JUDGMENT G.S. CHAUBE, J.:- This Second Appeal by the plaintiff is against the judgment and decree of reversal passed by the appellate court of the First Additional Judicial Commissioner of Ranchi in Title Appeal No.23 of 1986. By the judgment and decree under appeal, the lower appellate court has set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court i.e. Munsif of Ranchi in Title Suit No.44 of 1988 granting decree of ejectment of the defendant-tenant as also to pay arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 850/- with cost. 2. The suit had been instituted under the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1977 (herein-after to be referred to as the Act of 1977) against sole defendant Sirdar Gurbachan Singh. During the pendency of the suit the said defendant Sirdar Gurbachan Singh died. Therefore, his mother, widow, sons and daughters were substitute as defendants in the suit. After the suit was decreed by the trial court, the substituted defendants took the appeal to the Judicial Commissioner of Ranchi, which was registered as Title Appeal No.23 of 1986 wherein the sole plaintiff Mohari Devi Jain was impleaded as sole respondent. However, during the pendency of the said appeal Mohari Devi Jain was impleaded as sole respondent. Therefore, her husband, surviving son, married daughters and widow and children of the pre-deceased son were brought on record as respondents. After the appeal was allowed by the lower appellate court, the substituted respondents preferred this appeal against the heirs and legal representatives of the defendant Sirdar Gurbachan Singh, who were appellants in the court of appeal below. During the pendency of this appeal, appellant no.1 Lalchand Jain, the husband of Mohari Devi Jain also died. Like-wise, respondent no.1 Ram Rakhi, the mother of late Sirdar Gurbachar Singh also died. Their heirs and legal representatives being already on record, both of them have been taken off the appeal. 3. The case of the plaintiffs is that late Mohari Devi Jain was the owner of a building on municipal holding No. 1351 of Ward No.II-B of Ranchi Municipal Corporation, situated at J.J. Road, Upper Bazar in Ranchi town. Two rooms of the said building had been let out by her to late Sirdar Gurbachan Singh on a monthly rental of Rs. 170/-. He paid the rent at such rate till September, 1980. Two rooms of the said building had been let out by her to late Sirdar Gurbachan Singh on a monthly rental of Rs. 170/-. He paid the rent at such rate till September, 1980. However, he failed to pay the rental for the shop rooms under his occupation from subsequent months, i.e. from October, 1980 to February, 1981 making himself liable to be evicted. Besides, Mohari Devi Jain, the landlady, required those shop rooms for her unemployed grand-sons who need to be settled in life and business.' Consequently, a notice to quit was served on the said tenant Sirdar Gurbachan Singh. When he failed to vacate the premises and pay the rent which had fallen in arrear, the suit was instituted on 16.3.1981. Tenant Sirdar Gurbachan Singh appeared and contested the claim of the plaintiffs by filing written statement on 30.11.1981. According to him, the sole object of instituting the suit for his eviction from the shop rooms let out to him was to enhance the monthly rental. Earlier, the rent for those two rooms was at the rate of Rs. 45/- per month. The plaintiff had instituted a similar suit for his eviction in 1964. However, the suit was withdrawn and rent enchanced to Rs.170/- per month. He was paying rent to the plaintiffs at such rate. However, when the plaintiff and her husband avoided to receive rent with intent to entrap him in default, he started remitting rent by postal money order for October, 1980 to February 1981. As regards the need of the plaintiff for the suit premises, he asserted that apart from the fact that the plaintiff had other accommodation for doing business by her grand-sons(s), the averment made in the plaint in this regard was vague, inasmuch as she did not disclose for which of her grand-sons, she required the tenanted shop rooms. On this ground, he pleaded for dismissing the suit. Even in the written statement which the substituted defendants took the opportunity to file, the same plea was' reiterated except that while adopting the earlier written statement filed by Sirdar Gurbachan Singh, it was also stated by the said defendants that the families of the two sons of the plaintiff were separate since long residing in two separate houses; that all of grand-sons were employed; and that a vacant shop in the same building was in occupation of the plaintiff. 4. 4. The trial court framed as many as eight issues and evidence was led by the parties. On evidence, the trial court held that there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendants on which the parties were not at issue and that a notice to quit under section 106 of the T.P. Act even though not required, had been served on the tenant. The trial court also held that the tenant-defendants did not pay rent at the rate of Rs. 170/- per month to the plaintiff from the months of October, 1980 to February, 1981. Thus, rent to the tune of Rs.850/- had fallen in arrears. The trial court also held that even though the defendant-tenant purported to remit the rent for the tenanted shop premises by postal money order, it was not a valid remittance in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1977 inasmuch as he failed to state while in the witness box that before making remittance, he had tendered the rent for the month of October, 1980 in person to the plaintiff, and ever though the first remittance of the rent for the month of October, 1980 is taken to be tendered with refusal to qualify him to remit rent by postal money order, there was no evidence that after return of the money order, the rent for the month of October, 1980 was again remitted by the defendant-tenant. Secondly, according to the trial court, the rent was not remitted by postal money order at the address of the plaintiff land-lady, because the postal peon who came to prove the money order coupons, stated that he never went to the dwelling house of the plaintiff/payee; rather, he went to the shop run by her son in the same building and returned the money order when he was told that the plaintiff was not available or had gone out of Ranchi. On such finding, the trial court held that the defendant-tenant did make default in payment of rent from October, 1980 to February, 1981 and was liable to be evicted. The trial court also held that the plaintiff reasonably and in good faith required the shop rooms let out to the defendant-tenant for the house of her grand-son Surendra Kumar Jain who intended to start a business therein of ready made garments. The trial court also held that the plaintiff reasonably and in good faith required the shop rooms let out to the defendant-tenant for the house of her grand-son Surendra Kumar Jain who intended to start a business therein of ready made garments. Having so held, the trial court decreed the suit directing the defendant(s) to give vacant possession of the suit premises as well as arrear rent within three months, failing which they were liable to be evicted by the plaintiffs through the process of the court. 