Judgment : The above batch of writ petitions have been filed by different writ petitioners either praying to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus or a declaration calling for the records of the second respondent/Commissioner, Corporation of Madras thereby levying vector service charges for providing planning permission for the proposed buildings at various places in Madras and quash the same as illegal without quid pro quo and violative of Art.14 of the Constitution of India and consequently forbear the respondents from giving effect to the S.O.Council Resolution No.311/92, dated 25. 1992 of the Corporation of Madras and further direct the second respondent/Commissioner, Corporation of Madras not to insist upon the levy of such vector service charges and to pass such other or further orders as this court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. In short, all the above batch of the writ petitions have been filed either to quash or to declare null and void the proceedings of the second respondent/Commissioner, Corporation of Madras thereby levying vector service charges for providing planning permission for the proposed buildings as illegal and arbitrary. 2. Though each petition would slightly differ from the point of approach from the other or others, all the petitions are pointed towards quashing the proceedings of the second respondent/Commissioner, Corporation of Madras thereby levying ‘vector service charges’ either by a writ of certiorarified mandamus or by a writ of declaration and hence it has become incumbent to hold a common enquiry into all the above writ petitions and to pass a common order since either in one way or other, the relief sought for is one and the same or vitally related to each other. 3. At this juncture, it is relevant to extract the impugned proceeding of the second respondent/Commissioner, Corporation of Madras passed in H.D. (M.C.) C.No.EA.11/92, dated 7. 1992, which is as under: “The Special Officer in Council has resolved to collect a fee of Rs.1 per sq.ft. as Vector Control Charges towards the vector control services that is proposed to be provided at the sites of new building construction as part of the control measures to tackle the problem of malaria in the City of Madras. 2. The City Engineer will arrange to collect the vector Control Charges at the rate of Rs.1 per square foot as service charges for a period of one year along with the licence fee. 2. The City Engineer will arrange to collect the vector Control Charges at the rate of Rs.1 per square foot as service charges for a period of one year along with the licence fee. The Collection of vector control charges should be made applicable only in respect of new constructions with 1000 sq.ft. and above. 3. The Executive Engineer, Town Planning will communicate the details of building licenses issued by him to the concerned Zonal Officers in the prescribed format enclosed herewith a copy to the Chief Vector Control Officer, so as to enable them to take necessary further follow up action in undertaking weekly spray operations at the sites of new construction. 4. The fee collected for Vector Control Services should be credited to the” Head of Account 041-Other Fees-under the Health Department.“ 5. Since the mosquitogenic sources prevailing at the new sites of new constructions are responsible for causing focal out break of malaria in the vicinity of such new constructions, all the Assistant Health Officers/Senior Entomologist will bestow their personal attention in undertaking larvicidal treatment in all such breeding sources. A separate squad with adequate spray and supervisory staff should be formed for this purpose at the level of the Unit or at the level of Zone depending on the needs of such Zone. They should ensure that all the new construction sites are covered with systematic weekly spray operations without giving room for any complaint. 6. An acknowledgment should also be obtained by the spray Squad from the construction sites in token of having covered the sites by spray measures and this should be cross checked by the inspecting officers. 7. A separate register should also be maintained indicating therein the details of weekly coverage of building construction sites. They should also submit a report in this regard along with their monthly technical report in the format that is prescribed.” 4. 7. A separate register should also be maintained indicating therein the details of weekly coverage of building construction sites. They should also submit a report in this regard along with their monthly technical report in the format that is prescribed.” 4. As regards the pleadings, the common grounds of attack of the levy of the vector service charges are: .• (i) that the second respondent has no right to levy a charge in the nature of the ‘Vector Service Charge’ since the second respondent is not directed by the first respondent/Government of Tamil Nadu by any letter or by Government order for the time being in force empowering to make such levy from the persons applying for approval of the building plans; • (ii) that under Chapter 10 of the Tamil Nadu City Municipalities Act and under Secs.230 to 257, the second respondent is empowered to levy, assess and recover plan sanctioning charges subject to the rules under the Act and as per direction from the Government and that without previous sanction from the Government, levying of vector service charges by the second respondent is not authorised or directed to make levy of such charges at the time of the building permission and the same is illegal; .• (iii) that the impugned order dated 17. 1992 to levy vector service charges and the resolution passed are ex facie illegal, without the authority of law, arbitrary and discriminatory thereby violative of Arts.14, 19(1)(g) and 300-A of the Constitution of India; .