power because none such is prescribed. If in such a situation the suo moto power is not exercised, what a glaring illegality goes unnoticed, can be demonstrably established by this case itself. (17). The object of revisional jurisdiction is to confer upon revisional court a kind of supervisory jurisdiction in order to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure which resulted into some under served hardship to individuals. Even in exercise of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court has power of superintendence over all Courts in respect of grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse or excess of authority or violation of elementary principles of natural justice. Undoubtedly, such power should be exercised sparingly and with most circumspection only in appropriate cases. (Vide M/s. Savita chemicals (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. Dyes & Chemical Workers Union & ors. (11); and Pepsy Food Ltd. vs. Special Judicial Magistrate (12). But I am afraid, the instant case falls in the category of rare cases, where such jurisdiction should be exercised. A revisional jurisdiction can be exercised wherever there is some glaring defect in the procedure or a manifest error or a point of law resulting in a flagrant mis-carriage of justice. (Vide K. Chinnaswami Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (13). (18). A revisional jurisdiction can be exercised wherever there is some glaring defect in the procedure or a manifest error or a point of law resulting in a flagrant mis-carriage of justice. (Vide K. Chinnaswami Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (13). (18). In addition to all above, the Constitution has conferred a very wide power on High Court to reach injustice wherever it is found. (Vide T.C. Basappa vs. T. Nagappa (14); P.J Irani vs. State of Madras & Ors. (15); and Dwarka Nath vs. Income Tax Officer (16). In Jai Kumar vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1999) 5 SCC 1 , the Apex Court has observed as under:- ``Justice is supreme and justice ought to be beneficial for the society so that the society is placed in a better off situation. Law Courts exist for the society and ought to rise upto the occasion to do the needful in the matter, and as such ought to act in a manner so as to subserve the basic requirement of the society. (19). Thus, it is fit case where this Court should exercise the revisional powers suo moto even after six years of the order of accepting the Final Report. Otherwise, such a glaring mistake, which has resulted in grave injustice, would remain unrectified. The Court, being the custodian of law, cannot close its eyes to an illegality which attracts the entire society towards itself by its stink. Such orders not only demoralise the victims but also force the society to think as to what is the occasion to have a system of administration of criminal justice and such incident leaves serious repercussions being slur on entire social system. The case proved to be criminalisation of administration of justice rather than administration of criminal justice. (20). It has further been submitted by Mr. Kala that the State Government has rightly refused the sanction and, therefore, that issue cannot be re-opened by this Court. The mandate of Section 197 Cr. P.C. is only that when a public servant, not removeable from his office save by or with sanction of the Government, is accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purported to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction of the competent authority. The embargo put by that Section is in order to save the public servant from harassment in the discharge of official duty and to guard against vexatious proceedings and to secure well considered opinion of the superior authority before a prosecution is launched against him, but this qualified protection is limited to a class of offences. A public servant can only be said to act or purported to act in the discharge of his official duty if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duties. The test may well be whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that what he does, he does in virtue of his office. Thus, it is not every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197(1) Cr. P.C. If the act, complained of, is directly concerned with his official duty so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office then sanction would be necessary and that would be so irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a proper discharge of duties because that would really be a matter of defence on the merits. (21). In Matajog Dobey vs. H.C. Bhari (17), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held as under:- ``There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful, claim that he did it in the course of performance of his duty. (22). In Pukhraj vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (18), the Honble Apex Court observed as under:- ``The intention behind the section is to prevent public servants from being unnecessarily harassed. The section is not restricted only to cases of anything purported to be done in good faith, for a person who ostensibly acts in execution of his duty still purports so to act, although he may have a dishonest intention. Nor is it confined to cases where the act, which constitutes the offence, is the official duty of the official concerned. Such an interpretation would involve a contradiction in terms, because an offence can never be an official duty. Nor is it confined to cases where the act, which constitutes the offence, is the official duty of the official concerned. Such an interpretation would involve a contradiction in terms, because an offence can never be an official duty. The offence should have been committed when an act is done in the execution of duty or when an act purposes to be done in execution of duty. The test appears to be not that the offence is capable of being committed by a public servant in an act done or purported to be done in the execution of duty. The section cannot be confined to only such acts as are done by a public servant directly in pursuance of his public office, though in excess of the duty or under a mistaken belief as to the existence of such duty. Nor need the act constituting the offence be so inseparably connected with the official duty as to form part and parcel of the same transaction. What is necessary is that the offence must be in respect of an act done or purported to be done in the discharge of an official duty. It does not apply to acts done purely in a private capacity by a public servant. Expressions such as the `capacity in which the act is performed, `cloak of office and `professed exercise of the office may not always be appropriate to describe or delimit the scope of section. An act merely because it was done negligently does not cease to be one done or purporting to be done in execution of a duty. (23). In S.B. Saha vs. M.S. Kochar (19), the Honble Apex Court placed reliance upon the judgments of the Privy Council in H.B. Gill vs. The King (20); and Hori Ram vs. Emperor (21), and held that there is nothing ``in the nature or quality of the act complained of which attaches to or partakes of the official character of the appellants who allegedly did it. Nor could the alleged act of misappropriation or conversion, be reasonably said to be imbued with the colour of the office held by the appellants. (24). Nor could the alleged act of misappropriation