5. On appeal, the lower appellate court reversed the findings of the trial court as well as the decree not only for eviction, but also for arrears of rent which had admitted not been paid to and received by the plaintiff, in consequence of rent remitted by postal money order having been returned to the defendant tenant by the postal department. In reversing the decree of the trial court the lower appellate court held that, in law, there was no absolute necessity of at first rent being tendered by the tenant to the land-lord and the latter refusing to receive the same to make the tenant eligible for remitting rent by postal money order to avoid default. Moreover, when the tenant remitted rent for the month of October, 1980 by postal money order the same shall be treated as valid tender and on refusal or having been avoided to receive the same by the plaintiffs, subsequent remittance was valid. The lower appellate court also held that since the money orders were sent at the address of the plaintiff given not only in the plaint, but also in the notice to quit (Ext.2) and the shop into which the post man went to make payment on the basis of postal money order was part of the same building and was being run by her own son, or grandson, there could not be complaint that the money order was not sent at the proper address of the person entitled to receive rent, i.e. the plaintiff. Therefore, the learned appellate court held that the tenant defendant having validly remitted the rent for the month of October, 1980 and subsequent months till February, 1981 by postal money order .did not make default in payment of rent so as to be liable to be evicted. 6. Therefore, the learned appellate court held that the tenant defendant having validly remitted the rent for the month of October, 1980 and subsequent months till February, 1981 by postal money order .did not make default in payment of rent so as to be liable to be evicted. 6. Regarding personal necessity of the plaintiff-landlady, the lower appellate court held that she had no personal need for the suit premises so as to get a decree for evicting the tenant, because her pleading in this behalf was not specific as she had not specifically stated in her plaint as to for which of her grand-sons she required the shop in question. There was no pleading on her part that the grand-son or grand-sons was/were dependent on her. Even the evidence showed that her grand-son Surendra Kumar Jain who was later on singled out as the person for whom shop rooms in question were required had not stated that he was dependent on the plaintiff; even though the said Surendra Kumar Jain stated that he required the shop rooms for running his ready-made garments shop, he did not state that he was dependent on either or both of his grand-parents and that the grand-son cannot be treated as a member of the family of the grand-mother and dependent on her. Therefore, the need of the grand-son cannot be taken to he the personal necessity of the grand-mother and the conduct of the plaintiff showed that she had instituted the suit for eviction only as a pretext for enhancement of rent, inasmuch as similar suit was filed in the year 1964 against the same defendant and was withdrawn when the latter agreed to enhance the rent from Rs.45/- to Rs. 170/- per month and similar suits were instituted by her even against other tenants occupying part of the building. In the lower appellate court a plea was also taken on behalf of the respondents, namely, the present appellants that as Sirdar Gurbachan Singh who had been inducted as a tenant in respect of the shop rooms, had died, his heirs and legal representatives could not obstruct the decree for eviction on the ground of personal necessity. The lower appellate court negatived the contention and held that as the tenancy rights are heritable, the heirs of the deceased tenant could take all the defences as were available to the tenant himself. The lower appellate court negatived the contention and held that as the tenancy rights are heritable, the heirs of the deceased tenant could take all the defences as were available to the tenant himself. On such findings, the lower appellate court allowed the appeal with cost setting aside the judgement and decree of the trial court. Hence this appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. While admitting this appeal the following substantial questions of law (sic) were framed :- (i) whether in view of the settled principle of law that requirement of landlord for business purposes of his grand-son is a personal necessity of the land lord and consequently the finding that the same was not personal necessity cannot be accepted as a correct and lawful finding? (ii) whether the finding of the learned court of appeal can be said to be lawful in view of the settled principle of law that since rightful tenant Gurbachan Singh died during the pendency of the suit, his heirs after being substituted had no right to challenge the plea of personal necessity of the landlord which is now settled by this Hon'ble Court in AIR 1980 Patna 73 which has ruled after relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as reported in AIR 1972 SC 2525 and the said view of the Patna High Court as set in AIR 1980 Patna 73 was never over-ruled in AIR 1985 SC 796 as alleged and, therefore the finding of the learned court of appeal is an error of law and is only fit to be rejected, because in AIR 1985 SC 796 Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the case of Delhi Rent Control Act, and not of Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act and that both the Acts were on different pattern? (iii) Whether the finding of the appellate court can be upheld that there was valid remittance under section 12(1) (d)-previously section 11(1) (d) of the Bihar Buildings Act in view of the fact that the defendant in his own evidence never mentioned that he tendered the rent to the landlord either by money order or personally, and that the same were refused and on refusal, he had been continuously remitting the same, because the defendant only stated that he has been remitting rent