• (iv) that the vector control charges is in the nature of a fee and any fee or tax can only be collected by authority of law or should be traceable to statutory powers vested with the Corporation of Madras; .• (v) that neither the Corporation is empowered to collect such fee of Re.1 per sq.ft. from those who construct building in 1000 sq.ft. from those who construct building in 1000 sq.ft. and above under the Town and Country Planning Act or under the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act and such a levy is without the authority of law and liable to be interfered with since being arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional; .• (vi) that the impugned order is also, on the face of it, discriminatory; .• (vii) that it is the bounden duty of the Corporation to eradicate the malaria arising out of mosquito menace but that cannot be done by means of illegal taxation such as Vector Control charges, which power the Corporation does not possess; .• (viii) that even though there is a statutory sanction for levying licence fee for the building plan or permission granted under the City Municipal Corporation Act as a statutory fee, the levy of vector service charges is not supported by any statutory law or regulation or rulings and therefore ex facie without jurisdiction; and (ix) that it is the fee which requires to satisfy the principles of quid pro quo and the collection of the said charges only from the persons, who apply for new constructions above 1000 sq.ft. is without quid pro quo. 5. is without quid pro quo. 5. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Nos.2 and 3 in W.P.No.14845 of 1992, praying to adopt it for the other writ petitions also so far as the general application of facts and law are concerned, it would be contended that on a overall survey made by the officers of the Health Department of the Corporation of Chennai it came to be known that the City of Chennai recorded the largest number of malaria cases among all the metropolitan cities in the country and the City of Madras contributing nearly 50% of the total malaria cases recorded in a year in the entire State of Tamil Nadu; that moreover, the incidents also showed a steep increase from the year 1987 to 1992; that the magnitude of the problem of malaria in Chennai requires preventive measures on war footing to control mosquitoes which transmit malaria; that on a survey made, it came to light that the vector mosquito by name “Anopheles Stephensi” transmits malaria and breeds only in fresh water stagnations especially the stagnant pools of water kept for construction as well as curing at buildings construction sites, which are the ideal breeding grounds for these vector mosquitoes; that the workers engaged in and around such constructions serve as potential carriers of malaria diseases and such out-break of malaria could only be brought under control by systematic weekly application of mosquito larvicides over the water collections around the new construction sites and therefore in Resolution No.311/92, the Special Officer Council considered the necessity and urgency of measures to provide vector control services for all the building construction sites at a huge amount and hence collection of the vector control charges from the new builders has become inevitable that too charging a meager sum of Rs.1 per sq.ft. with the construction site of more than 1000 sq.ft.; that Secs.83 to 85 of the Tamil Nadu Public Health Act, 1939 gives enormous powers to the Health officer to do such things regarding the preventive measures to be adopted and to recover the cost of doing so from the owner or occupier of the property as the case may be in the same manner as if it were a property tax and hence the proceedings issued by the Commissioner dated 7. 1992 is perfectly valid in law especially when it is supported by provisions of the Chapter IX of the Act, 1939 and it cannot be said that there is no power to levy such charges; that the petitioners cannot have any grievance against the impugned proceedings as violative of Arts.14, 19(1)(g) and 300-A of the Constitution of India; that there is no question of arbitrary fixation of the vector service charges and the charge of Rs.1 per sq.ft. is for one year and if the construction is not completed within one year, the Corporation of Madras is bound to collect a sum of Rs.1 per sq.ft. till such construction is completed. The counter would also furnish the list of the incidents of malaria after the launching of the scheme in the year 1993 showing thereby that the incidents had been enormously reduced from the year 1993 to 1997. With these and such other contentions, the respondents would pray to dismiss the writ petitions with costs. 6. During arguments, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.14845 of 1992 would contend that under the Tamil Nadu Public Health Act, 1939 itself, the particular mode of levying of charges is provided with; that the petitioner has to pay the development charges, extra-development charges, intrastructural development charges, security deposit, open space reservation charges etc. Citing Secs.83 to 85 of the Tamil Nadu Public Health Act, 1939 the learned counsel would point out that as to how and in what manner the Health Officers are provided with such powers to maintain health and would cite judgments reported in A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 267, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 295 and A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 634 and would state that all these three judgments are on the same principle that if a statute prescribes the particular mode of exercising power, then it shall be exercised in the mode prescribed or not at all. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner would point out that the Corporation cannot impose any duty without any Government order or notification by the Government empowering the Corporation to collect the same; that in para No.13 of the counter, it is conceded by the respondents 2 and 3 and that for discharging its own duty, the Corporation cannot levy a fee. The learned counsel would then cite another judgment of the Apex Court delivered in The Corporation of Calcutta and another v. Liberty Cinema The Corporation of Calcutta and another v. Liberty Cinema The Corporation of Calcutta and another v. Liberty Cinema , A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1107 wherein under the Calcutta Municipal Act, it is held: “The levy authorised by Sec.548 Calcutta Municipal Act is a tax and not a fee in return for service to be rendered by the Corporation. The Act does not provide for any services of special kind being rendered resulting in benefits to the person on whom it is imposed. The work of inspection done by the Corporation which is only to see that the terms of the licence are observed by the licencee is not a service to him. No question here arises of correlating the amount of the levy to the costs of any service… In order to make a levy a fee for services rendered the levy must confer special benefit on the persons on whom it is imposed.” Citing the above judgment, the learned counsel for the petitioner would point out that Sec.98 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act enumerates all the taxes; that Sec.249 specifies the powers of the council to make bye-laws but nowhere it is seen that the Corporation is conferred with power to collect fee for maintaining sanitation, which can be conferred with Sub-sec.22(b) of Sec.249; that since fee is collected only in respect of buildings having more than 1000 sq.ft., it is nothing but discrimination; that it is not correct to say that new construction alone gives way for breeding of mosquitoes; that it is the bounden duty of the Corporation to prevent malaria thus safeguarding the general public. 8. The learned counsel would cite yet another judgment of the Apex Court delivered in Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority v. Sharadkmar Jayanti Kumar Pasawalla and others Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority v. Sharadkmar Jayanti Kumar Pasawalla and others Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority v. Sharadkmar Jayanti Kumar Pasawalla and others , A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 2038 wherein it has been held that: “A delegated authority can impose tax or fee. Such power of imposition of tax and/or fee by delegated authority must be very specific and there is no scope of implied authority for imposition of such tax or fee. Such power of imposition of tax and/or fee by delegated authority must be very specific and there is no scope of implied authority for imposition of such tax or fee. The delegated authority must act strictly within the parameters of the authority delegated to it under the Act and it will not be proper to bring the theory of implied intent or the concept of incidental and ancillary power in the matter of exercise of fiscal power.“ All the other counsel for the petitioners in all other writ petitions would adopt the above arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.14845 of 1992. 9. In reply, citing the impugned order dated 7. 1992 and the resolution dated 25. 9. In reply, citing the impugned order dated 7. 1992 and the resolution dated 25. 1992, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents Corporation of Madras would contend that the resolution and the impugned order has been approved by the Corporation thereby giving the reason for the vector charges being levied; that the main objection is that the Corporation does not have the power to levy such charges; that Sec.98 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act enumerates the taxes and duties; that Sec.5 deals with the constitution of the council; that the Corporation has decided to constitute a separate wing containing separate staff to control and totally eliminate malaria; that the argument of the writ petitioner that the new constructions are one of the sources for breeding mosquitoes and unless all others are taxed, they cannot be taxed is wrong; that regarding the spreading areas, the question of discrimination does not arise; that after a thorough investigation, the Corporation came to the conclusion that the new constructions are the main sources of breeding mosquitoes and hence decided to collect the vector service charges from them; that it is only the beginning made and the same is going to spread to other areas also; that the principle of quid pro quo is found in constituting specially engaged staff, a special squad to assure systematic interest since the entire residency of the City of Madras ought to have been protected from malaria; that constructions are stagnating water which and become the main breeding center for mosquitores and discrimination is totally unfounded; that a study has been done by the authorities of the Corporation and ultimately decided that it is the new construction centers which are mainly responsible for spreading mosquitoes; that the power under Sec.90 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act includes the incidental power to levy charges even though there is no specific power conferred; that chapter IX of the Tamil Nadu Public Health Act empowers the local authority to levy charges; that Sec.83 of the Tamil Nadu Public Health Act deals with the mosquito control; that this Act also gives power to levy and the better way is to collect the charges at the time of granting permission. 10. 