JUDGMENT P.K. DEB, J.:- This appeal has been preferred against the concurrent judgment and decree passed by the District Judge, Katihar, in Title Eviction Appeal no.4 of 1994 and by the Munsif, Katihar, in Title Eviction Suit No. 18 of 1990. The eviction suit filed by the appellant has been dismissed by both the courts below. 2. The plaintiff happens to be a landlord of Municipal holding no. 164, ward no. 6 of Katihar Muncipality. The holding consists of one self contained flat (pucca building) comprising of two bed rooms with covered verandah inside and outside, store room and kitchen with pucca courtyard, well, latrine surrounded by pucca wall and the same premise is the portion of two units single storied building. The description of the premises including its boundary has been given on the foot of the plaint. According to the plaintiff, the defendant is a tenant in the flat on a monthly rental of. 60/- since the days of predecessors of both the parties. The plaintiff was in service under the railways. The defendant used to send the rent through money orders. The plaintiff retired on 1.10.90 and since then he is residing in another house at Katihar just by the side of the tenanted premises. According to the plaintiff, he requires the suit flat for bonafide use and occupation. According to him, his son has passed the M.B.B.S. Examination and as such, he wants to start a medical dispensary in the suit premise and also by constructing a Nursing Home comprising of several rooms for indoor patients, pathological laboratory and X-ray plant after thorough repairs and reconstruction of the dilapidated portion and properly remodelling. It may be mentioned here that the suit house has also a small piece of vacant land in front of it and according to the plaintiff, if the two flats along with the vacant plot is taken in possession of the plaintiff the same would suffice his son's accommodation for opening up dispensary and also for a Nursing Home after some reconstruction and repair. It is the case of the plaintiff that although he made several requests for vacating the suit premise by the defendant the same was not done even after notice being given by the plaintiff for the purpose. It is the case of the plaintiff that although he made several requests for vacating the suit premise by the defendant the same was not done even after notice being given by the plaintiff for the purpose. Hence the suit for eviction was filed on the ground of personal necessity as contemplated under Section 11 (1)(c) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. It has further been stated in the plaint that as the plaintiff's necessity is of urgent nature he wanted the unit premises to be vacated within the special procedure as contemplated under Section 14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act and hence although the defendant is a defaulter, in the eviction suit claim for arrears of rent have not been included as a separate suit for realisation of arrears of rent has been filed. 3. On appearance, the defendant filed written statement contending, inter alia, that the suit is not maintainable as the same is barred by principles of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence and the present suit has been filed with mala fide intention to evict the defendant for the purpose of inducting another tenant on inflated rent. It has been stated that only two years back the plaintiff had inducted two more tenants on the ground floor of his residential houses and as such if there was any necessity for the plaintiff such induction would not have been there. It has further been stated that the story of requirement has been hatched out with ulterior motive as the suit premises is not in any way fit for opening up of a dispensary and Nursing Home and that the so called necessity is only a myth as the plaintiff's son did not complete his medical course as he was still doing housemanship after obtaining medical degree. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties four issues were framed as mentioned below :- (1) Whether the suit is maintainable and whether the plaintiff has got any cause of action to institute the suit ? (2) Whether the plaintiff is in bonafide and reasonable need of the suit premises for his own house and occupation ? (3) Whether the provision of Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act is applicable in the present suit? (4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get any relief or reliefs ? (2) Whether the plaintiff is in bonafide and reasonable need of the suit premises for his own house and occupation ? (3) Whether the provision of Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act is applicable in the present suit? (4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get any relief or reliefs ? Although it was held by the original court that the relationship of landlord and tenant is existing between the parties but it was held that the personal necessity as alleged from the side of the plaintiff is a genuine one but the suit is prematured as the plaintiff's son has never completed his medical course and fit enough to open up independent practice by starting medical dispensary and Nursing Home. It was also held that as the suit premise is a small unit the same is not fit to be converted into a Nursing Home. Although the suit proceeded under the special provisions of Section 14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act and the suit was dismissed then the landlord had no other alternative but to file an appeal before the District Judge being Title Appeal no.4 of 1994. The appellate court also came to the same finding that the suit is prematured when the cause of action for the suit arose then the plaintiff's son was not qualified for opening up a dispensary or a Nursing Home as he was still doing houseman ship. It was further held by the appellate court that the suit premise along with other contiguous flats and vacant portion in front of the premise are not sufficient for the purpose of opening up a Nursing Home as the lane in front of the suit premise is narrow that the patients would not be able to enter directly to the Nursing Home on vehicle. It was also held by the learned appellate court that rather if the son of the plaintiff wants to open up a Nursing Home then the residential building, is fit enough for opening up the