Judgment R.A.Sharma, J. 1. The appellant filed this appeal challenging the judgment and order dated 26th March, 1992, passed by the Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Simdega, in S.T. No. 102/87/T.R. No. 38/91 convicting and sentencing him to life imprisonment for committing the murder of Eto Kharia. 2. The case of the prosecution as set out in the F.I.R. is as under : On 7.2.1986 Eto Kharia (deceased) requested the appellant to help him to bring his buffalo lying at Binjhiya Bandh at villageRajabasa Tola Danrpani P.S. Thethaitangar DistrictGumla, to his house but the appellant refused to help him inspite of the repeated request made by the deceased and his father (informant) which gave rise to quarrel and exchange of hot words between the deceased and the appellant. The appellant thereupon rushed to his house and brought a Tangi by which he assaulted the deceased causing incised wound on the left side of his head, on account of which he fell down on the ground. The accused thereafter left the place of occurrence. The informant with the help of his wife and daughter-in-law brought the deceased to his house but before he could be taken to the hospital he died in the morning of the next day. The informant thereafter lodged F.I.R. with the police station. The police prepared the inquest report, sent the dead body for post-mortem examination and after making investigation submitted the charge sheet against the appellant, on the basis of which the cognizance was taken and the case was sent to the sessions court for trial. The appellant denied the charge but no witness has been produced on his behalf. 3. The prosecution examined six witnesses in support of its case. P.W.1 and 2 are the formal witnesses who have proved the F.I.R. and the seizure list. P.Ws. 3 and 4 are the eye-witnesses. P.W. 5 is the Doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination on the dead body. P.W. 6 is also a formal witness who has proved the inquest report. The informant and I.O. have not been examined in this case. 4. The trial Court, on the basis of the testimonies of the P.Ws. 3, 4 and 5 has convicted the appellant and sentenced him to life imprisonment under section 302 I.P.C. Hence this appeal. 5. P.W. 6 is also a formal witness who has proved the inquest report. The informant and I.O. have not been examined in this case. 4. The trial Court, on the basis of the testimonies of the P.Ws. 3, 4 and 5 has convicted the appellant and sentenced him to life imprisonment under section 302 I.P.C. Hence this appeal. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant has made three submissions in support of the appeal, namely, (i) the conviction of the appellant is unsustainable because P.Ws. 3 and 4 are not the eye-witnesses and the only eyewitness (informant) was not examined, (ii) P.Ws. 3 and 4 are directly related to the deceased being his mother and sister-in-law and were thus highly interested witnesses, on the basis of whose testimonies the appellant should not have been corvicted in the absence of corroboration by independent witness and (iii) even if the prosecution case is accepted as correct, the appellant was not liable to be convicted under section 302 and utmost the conviction could have been recorded under section 304, Part-ll only. 6. It is true that according to the F.I.R., the informant is an eye-witness and he has not been examined by the prosecution, but on that account, the testimonies of the P.Ws. 3 and 4 cannot be rejected. They have to be adjudged on their own merit. 7. P.W. 3 is the wife of the informant and the mother of the deceased. In her testimony before the trial court, she has said that her son (deceased) along with his father requested the appellant to help him to bring back the buffalo to the house but he declined to help him saying that let the buffalo die which gave rise to quarrel between them and the appellant thereafter brought Tangi from his house and hit the deceased at the left side of the head causing serious injury on account of which he fell down on the ground. She has stated that she has seen the attack on the deceased by the appellant from her house which is at a distance of 20-25 yards from the place of occurrence. 8. The submission of the learned counsel that P.W. 3 could not have seen the attack on the deceased by the appellant because she has said that the deceased was lying on the village road behind the house of Chutiya is liable to be rejected. 8. The submission of the learned counsel that P.W. 3 could not have seen the attack on the deceased by the appellant because she has said that the deceased was lying on the village road behind the house of Chutiya is liable to be rejected. It is true that this witness has said in her testimony that the decease was lying on the village road behind the house of Chutiya but she has also said that the road behind the house of Chutiya where the dead body was lying is in her Basti (place where she lives) and she has seen the occurrence from her house which is at a distance of 20-25 yards from the place of occurrence. That apart, there is nothing on the record to show that she could not have seen the occurrence from her house. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant has further challenged the testimony of P.W. 3 on the ground that there is inconsistency regarding time of occurrence. P.W. 3 in the examination-in-chief has said that the time of occurrence is about 8.00 p.m. but in the cross-examination she has said that at about 3 Oclock, the deceased went to the appellant seeking help to bring back the buffalo lying at Binjhiya Bandh. This witness is rustic illiterate village woman belonging to scheduled tribe. Such people do not have the correct concept of time. Moreover, excepting the said inconsistency about the time, she has stood the test of cross-examination successfully where searching question were put to her. That apart, it does not affect the substratum of the prosecution case. Her testimony cannot be rejected merely on the ground that she has mentioned two times as the time of occurrer. 10. P.W. 3 is an eye-witness and has supported the prosecution case. Her testimony is corroborated by the medical evidence as is clear from the testimony of Doctor, P.W. 5, who conducted the postmortem examination, in which the following injury was recorded : "(1) Incised wound 2 1/2 "x 2" x 2" just above left pivra cutting scalp, temporal bone, temporal log and brain and underlying blood vessels" The Doctor has opined that the injury which was caused by Tangi has caused the death of the deceased. 11 P.W. 4 who is the daughter-in-law of the informant has also corroborated the prosecution case saying that she has seen the occurrence and the attack on the deceased by the appellant from her house. The learned counsel for the appellant has, however, challenged her testimony on the ground that as she was feeding her husband at the time of occurrence, it was not possible for her to see the occurrence from her house. It is true that this witness has said that at the time of occurrence her husband was eating food at the house but she has also said that she was standing in the courtyard at that time. She has further said that in front of her house, there is the house of the appellant. 12. It is, thus, clear that P.Ws. 3 and 4 are the eye-witnesses of the occurrence and have proved the case of the prosecution. The testimony of P.W. 5 (Doctor) also corroborates the prosecution case. The first submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is, therefore, liable to be rejected. 13. As regards the second submission, it may be mentioned that both the P.Ws. 3 and 4 are directly related to the deceased. P.W. 3 is mother whereas P.W. 4 is his sister-in-law. It is well settled that the testimony of the interested witness should be examined with caution and care. But that does not mean that conviction cannot be recorded on his testimony in the absence of any other witness corroborating it. Corroboration of the testimony of the witness who is related to the deceased, being a rule of caution, is most desirable. But if the testimony of such a witness contains quality contents and inspires confidence, there will be no justification to reject the same. 14. In the instant case, these two witnesses are related to both the appellant and the deceased. The appellants father and the deceaseds father are the real brothers. Both the appellant and the deceased are, therefore, directly related to each other. It is not expected that witnesses who are related to both the accused and the deceased will falsely implicate the accused. That apart, as mentioned while dealing with the first submission, these witnesses have stood the test of cross-examination successfully and they have corroborated the substratum of the prosecution case. The second submission is also rejected. 15. It is not expected that witnesses who are related to both the accused and the deceased will falsely implicate the accused. That apart, as mentioned while dealing with the first submission, these witnesses have stood the test of cross-examination successfully and they have corroborated the substratum of the prosecution case. The second submission is also rejected. 15. The third submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is liable to be accepted to the extent that it is a case where the conviction should have been recorded under section 304 instead of 302. In this case, due to refusal by the appellant to help the deceased in bringing back his buffalo there was quarrel and exchange of hot words between them, due to which in the heat of passion, the appellant brought Tangi from his house and hit the appellant on the head causing serious injury which resulted in the death of the deceased. It is, thus, a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. But in the instant case, Part-I of 304 is applicable because the appellant has caused such injury to the deceased which was likely to cause death. From the postmortem report, it was apparent that incised wound of 2½" x 2" x 2" above left pivra was caused by the appellant with a Tangi cutting scalp, temporal bone, temporal log and brain and underlying blood vessels. When an accused attacked a person with Tangi hitting hard on the head, the intention to cause such injury as is likely to cause death can be inferred. 16. For the reasons given above, the conviction and sentence to life imprisonment under section 302 of the appellant is set aside and is substituted by the imprisonment of 10 years under section 304, Part-I. The appellant, who is in jail custody, is directed to be released forthwith, if he has completed 10 (ten) years imprisonment, if not wanted in any other case(s). 17. With the above modification in conviction and sentence, the appeal is dismissed. A.K.Prasad, J. 18 I agree.