10. The learned senior counsel for the respondents would cite a judgment delivered by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in Loonkaran v. State , A.I.R. 1975 M.P. 217 wherein it is held: ”Although there is no separate provision for the Act authorising the Corporation to charge any fee for grant of building permission and Sec.366(3) read with Sec.294 is sufficiently worded to cover such authority of the Commissioner to grant written permission on payment of fees…. The order of the Commissioner is enough for fixation of rate of fees and rate of fees is not therefore a subject which can be dealt with by the bye-laws.“ Citing the above judgment, the learned counsel would exhort that the proposition is that even though, there is no specific provision to collect the vector control charges, the Corporation can collect it; that Secs.234, 235, 236 and 238 of the City Municipal Corporation Act are sufficient to give the power to the Corporation to levy charges even though there is no specific provision; that what is impugned in the writ petitions is the resolution of the Corporation; that there is alternative remedy under Sec.44 either to suspend or cancel the resolution; that under Sec.44(a)(ii), the State Government may at any time prohibit such resolution, order, licence, permission or act if they have not been legally passed, issued granted or authorised, but in this regard, no such interference has been made by the State Government at all; that some of the writ petitions are for mere mandamus not to levy the vector service charges and they do not lie at all nor maintainable and that there is an alternative remedy though not barred for exercising the jurisdiction of the High Court. 11. 11. In clarification, the learned counsel Mr.S.A.Rajan, appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.20854 of 1992 would contend that Sec.98 only imposes taxes mentioned under (a) to (f) that when a tax was levied before the council passed any levy of tax, Sec.98(a) is to be complied with; that this procedure laid down under this section has not been followed in the case of the levy of vector service charges; that the authority of the Corporation to impose additional duty or levy any addition to what they have been empowered under the enactment, that the supporting legislation has employed powers, but these authorities like Corporation or such other bodies have to function under the respective enactments, they must have the power under the enactment to collect the money or the learned counsel would cite a judgment delivered in Bimal Chandra Banerjee v. State of Madhya Pradesh Bimal Chandra Banerjee v. State of Madhya Pradesh Bimal Chandra Banerjee v. State of Madhya Pradesh , A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 517 wherein it has been held: “No tax can be imposed by any bye-law or rule or regulation unless the statute under which the subordinate legislation is made specially authorises the imposition even if it is assumed that the power to tax can be delegated to the executive. The basis of the statutory power conferred by the Statute cannot be transgressed by the rule-making authority. A rule making authority has no plenary power. It has to act within the limits of the power granted to it.” 12. The other judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is one delivered in Mohammed Yasin v. Town Area Committee, Jalalabad and another Mohammed Yasin v. Town Area Committee, Jalalabad and another Mohammed Yasin v. Town Area Committee, Jalalabad and another , A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 115 wherein it has been held: “There is a difference between tax like the income tax and a licence fee for carrying on a business. A licence fee on a business not only taken away the property of the licensee but also operates as restriction on his right to carry on his business, for without payment of such fee the business cannot be carried on at all. A licence fee on a business not only taken away the property of the licensee but also operates as restriction on his right to carry on his business, for without payment of such fee the business cannot be carried on at all. If the license fee cannot be justified on the basis of any valid law no question of its reasonableness can arise, for an illegal impost must at all times be an unreasonable restriction and will necessarily infringe the right of the citizen to carry on his occupation, trade or business under Art.19(1)(g) and such infringement can properly be made the subject-matter of a challenge under Art.32.” 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner would rely on another judgment of the Apex Court delivered in M/s.Lilasons Breweries (Pvt.) Ltd. and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others M/s.Lilasons Breweries (Pvt.) Ltd. and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others M/s.Lilasons Breweries (Pvt.) Ltd. and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others , A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1393 wherein dealing with Sec.62 of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915 and Rule 22 of the Madhya Pradesh Brewery Rules, it is held that recovery of duty from particular unit, which are not sufficient to meet expenses of officers and Rule 22 permitting raising of demand of additional excise duty, without its being actually done is ultra vires. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner would ultimately cite a judgment delivered in Daymond v. South West Water Authority , (1976)1 All E.L.R. 39 (H.L.) wherein it has been held: “In the absence of any express provision as to who was liable to be charged, the natural inference to be drawn from Sec.30(I) of the 1973 Act was that a water authority was empowered to charge only those persons who actually availed themselves the services, facilities and rights provided by the authority. It followed that Sec.30(I) did not empower a Water authority to require payment of sewerage charges from persons whose premises were not connected to public sewers. It followed that Sec.30(I) did not empower a Water authority to require payment of sewerage charges from persons whose premises were not connected to public sewers. Furthermore para 5(2)(c) of Sch.6 to the 1973 Act did not extend, or purport to extend, the categories of persons liable to be charged by a water authority beyond those to whom Sec.30 applied and in any event, insofar as the 1974 order sought to impose such charges on such persons, it could not be said to be incidental to, consequential on or supplementary to the 1973 Act; nor did the 1974 order purport to be transitional. Consequently the 1974 order was ultra vires to the extent that it authorised the recovery of sewerage charges from persons whose premises were not connected to public sewers.“ Ultimately, the learned counsel would and up his argument saying that the Corporation authorities are duty bound to control mosquitoes; that the respondent/Corporation is not called upon to do any act beyond the scope of the Municipal Corporation Act and it cannot charge any fee that is not included in Sec.98 nor the authorities followed Sec.98 (a); that in his case though he is not challenging the Commissioners authority but in addition to planning fee, no other fee be collected; that Sec.90 has absolutely nothing to do with his case, which is the budgeting provision and that the lower authority has no right to impose any levy then what it is authorised. 15. A fair assessment of the case as pleaded and argued on the part of the writ petitioners and contra would reveal that the second respondent/Corporation following the Bombay Municipal Corporation in Collecting the charges for mosquito control from plot owners/promoters for quite some time, has started imposing the novel levy of vector control charges’ for providing planning permission in respect of new constructions with 1000 sq.ft. and above as per the proceedings of the second respondent/Corporation dated 7. 1992 made in H.D. (MC). C.No.E.A.11/92, thus proceeding to implement the Special Officer Council Resolution No.311/92, dated 25. 1992 and has purported to pass an order to collect a fee of Re.1 per sq.ft. as vector control charges. It is against the imposition of such levy, the petitioners have come forward to file these writ petitions. .16. 1992 made in H.D. (MC). C.No.E.A.11/92, thus proceeding to implement the Special Officer Council Resolution No.311/92, dated 25. 1992 and has purported to pass an order to collect a fee of Re.1 per sq.ft. as vector control charges. It is against the imposition of such levy, the petitioners have come forward to file these writ petitions. .16. On the part of the petitioners, the main grounds of attack are that the second respondent/Corporation being an instrumentality of the State Government it has to function within the direction given by the State and the rules laid down under the relevant Act and unless the second respondent/Corporation is either permitted by the Tamil Nadu City Municipalities Act or by any other law for the time being in force or specifically authorised by the first respondent/State Government, the Corporation is incapable of imposing such levy and since the second respondent/Corporation is neither authorised by law nor directed by the first respondent/Government empowering to make such levy, it cannot have either the locus standi to pass such orders as comprised in the proceeding of the second respondent-Corporation dated 7. 1992 or impose the collection of such levy from the petitioners and the same is wholly illegal and liable to be quashed. 17. The second ground of attack is that the levy of vector service charges is an additional levy imposed against the petitioners over and above the payment of the other charges such as building licence fee, scrutiny charges, etc. and for the collection of these charges, the second respondent is fully authorised by law but not for the collection of this new levy of vector service charges and this levy is said to have been imposed for malarial control which is a factor-in-rem and those who come forward to get the building approval plan for the new construction of more than 1000 sq.ft. alone are levied with this additional charge, which is nothing but a hostile discrimination in law. 18. alone are levied with this additional charge, which is nothing but a hostile discrimination in law. 18. The third ground of attack is that malaria is a problem affecting the general public and the civic authorities like the second respondent are duty bound to control and eradicate such a menace and a levy imposed for such eradication on a chosen few opting to construct new buildings as a pre-condition for providing planning permission is not only unreasonable but also arbitrary exercise of power by the second respondent and ex facie without jurisdiction and violative of Arts.14, 19(1)(g) and 300-A of the Constitution of India. .19. .19. On the other hand, the counter argument put forth by the second respondent/Corporation is that malaria in and around the City of Chennai has become a dressed disease and a survey conducted would show that from the year 1987 to 1992 number of people got affected by malaria but after introducing the scheme to eradicate malaria by formation of special squads with chosen officials; that the statistics show that from the year 1993 to 1997, the cases of malaria started dwindling year by year; that the stagnated water kept at the new building constructions in a massive scale being the main cause of breeding of the mosquitoes, they give way for large number of malarial cases among all the places