from October 1990 (sic) to February, 1991 (sic), but there is no mention that any of the remittance was refused by the plaintiff-landlord to enable him to avail the remedy as provided by law and such finding in respect of default as recorded by the appellate court that the remittance was valid is an error of law?" 8. At the time of hearing of this appeal, Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that in view of the law laid down by the apex court in the case of Smt. Gian Devi Anand Vs. Jeevan Kumar & ors. ( AIR 1985 SC 796 ) in respect of the rights and obligations of the heirs of a deceased tenant, he did not intend to press the second question for decision in this appeal. However, he sought leave to raise another substantial questions of law in modification of the third question to the effect whether the remittance of the money order was in accordance with the provisions of clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 12 read with sub-section (1) of section 16 of the Act of 1977 even if the remittance was found to be otherwise valid. Therefore, on hearing the counsel for the parties, the following substantial questions of law have been reformulated. Counsel for the parties have been extensively heard on these formulated substantial questions of law and this appeal is being disposed of on the basis thereof. (i) Whether the requirement of the grand-son of the landlord (landlady) for stating business in the tenanted shop rooms is, in law, the requirement or personal necessity of the landlord? Counsel for the parties have been extensively heard on these formulated substantial questions of law and this appeal is being disposed of on the basis thereof. (i) Whether the requirement of the grand-son of the landlord (landlady) for stating business in the tenanted shop rooms is, in law, the requirement or personal necessity of the landlord? (ii) Whether in absence of evidence by and on behalf of the defendant tenant that he had tendered rent for the month of October, 1980 to the plaintiff-landlady either personally or through postal money order and she avoided or refused to receive the same, the remittance of rent by postal money order was a valid remittance under clause (d) of section 12(1) of the Act of 1977 and whether in this backdrop, the finding of the lower appellate court that the remittance by postal money order was valid can be sustained in law and even if such remittance is taken to be valid under sub-section (1) of section 16 of the Act of 1977 whether it was a good remittance in accordance with the provisions of clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the said Act to avoid decree of eviction in terms thereof? Question No.1 9. The case of the plaintiff as disclosed in their pleading is that the landlady needed the shop rooms in question reasonably and in good faith for opening a shop therein by her unemployed grandson who was then out of employment and need to be settled in life and business’. On the other hand, the defendant-tenant submitted that there was no such requirement; as a matter of fact, the plaintiffs had other accommodation for running business of her grand-sons. He also doubted the bonafides of toe plaintiff as there was no specific averments in the plaint as to for whom of the grandsons she required the said rooms in his occupation. 10. Section 12(1) of the Act of 1977 provided that a tenant in possession of any building shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except in execution of a decree passed by the court on one or more of the grounds stated therein. 10. Section 12(1) of the Act of 1977 provided that a tenant in possession of any building shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except in execution of a decree passed by the court on one or more of the grounds stated therein. One of the grounds on which the tenant can be evicted is contained in clause (c) thereof according to which the tenant can be evicted where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord. Therefore, plain meaning of the above provision contained in clause (c) of section 12(1) is that if there is need by the land lord himself to occupy the tenanted premises for whatsoever purposes and the need is found to be reasonable and bonafide, the tenant has to be evicted. Even in case the landlored holds the building for the benefit of any other person or persons, eviction of the tenant can be granted on the need of such person or persons for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord. Thus, in case of a building forming part of a joint Hindu family, the Karta or co-parcener who realises the rent from tenant and is the landlord within the meaning of section 2(f) of the Act of 1977 holds the building for the benefit of coparcener/members of the Joint Hindu Family having interest therein, so that the need or the requirement of the latter shall be deemed to be the necessity of the landlord. Therefore, if the suit building or for that matter the suit rooms in occupation of the tenant is a Joint Family property, the requirement thereof by any of the members of the family, may be grandson or grandsons, shall be treated requirement or personal necessity of the plaintiff landlady. However, in the instant case, PW1 Lalchand Jain, the husband of the landlady Mohari Devi Jain and her constituted Attorney said in court on oath that the said building was an exclusive property of his wife Mohari Devi Jain, the landlady. In other words, the building in question was not joint family property. However, in the instant case, PW1 Lalchand Jain, the husband of the landlady Mohari Devi Jain and her constituted Attorney said in court on oath that the said building was an exclusive property of his wife Mohari Devi Jain, the landlady. In other words, the building in question was not joint family property. PW1 also stated in court that the shop rooms in occupation of the tenant defendant were required by him for starting a business of readymade garments for one of the grandsons, Surendra Kumar Jain (PW2). Indeed, he stated that even though it was the common desire of both the husband and wife, meaning thereby he himself and his wife Mohari Devi Jain, to establish Surendra Kumar Jain by opening a shop. He unequivocally stated that entire capital therefore was to be provided by him. In course of his evidence even PW2 stated that the capital for the business was to be provided by his grand-father(PW1). The witness nowhere stated that he was dependent on his grand- father, or for that matter, even on his grand-mother. According to PW1 as also his son Shanti Lal Jain (PW7), both the sons of the plaintiff and PW1 were living separately and doing their business independently and separately. Even the brothers were living and doing business separately from each other. On these facts, the lower appellate court held that the necessity of Surendra Kumar Jain, the grandson of the landlady could not be treated the necessity of the plaintiff-landlady or the owner of the building. However, it has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the finding arrived at by the lower appellate court is erroneous and not sustainable in law. According to the learned counsel, keeping in view the close relation between the landlady and the person for whom she required the shop rooms in occupation of the defendant-tenant, the building in question can reasonably be taken to be required by her. In support of his contention the, learned counsel has placed reliance on AIR 1955 Patna 496; AIR 1988 PLJR 255 (Patna); (1997) 2 SCC 53 , and (1999) 12 SCC 141. 