ORDER: The petitioner has filed the above writ petition praying to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records of the second respondent in its order No.OCA/MDS/2071/79, dated 31.10.1991 and the order of the first respondent dated 8.5.1992 in F.P.A.No.29/MAD/ 91 and quash the said proceedings and consequently forbear the respondents from forfeinting the property belonging to the petitioner in pursuance of the said orders and pass such other or further orders as the court deems fit and proper. 2. 2. The petitioner would reveal her case in the lengthy affidavit filed in support of her petitioner to the effect that she got married with Sri.A.B.Shanmugham in the year 1969; that in the year 1973, she acquired a house property at Kumbakonam for a valid consideration of Rs.32,536; that in order to establish the source of the said acquisition, she filed Income-tax returns for the assessment years 1973-74 and 1974-75 indicating that during those relevant years, her income was Rs.32,936 i.e., Rs.14,936 for the year 1973-74 and Rs.10,000 for the year 1974-75 with a possible savings of Rs.8,000; that the Income-tax Officer at Kumbakonam had passed an order on 27.1.1977 holding that the investments in respect of the purchase of the house property at Kumbakonam had come from the monies of Sri V.P.Ranganathan, father of the petitioner and as a protective measure included the name of the petitioner’s husband Sri A.B.Shanmugham in his order G.I. No.893-S, dated 27.1.1977; that on appeal, the said order was confirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner; that apart from this, the Income-tax Officer had also included a sum of Rs.24,179 under the heading ‘other sources’ in the hands of the petitioner’s husband Sri A.B.Shanmugham, which was also confirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in the appeal; that the Income-tax Officer also made an assessment under protective measure for the assessment year 1974-75 holding that the said sum of Rs.24,179 is also assessable in the hands of the petitioner; that the proceedings were initiated against the said order resorting to protective measure assessment and ultimately it was cancelled; that accordingly, the petitioner was declared not assessable in respect of the said income for the year 1974-75, thus, from the orders of the assessment, the house purchased at Kumbakonam was from the sources provided by the husband of the petitioner, in view of the cancellation of the protective order of the assessment by the Income-tax Officer, Kumbakonam in January, 1988. 3. 3. The further case of the petitioner, as set out in the affidavit, is that while such being the state of affairs, she was shocked to receive a notice from the second respondent under Sec.6(1) of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (hereinafter called ‘SAFEMA’) on 3.11.1979, the reason assigned for issuance of the said notice was that the petitioner was the daughter of Sri V.P.Ranganathan and that the petitioner’s father’s brother Sri V.P.Selvaraj was convicted under the Sea Customs Act for an offence in respect of the goods, whose value had exceeded Rs.1,00,000 i.e., the smuggled gold of Rs.2,76,000 and in view of the conviction of the petitioner’s paternal uncle, she was a person within the meaning of Sub-clause (vii) of Explanation 2 to Sec.2(2)(a) of the SAFEMA; that the petitioner would not even be remotely connected with any of the illegal activities of her paternal uncle. 4. 4. The petitioner would further quote the Sec.3(1)(c) of the SAFEMA wherein the illegality acquired properties have been defined in relation to any person and would contend that in order for being an illegally acquired property, the four conditions mentioned in the said Section have to be satisfied according to which, essentially, a property should have been illegally acquired for which no source could be shown or proved or could be traced or should have been acquired through an activity prohibited, so as to attract action under the said Act; that none of the conditions or criteria as laid down under the said Section of the Act could be applied to the case of the petitioner since there is sufficient evidence that the property was acquired through the funds of the petitioner’s husband and that of her own funds during the assessment years 1973-74 and 1974-75; that in the reply to the show-cause notice issued by the second respondent, the petitioner has detailed the sources of the purchase money; that in the order passed by the second respondent, he has accepted the reasoning given by the petitioner that the funds for the acquisition of the said property emanated from her husband and herself, taking into consideration the evidence produced by the petitioner; that the Income-tax Assessment Orders, as confirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on appeal have also been duly considered by the second respondent but, however, he disbelieved the case of the petitioner only in respect of the receipt of Rs.5,000 from her mother-in-law and held that the said sum was not properly explained by contemporaneous, reliable and conclusive evidence treating the said amount as unexplained and arising from illegal activities, but, however, inasmuch as the investment of the property is less than 50% of the cost of the property, he gave option to the petitioner to pay a fine equivalent to 120% of unexplained portion of the investment amounting to Rs.5,000 i.e., at Rs.6,000 and in case of default, ordered for forfeiture of the property, by his order in O.C.A. M.D.S.2071/79, dated 27.2.1991. 