NASEEM UDDIN, J. This revision has been filed by Ashish Gupta against the order of framing of the charge on 1-6-1998 passed by Shri Gaya Prasad, Sessions Judge, Kheri in S. T. No. 332/98. 2. Counsel for both the parties were heard in detail. 3. On 3-2-1998 at 8. 15 a. m. an F. I. R. was lodged with the police by Dr. Rochak Tandon with the allegation that on 2-2-1998 at about 11 p. m. while his father Dr. Vipin Tandon had gone to attend the mar riage of the niece of one Satyendra Gupta then some unknown person at about 11. 30 p. m. opened fire on his father at the time of dwarghat at the gate. That the shot hit the head of the father who fell down. That he was brought to the hospital where he succumbed to his injury at 1. 30 a. m. that morning. On the basis of this F. I. R. a case was registered and the Investigating Of ficer recorded the statements of witnesses Anuj Pratap Singh (Annexure No. 3 to the petition of revision), Anoop Kumar Gupta (Annexure No. 4 to the petition of revision), Raj Kamal (Annexure No. 5 to the petition of revision), Ajai Kumar (An nexure No. 6 to the petition of revision), Rajesh Srivastava (Annexure No. 7 to the revision), Rakesh Mohan Gupta (An nexure No. 8 to the petition of revision) and others. All these witnesses gave the same story of the unfortunate incident which took place at the time of the ceremony of dwarghat at Khcri Club at the gate. It was stated by these witnesses that while several persons were standing closely, including the aforementioned per sons and including Dr. Vipin Tandon, for the purposes of welcoming the barat and the barat had arrived at from there about 30-35 paces away from him then Ashish Gupta, revisionist opened a fire in the air by raising his haiid having a tamancha, but the fire missed. That Ashish Gupta handed over the pistol to Rinkoo Nigam, who was standing beside him, for opening the fire. That Rinkoo Nigam also raised his hand with the Tamancha and pulled the trigger of the pistol in the air, but again the fire missed and did not open. That Ashish Gupta handed over the pistol to Rinkoo Nigam, who was standing beside him, for opening the fire. That Rinkoo Nigam also raised his hand with the Tamancha and pulled the trigger of the pistol in the air, but again the fire missed and did not open. That Rinkoo Nigam then took out the cartridge of the pistol and the cartridge was taken over by Ashish Gupta who rubbed it against his pant and handed it back over to Rinkoo. That Rinkoo loaded the cartridge again in the pistol and tried to raise his hand for opening fire in the air, whereupon at the same time Ashish Gupta asked him to handover the pistol to him for the purpose of opening the fire. That Rinkoo Nigam told him that he would open the fire. That during this exchange of words and attempt to take the pistol the fire opened suddenly and hit the head. of Dr. Vipin Tandon in the back, due to which the injured fell down. The two persons ran away. Dr. Tandon was brought to the hospital tor treatment. These facts were considered by the learned Sessions Judge while passing orders for framing the charges. The learned Sessions Judge was influenced by the fact that the pistol (Katta) in question was an illegal weapon and rejected the plea of the revisionist-accused regarding the case being the result of an accident and found that it was a case of murder and framed the charge accordingly. Section 304-A runs as follows: "304-A. Causing death by negligence- Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide shall be punished with im prisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. " 4. The definition of this section makes it clear that there should not be element of any motive or intention and the rash or negligent act should not amount to culpable homicide. Culpable homicide has been defined under Section 299. I. P. C. , which runs as follows: "299. " 4. The definition of this section makes it clear that there should not be element of any motive or intention and the rash or negligent act should not amount to culpable homicide. Culpable homicide has been defined under Section 299. I. P. C. , which runs as follows: "299. Culpable homicide-Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention c if causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide. " 5. This definition makes it clear that for the offence of culpable homicide there should be an intention of causing death, or an intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. 6. In the instant case there is no al legation that the fire was opened with the intention of causing death or causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. There is also no ground to hold that inten tion of opening fire in the air would amount to the knowledge that death would be the result. 7. Learned Counsel for the revisionist in this connection cited the case of Mrs. Meera Puri v. The Stale of Nagaland, 1971 Cri. L. J. 539. In this case the accused was alleged to have opened fire by means of a rifle with the knowledge that the children and others were neara bout. The bullet hit a child and killed him. On these facts it was held that the act of accused was rash and negligent and direct proximate and efficient cause of death. The accused was held not guilty of culpable homicide but was found guilty under Section 304-A, I. P. C. The case reported in AIR 1965 SC 1616 : (1902) 4 Bom LR 676 and AIR 1954 All 186; AIR 1954 SC 271 were also relied upon in this case. 8. In the present case also the persons attending the marriage party were nearabout and the facts of the present case are similar to the facts of Mrs. Meera Puris case (supra ). 