Judgment 1. This writ petition has been filed, by Baidyanath Dham Prasadi Bikreta Sangh through its secretary and by about 21 other traders carrying on business in Baidyanath Dham challenging the prices of various items fixed by the authorities. 2. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order dated 17-7-1999 which is at Annexure-3 issued by the Sub-divisional Officer, Deoghar (respondent No. 2). By the said order, respondents concerned have fixed the prices of items, like, Pera, Chura and Elaichidana along with other items. By the said notification dated 17th July, 1999 prices of various other items have also been fixed, but in the instant writ petition the grievance has only been raised for fixation of prices of Pera, Chura and Elaichidana. Therefore, decision of this Court is confined only to the question of price. 3. From a perusal of Annexure-3 it appears that a meeting was held on 6th July, 1999 under the Chairmanship of the Sub-divisional Officer, in which local businessmen and their representatives have attended, and in that meeting prices of those commodities, both in retail and wholesale, have been fixed. It has also stated that the said price fixation will be continued only up to Sravani Mela. It has also stated that the prices as fixed should be displayed strictly and if the said prices are not followed then legal action will be taken against the concerned traders. 4. The grievances of the petitioners are that neither Pera nor Chura and Elaichidana are included in Schedule-I and II of the items prescribed in Clause (6) of the Bihar Essential Articles (Display of Price and Stock) Order, 1979 (hereinafter called the said order). As such the said order does not apply to such commodities. It has further been stated that the Sub-divisional officer has no role to play under the provisions of Essential Commodities Act, and also under the said order. As such he has no authority to fix the prices of the said commodities. As such the said order does not apply to such commodities. It has further been stated that the Sub-divisional officer has no role to play under the provisions of Essential Commodities Act, and also under the said order. As such he has no authority to fix the prices of the said commodities. It has also been stated that in the meeting which was held in the Chamber of the S.D.O. Deoghar on 6-7-1999 under the Chairmanship of the S.D.O. some of the shopkeepers objected for fixation of rate by the S.D.O. and presented before the S.D.O. a copy of the order of the Hon ble High Court passed in C.W.J.C. No. 6591 of 1997, but even then the S.D.O. fixed the prices of all the items like Pera, Chura and Elaichidana and directed the shopkeepers to comply with the said order. 5. The petitioners case is that the rate of the aforesaid commodities depend upon the rate of its different ingredients in the open market and it usually fluctuates for different reasons, and as such fixation of rate is wholly unreasonable. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the order of the Hon ble High Court dated 1-7-1998 rendered in C.W.J.C. No. 6591 of 1997 in support of their case that the respondent cannot fix the prices of food articles on the occasion of Sravani Mela. 7. Since this matter was heard at the admission stage finally, this Court directed the respondent to file affidavit and produce necessary notification by which the respondents are permitted to fix the prices of the said commodities. Pursuant to such direction affidavits in this case have been filed by the respondents. This Court also after considering the facts of this case added the Deputy Commissioner, Deoghar as respondent No. 3 to this writ petition. 8. In the counter-affidavit the stand which has been taken is that under the provisions of the said order concurrence of the Government of India has been obtained, and according to the said order the District Magistrate is competent to exclude or add any articles in Schedule-I or II of the said order. Accordingly, the articles in question has been added in Schedule-II of the order vide notification dated 28-6-1999. Accordingly, the articles in question has been added in Schedule-II of the order vide notification dated 28-6-1999. It has been stated further that the items like Chura, Pera and Elaichidana have been included in Schedule-II of the said order by the Deputy Commissioner, Deoghar vide his order circulated vide Memo No. 1108/Conf. (S) dated 28-6-1999. It has been further stated that in exercise of power conferred under Clause 2 (A) of the said order was notified on 30-4-1986 by the Bihar Government vide notification No. G.S.R.-11 dated 30th April, 1986, and the Commissioner and the District Magistrate were authorised, if it is satisfied that there is any apprehension of malpractice by the dealer, to add to or exclude any item from time to time by general or special order in this regard, from such schedule. 9. Attention of this Court has been drawn to the definition of the said article as notified by the Government. The said definition is set out below :- 10. Definitions :- (a) "Article" means any essential commodity mentioned in Schedules I and II appended to this order and includes any other article to be declared so from time to time by the State Government or the Commissioner or the District Magistrate empowered by the State Government in this behalf.Provided that if the Commissioner or the District Magistrate is satisfied that there is no shortage, boarding, profiteering or blackmarketing in any article mentioned in Schedules I and II or for which there is no apprehension of malpractices by the dealers he may, from time to time, by a general or special order, in this behalf, exclude from or add to any item in the said Schedules. 