5. 5. The further case of the petitioner is that aggrieved against the said order of the second respondent, holding that Rs.5,000 had emanated from illegal sources, since rendered without evidence, the petitioner filed an appeal to the first respondent and the first respondent by his order in F.P.A.No.22/Mad/91, dated 19.7.1991 allowed the appeal filed by the petitioner in respect of the finding regarding illegitimately of sources of income pertaining to Rs.7,500 and also held that the second respondent had recorded abrupt findings without verifying it, indicating non-application of mind and remanded the matter to the competent authority to decide the matter afresh by passing speaking order with an opportunity to the appellant. 6. The further case of the petitioner is that only a limited question should have been considered afresh by the authorities on remand with regard to the fact whether the second respondent was right in earlier finding that the sum of Rs.5,000 had emanated from illegal activities and was justified in ordering forfeiture of the property in the event of failure to pay the fine ordered, but the second respondent had proceeded to consider the entire mater afresh and passed an order in OCA/MDS/2071/79, dated 31.10.1991 holding that the entire property was acquired illegally within the meaning of Sec.3(1)(c) of the SAFEMA and ordered forfeiture of the property of the petitioner free from all encumbrances; that aggrieved the petitioner again filed an appeal in F.P.A.No.29/Madras/91 on various grounds, but the first respondent, without considering the scope of its own earlier order pertaining to remand order on limited grounds, confirmed the order of the second respondent, by his order dated 8.5.1992. It is only aggrieved against the said order of the second respondent made in F.P.A.No.29/Madras/91, dated 8.5.1992, the petitioner has filed this writ petition on certain grounds as brought forth in her affidavit, filed in support of the writ petition. 7. It is only aggrieved against the said order of the second respondent made in F.P.A.No.29/Madras/91, dated 8.5.1992, the petitioner has filed this writ petition on certain grounds as brought forth in her affidavit, filed in support of the writ petition. 7. During arguments, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that the writ petition is filed challenging the order of the first respondent; that the petitioner is a married woman and she acquired a house property at Kumbakonam for a valid consideration of Rs.32,536 on 30.3.1973; that she filed Income-tax returns, according to which, during the year 1973-74, she had a net income of Rs.14,936 and during the year 1974-75, the same is Rs.10,000; that her husband is another assessee and for the assessment year 1974-75, the Income-tax Officer had included a sum of Rs.24,179 under the heading ‘other sources’ in the hands of the petitioner’s husband. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner would further contend that the petitioner’s paternal uncle viz., V.P.Selvaraj is alleged to have been convicted of the Sea Customs Act and connecting the petitioner with the said offence of her paternal uncle, a show-cause notice dated 3.11.1979 had been issued to her under Sec.3(1)(c) of the SAFEMA calling upon her to explain as to why her property should not be confiscated under the said provision of the Act; that admittedly, the petitioner purchased house property on 30.3.1973 and the said show-cause notice was issued in the year 1979 i.e., on 3.11.1979; that the assessment of the income of the petitioner for the year 1973-74 includes her husband’s income of Rs.24,000 also and under pretext that she could not satisfactorily explain the source of purchase money the competent authority concluded that ‘out of the total investment of Rs.32,536, a sum of Rs.27,536 is treated as emanating from the sources constituting legal activities and a sum of Rs.5,000 as treated as unexplained arising from illegal activities’, thereby ultimately treated the property as illegally acquired property within the meaning of Sec.3(1)(c) of the SAFEMA and ordered for forfeiture free from all encumbrances and that however, the competent authority gave the option in terms of Sec.9(2) of the SAFEMA to Pay the fine equivalent to 120% i.e., at Rs.6,000 in lieu of the forfeiture. 9. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner would then focus his attention on the order passed by the second respondent in OCA/MDS/2071/79, dated 27.2.1991 wherein he disbelieved the case of the petitioner only in respect of the receipt of Rs.5,000 from her mother-in-law and held that the said sum was not properly explained and hence arising from illegal activities, but, however, inasmuch as the investment of the property is less than 50% of the cost of the property, he gave option to the petitioner to pay a fine equivalent to 120% of unexplained portion of the investment amounting to Rs.5,000 i.e., at Rs.6,000 and in case of default, ordered for forfeiture of the property and on appeal, the first respondent held that the second respondent had recorded abrupt findings and remanded the matter afresh by passing speaking order and also, accusing the competent authority on ground on non-application of mind. It is amazing to note that the same competent authority, after remand, would arrive at a different conclusion on one and the same points decided earlier by him, concluding that the entire investment in the property to the extent of Rs.32,536 has been illegally acquired and the same again on appeal came to be confirmed by the appellate tribunal by its order dated 8.5.1992. The learned counsel for the petitioner would further contend that the competent authority and the appellate tribunal, who twice dealt with one and the same subject matter, have both passed quite different orders thus exhibiting their hypothetical application of mind without being able to arrive at a stand and uniform decision, which itself would go to show that the orders passed by both the authorities are not with any legal conviction or standard or appreciation but as time servers and would urge the court to quash the same. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner would cite a judgment of the appellate tribunal for forfeited property delivered in Kamal Narain Kapoor and others v. Competent Authority, 214 I.T.R. 33, wherein it has been held: "...it was not the intention of the Legislature while enacting the 1976 Act that properties of relatives or associates, without being traced to the convict or detenu, were also liable to be forfeited." 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner would cite another judgment of the appellate tribunal for forfeited property delivered in V.I.Abdul Majeed v. Competent Authority, 214 I.T.R. 101, wherein it is held: "In order to make a person liable to be proceeded against under the 1976 Act all properties sought to be forfeited ought to be traceable or relatable to the detenu or convict: each and every property in the name of such relative or associate, even though illegally acquired by such "relative" or "associate" is not liable to be forfeited, unless a nexus was established between the said property and the detenu or convict, or it was shown that the source of funds for the acquisition of the property in question had come from such detenu or convict." 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner would cite yet another judgment of the same Tribunal delivered in Viyas Chand v. Competent Authority, 181 I.T.R. 463, wherein it is held: "The competent authority has thus taken a very myopic view of the business affairs of the appellant by entirely attributing them to Rs.5,000 initially invested and forfeit whatever the appellant has established himself by diat or his perseverance, goodwill, enterprise and acumen, covering a period of almost twenty years." 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner would rely on another judgment of the tribunal delivered in Ram Sah v. Competent Authority, Calcutta, 188 I.T.R. 82, wherein it is held: "The statement of the appellant that the land in question was inherited by him had either to be believed or not to be believed as a whole. If the party in whose name the land stood was the appellant’s forefather, then the appellant acquired it by inheritance. If the recorded owner was a stranger, the competent authority had no jurisdiction to forfeit the property in the appellant’s hands as it belonged to a stranger. The finding of the competent authority on this item could not be sustained.“ 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner would then cite a judgment of this Court delivered in S.Hastimal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, 49 I.T.R. 120, wherein it is held: "After the lapse of a decade, an assessee should not be placed upon the rack and called upon to explain not merely the origin and source of a capital contribution but the origin of origin and source of source as well. The difficulty on the part of any assessee to explain a transaction which took place before a decade has to be borne in mind by the department and should under no circumstances be under estimated or taken advantage of by them." Citing the above judgments, the learned counsel for the petitioner would end up his argument praying to quash the impugned order. 15. On the part of the respondents, neither the respondents nor their counsel appeared before the court to argue their case in spite of the above matter having been posted on many occasions and hence the above matter has to be decided with the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner heard and on perusal of the available records and in the context of the position of law. 16.At the outset it is relevant to extract the relevant sections of the Act, with which the subject matter is concerned Sec.2 of the SAFEMA reads: “2. Application: (1) The provisions of this Act shall apply only to the persons specified in Sub-sec.