Judgment : 1. Plaintiff in O.S.No. 99 of 1990 on the file of District Munsif, Tirunelveli is the appellant. 2. Suit filed by plaintiff was one for declaration and recovery of possession on the following allegations: Scheduled property belonged to late Kalyansundaram Pillai who executed a settlement deed on 15. 1969 as evidenced by Ex.A1. Under that deed, he bequeathed his life estate in favour of his wife and vested reminder with his two daughters i.e., plaintiff and her sister. It is her further case that as per settlement deed, mother of plaintiff got life estate. Father of second defendant was tenant under Kalyanasundaram Pillai. On his demise, second defendant became the tenant. Out of the entire property, plaintiff’s sister Thangammal was entitled to undivided half share and the remaining half share belong to plaintiff. Thangammal sold her right by registered sale deed dated 18. 1975 as per Ex.B4. It is further alleged that plaintiff never sold her share in the property but she came to know sometime in April 1988 that second defendant has fabricated a document on 210. 1981 as if plaintiff has executed a sale deed in favour second defendant in regard to scheduled property. According to appellant, she never affixed her signature and she never went to Sub-registrar’s office either on 210. 1981 or on any other date. She has also not put her thumb impression in any document. 3. From second defendant, first defendant purchased the entire property which according to plaintiff is also not valid. First defendant is not bona fide purchaser for value. A suit notice was issued to second defendant on 14. 1988 evidenced by Ex.A.4. But he did not sent any reply. Later on 12. 1988, as evidenced by Ex.A6, another notice was issued to first defendant with a copy to second defendant. First defendant sent a reply on 212. 1988 evidenced by Ex.A.5 denying the allegation and also contending that plaintiff has really executed sale deed. It is said that plaintiff is also known as Rengammal but after her marriage she used to sign only as Rajalakshmi Ammal. Alleged sale deed dated 210. 1981, according to appellant in so far as her share is concerned is void and the suit was therefore laid for declaration of title and recovery of possession. According to her, first defendant is only a trespasser and even liable to pay mesne profits. 4. Alleged sale deed dated 210. 1981, according to appellant in so far as her share is concerned is void and the suit was therefore laid for declaration of title and recovery of possession. According to her, first defendant is only a trespasser and even liable to pay mesne profits. 4. First defendant alone filed written statement and second defendant remained ex parte. According to first defendant, real name of plaintiff is Ramu Ammal and she is now describing herself as Ramalakshmi Ammal. It is his further case that plaintiff herself sold 5 cents of land on 210. 1981 in which her own brother-in-law i.e., Thangammal’s husband also is an attestor. It is also said that consequent to the sale deed, on 24.6, 1986, evidenced by Ex.B1, he has also effected mutation in his name and patta was also changed. According to him, plaintiff is not entitled to any right and suit for recovery is misconceived. 5. On the above pleadings, trial court took oral and documentary evidence. Exs.A.1 to A14 were marked on the side of plaintiff and B1 to B5 were marked on the side of defendants. Plaintiff got herself examined as PW1 and her husband was examined as PW2. On the side of first defendant, DW1 was examined. 6. Trial court as per judgment dated 24. 1998, decreed the suit. Trial court was of the view that there is vast differences in the admitted signature of plaintiff with that of Ex.B2. It is further held that it is for first defendant to prove by leading positive evidence that the document Ex.B2 was executed by Plaintiff. 7. Aggrieved by the judgment of trial court, first defendant took the matter in A.S. 151 of 1996 on the file of Assistant Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli. Lower appellate court after reappreciating evidence, came to the conclusion that the suit itself is misconceived and the burden is only on plaintiff to prove that there is forgery on impersonation in execution of Ex.B2. It also held that the suit is barred by limitation. 8. It is against the said judgment, plaintiff has preferred this second appeal on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the Lower Court is right in reversing the well considered Judgment and Decree of the trial Court by misdirecting itself with regard to question of law and facts? 2. 8. It is against the said judgment, plaintiff has preferred this second appeal on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the Lower Court is right in reversing the well considered Judgment and Decree of the trial Court by misdirecting itself with regard to question of law and facts? 2. Whether the lower court is right is throwing the burden of proof of B2 that the same was not executed by the appellant even as per law it was the burden of the defendants to prove that B2 was executed by the appellant? 3. Whether the lower court is right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant ought to have examined an expert to prove that the signature in B2 was not that of the appellants? 4. Whether the lower court was right in holding that the suit was barred by limitation? 5. Whether there is any proof that the appellant has B2 beyond 3 years from the date of the signature? 