Nursing Home and as such, confirmation of dismissal of the suit has been made by the appellate judgment. It was also held by the learned appellate court that rather if the son of the plaintiff wants to open up a Nursing Home then the residential building, is fit enough for opening up the Nursing Home and as such, confirmation of dismissal of the suit has been made by the appellate judgment. In the Second Appeal following substantial questions of law have been framed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure :- (a) Whether the court below erred in law in holding the cause of action for filing the suit had not arisen and therefore the suit was prematured. (b) Whether the court below committed error in not taking note of the subsequent events to grant relief in favour of the plaintiff. (c) Whether the need of the house to use it after demolition to the existing one can be bonafide. (d) Whether the court below erred in holding that the plaintiff's need can be satisfied by opening up Nursing Home in his residential house. 4. The first two substantial questions of law as formulated are interrelated. It is an admitted fact that when the suit was filed the plaintiff's son had not been fully qualified one to start independent medical practice as although he had acquired the M.B.B.S. degree but he was continuing his housemanship in the Patna Medical College Hospital for getting him fully qualified and equipped to be a doctor. But it has also come in evidence during the pendency of the suit that housemanship of the plaintiff's son was completed and he became fully qualified as a doctor to start his independent practice either by opening a dispensary or a Nursing Home. Now the question remains as to the date when the cause of action had arisen the plaintiff's son was not fully qualified for starting his own dispensary and it was held by both the courts below that at the time of filing of the suit, as the plaintiff's son was not fully qualified then the suit was a prematured one in view of the necessity as averred from the side of the plaintiff. Under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, specified grounds have been incorporated for the purpose of eviction of a monthly tenant to protect the tenant from the whims of the landlord. Under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, specified grounds have been incorporated for the purpose of eviction of a monthly tenant to protect the tenant from the whims of the landlord. One of the grounds is personal necessity of the plaintiff or his family members to occupy the suit premises for satisfaction of their necessity or accommodation. It has also been a settled principle of law that the assertion of the personal necessity from the side of the landlord should be a bonafide and genuine one. The necessity must be a real one without any semblance of its imagination and the same should be a bonafide one. If it is taken the that the plaintiff's son is a qualified doctor then definitely he can start practice of his own independent practice and for that purpose he may need the suit premise for starting his dispensary or a nursing Home by making reconstruction and remodelling etc. etc. But the fact remains that on the date the eviction suit was filed the plaintiff's son was not fully qualified to start his independent practice. So it was held by both the courts below that the personal necessity as asserted from the side of the plaintiff was not a bonafide and a real one but the fact remains that during the pendency of the suit the son had totally become qualified to start his independent practice but that fact has not been considered by any of the courts below. It is now the settled principle of law that when a landlord on the ground of personal necessity wants to evict a tenant then the court must see that on' the date the eviction decree is to be passed such necessity still exists. It is also settled principle of law that the eviction suit does not suffer from the principle of res judicata and the cause of action for eviction of the tenant may arise at any time. It is also settled principle of law that the eviction suit does not suffer from the principle of res judicata and the cause of action for eviction of the tenant may arise at any time. If on the cause of action when the suit has been filed is to be seen to be subsisting on the date of passing of the decree then also if view is moulded then the cause of action if found to be fully arisen during the pendency of the suit then whether the plaintiff-landlord's suit for eviction can be dismissed making him liable to file a fresh suit or not is the main question to be decided in the suit as per questions of law formulated. 5. It is true that in the present case when the suit was filed the plaintiff was contemplated to get his son fully qualified during the pendency of the suit and as such asked for vacating the suit premises for facilitating the independent medical practice of his son. So on the date of cause of action some future expectation was there from the side of the plaintiff and in that way he can be said that the future expectation is having the semblance of imagination than the plaintiff's need was not a totally real one and it had the semblance of desire and wish and in that way the necessity could not be said to be a bonafide one on the date of filing of the suit. But the position became clear during the pendency of the suit the plaintiff's son became fully qualified and in that way at least during the pendency of the suit the plaintiff's demand of personal necessity became a bonafide and a real one. So on the very date of passing of the decree the plaintiff's necessity was definitely a bonafide and real one and did not remain as desire & wish alone which might be so as construed above on the exact date of filing of the suit. The cause of action in an eviction suit between the landlord and tenant can arise again and again and even on dismissal of one eviction suit on the same ground may give rise to filing of another eviction suit if the grounds became a firm and genuine one on the subsequent suit. The cause of action in an eviction suit between the landlord and tenant can arise again and again and even on dismissal of one eviction suit on the same ground may give rise to filing of another eviction suit if the grounds became a firm and genuine one on the subsequent suit. When it is to be seen by the court on the date of granting of the decree that the necessity of the plaintiff-landlord was still existing then also it does not come to reason as to why the plaintiff-landlord's necessity as claimed which became a firm and genuine one during the pendency of the suit could not be construed for the purpose of granting of a decree of eviction in the same suit. Thus, I come to the finding that the learned courts below were not correct in dismissing the eviction suit of the plaintiff on the ground of prematurity. 