(2). (2) The persons referred to in Sub-sec.(1) are the following, namely: (a) every person- (i) who has been convicted under the Sea Customs Act, 1878, or the Customs Act, 1962, of an offence in relation to goods of a value exceeding one lakh of rupees; (ii) to (iv):... (b)... (c) every person who is a relative of a person referred to in clause (a) or (b) (d) and (e).... Explanation 1:... (b)... (c) every person who is a relative of a person referred to in clause (a) or (b) (d) and (e).... Explanation 1:... Explanation 2: For the purposes of clause (c),”relative“, in relation to a person, means- (i) spouse of the person, (ii) brother or sister of the person; (iii) brother or sister of the spouse of the person; (iv) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the person; (v) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the spouse of the person; (vi) spouse of a person referred to in clause (ii), Clause (iii), Clause (iv)or clause (v); (vii) any lineal descendant of a person referred to in clause (ii) or clause (iii).” Sec.3(1)(c) of the SAFEMA reads: “illegally acquired property”, in relation to any person to whom this Act applies, means- (i) any property acquired by such person whether before or after the commencement of this Act, wholly or partly out of or by means of any income, earnings or assets derived or obtained from or attributable to any activity prohibited by or under any law for the time being in force relating to any matter in respect of which Parliament has power to make laws; or (ii) any property acquired by such person, whether, before or after the commencement of this Act, wholly or partly out of or by means of any income, earnings or assets in respect of which any such law has been contravened; or (iii) any property acquired by such person, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, wholly or partly out of or by means of any income, earnings or assets the source of which cannot be proved and which cannot be shown to be attributable to any act or thing done in respect of any matter in relation to which Parliament has no power to make laws; or (iv) any property acquired by such person, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, for a consideration, or by any means wholly or partly traceable to any property referred to in Sub-clauses (i) to (iii) or the income or earnings from such property; and includes- (A) any property held by such person which would have been, in relation to any previous holder thereof, illegally acquired property under this clause if such previous holder had not ceased to hold it, unless such person or any other person who held the property at any time after such previous holder or, where there are two or more such previous holders, the last of such previous holders is or was a transferee in good faith for adequate consideration; (B) any property acquired by such person, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, for a consideration, or by any means, wholly or partly traceable to any property falling under item (A), or the income or earnings therefrom." 17. The property sought to be confiscated is one which had been purchased by the petitioner on 30.3.1973 and the competent authority issued show-cause notice on 3.11.1979, which is the first proceeding initiated against the petitioner, thereby calling upon the petitioner to explain within 35 days, the sources of income, earnings or assets, out of which, she acquired the property. It is relevant to note that even in this notice, the source of information was not been disclosed by the competent authority. 18. In assessing the case in short oh facts and circumstances, it comes to be known that the petitioner, a lady, got married with one A.B. Shanmugam in the year 1969 and in the year 1973, she acquired a house property at Kumbakonam for a valid consideration of Rs.32,536; that she had been assessed to income-tax for the assessment years 1973-74 and 1974-75 at Rs.14,936 and Rs.10,000 respectively with the possible savings of Rs.8,000 that the Income-tax Officer, Kumbakonam passed an order on 27.1.1977 holding that her investments in respect of the purchase of the said house property had come from her father and on appeal the said order was confirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. 19. While so, much to her shock and surprise, she was served with a notice under Sec.6(1) of the SAFEMA, dated 3.11.1979 as per the proceedings of the second respondent in OCA/ MDS/2071/79 calling upon her to indicate to him within 35 days of the service of the said notice, the sources of her income, the earnings or assets by means of which she acquired the said house property with such evidence, information and particulars and show-cause why the same should not be declared to be illegally acquired and forfeited to the Central Government under the said Act, for which in spite of her explanation offered as per her reply dated 9.2.1980, the second respondent/competent authority held, disbelieving the case of the petitioner only in respect of Rs.5,000 said to have been received from her mother-in-law since the said sum was not properly explained and giving option to the petitioner to pay fine equivalent to 120% of the unexplained portion of the investment and in default to forfeit the property, as per his proceedings in OCA/MDS/2071/79, dated 27.2.1991. 