10 Learned counsel for the respondent submits that in view of the aforesaid authorisation, the Deputy Commissioner, Deoghar has included the items like Pera, Chura and Elaichidana as items under the said Order of 1977, and made it clear that such addition would remain effective from 29-7-1999 to 26-8-1999. The further case of the respondent is that the said items have been added by the notification dated 28-6-1999, and by the said notification the Deputy Commissioner, Deoghar authorised the Sub-divisional officer, Deoghar to fix the prices of the items like Pera, Chura and Elaichidana to check the black marketing in those articles during Sravani Mela. The further case of the respondent is that the said items have been added by the notification dated 28-6-1999, and by the said notification the Deputy Commissioner, Deoghar authorised the Sub-divisional officer, Deoghar to fix the prices of the items like Pera, Chura and Elaichidana to check the black marketing in those articles during Sravani Mela. It has further been stated that before fixation of prices a meeting was called of different sellers of those items and the meeting was held on 6-7-1999, and 7-7-1999 and the prices of Pera, Chura, Elaichidana and other food items were fixed on the basis of agreement of the sellers for the limited period as mentioned above. 11. In view of the aforesaid rival contentions of the parties the following points which have been urged by the petitioner fall for consideration of this Court :(1) The said order, namely, Bihar Essential Articles Display of Price and Stock Order, 1977 has not been framed with prior concurrence of the Central Government, and as such under the said order no direction can be given for fixation of prices of any essential commodities.(2) The items Pera, Chura and Elaichidana have not been included in Schedule-II of the said order as it was originally framed, and the Deputy Commissioner, Deoghar is not empowered to add those items to the Schedules of the said order.(3) Even if it is assumed that the Deputy Commissioner is empowered to add those items in Schedule-II to the said order, the Deputy Commissioner does so as a delegated authority. In this case, the Deputy Commissioner has not fixed price of those items, but he has delegated his power in favour of the S.D.O. to fix such prices. A delegated authority cannot further delegate his power. Therefore, fixation of price by the S.D.O. of those articles is bad.(4) Under the said order the obligation on the dealer is only to display the list of price, and there is no power given to authorities to fix the price having regard to the definition of price give in Clause (2) (d) of the said order. 12. Therefore, fixation of price by the S.D.O. of those articles is bad.(4) Under the said order the obligation on the dealer is only to display the list of price, and there is no power given to authorities to fix the price having regard to the definition of price give in Clause (2) (d) of the said order. 12. This Court deals with all these points separately :- Point No. 1 :- This point is basically without any substance, in as much as, from the preamble of the said order it is made clear from G.S.R. dated 30th April, 1986 that prior concurrence of the Government of India, Ministry of Civil Supplies and Co-operation was received vide Letter No. F-20 (10)/77-E.C.R. dated 20th September, 1977.In view of the aforesaid notification contention of the petitioner that the concurrence of the Central Government was not obtained before promulgation of the said order, cannot be accepted by this Court.It is well settled that these orders are made by the State Government in exercise of delegation of power under Sec. 5 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 . The Central Government has delegated its power conferred on it under Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 3 in respect of matters specified in Clause (c) of sub-sec. (2) of the said Act. 13 The relevant G.S.R. 906 dated - 9th June, 1966 is set out below :- G.S.R. 906, dated the 9th June, 1966 :- In exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 5 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955) the Central Government hereby directs :- (a) that the powers conferred on it by Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the said Act to make orders to provide for the matters specified in Clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (ii) and (j), of Sub-sec. (2) thereof, (in relation to foodstuffs and for matters specified in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the said Act to make orders to provide for the matters specified in Clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (ii) and (j), of Sub-sec. (2) thereof, (in relation to foodstuffs and for matters specified in sub-sec. (3-B) thereof (in relation to foodgrains) to be exercisable also by a State Government subject to the condition :-(1) that the powers shall be exercised by a State Government subject to such directions, if any, as may be issued by the Central Government in this behalf; and(2) that before making an order relating to any matter specified in the said Clauses (a) and (c) or in regard to regulation of transport of any foodstuffs under the said Clause (d) or relating to the matter specified in Sub-sec. (3-B) in relation to foodgrains, the State Government shall also obtain the prior concurrence of the Central Government. 