Judgment : This petition is to condone the delay of 686 days in filing the appeal. 2. This petition has arisen in this way: There was land acquisition proceeding under which certain lands were acquired for the purpose of providing house sites to Adi Dravidars. The Land Acquisition Officer fixed the land value at Rs.100 per cent. The matter was referred under Sec.18 of the Land Acquisition Act to the court, i.e., to the learned Sub Judge, Ranipet, who took the reference on file in L.A.O.P.No.3 of 1994. The learned Sub Judge enhanced the compensation at Rs.375 per cent. Aggrieved by the orders passed by the learned Sub Judge, the appellant, the Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Adi Dravidars Welfare, Vellore, has come forward with an appeal to this Court. The judgment was pronounced 8. 1996. The certified copies were obtained on 9. 1996, but the appeal could not be filed in time. There had been a delay of 686 days in filing the appeal. The reason given by the appellant in his affidavit is that during November to February, 1998, the entire staff was fully engaged in general election and the post of Special Tahsildar, Adi Dravidar Welfare, was vacant for three months from 1. 1998, that the Collector had taken 176 days for according sanction for filing the appeal, that it was due to administrative delay; that the Collector has to look after the development works of the district, law and order problems etc. and therefore, there had been a delay and the delay should be condoned. 3. The respondent filed counter, contending that the delay has not been properly explained, and that the reasons given in the affidavit are all flimsy reasons. 4. Heard both the sides, It is evident that the learned Sub Judge has pronounced judgment on 8. 1996. The copy application was filed on 18. 1996 and the copies were made ready on 9. 1996. No cause is given for not preferring an appeal from 9. 1996 to November, 1998. Though it is stated that during the month of November to February, 1998, the staff members were fully engaged in general election work. Why there is delay from 9. 1996 to November, 1997 had not been explained. Then again, the fact that post of Special Tahsildar was vacant from 1. 1996 to November, 1998. Though it is stated that during the month of November to February, 1998, the staff members were fully engaged in general election work. Why there is delay from 9. 1996 to November, 1997 had not been explained. Then again, the fact that post of Special Tahsildar was vacant from 1. 1998 is also not an acceptable ground to condone the delay, because it is not as if none would have been incharge of that post. After all, the maxim ‘The king is dead; long live the king’ applies to all governmental organisations. Then again, the engagement of the staff from November to February, 1998 in election work is not an acceptable for the delay in sending letter to the Collector for sanction on 4. 1998. Admittedly, the Collector has taken 176 days in according sanction. It is stated that this is all administrative exigencies. Such contention cannot at all be accepted. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent cited the following authorities to stress that the delay in this case should not be condoned. • (i) In Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Sakuntala Ganapathy Rao , (1998)3 C.T.C. 170 (D.B.) C.Shivappa and K.Natarajan, JJ., have pointed out that reason for delay mentioned as “administrative delay”, is not a proper explanation to show that it has sufficient cause. Their Lordships have observed that the legal right accrued in favour of other party due to expiry of limitation for filing appeal should not be light-heartedly disturbed and discretion vested in court to condone delay should be exercised to advance substantial justice when party approaching court is not guilty of negligence or inaction or want of bona fides. .• (ii) In P.K.Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and another P.K.Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and another P.K.Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and another , J.T. (1998)7 S.C. 21 where there had been delay of 565 days, it was held the explanation showing that “Advocate Generals office was fed up with so many arbitration cases pending consideration, can be hardly taken as a reasonable, satisfactory or even proper explanation. .• (iii) In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Amroha v. Ganga Ram , A.I.R. 1992 All. .• (iii) In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Amroha v. Ganga Ram , A.I.R. 1992 All. 275 (D.B.) their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court has pointed out that plea of public interest is not a ground to give any different footing to Body Corporate having trappings of instrumentality of state, in considering the explanation, their Lordships refused to condone the delay in that case. .• (iv) Then again, in Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad v. Voltas Ltd. , A.I.R. 1995 Guj. 29 (F.B.) a Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court have observed that the phrase ‘sufficient cause; is not a question of principle, but is a question of fact and mere plea that the delay was due to administrative reasons cannot by itself establish sufficient cause. .• (v) In Sivasubramaniam and four others v. The Collector, Periyar District Sivasubramaniam and four others v. The Collector, Periyar District Sivasubramaniam and four others v. The Collector, Periyar District , (1998)3 L.W. 648 an identical question came up before my learned brother S.Jagadeesan, J. for condonation of delay of 646 days sought for by the Collector, Periyar District, the noble Judge pointed out that explanation that due to change of clerks, the intimation had not been put up in the file cannot be accepted in the absence of any details or particulars. .• (vi) In M/s.Democratic Builders v. Union of India M/s.Democratic Builders v. Union of India M/s.Democratic Builders v. Union of India , A.I.R. 1993 Del. 132 the Delhi High Court has held that if there is no sufficient and cogent reasons given for the delay of certain period, the delay is not liable to be condoned. .• (vii) In Jayaverchand v. Balan Jayaverchand v. Balan Jayaverchand v. Balan , (1990)1 L.W. 486 wherein a Rent Control Proceedings, there was a delay of 1650 days in applying to set aside the dismissal of a petition, it was held that allegation by the tenant that landlord had assured him that he will not be dispossessed by landlord, was not a sufficient cause. and • (viii) In a recent decision reported in Union of India v. Brij Lal Prabhu Dayal , A.I.R. 1999 Raj. 216 it was held that if the party fails to place sufficient facts, no presumption can be drawn that there must be sufficient cause for condonation of delay. 6. In the instant case, the delay that had occurred from 9. 216 it was held that if the party fails to place sufficient facts, no presumption can be drawn that there must be sufficient cause for condonation of delay. 6. In the instant case, the delay that had occurred from 9. 1996 till February, 1998 had not been properly explained. The staff were engaged in general election cannot be accepted as sufficient cause, because it cannot be said that the staff were engaged for nearly one year and two months. The fact that the office of the Special Tahsildar, Adi Dravidar Welfare was vacant is also not a ground, because someone also should be incharge of the office of the Special Tahsildar, Adi Dravidar Welfare, So also the time taken by the Collector, i.e., 176 days in according sanction is also not explained. The explanation is that the Collector has to look after eight taluks apart from law and order problem in the district and also the development work, which has caused administrative delay is ludicrous. After all, these are part of the duties of the Collector. He has to attend to those works also when he is entrusted the work. He has to carry on the work and at the same time when the matter involves exchequer, he should be doubly caution and ought to have looked into the matter early. I consider that the petitioner had not put forth any sufficient cause to condone the delay. This petition is therefore dismissed.