20. 20. The reason for instituting the proceeding against the petitioner is attributed to the conviction of one V.P.Selvaraj under the Sea Customs Act, said to be the brother of the father of the petitioner viz., V.P.Ranganathan for an offence relating to goods of the value exceeding Rs.1,00,000 thus, branding the petitioner as a ‘person’ falling within the meaning of Subclause (vii) of Explanation 2 to Sec.2 of the SAFEMA. 21. On an appeal preferred by the petitioner and her husband A.B.Shanmugam challenging the validity of the order passed by the competent authority in so far treating a sum of Rs.5,000 from out of the purchase money regarding the purchase of the house property as unexplained and arising from illegal activities and declaring the said property as illegally acquired property within the meaning of Sec.3(1)(c) of the SAFEMA and ordering forfeiture of the same option in terms of Sec.9(2) to pay a fine of Rs.6,000 the appellate authority having discussed the factual position of the case and the order of the competent authority and questioning the validity of the competent authority, treating the source to the extent of Rs.27,536 to be legitimate and treating only the rest of the amount of Rs.5,000 as not proved and pointing out that even according to the calculations of the competent authority, it is not Rs.5,000 but Rs.7,000 which is not proved and commenting that at the best he could have held only an amount of Rs.25,036 had emanated from the legal sources held the order of the competent authority as obviously incorrect and self-contradictory. The appellate authority further held that the competent authority had recorded abrupt finding without assigning proper reasons and branding the order as a non-speaking one and further remarking that the ‘appellant is therefore justified in making grievances against the order’ would allow the appeal setting aside the order of the competent authority and remanding the case for fresh disposal. 22. The competent authority, again dealing with the same subject, remarking that ‘the petitioner was not bothered about furnishing the statements given before the income-tax authorities while claiming that income-tax assessment had been made on that basis, which itself had not been proved’ and further remarking that ‘social status etc. 22. The competent authority, again dealing with the same subject, remarking that ‘the petitioner was not bothered about furnishing the statements given before the income-tax authorities while claiming that income-tax assessment had been made on that basis, which itself had not been proved’ and further remarking that ‘social status etc. has absolutely no relevance’ and not accepting anything for which the books of accounts were not maintained and that she has failed in proving that there is no taint of illegality, would ultimately concluded that the affected person did not have any legal source of income to acquire the said property thus branding the entire amount of Rs.32,936 had come from sources other than legal and would order forfeiture of the property. Again, on an appeal preferred by the petitioner and her husband, the same appellate tribunal sitting on judgment of the said appeal, remarking that the competent authority has rightly held that the affected person could not be treated to have discharged the burden of proving the legal sources of investment and her case is unsupported by any evidence to show that any part of income was available as evidence for the purpose of the investment in the house property, would ultimately decide treating the entire investment in the property as unexplained and therefore should be treated illegally acquired property within the meaning of Sec.3(1)(c) of the SAFEMA besides pointing out a glaring discrepancy regarding the description of the forfeited property between the notice issued under Sec.6(1) of the SAFEMA and the order of the competent authority dated 31.11.1991 and suggesting necessary rectification to be made. 23. In the above circumstances, the petitioner has come forward to file this writ petition praying to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records comprised in both the orders of the first and second respondents and quash the said proceedings since according to the petitioner, the impugned orders of the first and second respondents are clearly contrary to the provisions of the SAFEMA, contrary to the settled principles of law besides suffering from failure of relevant considerations and hence violative of principles of natural justice and fair play, contrary to their own findings, arbitrary and unreasonable. 24. 