Judgment P.K.Deb, J. 1. This second appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 20.12.1997 passed by the lst Additional District Judge, Munger in Eviction Appeal No. 7/96 reversing the judgment and order dated 24.6.96 passed by the Munsif, lst Court in Eviction suit No. 12 of 1993. 2. The plaintiff-appellant had filed the abovementioned eviction suit for a decree of eviction of the defendant from the suit house belonging to the plaintiff on the ground of defaulter and also for a decree for a sum of Rs. 10,800/- as arrears of rent from March, 1989 till the date of the filing of the suit i.e. 24.4.1993. 3. According to the plaintiff the defendant was inducted as a tenant on two rooms on the ground floor of the tenanted house on 5.7.1982 on monthly rental of Rs. 300/- payable on the first day of every succeeding month and then the defendant started running a stationery shop and that the defendant paid rent till February, 1989 but thereafter stopped paying rent. Plaintiff developed cancer in urinary bladder for which he had been treated in A.I.I.M.S., New Delhi and for that the health of the plaintiff deteriorated and such, he required the ground floor of the house for his personal use and as a notice was sent on 5.7.1989 to the defendant for vacating the suit premises but the defendant did not vacate and hence the plaintiff brought the eviction suit bearing no. 10/90 on the ground of personal necessity. It was further stated although at that time of filing of the earlier eviction suit the ground of default was available to the plaintiff, he did not choose to that ground rather reserved his right to proceed in a separate suit as the plaintiff was anxious of getting an order of eviction on the ground of personal necessity. According to the plaintiff in that suit the defendant appeared and admitted relationship of landlord and tenant but taken a wrong statement that the rent was only Rs. 200/- per month and when the plaintiff wanted to enhance the rent there was trouble between the parties and before Anchal Adhikari, Kharagpur in a case being Misc. case No. 4/89-90 a compromise was effected between the two to the effect that the rental was at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month which should be continued and for security Rs. case No. 4/89-90 a compromise was effected between the two to the effect that the rental was at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month which should be continued and for security Rs. 20,000/- is to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff which he accordingly paid. The Eviction Suit No. 10/90 was dismissed as the bonafide personal necessity could not be proved by the plaintiff. Hence the present suit has been filed on the ground of defaulter since March, 1989 and also for arrears of rent. 4. The defendant contested the suit by filing written statement. According to him the tenancy commenced from the month of September, 1980 and not from 5. 7. 1982 as claimed by the plaintiff and that monthly rental was Rs. 200/- and till February, 1989 rent was paid regularly but when the plaintiff wanted to enhance the rent then some disagreement arose between the parties and with such allegations the plaintiff filed a petition before Anchal Adhikari, Kharagpur claiming apprehension of breach of peace and the said petition was registered as Misc. Case No. 4/89-90 and in that case at the intervention of well-wishers a compromise was arrived at between the parties and the rental of Rs. 200/- remained as it was earlier and the defendant for security had to pay a sum of Rs. 20,000/- per month which was decided to be returned at the time of leaving the tenanted premise by the defendant. According to the defendant he paid rent upto the month of January, 1991 and because of the filing of the earlier suit rent from the month of February, 1991 was remitted by money order and since then the defendant is remitting rent month to month through money order. It has further been stated that in the earlier suit the plaintiff pleaded that the defendant was defaulter from March, 1981 but in the present suit he took the plea that the defendant was defaulter since March, 1989. According to the defendant the whole claim of the plaintiff is false, frivolous and by hook or crook he wants to eject the defendant. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties several issues were framed and both parties adduced evidence in support of their respective cases. Plaintiff adduced evidence of five witnesses including the plaintiff himself. Defendant also adduced evidence of five witnesses including the defendant himself. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties several issues were framed and both parties adduced evidence in support of their respective cases. Plaintiff adduced evidence of five witnesses including the plaintiff himself. Defendant also adduced evidence of five witnesses including the defendant himself. After considering the cases of the parties both oral and documentary evidence adduced from both sides the trial court came to the finding that the case of the defendant could not be proved as the so-called compromise before Anchal Adhikari Kharagpur could not be proved and hence he held that the defendant is a defaulter and hence decree of ejectment was granted. 