11. In AIR 1955 Patna 496, Bidu Bhushan Sen Vs. In support of his contention the, learned counsel has placed reliance on AIR 1955 Patna 496; AIR 1988 PLJR 255 (Patna); (1997) 2 SCC 53 , and (1999) 12 SCC 141. 11. In AIR 1955 Patna 496, Bidu Bhushan Sen Vs. Commissioner of Patna Division and another, the landlord had sought eviction of the tenant from the suit premises invoking similar provision contained in section 11(3) (a) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1947 on the ground that he required the premises for the use of his sister's son who was living with him and was maintained by him. On evidence, the Rent Controller found that the son of the sister of the landlord was living with him and was economically dependent on him. Consequently, he ordered for eviction of the tenant. On appeal, the Collector confirmed the decision. However, when the tenant went to the Commissioner in revision, the Commissioner set aside the order of the Rent Controller confirmed by the Collector in appeal on the ground that the requirement of the son of the sister could not be treated as the requirement of the landlord. When the matter came to this Court, a Division Bench held that the expression 'his own occupation' occurring in section 11(3) (a) cannot be restricted only to the occupation of the landlord himself, but it should be given a wider and liberal meaning so as to include the occupation of persons living with the landlord and are economically dependent on him. Consequently, it was held that the requirement of the landlord included the requirement of nephew (sister's son) living with him and entirely depending on him. 12. In the case of Krishna Kant Pandey & another Vs. Suniti Bala Sardar and ors (1988 PLJR 255), the tenanted premises was required by the landlady for accommodating the business of her son in partnership with son-in-law; part of the building was in occupation of the partnership on payment of rent. An objection was taken on behalf of the tenant-defendant that the requirement of the partnership business of the son and the son-in-law, a stranger, could not be the necessity of the landlady, more so, when the firm was a tenant paying rent. An objection was taken on behalf of the tenant-defendant that the requirement of the partnership business of the son and the son-in-law, a stranger, could not be the necessity of the landlady, more so, when the firm was a tenant paying rent. A Learned Single Judge of this Court held that members of a family coming within the scope of the word 'for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord' even if they are parties of a juristic entity will be entitled to get the benefit of the personal necessity of the landlord, vis-a-vis, their inter se relationship. The learned Judge further held that one does not have to be dependent on the landlord to come within the meaning of person of persons for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord. The word 'dependent' has not been used in the Act. A member of the family would be entirely independent; yet, he could be entitled to the use of the property of the holder in view of the proximity of the relationship. If the personal necessity of the persons can only be extended to the dependent children, and not to others, then it will negate the very purpose of the said Act. Dependence on the landlord entitled a person to the benefit of eviction. It does not, however, follow that lack of dependence would result in deprivation of that right." Therefore, it is manifest from the decision of this Court in the case of Krishna Kant Pandey (supra) that in order to bring the requirement or the necessity of a member of a family within the ambit of the necessity of the landlord, the dependence of the former on the latter, either economically or otherwise, is not a sine qua non. It is sufficient if the person for whose benefit the landlord requires the building is related by blood and the landlord owes some legal or moral obligation to provide for him. 13. In 1997(2) SCC 53 (K.V. Muthu Vs. Angamuthu Ammal), the apex court held that even a foster child was part of the family and for his need, the landlord could get decree of eviction of a tenant in occupation of his building. 14. 13. In 1997(2) SCC 53 (K.V. Muthu Vs. Angamuthu Ammal), the apex court held that even a foster child was part of the family and for his need, the landlord could get decree of eviction of a tenant in occupation of his building. 14. There is evidence on record that the holding of the plaintiff landlord compromises of, at least, five shop rooms some of which were in occupation of one of the other member of the family. P.W. 7, one of the sons of the landlady is, admittedly, running an electrical shop; in another room his son Raj Kumar runs a medicine shop and in the third room, yet another son of PW7 runs a shop for selling cosmetics and fancy items. The shop is known as 'Rupdarsan' and is being run since 26.7.1985. i.e. during the pendency of the suit. In course of his evidence, PW 7 has gone to the extent of saying that in that very building, he occupies two bed rooms a guest room, a kitchen, a store and a godown. There is nothing on the record to show that they were in possession of parts of the building as tenants of late Mohari Devi Jain. Thus, from the above facts, it follows that Mohari Devi Jain was, in fact, holding the building for the benefit of her sons and grand sons even though they were living and doing business separately. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that in course of his evidence, her husband (PW1) has specifically stated that, as a matter of fact, he was managing the property; he was inducting tenants therein. Therefore, in view of the facts and circumstances stated above, the lower appellate court does not appear to be right in holding that the requirement of one of the grand sons, precisely Surendra Kumar Jain, could not be treated as the requirement or necessity of Mohari Devi Jain, the landlady. However, on evidence, the lower appellate court has held that the alleged requirement could be neither reasonable, nor in good faith. On evidence, it has been held that the sole object of bringing the suit for evicting the tenant was to force him to enhance rent. Earlier, admittedly, the monthly rent for the said shop rooms was Rs. 45/- per month. On evidence, it has been held that the sole object of bringing the suit for evicting the tenant was to force him to enhance rent. Earlier, admittedly, the monthly rent for the said shop rooms was Rs. 45/- per month. By bringing a suit for eviction in 1964, the plaintiff succeeded in getting the rent enhanced to Rs. 170/- per month. She had sought eviction of another tenant (DW5) Makhan Singh who stated that earlier also, a suit was instituted against him and got compromised by enhancing rent. When Sirdar Gurbachan Singh came to the witness box as DW1, he stated that one room in the same building situated very close to his shop was then lying vacant. At a later stage, evidence was led by examining DW 5 who stated that in the very vacant room 'Roopdarpan' was opened on 26.7.1985. This fact was admitted by PW7 in course of his evidence. When the husband of Mohari Devi Jain was in the witness box as PW1, he stated that he was in occupation of two shops and there was also a godown which was being used by PW7 for keeping electrical goods. PW7, however stated that he opened Roopdarpan by converting the guest-room in his occupation not a shop room. Even according to PW1, Medicine shop run by the eldest sons of PW7 was opened at about the time the suit was instituted. Surendra Kumar Jain is certainly the eldest of the grand sons. Still, he was not provided for, if at all, he needed to be established 'in life and business'. Therefore, the lower appellate court was perfectly justified in holding that the conduct of the plaintiff showed that the suit for eviction on the ground of personal necessity was merely a pretext for enhancing rent. In other words, the plaintiff did not reasonably and in good faith require the shop rooms in occupation of the defendant-tenant for use of any of her grand sons so as to qualify for getting a decree for eviction of the tenant on that ground. As the apex court has held in the case of Rahabhar Production Pvt. Limited Vs. Rajendra K. Tandon : 1998(4) SCC 49 , bonafide need should be genuine honest and conceived in good faith. Landlord's desire for possession, however honest it might otherwise be, has inevitably, a subjective element in it. As the apex court has held in the case of Rahabhar Production Pvt. Limited Vs. Rajendra K. Tandon : 1998(4) SCC 49 , bonafide need should be genuine honest and conceived in good faith. Landlord's desire for possession, however honest it might otherwise be, has inevitably, a subjective element in it. 'Desire' to become 'requirement' must have the objective element of a need which can be decided only by taking all relevant circumstances into consideration so that the protection afforded to a tenant is not rendered illusory or whittled down. The possession can be recovered by the landlord only for real, genuine and bonafide need, and not for feigned need. In para 20 at page 58 of the report, the apex court held the landlord, not even a landlord under section 14-C Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958) can be permitted to come to court for eviction of the tenant for his requirement which is not real, genuine or bonafide. The tenant can not be evicted on false plea of requirement or feigned requirement." Indeed, the lower appellate court has reversed the finding of the trial court, which has held that the plaintiff reasonably and in good faith required the shop premises in occupation of the defendant-tenant for use of her grand-son Surendra Kumar Jain who needed to run a business in ready made garments. While reversing that finding of the trial court, the lower appellate court has held that the requirement was not genuine and bonafide. For coming to such conclusion lower appellate court has taken, note of all the relevant facts on record of the trial court. 15. On perusal of the record of the trial court, I find that the finding of the lower appellate court in this regard can neither be said to be erroneous, nor perverse so as to warrant interference by this Court in Second Appeal. Therefore, even if the requirement of the grand-son could be treated as the requirement or necessity of the landlady grand- mother, her requirement not being reasonable and in good faith, the tenant could not be evicted in accordance with the provisions of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act of 1977. Question No.2. 16. Therefore, even if the requirement of the grand-son could be treated as the requirement or necessity of the landlady grand- mother, her requirement not being reasonable and in good faith, the tenant could not be evicted in accordance with the provisions of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act of 1977. Question No.2. 16. Coming to the second substantial question of law, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that admittedly, the plaintiff landlady was not paid rent for the month of October, 1980 and subsequent months, before the suit was instituted in the court of Munsif in the month of March, 1981. The plea of the defendant-tenant was that he started remitting rent for the month of October, 1980 and subsequent months by postal money order when the plaintiff landlady and her husband avoided to receive the rent. Learned counsel has contended that when the defendant came to the witness box, he did not say that he had ever tendered rent for the month of October, 1980 to the plaintiff or even to her agent and they refused to receive the same. Therefore, in law, the rent remitted by postal money order cannot be treated as valid remittance so as to avoid penal default. According to him, tender of the rent by the tenant to the landlord and refusal by the latter is a precondition to the remittance of rent by postal money order. Clause (d) of sub-clause(1) of clause 12 of the Act of 1977 provided that a tenant can be evicted by decree of court if the amount of two months' rent lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract, or in absence of such contract, by the last day of the month next following that for which rent is payable or by not having been validly remitted, or deposited in accordance with section 16. Sub-section(1) of section 16 laid down that when a landlord refuses to accept any rent lawfully payable to him by a tenant in respect of any