24. So far as the orders passed by each of the respondents twice are concerned, it is the second respondent, who initiated the proceeding against the petitioner as per his proceeding in OCA/MDS/2071/79, dated 3.11.1979 with the show-cause notice not only treating her as the ‘affected person’ within the meaning of Subclause (vii)of Explanation 2 to Sec.2(2)(a) of the SAFEMA but also branding the property purchased by the petitioner as acquired out of undisclosed sources of funds and an illegally acquired property under Sec.3(1)(c)(iii) of the SAFEMA and issuing notice under Sec.6(1) of the SAFEMA. Hence, at the outset itself, it could be safely concluded that the competent authority, who initiated the proceedings with the show-cause notice and as per para No.4 of the annexure to the notice, had pre-determined the petitioner to be the ‘affected person’ within the meaning of Sub-clause (vii) of Explanation 2 to Sec.2(2)(a) of the SAFEMA and the property to be ‘illegally acquired property’ under Sec.3(1)(c)(iii) of the SAFEMA and then the show-cause notice has been issued. At this stage, it could be preliminarily held that even prior to issuing the show-cause notice, the competent authority had almost arrived at the conclusion that which is to be arrived at after due opportunity for the petitioner to be heard and therefore at this stage it could be said that the competent authority has adopted the policy of ‘play the game and frame the rules’. 25. As already found in the discussion held above, the competent authority, not being satisfied with the explanation offered on the part of the petitioner, had arrived at me conclusion treating the major portion of the investment i.e., Rs.27,536 from out of the total investment of Rs.32,536 as emanating from the sources constituting legitimate activities and only treating a meagre sum of Rs.5,000 as unexplained and arising from illegal activities and thereby concluding the acquisition of the said property to be illegal within the meaning of Sec.3(1)(c) of the SAFEMA and further giving option in terms of Sec.9(2) of the SAFEMA. 26. Aggrieved, when the petitioner and her husband preferred an appeal before the appellate tribunal, the said tribunal also has accepted the manner in which the conclusions have been arrived at by the competent authority but since the tribunal was not satisfied with the calculations of the competent authority. 26. Aggrieved, when the petitioner and her husband preferred an appeal before the appellate tribunal, the said tribunal also has accepted the manner in which the conclusions have been arrived at by the competent authority but since the tribunal was not satisfied with the calculations of the competent authority. Since according to his own finding, it is the amount of Rs.7,500 and not Rs.5,000 that should have been held not from legitimate sources and hence treating his finding as incorrect and self-contradictory besides branding the order a non-speaking one, had remanded the same to the competent authority thus allowing the said appeal and setting aside the order of the competent authority, as per the orders passed by the appellate tribunal in its proceeding in F.P.A.No.22/MAD/91 dated 19.7.1991. It is interesting to note that the subject having been remanded to the same competent authority, he would arrive at a different conclusion now, totally deviating from his own earlier conclusions arrived at, in spite of the scope of the appeal and the reason for remand being restricted only with the limited sphere in so far the competent authority has arrived at treating the whole purchase money of Rs.32,536 as emanated from illegal sources quite repugnant to his own earlier conclusions. 27. 27. It is still more agonizing to note that on an appeal preferred a second time by the petitioner and her husband with the appellate tribunal as against the order passed by the competent authority, the same appellate tribunal, which sought for the reasons from the competent authority in a speaking manner in respect of the manner in which the competent authority arrived at the figure of Rs.5,000 having not come from legal sources instead of Rs.5,000 having not come from illegal sources instead of Rs.7,500 that could alone be arrived at by the competent authority according to his own finding, now, differing from the reference of remand, appreciating the case in a different manner, would arrive at the conclusion to treat/the whole purchase money to have come out of illegal sources thus arriving at the conclusion to treat the entire purchase money to have emanated from illegal sources, without assigning any reason for differing from its own earlier stand of having accepted the case of the petitioner to the extent of the amount of Rs.25.036 having emanated from legal sources and thereby allowing the appeal setting aside the order of the competent authority further remanding the same for fresh disposal. 