9. In the case of Kumkitm Pmdhan v. State, Cri. 8. In the present case also the persons attending the marriage party were nearabout and the facts of the present case are similar to the facts of Mrs. Meera Puris case (supra ). 9. In the case of Kumkitm Pmdhan v. State, Cri. L. J. 251, an arrow was shot from a distance of ten feet from the road which was very frequently used without taking due care and caution as is expected of a reasonable man, was found to be imputing only a culpable rashness and wanton neglect of the civic duty owed by a men. It was observed as follows: "the accused in shooting an arrow must be imputed with the knowledge that he was under taking a very dangerous act which could cause injury to others and that he was entirely indifferent to the consequences. The act was committed without taking any reasonable and proper care. " "there fore when because of such negligent shooting a person died, hut in absence of any motive or intention on his part to kill the deceased he must be held guilty of an offence under Section 304- A, I. P. O. and not under Sec tion 302 there of. " 10. In the case 1972 Cri LJ 496 was followed. It was held in AIR 1972 SC 685 : 1972 Cri LJ 496, S. M. Hussain v. State of Andhra Pradesh that "criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so and that it may cause injury. "the criminality lies in such a case in running the risk of distinguish an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence, on the other hand, is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precau tion to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in par ticular, which, having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duly of the accused person to have adopted. The ap pellant must be imputed with the knowledge that he was undertaking a very dangerous act which could cause injury to others and that he was entirely indifferent to the consequences. The act was com mitted without taking any reasonable and proper care. 11. The ap pellant must be imputed with the knowledge that he was undertaking a very dangerous act which could cause injury to others and that he was entirely indifferent to the consequences. The act was com mitted without taking any reasonable and proper care. 11. In the present case also knowledge can be imputed to the persons allegedly responsible for this act that by trying to take the pistol from each other they were just doing a dangerous act. So the knowledge could be imputed only that the alleged persons were undertaking a very dangerous act by snatching the pistol from each other which could have caused injury to others. These persons can be deemed to have knowledge also to the effect that these persons were intentional ly indifferences to the consequences of their entering into a small scuffle for the purposes of taking the pistol from one to the other. The facts gathered during the investigation remained consistent as is evi dent from the perusal of the case diary, which was also brought before this Court. Since there was no motive or intention, therefore, there was no question of commission of a crime covered by the definition of culpable homicide under Section 299, I. P. C. It could best be an offence punishable under Sec tion 304-A, I. P. C. at all. 12. That the Tamancha was an un licensed one and may make out an offence under the Arms Act but simply because the Tamancha is alleged to be without a licence does not mean that there was a motive or intention or knowledge to commit mur der. Whether the Tamancha was licensed or not does not affect the case being out of the clutches of culpable homicide as defined under Section 299, I. P. C. The learned Sessions Judge therefore should not have framed the charge under Section 302, I. P. C. the learned Sessions Judge erred when in the impugned order it was held that from the alleged facts a case for murder was made out. It appears from the facts of the case as discussed above that it is not a case of culpable homicide. It appears from the facts of the case as discussed above that it is not a case of culpable homicide. When it is not a case of culpable homicide the neces sary consequence is that it is not a case of murder punishable under Section 302, I. P. C. and as defined under Section 300, I. P. C. Culpable homicide is murder in the circumstances enumerated in Section 300, I. P. C. Since the learned Sessions Judge erred in framing the charge under Section 302, I. P. C, therefore, the revision has got force and has to be allowed. The revision is allowed. Order under revision dated 1-6-1998 is set aside and in consequence the charge framed under Section 302/34, I. P. C. on 1- 6-1998 is also set aside. The learned Sessions Judge shall proceed with the case taking it to be a case not being one of culpable homicide as observed in the body of the judgment in accordance with law. The parties shall appear before the learned Sessions Judge for further or ders/trial on 11-10-1998. Let the record of the trial Court be transmitted forthwith to the trial Court by Special Messenger with in l0days. Revision allowed. .