building, the tenant may remit such rent and continue to remit any subsequent rent which becomes due in respect of such building by postal money order to the landlord. Sub-section(1) of section 16 laid down that when a landlord refuses to accept any rent lawfully payable to him by a tenant in respect of any building, the tenant may remit such rent and continue to remit any subsequent rent which becomes due in respect of such building by postal money order to the landlord. While in the witness box, DW 1 Gurbachan Singh stated only this much that he remitted the rent for the month of October, 1980 till February, 1981 and that he remitted rent by postal money order even after institution of the suit. He also brought on record as many as 43 money order coupons with endorsement by postal peons thereon to the effect that they could not contact the payee, the land-lady on all the occasions for one reason or the other. Even one of the two postal peons who had taken the money orders to the landlady has been examined as DW2. He stated that every time he went to the electrical shop of the son of the plaintiff situated in the same building, he was informed by the person present there that Mohari Devi Jain was not available on the pretext that she had gone to Rajasthan. On this ground, the trial Court held that the money order not having been sent to the land lady at the proper address, there was no valid remittance of the rent. The lower appellate court has disagreed and held that the money were sent to the address of the plaintiff as given in the plaint and the notice to quit, albeit the postal peon went to the shop of her son only to be told that she was not available at Ranchi. That showed that there was deliberate attempt on the part of the plaintiff and members of her family to avoid receiving rent tendered by the tenant. Simply because the postal peon did not go straigntway to her drawing room for tendering the money order, the remittance cannot be invalid, But the fact remains that the tenant did not whisper while in the witness box that before remitting rent by postal money order, he had personally tendered the rent to the land lady and she avoided or refused to receive the same. Due to this omission, it has been contended and it was so contended in the lower appellate court that the remittance was not valid as the essential requirement of tendering first and then remittance after refusal was not satisfied. Therefore, the substantial question of law which has been formulated is whether the remittance of rent by postal money order was valid remittance in view of the lack of evidence that at first rent was tendered and declined, then the remittance was made. In other words, whether tender of the rent by the tenant to the land lord and refusal by him is an essential pre-condition for valid remittance of rent in accordance with the provisions of subsection (1) of section 16 of the Act of 1977. It appears that earlier a view was taken by two single Judges of this Court that tender of rent either hand to hand or through money order and refusal by the landlord was a condition precedent to the tenant remitting rent by postal money order for avoiding default within the meaning of clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act of 1977 which corresponds to section 11(1)(d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1947 and the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982. One of those decisions was rendered in the case of M/s. Bharat Roadways & another Vs. Shailendra Kumar Birla ( 1984 BBCJ 97 Patna) and another M/s. Inter State Transport Agency Vs. Habiba Khatoon ( 1982 BBCJ 252 ). The decision of this court in M/s. Bharat Roadways (supra) was set aside by the apex court, when appeal was taken thereto against by the appellants, in the following terms (see 1984 BBCJ 103 (SC) :- "Finding recorded by the High Court on the basis of default in payment of arrears of rent is unsustainable and it is set aside." 17. In the case of Nand Gopal Prasad Vs. Mostt. Premlata Devi & ors. (1985 PLJR 923), P.S. Mishra, J. as he then was, noticed the two earlier decisions of this Court in M/s. Inter State Transport Agency Vs. Habiba Khatoon (supra) and M/s. Bharat Roadways & another Vs. Shailendra Kumar Birla & another (supra) as also the decision of the apex court in M/s. Bharat Roadways & another Vs. Premlata Devi & ors. (1985 PLJR 923), P.S. Mishra, J. as he then was, noticed the two earlier decisions of this Court in M/s. Inter State Transport Agency Vs. Habiba Khatoon (supra) and M/s. Bharat Roadways & another Vs. Shailendra Kumar Birla & another (supra) as also the decision of the apex court in M/s. Bharat Roadways & another Vs. Shailendra Kumar Birla (1984 BBCJ 103 (SC)) and held that in a suit for eviction, it is wholly unnecessary for a tenant to go to the question of his tendering rent in cash to the landlord and the landlord refusing to accept it, as the requirement of section 11(1) (d) would be fully satisfied if it is demonstrated that remittance of rent was in accordance with the provisions of section 13 of the Act. The learned Judge was dealing with the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1947 in which provision similar to sub-section (1) of section 16 of the Act of 1977 was to be found in sub-section (1) of section 13 thereof. 18. A similar question had come for decision before a Division Bench of this court in the case of Mahabir Prasad Saraogi & ors. Vs. Bibhuti Mohan Bhattacharya & ors. (AIR 1973 Patna 83). Shambhu Prasad Singh, J. with whom Shiveshwar Prasad Sinha J. concurred held that, "in construing the statute one has to look to its substance and the real intention behind the enactment. The substance of section 13(1) and the real intention behind it, in my opinion, are that once the rent is remitted by postal money order within the time mentioned in section 11(1) (d) of the Act, the landlord cannot claim eviction of the tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent. Therefore, in my opinion, tender by the tenant to the landlord before remitting rent by postal money order is not a condition precedent to such remittance." The same view was taken by the apex court in the case of Smt. Priya Bala Ghosh & Ors. Vs. Bajrang Lal Singhania & ors. (1992 BBCJ 193 (SC). 19. Therefore, in my opinion, tender by the tenant to the landlord before remitting rent by postal money order is not a condition precedent to such remittance." The same view was taken by the apex court in the case of Smt. Priya Bala Ghosh & Ors. Vs. Bajrang Lal Singhania & ors. (1992 BBCJ 193 (SC). 