28. From all the above exercises by the competent authority and the appellate tribunal, it is patently revealed that both have disowned rather differed with their earlier conclusions and have arrived at different conclusions the second time, when the subject was dealt with by them thus differing from their own earlier reasons and conclusions there by revealing mat every time they deal with the same subject, they could arrive at different reasons and conclusions in a self-contradictory manner. It is upto the respondents to explain as to how the earlier conclusions arrived at respectively in their first order and the reasons assigned therein do not hold good or irregular or untenable or unacceptable, so as to accept their later versions and conclusions arrived at in their later versions in their subsequent orders. But, absolutely no explanation comes forth from the respondents. The respondents having differed with their own findings and conclusions, unless valid or tangible reasons are assigned for such major deviation to occur from their own earlier findings, their orders cannot either be held valid or sustainable in law. But, absolutely no explanation comes forth from the respondents. The respondents having differed with their own findings and conclusions, unless valid or tangible reasons are assigned for such major deviation to occur from their own earlier findings, their orders cannot either be held valid or sustainable in law. Hence, at this score itself, the orders passed by both the competent authority and the appellate tribunal become liable to be set aside. 29. While on facts and circumstances and appreciation of evidence, the orders passed by the respondents suffer such major set-backs as aforeseen, it is still if we look into the legal position regarding the very proceeding instituted by the competent authority invoking the relevant provisions of the SAFEMA. In order to hold the properties acquired by a person as ‘illegally acquired properties’ as per Sec.3(1)(c) of the SAFEMA, it is relevant to specify Sub-clause (vii) of Explanation 2 to Sec.2(2)(a) as shown in the show-cause notice. It comes to be known from the annexure to the show-cause notice that one V.P.Selvaraj, said to be the brother of V.P.Ranganathan who is the father of the petitioner, got convicted under the Sea Customs Act for an offence in relation to goods of the value exceeding Rs.1,00,000 and hence the petitioner came to be branded as the affected person’ by the competent authority, who issued the show-cause notice dated 3.11.1979. It is further relevant to note here that the property had been purchased in the year 1973 and exactly after six years, the notice had been served on the petitioner and no one knows whether the so-called paternal uncle of the petitioner V.P.Selvaraj had been convicted prior to the purchase of the property in question by the petitioner, so as to suspect the genuineness of the purchase of the petitioner or whether just prior to issuing the show-cause notice and after the purchase of the property. Nothing is made known till date by whatever means by the respondents and so far as this big question is concerned silence is the answer. 30. It is by virtue of Sub-clause (vii) of Explanation 2 to Sec.2(2)(a) of the SAFEMA. the competent authority gains jurisdiction over the petitioner not only connecting her with the said V.P.Selvaraj since according to them he is her paternal uncle but also treating the property purchased by the petitioner as illegally acquired under Sec.3(1)(c) of the SAFEMA. 30. It is by virtue of Sub-clause (vii) of Explanation 2 to Sec.2(2)(a) of the SAFEMA. the competent authority gains jurisdiction over the petitioner not only connecting her with the said V.P.Selvaraj since according to them he is her paternal uncle but also treating the property purchased by the petitioner as illegally acquired under Sec.3(1)(c) of the SAFEMA. The show-cause notice is specific to the effect that she is a person within the meaning of Sub-clause (vii) of Explanation 2 to Sec.2(2)(a) of the SAFEMA. 31. The main Sec.2 of the SAFEMA speaks about the ‘application’ of the SAFEMA providing by Sub-sec.(1) the provisions of the Act shall apply only to the persons specified in Sub-sec.(2) thereof: Sub-Sec(2) indicates the persons referred in Sub-sec.(1). The person specified in Sub-sec.(2)(a)(i) is "who has been convicted under the Sea Customs Act, 1878 of an offence in relation to goods of a value exceeding one lakh of rupees" and Sub-sec.(2) (c) provides "every person who is a relative of a person referred to in Clause (a) or Clause (b)" and the term "relative" in the context of the case is defined by Explanation 2 (vii) wherein it is defined that "for the purpose of Clause(c) "relative" in relation to a person means any lineal descendant of a person referred to in Clause (ii) or Clause (iii). Therefore, only those persons who are mentioned under Explanation 2(ii) and (iii) could be considered the relative of the convicted person. Clause (ii) denotes brother or sister of the person and clause (iii) denotes brother or sister of the spouse of the person." 32. From the above explanations, one could understand that those who are mentioned in Clause (ii) or (iii) of Explanation 2 to Sec.2(2) are considered to be the "relatives" of the convicted person. It is the case of the respondents that one V.P.Ranganathan is the brother of the convicted person thus falling under Explanation 2(ii) and that the petitioner is the lineal descendant of the said ‘relative’ of the convicted person viz., V.P.Ranganathan being his daughter thus bringing the petitioner within the purview of Explanation 2(vii) to Sec.2(2) of the SAFEMA. 