6. Whether the lower appellate court is right in dismissing the suit as barred by limitation when there is no pleading that the appellant had knowledge of B2 beyond 3 years from the date of the suit? 7. Whether lower appellate court is right in holding that the suit is not maintainable at present as life estate holder is alive and the prayer could not be granted? 8. Whether the lower court is right in setting aside the fact the signature when it has not compared the documents by itself? 9. Since caveat was entered by respondents, I heard the second appeal at the admission stage itself. 10. From the narration of facts, the sum and substance of plaintiff’s case is that she has not executed Ex.B2 sale deed though it is purported to have been executed by her. According to her. Somebody might have impersonated her and she has not presented herself before the Sub-Registrar for executing Ex.B2. It is her further case that it is forgery. Reliance was placed in the very early decision of Calcutta High Court reported in Mohima Chunder Dhur v. Jugul Kishore Bhuttacharji, ILR 7 Cal 73. In that case at page 739, their Lordships held thus, “The second point taken is that the burden of proof has been wrongly placed upon the defendant. It appears to us that this contention is untenable. In that case at page 739, their Lordships held thus, “The second point taken is that the burden of proof has been wrongly placed upon the defendant. It appears to us that this contention is untenable. The plaintiff himself came forward and denied the execution of the document, and this was sufficient to cast upon the defendant the burden of proving it execution and its genuineness. Under these circumstances, we think that this appeal must be dismissed with costs.” It is true that the above decision supports the case of appellant to a certain extent. 11. But, I do not think that the above decision is a good law especially after the Privy Council took a different view in Gangamoyi Debi v. Troiluckhya Nath Chowdhry, ILR 33 Cal 537. 12. It is further held in Md. Ihtisham Ali v. Jamna Prasad, AIR 1922 P.C 56 at page 58 thus, “ ...There is no doubt that the deed was executed, for it is was registered, and registered in a regular way, and it is the duty of the registrar, before registering, to examine the grantor, or some one who, he is satisfied, is the proper representative of the grantor, before he allows the deed to be registered. There can be no doubt, therefore, that Ehsan Ali Khan executed the deed and was party to its registration, and in the deed there is an admission that he has received the Rs.200, which would be the full consideration as the vendee had to take upon himself the liability for the mortgage money. He says in the deed that he has received the consideration money in full, and that out of it he has left Rs.2, 800 with the vendee for the purpose of making payment to the mortgagee and defraying Court expenses, and that he has no further claim to the property sold or the consideration money. That he should have taken part in having such a deed registered if he did receive the consideration money is highly improbable at any rate, the burden is on him and on people claiming under him to prove that what apparently happened did not happen. ... ” (Italics supplied) 13. Both these decisions were followed again by Privy Council in the decision reported in Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurhi , AIR 1943 P.C. 83, wherein it is held thus, “... ... ” (Italics supplied) 13. Both these decisions were followed again by Privy Council in the decision reported in Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurhi , AIR 1943 P.C. 83, wherein it is held thus, “... The plaintiffs claim as reversioners of Parshotam Das and any statement proved to have been made by him is evidence against them as an admission. The registrar’s endorsements show (see sub-s.(2) of S.60, Registration Act, 1877) that in 1881 a person claiming to be this Parshotam Das and to have become son of Harish Chandra by adoption made by his widow Manki Bahu, presented the receipt for registration and admitted execution. He was identified by two persons one Sheo Prasad and the other Girja Prasad, who was the scribe of the document and was known to the Registrar. What remains to be shown is that the person admitting execution before the Registrar was this Parshotam Das and no impostor. The question is one of fact except in so far as there was as matter of law a presumption that the registration proceedings were regular and honestly carried out: 33 I.A.60 at p.65: 48 I.A. at p. 372. It seems clear that any objection to the sufficiency of the proof upon this point would have been idle, the circumstances being such that the evidence of due registration is itself some evidence of execution as against the plaintiffs. ... (Italics supplied) 14. So far as our High Court is concerned, there is a Bench decision binding on me, which is reported in Irudayam Ammal v. Salayath Mary, AIR 1973 Mad 421 . In paragraph 6 of the Judgment the Division Bench held thus, “...It is true that registration by itself in all cases is not proof of execution, but if no other evidence is available, the certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of its execution and the certificate of the registering officer under Section 60 of the Registration Act is relevant for proving execution (See discussion in Sankar’s evidence latest 12th Edn., p. 640. As observed by the Privy Council in Md. As observed by the Privy Council in Md. Ihtisham Ali v. Jamna