Judgment : Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the Government Advocate on the writ side. 2. From the pleadings of parties both in the writ petition and the counter filed and upon hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for the both, what comes to be known is that the petitioner in this writ petition is a primary school run with 100% grant by the Government and hence it comes under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973. The petitioner/school is seeking to quash the order dated 19. 1992 of the third respondent, wherein the third respondent ordered the Deputy Inspector of Schools to effect direct payment of the salary to the teachers of the petitioner/school. 3. From the arguments of the learned counsel for both, it comes to be known that the third respondent had issued a show-cause notice dated 9. 1992 calling upon the petitioner to explain as to why Tmt.M.Prema, a teacher working under the petitioner was not paid subsistence allowance on being placed under suspension for some reasons; that the petitioner was directed to send its explanation within ten days lest direct payment of salary to all the teachers would be effected through the third respondent; that the petitioner received the show-cause notice only on 9. 1992; that on 19. 1992, the petitioner sent a letter to the third respondent seeking for a further time of 15 days to offer its explanation; that in spite of the third respondent having received the said communication on 19. 1992, without conceding such a reasonable request made on the part of the petitioner, the third respondent passed orders on the same day ordering directing payment of the salary to all the teachers of the petitioner/school through the third respondent thus by passing the usual mode of payment through the petitioner/school and hence, the petitioner has come forward to file this writ petition for a writ of certiorari calling for the records relating to the issuance of the impugned order Ref.No.Na.Ka.No.7603/A3/92, dated 19. 1992 by the third respondent and quash the same. 4. The further case of the petitioner is that along with the above writ petition, they filed W.M.P.No.21169 of 1992 and obtained interim stay of the impugned order as on 29. 1992 and as such the school is running as usual. 1992 by the third respondent and quash the same. 4. The further case of the petitioner is that along with the above writ petition, they filed W.M.P.No.21169 of 1992 and obtained interim stay of the impugned order as on 29. 1992 and as such the school is running as usual. The petitioners grievance is that even though a time of ten days was granted, as per the show-cause notice to submit the explanation, even prior to expiry of the said ten days calculating the same from the date of receipt of the show-cause notice by the petitioner which was on 9. 1992, the third respondent was in a haste to pass the impugned order on 19. 1992 itself, which is nothing put denial of opportunity for the petitioner in gross violation of the principles of natural justice that too when the petitioner sent a letter requesting to grant a further time of 15 days to submit its explanation, which had been received by the third respondent on 19. 1992. 5. Onthe part of the respondent, the learned Government Advocate would contend that instead of availing the statutory appeal before the authorities as designated by law as against the impugned order, so as to exhaust its ordinary remedy, the petitioner has come forward to seek extraordinary constitutional remedy before this Court and the same cannot be encouraged or approved. She would further point out that only on resentment of the preparation of the bills by the school authorities and sending the same to the concerned officials, direct payment of the salary to the individual was rightly ordered by the third respondent and the same is quite legal and could ordinarily be exercised by such authorities especially in view of the fact that such exercise of power could neither be termed arbitrary nor in excess than what he has been empowered by law nor could it be construed a punishment on the petitioner/school nor does it attach any stigma with regard to the conduct of the petitioner/school and hence there is no much to loiter about effecting direct payment of the salary to the said teacher of the petitioner/school. 6. Be it as it may. 6. Be it as it may. The only point for consideration is whether the petitioner was afforded with sufficient opportunity to offer its explanation to the show-cause noticee On perusal of the materials placed on record, it is quite evident that the petitioner had received the show-cause notice issued by the third respondent only on 9. 1992 and it had sought for a further time of 15 days to offer its explanation as per its letter dated 19. 1992, which had rightly been received by the third respondent on 19. 1992. In spite of the petitioner, even in the usual course, having one more day to offer its explanation, in addition to which having sought for further time as per its letter dated 19. 1992, whether it is right on the third respondent to have passed his order on 19. 1992 itself directing the subordinate authority the Deputy Inspector of Schools concerned to make direct payment of the salary of the teachers working in the petitioner/schoole Considering the date of issuance of the show-cause notice and its receipt by the petitioner, the representation submitted by the petitioner seeking a further time of 15 days on 19. 1992, the receipt of the said representation by the third respondent on 19. 1992 and the third respondent having passed the impugned order on the very same day on 19. 1992 in spite of a day more left with for the petitioner to submit its explanation, even as per the time mentioned in the show-cause notice, I hold that it is a clear cut violation of the principles of natural justice in not affording sufficient and reasonable opportunity for the petitioner to be heard and hence at this score itself, the impugned order becomes liable to be quashed. 7. Further more, the other argument advanced on the part of the learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents is that the authority is at liberty to divest the payment through his subordinates. It is not the case of the petitioner that the third respondent is not having such powers to divest the payment through the Subordinate Officers, in the instant case, the Deputy Inspector of Schools concerned instead of the school itself. It is not the case of the petitioner that the third respondent is not having such powers to divest the payment through the Subordinate Officers, in the instant case, the Deputy Inspector of Schools concerned instead of the school itself. But on what basis such a regular course is differed and the other course is adopted carries more weight and for no fault committed on the part of the school, such a course should not have been adopted by the third respondent. Since there is no necessity for the third respondent to act in such a manner as he has done in respect of the impugned order, the decision made by the third respondent to effect payments through the Deputy Inspector of Schools instead of the school authorities is a decision taken in haste and the attitude of the third respondent in making such hasty decision is deprecated. Hence, at this score also, the impugned order passed by the third respondent becomes liable only to be quashed. 8. The impugned order passed by the third respondent suffers from patent errors of law and procedure. In the above circumstances, this Court is left with no option but to concede the request of the petitioner to quash the impugned order. 9. In result, the above writ petition succeeds and the same is allowed. The impugned order made by the third respondent in Ref.No.Na.Ka.No.760/A3/92, dated 19. 1992 is hereby quashed. 10. Consequently, W.M.P.No.21169 of 1992 is closed. 11. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.