33. It is the case of the respondents that one V.P.Ranganathan is the brother of the convicted person thus falling under Explanation 2(ii) and that the petitioner is the lineal descendant of the said ‘relative’ of the convicted person viz., V.P.Ranganathan being his daughter thus bringing the petitioner within the purview of Explanation 2(vii) to Sec.2(2) of the SAFEMA. 33. Though Sec.8 of the SAFEMA contemplates that in any proceeding under this Act, the burden of proving that the properties specified in the notice under Sec.6 is not illegally acquired properties shall be on the person affected, thus fixing the burden of proving that the property has not been illegally acquired on the petitioner so far as the case in hand is concerned, but still this burden contemplated by Sec.8 of the SAFEMA, as per the various decisions rendered by the Apex Court and the High Courts, is only confined to the property and not for the other facts of the case put up by the respondents. But, unless preliminarily it is established by the respondents with proof as to how the petitioner is brought under the purview of Sec.2(2)(a), Explanation 2(vii) the question of imposing the burden on the petitioner does not arise at all. Hence, preliminarily to establish that the petitioner is falling under the ‘application’ section of the Act is heavily on the respondents which fact unless positively proved, the further question of imposing the burden contemplated by Sec.8 of the SAFEMA on the petitioner does not arise at all. Excepting alleging that the petitioner is the daughter of one V.P.Ranganathan, who is the brother of one V.P.Selvaraj, who had been convicted for an offence under the Sea Customs Act, the respondents have not established it in any manner nor the least attempted to on the part of the respondents and these facts stand only as allegations without the iota of evidence or proof. There is no doubt that these allegations are subject to proof and the petitioner so far as these allegations are concerned, since presumed innocent, the burden to discharge the said innocence is paramountly on the respondents. There is no doubt that these allegations are subject to proof and the petitioner so far as these allegations are concerned, since presumed innocent, the burden to discharge the said innocence is paramountly on the respondents. However strong the suspicion against the petitioner is, unless every reasonable possibility of innocence has not been excluded regarding her relationship and nexus with the offence said to have been committed by the said V.P.Selvaraj, the respondents are not entitled to initiate proceedings against her and issue notice under Sec.6 of the SAFEMA. Whenever circumstances arise, they must be proved and not by themselves presumed. Therefore, if proof is lacking regarding these facts, the charge cannot be said to have been established. It is not only lacking in proof but absolutely no valid or tangible reason even assigned on the parts of the respondents to show as to how she becomes the lineal descendant of the convicted person, the burden of proof of which is undoubtedly on the respondents. So far as the case in hand is concerned, the respondents, in this regard, have drawn a blank. The respondents have committed grave errors in instituting the above proceeding against the petitioner and thereafter passing the orders, which are self-contradictory, irregular, inconsistent and wholly illegal. 34. Neither on facts nor in law either the proceedings instituted by the respondents against the petitioner or the orders passed by them as per their proceedings cited supra have been done legally and in the manner expected by law. With the institution of the said proceeding against the petitioner in a thoughtless manner, thereby placing the petitioner in unending mental agony and affiliation for over two decades, the respondents officials have not acted bona fide and in good faith and all the acts committed by all those officials connected to the respondents are hereby not only held unsustainable in law but also the manner in which the subject matter has been dealt with and the orders passed is wholly bereft of the norms established by law. The officers who dealt with the whole affair have act in an unbecoming and irresponsible manner. The officers who dealt with the whole affair have act in an unbecoming and irresponsible manner. Hence, it is decided to allow the writ petition with exemplary costs of Rs.10,000 to be paid by the respondent officials, who dealt with the subject matter right from issuing the notice under Sec.6 of the Act down to passing of the impugned order individually and severally to the petitioner. 35. In result, the above writ petition succeeds and the same is allowed. 36. An exemplary cost of Rs.10,000 (Rupees ten thousand only) is allowed that is to be paid from the personal funds of the respondents to the petitioner. 37. Consequently, W.M.RNo.11459 of 1992 is closed.