14 The order relating to fixation of price of the foodgrain has been framed in view of the aforesaid delegation of power made by the Central Government in favour of the State Government. Therefore, reading those two notifications together, namely, G.S.R. 906 dated 9th June, 1966 and G.S.R. 11 dated 30th April, 1986, it cannot be said that the said order has been framed without concurrence of the Central Government. Therefore this point is overruled.Point No. 2 : The objection of thepetitioner that the addition of articles like Pera, Chura and Elaichidana by the Deputy Commissioner is not permissible is also not sustainable in view of the Clause-2A of the said order. The said clause specifically authorised, if the District Magistrate is satisfied about profiteering and blackmarketing in respect of any articles he has powers of both for exclusion from and addition of any article to the said Schedule. 15. The articles in question being all food items the addition of those articles by the Deputy Commissioner who is the District Magistrate under the Act by notification dated 28-6-1999 is wholly in accordance with law.Point No. 3 : The argument that the District Magistrate being a delegated authority cannot further delegate his power is also without any substance. It is obvious that when the order is made on the basis of delegated authority under Sec. 5 of the Act, such order is virtually an order passed under the said Act, and is not independent of the said Act. It is obvious that when the order is made on the basis of delegated authority under Sec. 5 of the Act, such order is virtually an order passed under the said Act, and is not independent of the said Act. Therefore, the definition of Collector which is given under the said Act would also be applicable to the Collector under the said order. The definition of Collector given in Sec. 2 (iia) of the said Act is as follows :"Collector" includes an Additional Collector and such other officer not below the rank of Sub-divisional Officer, as may be authorised by the Collector to perform the functions and exercise the power of the Collector under this Act." 16. In view of the said definition the Sub-divisional Officer can be authorised by the Collector to perform the function and exercise the powers of as Collector under the said Act. So there is no substance in the third point.Point No. 4 :- While developing this point reliance has been placed on the definition of the price under the said Order. The definition of the price under Clause 2 (d) of the said order is set out below :- "Price" in relation to an article means the amount of money for which the dealer sells or parts with, agrees to sell or part with, offers to sell or to part with any article and includes sales tax and other tax and other taxes, if any. 17 Relying on the said definition it has been contended that the Collector has no jurisdiction to fix the price in as much as price is defined as an amount of money at which the dealer or seller agrees to sell any article. This objection is also not sustainable for the reasons given below :- (a) Under Clause 3 (c) of the said order, it has been provided that list of price of any article mentioned in Schedule-II means a price which has been specified from time to time by the Commissioner or the District Magistrate as the case may be. Therefore, from the said Clause 3 (c) of the said Act, it is clear that the said order pre-supposes the distinct possibility of price being fixed or specified from time to time by the Commissioner or the District Magistrate. Therefore, from the said Clause 3 (c) of the said Act, it is clear that the said order pre-supposes the distinct possibility of price being fixed or specified from time to time by the Commissioner or the District Magistrate. 18 Apart from that from the facts of this case it is clear that in the instant case prices were fixed by the S.D.O. in a meeting of the business man called for the said purpose where the business man have agreed to the prices of various commodities fixed for the time being. From the disclosure which is made in the counter-affidavit it appears that the prices were fixed for a limited period between 27th September, 1999 to 26th August, 1999 of various commodities and the prices fixed are reasonable and not meagre or insufficient. The S. D. O., has fixed Rs. 90.00 for one K.G. of good quality pera, Rs. 80.00 for one K.G. of medium quality of pera, and Rs. 60.00 for one K.G. for ordinary quality of pera. Sofar, Elaichidana is concerned, it was fixed at Rs. 20.00 for one K.G. and Chura was fixed at Rs. 16.00 for one K.G. 19. In view of the aforesaid fact, this Court cannot come to the conclusion that any unreasonable price has been fixed, and the aforesaid prices was fixed only for the limited period during Shrabani mela when lakhs of devotees go to Baidyanathdham and offer those items as Prasad. So unless the price is fixed, there is every possibility of blackmarketing and creation of artificial scarcity of those items in the market. Therefore price has been fixed in public interest. 20. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Chamri Ram V/s. The State of Bihar, 1980 BBCJ (HC) 189. In the said case, the learned Judges of the Division Bench came to the conclusion, while interpreting the provisions of this order, that it is meaningless to ask the dealer to display the list of price of any article, if it is not for the purpose of controlling the prices or rates of those commodities. It has been held in Chamri Ram (supra) that a purchaser can force a dealer to sell the article to him at the price mentioned in the list (See Para 6, Page 191 of the report). 