5. XXXXX 6. On appeal being preferred the appellate Court reversed the judgment and held that the original court committed error in not putting reliance on the compromise being arrived at between the parties in the Misc. Case before the Anchal Adhikari, Kharagpur and that the plaintiff was coming with different pleas at different times and when admittedly no rent receipt was granted then the defendants claim that he paid rent hand to hand till January, 1991 could not be construed as a false one and when since February, 1991 rent are being paid by money order the plea of defaulter could not be proved by the plaintiff and hence by reversing the decree dismissal order has been recorded by the appellate Court. 7. While admitting this second appeal a Bench of this Court formulated the following questions of law as required under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code: "(i) Whether the Court of appeal below has erred in law in reversing the findings of the trial court relating to rate of monthly rental as also default in payment of rent from March, 1989? (ii) Whether exhibits E, F and G and G/1 were admissible in evidence." 8. Mr. Tara Kant Jha, learned senior counsel appearing for and on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant on the second formulated question of law has strenuously argued that the learned appellate Court committed error of law in holding the certified copies of petition by the plaintiff the compromise petition etc., which were marked as Exts. E, F, G and G/1 before the Circle Officer, Kharagpur when it was held by the trial Court that those are totally inadmissible in evidence. E, F, G and G/1 before the Circle Officer, Kharagpur when it was held by the trial Court that those are totally inadmissible in evidence. According to him the reasonings given by the learned appellate Court by referring to Section 79 of the Evidence Act was not at all proper and justified rather the reasonings given by the trial court were more appropriate in rendering the abovementioned exhibits as inadmissible in evidence. It is submitted by Mr. Jha that when the plaintiff is fighting before the Civil Court again and again for eviction there was no reason as to why he would go before the Anchal Adhikari pressing for eviction of the defendant. On the other hand Mr. Parbat appearing for and on behalf of the respondent has justified the findings of the appellate Court by referring to Section 79 of the Evidence Act and the contents of those exhibits. 9. The relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is admitted. As per the records as has been pleaded from the side of the defendant continuously in both of his written statements filed earlier and in the present suit that the defendant was inducted as a tenant in the suit premises from September, 1980 on the rental of Rs. 200/- but when the plaintiff wanted to enhance the rate of rent a trouble started and with the apprehension of breach of peace he brought allegations by filing a petition before the Anchal Adhikari, Kharagpur to the effect that when he wanted to enhance the rent then the defendant and his son started threatening the plaintiff and, as such, he thought it proper by filing petition before the Anchal Adhikari. Notice was sent by registering the case as Misc. case under Section 144 of the Cr.P.C. as contemplated under Chapter X of the Cr.P.C. to the defendant and his son, and in that proceeding according to the defendant at the intervention of well-wishers a compromise was arrived at and in that compromise petition both the parties signed, the rental of Rs. 200/- was maintained regarding the tenancy but the defendant as per that compromise was to pay Rs. 20,000/- as security to the plaintiff which would be returned at the time of vacating the premises which according to the defendant had made payment of. 200/- was maintained regarding the tenancy but the defendant as per that compromise was to pay Rs. 20,000/- as security to the plaintiff which would be returned at the time of vacating the premises which according to the defendant had made payment of. On the other hand the plaintiff at the very outset stated that those are only forged and fabricated documents he never filed any petition before the Anchal Adhikari nor there was any compromise being effected between the parties. He submitted that the original records regarding that Misc. case was never brought and, as such certified copies marked as exhibits were illegal and could not be relied on. Thus it appears that such petition for apprehenion of breach of peace may be filed by either of the parties seeking relief of protection before the Executive Magistrate as per Chapter X of the Cr.P.C. and if such compromise is arrived at between the parties then the same may not be said to be inadmissible on the face of it but the same may not be construed as an agreement of tenancy between the two rather the same may be construed as a rent note and may be utilised for the collateral purposes for adjudicating the dispute between the parties. Mr. Jha learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that those documents are totally inadmissible in evidence. l have gone through those documents. It is not that such documents were being created in a Court where there was no jurisdiction. Definitely dispute between the tenant and the landlord cannot be adjudicated by an Executive Magistrate and only the Civil Court has the power or the rent