Judgment :- K. GOVINDARAJAN, J. In all these cases, the petitioner challenges the order of the second respondent dated October 22, 1999, rejecting its appeals for non-payment of the 25 per cent of the difference of tax assessed by the assessing authority, and the tax admitted by the petitioner-Corporation Ltd. In these cases, we are concerned with the assessment orders for the years 1986-87, 1987-88 and 1988-89, which have been passed on August 31, 1999 by the first respondent, after considering the petitioner's objection. Aggrieved by the said assessment orders, the petitioner filed appeals before the second respondent. The second respondent returned the papers mentioning that unless the petitioner pays the 25 per cent of the difference of tax assessed by the assessing authority, the Appeals could not be entertained. Hence, the petitioner has filed the above writ petitions, challenging the said return of papers by the second respondent/appellate authority. Prior to the amendment under the Act No. 14 of 1999, there is no such condition that the 25 per cent of the difference of tax assessed by the Assessing Authority, should be paid, as a precondition to entertain the Appeal. For the first time only under Act No. 1 of 1999, which came into effect on May 31, 1999, such a condition has been introduced by way of amendment. Now, the question is whether such amendment can be made applicable to the petitioner's case, and thereby whether the appellate authority can refuse to entertain the appeals for not complying with the conditions contemplated under the said amendment. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the said amendment has come into effect only from May 31, 1999, and even prior to the said amendment, show cause notices were issued and assessments were made, in one case and so the petitioner's case should be dealt with only on the basis of the provisions made before the amendment.It is not in dispute that show cause notices were issued for the purpose of assessment, prior to the amendment, which came into force on May 31, 1999. So, the lis had commenced, in so far as the petitioner is concerned. When the lis had commenced before the said amendment, the amended provision cannot be made applicable to such cases, unless such amendment is made retrospective expressly or by clear implication. So, the lis had commenced, in so far as the petitioner is concerned. When the lis had commenced before the said amendment, the amended provision cannot be made applicable to such cases, unless such amendment is made retrospective expressly or by clear implication. In these cases, it is not in dispute that the Act No. 14 of 1999 is not having any retrospective effect. So, the same cannot be made applicable to the petitioner's case. It is well-settled that the right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. Such a right exists a on and from the date the lis commences, even though the litigant exercised his right to file appeal against the order pronounced against him. The apex Court in Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Chowdhry formulated the principles, from the decisions in Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Ganpat Rai Hiralal v. Aggarwal Chamber of Commerce Ltd., R. M. Seshadri v. Province of Madras 1954 AIR(Mad) 543, In Re Reference under section 5, Court Fees Act 1955 AIR(Bom) 287 and in Sawaldas Madhavdas v. Arati Cotton Mills Ltd. 1955 AIR(Bom) 332, and has held as follows : "From the decisions cited above, the following principles clearly emerge : (i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. (ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit.(iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise".] Similarly, in Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur, the apex Court has held as follows : "That leaves over for consideration the question whether Hoosein Kasam Dada's case, should be applied. That also presents some difficulty to us. We have before us the petition which was made in the High Court, and we cannot allow that petition to be amended. That petition does not mention the dates on which the return was filed, so that we could apply the dictum of this Court in Hoosein Kasam Dada's case. Dr. Barlingay deduces the date of the filing of the return from the dates on the challans accompanying the payment of tax in the treasury, and argues that this was prior to the amendment. He contends that this is sufficient for the application of the principle in the said case. The decision in Hoosein Kasam Dada's case proceeded on the ground that when a lis commences, all rights get crystallised and no clog upon a likely appeal can be put, unless the law was made retrospective, expressly or by clear implication. From the record of this case, we cannot say when the lis commenced, and unless it can be proved conclusively that it was before the amendment of the law, the rule in Hoosein Kasam Dada's case cannot apply. There is no averment that a right of appeal had vested, and has been wrongly taken away." The Division Bench of this Court in yet another case proceeds that the moment the assessee filed his return, the assessment proceedings would commence. On that basis the amendment to the Act will not affect the assessee's right to file appeal which is vested right under the earlier Act. This position has been discussed and held in State of Madras v. Latheef Hameed & Co., observing as follows : "In our opinion, Madras Act 10 of 1963 makes a difference. Section 2 of this Act, as we said, substituted section 61 by a new section the effect of which is that the repeal of the 1939 Act shall not affect certain things including any right or privilege acquired or accrued. Section 2 of this Act, as we said, substituted section 61 by a new section the effect of which is that the repeal of the 1939 Act shall not affect certain things including any right or privilege acquired or accrued. The new section 61 further saves from the effect of the repeal any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right or privilege, and says : 'and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced ........ as if this Act had not been passed'. This section, therefore, clearly preserves the vested right of the assessee under the old Act to file an appeal and a further appeal; and he can pursue this remedy, as if the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, had not been passed. The words in the amending Act as if this Act had not been passed appear to us to be decisive. The remedy is preserved and can be continued as if the new Act (the 1959 Act) had not been passed, and that means, for purposes of preserving and prosecuting that remedy, the 1959 Act should be ignored. That we think is the effect of the words 'as if this Act had not been passed'. The remedy so preserved for the assessee is related to the appellate powers as contemplated by the 1939 Act. We are not, in this case, called upon to decide the effect of dropping the Commercial Tax Officer and bringing into existence the post of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. What will be the consequence of it on the appeal itself to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner from an order passed prior to 1st April, 1959, is a different matter. We are only concerned with the limited question whether in an appeal like that, it is open to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to enhance the turnover. If the appellate power is to be exercised as if this Act (the 1959 Act) had not been passed, it is explicit there will be no power in the appellate authority, whatever his designation may be, to enhance the assessment." While dealing with similar circumstances, the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Hindustan Shipyard Limited, has held a follows : "On a consideration of the rival submissions, we are inclined to agree with the respondents' counsel. The approach adopted by the learned Government Pleader to call the said power a procedural one and on that basis to say that it is not saved, is, in our opinion, not the right approach to adopt. The Tribunal was granting stay hitherto in exercise of its incidental/ancillary power which is an adjunct of, and flows from the substantive power to entertain and hear the appeal, conferred upon the Tribunal. We do not find it possible to separate this incidental/ancillary power from the substantive power. The substantive power to entertain and hear the appeal remains undisturbed. May be so, submits the learned Government Pleader, the said incidental power is clearly taken away with retrospective effect. We find it difficult to agree. The retrospective effect must given either by express language, or must arise by necessary implication. We are not satisfied that any such intention is evidenced by the Amendment Act. We can illustrate our view by giving an example. Take a situation where the very right of appeal has been taken away by the Amendment Act. In such a situation, it cannot be disputed that in the case of assessment years falling prior to the Amendment Act, the right of appeal would be saved, and would be available. If the right of appeal remains available, the incidental/ancillary power to grant stay pending such appeal would also remain available. The question is whether the position would be worse where the right of appeal is retained undisturbed but where the incidental power flowing therefrom is taken away by the amending statute - particularly when it does not say clearly that it is taken away with retrospective effect ? We think not. We may also notice that the Appellate Tribunal is a quasi-judicial Tribunal. It is manned by a judicial officer of the rank of a District Judge, besides another non-judicial member. The appeal lies to it against the orders of the departmental authorities. In the hierarchy, the Appellate Tribunal is the first independent Tribunal. In such a case, we would lean in favour of preserving such a power of the Tribunal rather than leaning the other way. The appeal lies to it against the orders of the departmental authorities. In the hierarchy, the Appellate Tribunal is the first independent Tribunal. In such a case, we would lean in favour of preserving such a power of the Tribunal rather than leaning the other way. Of course, this concern comes into play only where the language of the amending statute is not clear on the question of retrospectivity." In view of the abovesaid settled principles of law, and also in view of the fact that the lis had already commenced by issuing of show cause notice by the authorities to the petitioner, the appellate authority is not correct in returning the appeal papers filed by the petitioner, on the ground that the petitioner has not complied with the requirements under the Act No. 14 of 1999. Accordingly, the impugned proceedings of the appellate authority/second respondent in returning the papers, are set aside, and the second respondent is directed to deal with the appeals filed by the petitioner, and the stay petitions, on the basis of the provisions of the said Act, before amendment under the Act No. 14 of 1999. With the above observations, these writ petitions are allowed. No costs. Writ petitions allowed.