21. It has been held in Chamri Ram (supra) that a purchaser can force a dealer to sell the article to him at the price mentioned in the list (See Para 6, Page 191 of the report). 21. Therefore, on a harmonious construction the provisions of the said order it is clear that under the said order, power is given to the appropriate authority to fix the prices of the commodities and this is the ratio in the case of Chamri Ram (supra) and with which this Court is in respectful agreement. 22. In support of fourth point, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a Division Bench judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of State of M.P. V/s. Chain Karan, reported in 1974 Cri LJ 1110. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Chamri Ram, (1980 BBCJ (HC) 189) (supra) has, in para 5 of the judgment, differed with the view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court. Sitting singly I also endorse the same view taken by the Division Bench. Apart from that, it appears that the order which was considered by the Madhya Pradesh High Court did not have a clause like 3 (c) as in the present order, which is considered by this Court in this judgment. Therefore, tenor of the order considered by the Madhya Pradesh High Court is different. As such, the proposition decided by the Madhya Pradesh High Court cannot be made applicable in the facts of this case. Apart from that the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has already been differed from by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Chamri Ram (supra) as stated above. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon a decision of the Division Bench of Kerala High Court in the case of A. K. Abdullah V/s. State of Kerala, reported in AIR 1973 Kerala 242. The point which came for consideration in the Kerala judgment is whether the control order relating to Kerala Cycle, Tyre and Tube declared in the Maintenance of Stock Order, 1966 and Clause 4 thereof is invalid or not. 24. The point which came for consideration in the Kerala judgment is whether the control order relating to Kerala Cycle, Tyre and Tube declared in the Maintenance of Stock Order, 1966 and Clause 4 thereof is invalid or not. 24. The learned judges of the Division Bench came to the conclusion that Clause (4) of the said Act, has the effect of controlling the prices and the commodities, but the said order was framed without any delegation by the Central Government of the power under Sec. 3 (2) (c) of the Act in favour of the State Government. As such Clause 4 of the said order which has affect of controlling the prices is bad. Here those points are not in issue. As pointed out above, there is valid concurrence of the Central Government in favour of the State Government under Sec. 3 (2) (c) of the said Act. 25. Another judgment on which reliance has been placed is the single Bench decision of Calcutta High Court in the case of Sambhua Nath Ghosal V/s. State of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1966 Cal 577 . In that judgment, the learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court held that the Additional District Magistrate cannot exercise power of the District Magistrate. The said judgment is of the year, 1966, and do not have occasion to consider the subsequent definition of the Collector under Sec. 2 (iia) of the said Act. The said amendment was brought about by the Act 76 of 1992, and as such the ratio in the decision of the Calcutta High Court is of no relevance in the context of the changed definition of the Collector under the Essential Commodities Act, as noted above. 26. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds that the contentions of the petitioner in this case cannot be accepted. 27. It may be noted here that in the instant case even though validity of the impugned order has come to an end, but the matter was argued at length by the learned counsel for the parties, and the learned counsel for the parties wanted a decision on the points raised by them, in view of the fact that each year during the Srabani Mela this question may crop up, and as such the parties are wanted to know the legal position. In that view of the matter, this Court has heard the parties at length and delivered this judgment deciding the points urged by the parties. 28. So far as unreported judgment of the Learned Judge is concerned, this Court finds that before the learned Single Judge the matter was not considered at length, and the learned counsel appearing for the notified area committee was not been able to show anything despite opportunities to explain how the Sub-divisional Officer is empowered to pass order fixing the prices of food articles under the said order of 1977. Therefore, in absence of any assistance by the respondent, and without any affidavit being filed by them, the learned Judge was not properly assisted in passing the order. In fact, the points which are urged before this Court in this case were neither urged nor decided in the said decision dated-1st July, 1998. Therefore, the same cannot be cited as a precedent in the instant case. 29. Therefore, considering this matter in all its angles, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the order challenging in this writ petition. This writ petition therefore fails, and is dismissed. All interim orders are vacated.Petition dismissed.