19. In the case before the apex court, the final court of fact, has taken the view that there was no valid tend en of rent by the tenant to the land lord and that there had been no refusal on the part of the latter to accept the same. On this premise, in the second appeal, a Bench of this Court had held that the question of validity of remittance by money order did not arise the apex court held; "The above observation would show that according to High Court it was essential that before the rent was remitted by money order, there must be tender of the rent personally to the land lord and he should have refused, the remittance of rent by money order within the time stipulated by section 11(1) (d) read with section 13 (1) can be of no avail. We are afraid that this interpretation of the relevant provision of law is too narrow to commend to us." The apex court further observed that :- "it must be realised that the law intended to ensure, on the one hand, regular payment to the landlord and on the other, protection to the tenant from a not too co-operative landlord". If the tenant is sure on account of a consistent course of conduct of the landlord that the latter will not accept the rent if paid hand to hand, it would be futile for him to make the trip every time; in such situation he would be justified in remitting rent by money order. What is it that the landlord requires? He must be assured of his rent. If the tenant pays rent, whether by hand to hand or by money order at his cost, that would not make any difference to the landlord. Why should a tenant who resorts to latter mode of payment be evicted even though he has shown readiness and willingness to pay the rent due and payable by him to the landlord? If the tenant pays rent, whether by hand to hand or by money order at his cost, that would not make any difference to the landlord. Why should a tenant who resorts to latter mode of payment be evicted even though he has shown readiness and willingness to pay the rent due and payable by him to the landlord? Law has to be broadly construed because it is not intended to trap the tenant into a situation, so that the landlord can evict him. We are afraid that the High Court construed the relevant provision of law in a rather hyper technical manner without keeping in mind the fact that the Rent Restriction Legislations were enacted to protect tenants from eviction by not too cooperative landlords." 20. Thus, the principle of law which emerges from the above mentioned decision of this Court reported in AIR 1973 Patna 83 and 1985 PLJR 923 and of the apex court in 1984 BBCJ 103 (SC); 1992 BBCJ 193 (SC) is that for a valid remittance of rent by postal money order in accordance with the provisions of section 16 (1) of the Act of 1977 corresponding to Section 13(1) of the Act of 1947 and section 19(1) of the Act of 1982 to fall in line with the requirement of clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act of 1977 corresponding to clause (d) of subsection(1) of section 11 of the Acts of 1947 and 1982, prior tender of rent by the tenant to the landlord and refusal by the latter is not a precondition. If somehow or the other, the tenant reads the mind of the landlord that he may not accept the rent offered by him hand to hand, he may validly remit the same by postal money order to avoid making default in payment of rent to incur eviction from the tenanted premises. 21. In the present case, according to the plaintiff the rent was paid and accepted upto September, 1980 in the month of October, 1980. The rent for October, 1980 was either tendered hand to hand and was avoided being received or refused, (for which there is, of course, no whisper in course of the trial); or sensing the mood of the landlady, the defendant tenant remitted the rent for that month by postal money order. The rent for October, 1980 was either tendered hand to hand and was avoided being received or refused, (for which there is, of course, no whisper in course of the trial); or sensing the mood of the landlady, the defendant tenant remitted the rent for that month by postal money order. The case of the tenant is that he went on remitting the rent even for subsequent months even after institution of the case suit a number of money order coupons with endorsements of the postal peons in respect of non-payment thereof to the payee have been adduced in evidence. Those money order coupons are Exts. D series, Ext.D/2, D/9, D/16, D/20 and D/42 are the relevant money order coupons. Remaining money order coupons are in respect of remittance for the period subsequent to the institution of the suit. In Ext. D/42, a sum of Rs. 170/- on account of rent for the month of October, 1980 is shown to be remitted and the same returned to the sender with an endorsement dated 8.12.1980 of the postal peon that the payee could not be contacted. Ext.D/16 discloses that later on a sum of Rs.340/- on account of rent for the months of October 80 and November,'80 had been remitted and the same was returned unpaid with an endorsement dated 07.1.1981 of the postal peon to the same effect. Thereafter, rent .for the months of October, November and December, 1980 amounting to Rs. 510/- had been remitted only to be returned with a report of the postal peon made on 24.1.1981. In other words, when rent for the month of October, 1980 was avoided to be received and consequently returned, rent for the months of October and November 1980 together was remitted and when the same was also avoided to be received and returned, three months' rent i.e. for October, November and December, 1980 had been remitted together. That remittance was also avoided to be received and consequently returned to the sender, the tenant. It appears that thereafter the defendant remitted rent for the month of January, 1981 only and it was returned unpaid with an endorsement dated 23.2.1981 that the payee could not be contacted. Thereafter again, rent for the months of February, 1981 only was remitted and the same was returned with endorsement dated 19.3.1981 that the payee could not be contacted as she had gone out of Ranchi. Thereafter again, rent for the months of February, 1981 only was remitted and the same was returned with endorsement dated 19.3.1981 that the payee could not be contacted as she had gone out of Ranchi. The genuineness of these money order coupons has not been disputed by the appellants. At least, the evidence of DW2, the postal peon who had taken at least, 18 of the money orders for payment has left little scope for doubting the genuineness of the money order coupons with endorsements made thereon. Therefore, if the rent for the months of October, 1980 till February, 1981 is found to be validly remitted, in such way that rent equal to two months' rent cannot be deemed to have fallen in arrear the tenant was not defaulter within the meaning of clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act of 1977. Clause (d) envisages a situation making the tenant liable to be evicted where the amount of two months' rent lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him falls in arrear by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract or in absence of such contract, by the last date of the month next following that for which rent is payable, or not having been validly remitted or deposited in accordance with section 16. Obviously, there was no written contract stipulating payment of rent on a particular date, or within a particular time, much less on the first day of the succeeding month as contained by the plaintiff. Therefore, naturally, rent for a particular month was payable by the last day of the succeeding month. If rent for two consecutive months was not paid or remitted by the last day of the third month so that two months' rent fell in arrear, the tenant was liable to be evicted. In other words, if the defendant-tenant failed to pay or remit rent for the months of October, and November, 1980 by the 31st December, 1980 he invited the mischief of clause (d) referred to above. 22. In the present case, rent for the month of October, 80 purports to have been remitted. It is not known when it was remitted. The money order coupons only bear an endorsement of the postal peon made on 8.12.1980 that the payee could not be contacted. 22. In the present case, rent for the month of October, 80 purports to have been remitted. It is not known when it was remitted. The money order coupons only bear an endorsement of the postal peon made on 8.12.1980 that the payee could not be contacted. In other words, there is no evidence of any sort, either oral or documentary, that the rent for the month of October, 1980 had been remitted by the tenant on or before 30.11.1980. Similarly, there is no evidence either oral or documentary when the rent for the months of October and November, 1980 had been remitted. Money order coupon (Exts. D/16) only evidences that on 7.1.1981 the postal peon returned the money order with endorsement that the payee could not be contacted. In other words, there is no evidence that even for the months of October and November, 1980 (together) rent had been remitted by the tenant on or before 31st. December, 1980. Indeed, rent for the months of October, November and December, 1981 can be taken to be remitted only after return of the money order with endorsement dated 7.1.1981 and the same was returned with endorsement dated 24.1.1981 (as per Ext.D/20). Thus, it is manifest that there is no evidence by and on behalf of the defendant that rent for the months of October and November, 1980 had been remitted by money order before the end of December, 1980. Even the rent for the month of October, 1980 is not shown to have been remitted before 30.11.1980. The parties were residing in the same town of Ranchi. In other words, rent was remitted from Ranchi Post Office to the land- lady residing in the same town to be paid through the same post office. Therefore, even taking the dates of endorsements made by the postal peons in respect of the money orders for the months of October, 1980 and October and November, 1980, by no stretch of imagination it can be inferred that the rent for those months had been remitted within the period prescribed under the Act. The defendant-tenant not only failed to bring on record the postal receipts which alone could be the best and conclusive evidence of the time of the remittance of the money orders in question. The defendant-tenant not only failed to bring on record the postal receipts which alone could be the best and conclusive evidence of the time of the remittance of the money orders in question. He has not even whispered either in the written statement or while in the witness box that rent for the month of October, 1980 was remitted by the last day of November next, and that rent for October, and November, 1980 had been remitted by the last day of December, 1980. 23. The trial court has held, though for different reasons that the defendant-tenant was defaulter within the meaning of clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act of 1977, the lower appellate court has reversed that finding on the ground that "endorsements of postal peon on the money order coupons show that the defendant sent money order to the plaintiff for a period ranging from 29.11.1980 to 28.3.1983 continuously". There is nothing on the record of the trial court to support the finding of the lower appellate court that the first money order on account of rent for the month of October.‘80 had been remitted by the defendant-tenant on 29.11.1980. The lower appellate court appears to have, entirely overlooked the relevant money order coupons, namely, Exts. D/42, D/16 and D/20 which show remittances on account of rent for the months of October, November and December, 1980; none of them disclose that the rent for those months had been remitted by the defendant tenant within the period prescribed by clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act of 1977. As noticed earlier, there is no evidence that the rent for the month of October, 1988 had been remitted by 30.11.1980 and that the rent for the months of October and November, 1980 had been remitted by 31.12.1980. In the circumstances, the finding of the lower appellate court that the defendant-tenant did not make default in terms of clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act of 1977 is not based on evidence. Therefore, the finding is liable to be set aside being erroneous and not founded on evidence. In the circumstances, the finding of the lower appellate court that the defendant-tenant did not make default in terms of clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act of 1977 is not based on evidence. Therefore, the finding is liable to be set aside being erroneous and not founded on evidence. Once it is found that there was arrear of rent equivalent to two months' rent payable by the tenant-defendant and due to the plaintiff-landlady in consequence of not having been either paid in cash or remitted by postal money order in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 16 of the Act of 1977, the defendant-tenant made himself liable to be evicted from the shop rooms let out to him. 24. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court is set aside. The suit of the plaintiff landlord is hereby decreed. The respondents-tenants are directed to give vacant possession of the tenanted premises to the appellants within a period of three months from this date together with arrears of rent. The respondents shall pay cost to the appellants throughout.