6. In the original court reference was given to a single Bench judgment of this Court as reported in AIR 1981 (Patna) 230 (Arun Kumar Sah Vs. Md. Basir Ahmad and another) wherein it was held that in a suit for eviction on the ground of personal necessity, requirement of landlord mentioned in Section 11 (1)(c) must be on the date of the suit and not on subsequent date. In that suit the tenanted premises were sought to be evicted on the ground of requirement of business for the sons of the landlord but it could be found that on the date of filing of the suit two of the sons were minors and it was urged before the Court that the requirement on the date of filing of the suit was not just and proper. In para-9 of the judgment although it was held that on the date of filing of the suit requirement as urged were not there proper but it was held that the circumstances show that the plaintiffs while running a business can be construed to have an intention to expand their business in the particular object for the employment of three sons and thus although principle was enunciated but in the circumstances eviction decree was granted. In the present case also the son of the plaintiff has already graduated in medical science for technical requirement of becoming a full-fledged doctor, he was doing housemanship at the time of institution of the suit and during the pendency of the suit he became a fulfledged doctor. Naturally the father i.e., the plaintiff was anxious for getting his son properly established on completion of his housemanship and as such the suit was filed and during the pendency of the suit he became a fulfledged doctor. So in these circumstances, considering the observation made in the reported judgment as mentioned above it could not be said that the suit is bad on the ground of prematurity as the requirement under Section 11 (1)(c) was not fulfledgedly existing at the time of filing of the suit. Thus, from the facts and circumstances, I find that the courts below had committed error of law in not considering the circumstances of personal requirement in its proper perspective and came to an erroneous finding. 7. Regarding the third point as formulated as substantial question of law, it has been strenuously urged from the side of the plaintiff-appellant that as per averments in the plaint the suit premises were necessary to be vacated for the purpose of using the same along with the contiguous one room flat for the purpose of opening up of a dispensary and also by remodelling and restructuring the same for opening up a Nursing Home and the landlord being the best person to choose whatever accommodation would satisfy his need then the urge of the plaintiff on this score cannot be negatived by the court of law on the inconvenience of the defendant. The original court held that the suit house is bonafidely required by the plaintiff for accommodating his son but the suit was dismissed on the ground of prematurity as on the date of filing of the suit son of plaintiff did not become a fulfledged doctor but the appellate court although no cross appeal was filed against the finding of the issue by the learned court below reversed the same holding that the requirement as alleged from the side of the plaintiff-landlord cannot be justified considering the position and site and the area of the suit premises. On the other hand, it has been urged from the side of the respondent-defendant that as per Section 11 (1) (c) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act the personal necessity must be for evicting the tenant to occupy the building and it does not expand to the position that the building would not be occupied by the plaintiff or his son but the same would be demolished and then a Nursing Home was to be established. I have carefully and closely scrutinised the paragraphs in the plaint wherein the personal necessity has been urged but therein it has been specifically mentioned that the suit premises were necessary for the purpose of opening up of dispensary for the son of the plaintiff and also for reconstructing and remodelling the same with the contiguous one room flat and the space available in front for establishing a Nursing Horne. So the primary need was to get the suit premises vacated for accommodation of the son of the plaintiff for opening up his dispensary. Whether the ejectment on the ground of personal necessity of the tenanted premises are also to be included for the purpose of accommodation of the land-lord on demolishing the came up for consideration before the Apex Court. In AIR 1964 (SC) 1976 (Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta Vs. Indradaman Amritlal Sheth) it was held by the Apex Court that under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act bonafide need of the premises for the occupation of the landlord does not include demolishing and rebuilding but it was held that occupation comes of the tenanted premises first and then the decision would be arrived at by the landlord to rebuild or demolish for the purpose of making it fit for his residence. Thus although word "building" is mentioned in the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act and also under Section 11 but that does not take away the purpose for which occupation is to be taken by construction and rebuilding or remodelling to make it fit for the purpose for which eviction was sought. Thus although word "building" is mentioned in the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act and also under Section 11 but that does not take away the purpose for which occupation is to be taken by construction and rebuilding or remodelling to make it fit for the purpose for which eviction was sought. In the present case, I have already mentioned that the building was sought to be vacated for the purpose of starting of dispensary for the son of the