or conversion, be reasonably said to be imbued with the colour of the office held by the appellants. (24). Same view has been reiterated in Amrik Singh vs. State of Pepsy (22); Om Prakash Gupta vs. State of U.P. (23); Baijnath vs. State of M.P. (24); Prabhakar V. Sinari vs. Shanker Anant Verlekar (25); Bhagwan Prasad Srivastava vs. N.P. Mishra (26); B.S. Sambhu vs. T.S. Krishnaswami (27); K.M. Methew vs. State of Kerala (28); State of Maharastra vs. Dr. Buddikota Subbarao (29); Director of Inspection and Audit & ors. vs. C.L. Subramanian (30); Suresh Kumar Bhikam Chand Jain vs. Pandey Ajay Bhushan & ors. (31); N.K. Ogle vs. Sanwaldas (32); and A.K. Singh vs. Uttarkhan Jan Morcha & ors. (33). (25). In Shambhoo Nath Misra vs. State of U.P. (34), the Honble Supreme Court held as under:- ``In such a situate it postulates that the public servants act is in furtherance of his performance or his official duties. If the act/omission is integral to performance of public duty, the public servant is entitled to the protection under Section 197 (1) Cr. P.C.. . .The sanction of the Appropriate Government or Competent Authority would be necessary to protect a public servant from needless harassment or prosecution. The protection of sanction is an assurance to an honest and sincere officer to perform his public duty honestly and to the best of his ability. The threat of prosecution demoralises the honest officer...However, performance of public duty under colour of public duty cannot be camouflaged to commit crime. Public duty may provide him an opportunity to commit crime. The court to proceed further in the trial or the inquiry, as the case may be, applies its mind and records a finding that the crime and the official duty are not integrally connected...The official capacity only enable him to fabricate the record or misappropriate the public fund etc. It does not mean that it is integrally connected or inseparably inter-linked with the crime committed in the course of same transaction... (Emphasis added). (26). Therefore, it is settled principle of law that in absence of ex-facie official action alleged in the complaint, the accused can be proceeded against in the criminal trial like any other accused without any requirement for sanction under Section 197 Cr. P.C. or any other analogous provision in other Statute/Rules. (Emphasis added). (26). Therefore, it is settled principle of law that in absence of ex-facie official action alleged in the complaint, the accused can be proceeded against in the criminal trial like any other accused without any requirement for sanction under Section 197 Cr. P.C. or any other analogous provision in other Statute/Rules. And in view of the above, I am of the considered opinion that the said sanction was not required at all, as there was no connection between the official duty the offence allegedly committed. More so, no person, in discharge of his official duty, can be permitted to use his official position to commit an offence. In the instant case, there was no inter-relationship between the official duty and the offence committed by the petitioner, and, therefore, even by means of imagination, no one can postulate reasonably that the offence was committed by the petitioner in performance of his official duty. (27). If the instant case is examined in the totality of the circumstances, there had been glaring irregularities and illegality from the very inception of the case. Once the investigating officer came to the conclusion that on the basis of the evidence collected during investigation, a case was made out against the petitioner, he ought to have filed the police report to the competent criminal court straight-way and the Court was obliged to take cognizance thereon. Under the garb of seeking sanction which was certainly not required in the case, a period of more than three years was wasted, While considering the grant of sanction, the Authority ought to have taken into consideration the material produced before it and examine whether a case was made out against the petitioner or not. The Authority committed a grave error in taking into consideration the letter written by the Sub-Divisional Officer and another Staff Nurse in favour of the petitioner. It further erred in observing that it would be difficult for the prosecution to prove the case before the Court as veracity of the allegation cannot be examined at the stage of grant of sanction or even at the stage of taking cognizance. The Authority was not concerned with the out-come of the case and it was concerned only to examine the relevant record and pass an appropriate order objectively. More so, affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before granting sanction is alien concept in criminal jurisprudence. The Authority was not concerned with the out-come of the case and it was concerned only to examine the relevant record and pass an appropriate order objectively. More so, affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before granting sanction is alien concept in criminal jurisprudence. Giving him a large number of opportunities for hearing, makes it clear that the Authority was in collusion with the petitioner and had been won over by him. Even the letter written by the victim herself had to be ignored as the offence under Section 354 I.P.C. is compoundable only with the permission of the Court and offence punishable under Section 353 I.P.C. is not compoundable at all. The so-called police report filed on the basis of non-grant of sanction and expiring of limitation under Section 468 Cr. P.C. was totally inconsistent with the statutory provisions of Sub-Section (3) of Section 470 Cr. P.C., which provides for excluding the period taken by the Authority while considering the grant of sanction. The learned Magistrate failed to appreciated the case in a proper perspective and under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, he ought to have rejected the so-called final report and proceeded with the case. (28). Before parting with the case it may be pertinent to mention here that Mr. Kala, learned counsel for the petitioner, has argued the matter five times and on 9.9.99 the matter was adjourned at his request but today he did not appear and it was only for his satisfaction that the case was adjourned otherwise I was inclined to pass the order on that very day. His non-appears is perhaps due to anticipation of the fate of the case. (29). Thus, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the following orders are passed:- (i) As no sanction under Section 197 Cr. His non-appears is perhaps due to anticipation of the fate of the case. (29). Thus, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the following orders are passed:- (i) As no sanction under Section 197 Cr. P.C. was required in the instant case, the order of refusal of such a grant is redundant and has to be ignored and even if it has some significance, the order dated 7.10.1988, is hereby quashed; (ii) Magistrates order dated 5.3.1993 accepting the police report (Final Report) is hereby quashed; (iii) Registry of this Court is directed to send a copy of this judgment and order and the original record of the case to the competent Magistrate immediately and the Magistrate is directed to proceed further strictly in accordance with law; and (iv) The observations made hereinabove shall not, by any means, affect the merit of the case of the parties. the writ petition is dismissed as not maintainable but with the aforesaid orders/directions.