Prasad , AIR 1922 PC 56, registration is a solemn act and if no other evidence is available the court can presume that the Registrar performed his duty of satisfying himself that the document presented to him for registration was duly executed by the executant and the executant was duly and properly identified before him. The same view was taken in Gopaldas v. Sri Thakurji, AIR 1943 PC 83, in which, after referring to the earlier decision of the Privy Council in AIR 1922 PC 56 (referred to above) Sir George Rankin observed that the evidence of due registration is itself some evidence of execution as against the other side. There is a full discussion on this question as to the presumption arising from the fact of due registration, coupled with the presumption arising under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act in a Bench decision of the Mysore High Court in Hutchegowda v. Chennigegowda, AIR 1953 Mys 49, in which it was held that the evidence that a document was duly registered is some evidence of its execution by the person by whom it purports to have been executed. There is a full discussion of the relevant case law including the decision of the Privy Council in AIR 1922 PC 56 aforesaid. In Revanna v. Dr.A.V. Ranga Rao, AIR 1952 Mys 119, it was observed that in cases where it is impossible for any person to prove execution of a document on account of the death of all the persons concerned, the best and the only possible evidence that may be available is that of a certified copy of the registered document and that in such cases, a presumption could arise under Section 60 of the Registration Act along with Section 114 of the Evidence Act see also Kashibai v. Vinayak, AIR 1956 Bom 65 . It will be seen that in the ultimate analysis, the problem in each case is ‘has the best evidence adduced on the facts of each case’: in the instant case, we have not the slightest hesitation in holding that this essential test for arriving at the truth has been amply satisfied.” (Italics supplied) 15. In a Division Bench decision of Bombay High Court reported in Vishvanath Ramji Rahibai Ramji Karale, AIR 1931 Bom. 105, also a similar view was taken. 16. In a Division Bench decision of Bombay High Court reported in Vishvanath Ramji Rahibai Ramji Karale, AIR 1931 Bom. 105, also a similar view was taken. 16. In Sumathi Amma v. Kunjulekshmi, 1964 K.L.T. 945, the Kerala High Court has also taken a similar view. 17. In this case, plaintiff has no case that the registration formalities have not been fully complied with. Under Section 114 of Evidence Act, the Court can presume that official acts have been followed properly unless it is challenged in the suit. Mere statement that plaintiff was not present before Sub-Registrar will not amount to challenging the registration procedure one more impotant circumstance against appellant is that her own brother-in-law i.e., Thangammal’s husband is an attestor to the deed. Initially she admitted that between her and her sister, there was no misunderstanding. Subsequently, she corrected herself that they are not in talking terms. Either in the plaint or in the chief examination, plaintiff do not say about the so called misunderstanding between her sister and brothers-in-law. Where registration formalities have been complied with and when sub-registrar certifies that the documents has been registered that will be evidence of execution since Ex.A2 is a document which does not requires attestation. 18. When plaintiff has not adduced any other evidence, certificate of registration can be taken as a piece of evidence which goes against plaintiff. Eventhough first defendant is purchaser under Ex.B1, plaintiff still maintains that second defendant is her tenant. Even though she was dumped as a man of bad character, between plaintiff and second defendant, when they maintain good relationship he could have been examined in this case. 19. The falsity of plaintiff’s case can also be seen from the facts that she is known as only Rengammal or Ramalingammal. But when Ex.A4 notice was issued. She names only as ‘Ramu Ammal’, which is the case of first defendant and signs as ‘Ramu’ what was her signature before marriage, no evidence was let in. After her marriage, though documents are filed, lower appellate court has found that none of the signature tally with one another. So merely on the basis of differences in signature, no finding could be entered in favour of appellant. When the document is duly registered, certain presumption follow under Registration Act. Plaintiff has not adduced the best evidence except for examination of PW2, who is her husband. 20. So merely on the basis of differences in signature, no finding could be entered in favour of appellant. When the document is duly registered, certain presumption follow under Registration Act. Plaintiff has not adduced the best evidence except for examination of PW2, who is her husband. 20. Once it is found that plaintiff has not discharged her burden, finding of lower appellate court is only to be confirmed. The question of limitation also therefore do not arise for consideration. On the basis of available evidence, only conclusion that could be arrived is that appellant executed document in Ex.B2 and has parted her right to him. Lower appellate court is therefore right in coming to the conclusion that plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. 21. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed with costs. Consequently, C.M.P.No. 14544 of 1999 is also dismissed.