Controller relating to the nature of the dispute between the parties but irrespective of their relations if there is any apprehension of breach of peace then either of the parties may knock the doors of an Executive Magistrate and in that way the contents of the ext. E. i.e. the copy of the petition filed by the plaintiff before Anchal Adhikari, Kharagpur cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. E. i.e. the copy of the petition filed by the plaintiff before Anchal Adhikari, Kharagpur cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. He sought for protection when he apprehended breach of peace from the side of the defendant and his son and such compromise was arrived at in between the parties for subsiding the apprehension of breach of peace and the compromise petition was entertained and the proceeding was dropped on the basis of that compromise petition It cannot be said that the compromise arrived at before the Anchal Adhikari is to tally outside the jurisdiction but for limited purpose of minimising the apprehension of breach of peace and for maintaining public peace and tranquility such com promise may be accepted and implemented too but whether that compromise would govern the terms and conditions of the tenancy or not is a matter to be considered which l shall do later. Regarding the admissibility of those documents it appears that the original of those documents had been called for but it was reportea from the Anchal Adhikaris office that the records were not available meaning thereby the records must be destroyed by that time. Such sort of cases are not kept permanently and, as such, the case records might be destroyed but certified copies of the orders, petition, compromise petition before an authorised Court are definitely admissible by adverting to Section 79 of the Evidence Act when the originals are not available. l do not find that the learned appellate Court has committed any error of law in this regard rather the original Court committed error when it was held by the original Court that as the plaintiff had raised objection that those documents have been manufactured, concocted and forged by the defendant in collusion with the revenue authority then unless those documents are proved in original the certified copies are not admissible. Here there is commission of error of law by the learned Munsif. The certified copy of a document is admissible if the original is not available. Here the originals are not available as is reported from the revenue Court. Then the certified copies are definitely admissible by adverting to Section 79 of the Evidence Act. Forgery and concoction as has been raised from the side of the plaintiff should not thrash the burden of proving of these documents to the defendant. Here the originals are not available as is reported from the revenue Court. Then the certified copies are definitely admissible by adverting to Section 79 of the Evidence Act. Forgery and concoction as has been raised from the side of the plaintiff should not thrash the burden of proving of these documents to the defendant. He has prima facie proved the admissibility of the documents. The proof of forgery and concoction always lies on the person who claims so. In that scope the plaintiff has miserably failed that those documents have been forged and manufactured. In that way the admissibility of the documents as held by the appellate Court is proper and just and cannot be said to be illegal. 10. How far the compromise petition recorded between the parties by the Anchal Adhikari would be admissible for the purpose of deciding the disputed fact of terms and conditions between the tenant and the landlord is totally a different matter then the admissibility of the documents in the evidence. Such terms and conditions were considered and accepted by Anchal Adhikari for the purpose of maintaining peace and tranquility and that might not create a fresh tenancy between the two as it was admitted fact when the compromise was effected there was already a relationship of landlord and tenant between the two. So that terms and conditions as per the compromise petition may not be totally applicable for the purpose of deciding the rights and liabilities of the tenant and the landlord but the same can be construed for col- lateral purposes. Such is the commence- ment of the tenancy, the nature of tenancy etc, etc., Mr. Jha has submitted that even if such compromise is con- strued to be admissible then also it has the semblance of an award during the ar- bitration proceeding and, as such, the said award cannot be implemented unless the same is made a rule of Court by fol- lowing the procedure of the Arbitration Act. I am not at all convinced with such submissions of Mr. Jha. The said com- promise as I have already stated was not a result of an arbitration between the par- ties and the Anchal Adhikari was not set up as an arbitrator for deciding the dis- pute between the landlord and the tenant. I am not at all convinced with such submissions of Mr. Jha. The said com- promise as I have already stated was not a result of an arbitration between the par- ties and the Anchal Adhikari was not set up as an arbitrator for deciding the dis- pute between the landlord and the tenant. It is only a compromise being affected be- tween the two parties for maintaining public peace and tranquility and at best can be construed as a rent note between the tenant and landlord and the same can be used for collateral purposes as has been mentioned earlier. Thus the first substantial question of law as formulated is answered in the positive and in favour of the defendant-tenant-respondent. 