plaintiff with the intention that the same would be reconstructed and remodelled for the purpose of making it fit for a nursing Home. In that score it appears that learned original court had came to the proper finding to the effect that the purpose for which the ejectment was sought for was proper as the landlord is the fit person to know how he would occupy the same for meeting his proper need. In this context another judgment of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1992 (SC) 1696 (K.A. Anthappai Vs. C. Ahmed) can be referred to. Wherein it was held under the Kerala Building Act that the claim of the landlord that he needs the building bonafide for his personal occupation cannot be negatived on the ground that the building requires repairs and alteration before the landlord could occupy the same. Thus it was rightly been held by the original court that the need of the plaintiff was justified in the fact and circumstances of the present case and the said need is a bonafide one but the same has been wrongly negatived by the appellate court holding that the building is not fit to be converted into a Nursing Home. It is not the court to adjudge as to how the landlord would satisfy his need of purpose because he is the best person to judge how he will use the building to suit the purpose. Thus I find that the appellate court had committed error of law in holding that the need of the plaintiff is not a bonafide one. 8. Regarding the fourth point as formulated by this Court it appears that the learned court below has committed definite error of law. There was no scope for a court of law to make out a third case when it was nobody's case in the suit. 8. Regarding the fourth point as formulated by this Court it appears that the learned court below has committed definite error of law. There was no scope for a court of law to make out a third case when it was nobody's case in the suit. It was held by the appellate court that the need of the plaintiff for using the suit premises as a Nursing Home is not proper as the same is not suitable for the purpose of opening up a Nursing Home rather he has come to the finding that the residential house of the plaintiff can be reasonably converted into a Nursing Home as the same has the opening towards the main road and the suit premise's opening towards a lane through which vehicles are difficult to move. It is not the case of any of the parties but the same has been brain-work of the learned appellate court. There was no scope for the learned appellate court to suggest that the residential house is to be converted into a Nursing Home. Both the son and father on the plaintiff's side have specifically stated that the suit premises are fit one to be converted into a Nursing Home along with the open space and the contiguous vacant one roomed flat. The said statement from the side of the plaintiff had never been denied or no suggestions have been put regarding conversion of the residential house of the plaintiff to a Nursing Home. The question does not arise of conversion of residential house of the plaintiff to that of a Nursing Home. It is not that a further vacant accommodation is available for opening up a Nursing Home to satisfy the need of the plaintiff. It became absurd idea that the plaintiff would be dictated to convert his residential house to a Nursing Home to satisfy his need to avoid inconvenience of the defendant. There is no scope of the court to suggest in such a way to negative the plaintiff's need. A third case cannot be made out by the appellate court and in that way definitely the appellate court committed error of law. Thus it appears that both courts below although on different findings have wrongly rejected the ejectment suit of the plaintiff. A third case cannot be made out by the appellate court and in that way definitely the appellate court committed error of law. Thus it appears that both courts below although on different findings have wrongly rejected the ejectment suit of the plaintiff. Again it appears that the question of partial eviction has not been considered by any of the court's below which requires to be adjudicated if it is found that the plaintiff's need is genuine and bonafide. As both the courts below had dismissed that suit holding that the necessity was not real and genuine then there was no scope to consider the point of partial eviction. Thus when this Court has come to the finding that the courts below had wrongly held that the bonafide necessity was not there and that the necessity as urged from the side of the plaintiff is real and genuine then the point of partial eviction is required to be decided by this Court. It appears that the need as enumerated requires not only the whole of the suit premises but also the adjacent one roomed vacant flat to the open space for construction of Nursing Home then the question of partial eviction does not come in for consideration even in the nature and circumstances of the need. So considering that need, which has already been found to be genuine and proper and also bonafide, the question of partial eviction in the circumstances of the present case does not arise at all. 9. Hence, although both the courts below had come to the concurrent findings of dismissal of the eviction suit but it is held that the courts below had committed error of law in considering the validity of the personal necessity of the plaintiff-landlord and hence the Second Appeal is hereby allowed. The judgment and decree of both the courts below are hereby set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is hereby decreed on contest throughout with costs. The judgment and decree of both the courts below are hereby set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is hereby decreed on contest throughout with costs. But as it appears that the defendant are residing in the suit house for a long time then some time must be required for them to find out an alternative accommodation and as such three months' time from this date is hereby allowed to the defendants to vacate the suit premises and deliver the vacant position to the plaintiff and during these three mon1hs the defendants shall have to pay rent at the existing rate as per terms and conditions of the tenancy and in default the plaintiff shall be entitled to get the suit premises vacated through execution proceeding during this period also.