11. Regarding the first substantial question of law as formulated is a bit vague one. The same related to factual aspect. Here in the present case two facts finding Courts have come to a dif- ferent findings on appreciation of the evidence on record. The original Court to- tally disbelieved Exts. E to G holding the same to be inadmissible in the evidence and, as such came to an erroneous find- ing that the rate of rent was never Rs. 200/- but it was Rs. 300/- per month. Regarding the rate of rent as Rs. 300/- per month the learned appellate Court gave a cogent finding by referring to the evidence on record. The plaintiffs averment that the rate of rent was Rs. 300/- per month is based totally on the oral evidence of the plaintiff and his so-called three witnesses. The evidence of those witnesses had been correctly disbelieved by the learned Court below as they were remembering the rate of rent it was once paid about seven years back. Such oral statement has been rightly rejected by the learned court below as contrary to written documents in Exts. E, F and G. Thus, the rate of rent was definitely Rs. 200/- per month at least from the date when the compromise was effected between the landlord and the tenant. Regarding the defaulter clause it appears that the plaintiff has taken different stands at different stage. In the earlier eviction suit although the defaulter ground was available he did not take it. 200/- per month at least from the date when the compromise was effected between the landlord and the tenant. Regarding the defaulter clause it appears that the plaintiff has taken different stands at different stage. In the earlier eviction suit although the defaulter ground was available he did not take it. Although the same do not stand as a barrier under Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C. for filing a fresh suit on the ground for the purpose of eviction but the stand of the plaintiff should be construed in the light of the plaints filed in two eviction suits. In the earlier eviction suit he stated that the defendant was defaulter since March, 1981 and now he is saying that he is defaulter from March, 1989. It is the admitted case of both the parties that no rent receipt was given by the landlord while receiving rent from the defendant. From February, 1991 he was paying rent through money order although the rent of February, and March was sent at a time in the month of April, 1991 then the defendant can be held to be a defaulter for the month of February, 1991 but as per BBC Act default for two months is necessary for the purpose of eviction. After April, 1991 rent was being remitted regularly through money order month to month. When the plaintiffs stand on the ground of defaulter differs from his own side then there remains a doubt as to the defaulter clause itself. In the earlier suit the plaintiff stated that the defendant was defaulter from March, 1981 but he did not pray for eviction on the ground of defaulter. The reason was given that as he needed the suit premises on personal ground very urgently he filed the earlier eviction suit on the ground of personal necessity to get the decree on summary proceeding as contemplated under Section 14 of the BBC Act. But such reasonings given by the plaintiff- landlord is not at all convincing because defaulter ground under Section 11 of the BBC Act also comes within the purview of summary proceeding under Section 14 of the BBC Act. When he stated defaulter ground on different occasions at different periods then it must be held that the plaintiff is himself confused as to from when the defendant became a defaulter. When he stated defaulter ground on different occasions at different periods then it must be held that the plaintiff is himself confused as to from when the defendant became a defaulter. When admittedly no rent receipt was granted by the landlord then the advantage goes in favour of the defendant himself. Moreover as plea of counter claim the defendant has already mentioned that he paid Rs. 20,000/- towards security for payment of rent which has to be returned to the defendant at the time of ejectment or vacating of the suit premises and the defendant has stated by adducing evidence that the said Rs. 20,000/- was paid. The evidence of D.W.4 may be referred to that effect then if that amount is there in the hands of the plaintiff until and unless the same is being exhausted by adjustment towards the arrears rent, if any, the ground of default cannot be maintained for the purpose of eviction. The reasonings given by the appellate Court is proper and justified in dismissing the plaintiffs suit for eviction and he has rightly reversed the judgment of the original Court and all points decided by the original Court has been reversed by giving reasons. Hence, l do not find that appellate judgment suffers from any illegality. In that way the substantial questions of law formulated in this appeal are decided as mentioned above and in favour of the respondent-tenant. The appeal fails having no force at all. Thus the second appeal is hereby dismissed with costs.