in the City thus serving an epicentre for transmission of malaria; that unless malaria is prevented on war-footing measures, the entire population of the State will have to face disastrous consequences as a result of which the scheme was formulated and to meet the additional expenses involved for implementation of the scheme and since the new building premises being the main source of breeding of mosquitoes, the second respondent rightly levied the vector service charges following the method of the Bombay Corporation which works out well till date and it is quite justified especially in view of the face that it was resolved by the Special Officer in Council; that reasonable charges are collected and since it is motivated to the welfare and well-being of the city population at large, it is a reasonable levy that is imposed on various sections of the City; that the City Municipal Corporation Act empowers the Commissioner and authorities of the Corporation to make such arrangements to meet the exigencies; that one of such measures introduced anew by the second respondent with the general honest thought is to implement the malaria control measures for which it has become incumbent on the part of the second respondent to collect the vector control charges from those who come forward to put up new constructions to an extend of over 1000 sq.ft. and at no stretch of imagination, such a good scheme and the collection of the charges could be termed as either unreasonable or arbitrary or without jurisdiction and the same is quite justified and reasonable and the collection of such charges from the persons of the stature of the petitioners is only a beginning and the other areas are also going to be included shortly and would pray for the dismissal of all these writ petitions. 20. Among all the grounds putforth by the petitioners, the first and the foremost ground is that the second respondent/Corporation is not directed by the first respondent/Government of Tamil Nadu to levy vector service charges by any law or Government order for the time being in force empowering to make such levy from the persons applying for approval of the building plan and hence the second respondent being an instrumentality of the State has to function within the directions given by the State and the Rules laid down by the Act and hence the levy of vector service charges is wholly without jurisdiction and illegal. This issue being fundamental and basic and quite legal, it has to be answered prior to dissecting the other grounds to solve many a question. .21. On the Part of the respondents, particularly the second respondent/Corporation, it is vehemently argued citing instances of the growing trend of malaria causing serious concern among the residents of the Madras city and the Corporation and in realisation of the seriousness of the problem, initiated such measures on the war-footing by appointing a team of officials to study the root cause of the menace and formulating a scheme, took such measures which involved the heavy amount of money and only to meet such contingencies, they were left with no option but to propose to levy the vector service charges on the new constructors of building that too in a reasonable manner not affecting those who put up small constructions, but on the building extending over 100 sq.ft. in a quite reasonable manner especially on coming to know form the study held that the places of new constructions wherein water is stagnated in huge quantities, that give way for breeding of mosquitoes and hence, it would be argued that such levy cannot in any manner be termed either unreasonable or arbitrary or even unlawful. 22. in a quite reasonable manner especially on coming to know form the study held that the places of new constructions wherein water is stagnated in huge quantities, that give way for breeding of mosquitoes and hence, it would be argued that such levy cannot in any manner be termed either unreasonable or arbitrary or even unlawful. 22. Though some authorities have been cited on the part of the respondents to the effect that the Municipal Corporation can, to an extent, act independently regarding the collection of taxes etc. Still, the judgment cited on the part of the learned counsel for the petitioners is quite authoritative to the effect that unless such Corporations are empowered under the Act or by a specific order of the Government being an instrumentality created under the authority of the State, the Corporation cannot independently assume power of levy of additional charges or collection of the same. The judgment cited especially by the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.20854 of 1992 is quite authoritative to the effect that such powers cannot at all be assumed by such bodies like the second respondent without the legislative competence and hence it has to be concluded that the second respondent/Corporation is not at all having the authority to levy such charges in the name of vector service charges and the same is absolutely bereft of any authority or force of law. Hence, the impugned proceeding under which the levy vector service charge is made payable by the petitioners shall be declared illegal, void ab initio and error on the face of the records. .23. From the above discussions, what comes to be arrived at is that the second respondent/Corporation being an instrumentality of the State it has to function either within the directions duly given by the State or in accordance with the rules laid down under the relevant Act in the context of the cases in hand and, therefore, unless the second respondent/Corporation is either permitted by the Tamil Nadu City Municipalities .Act or by any other law in force or specifically authorised by the Government, the second respondent is incapable of imposing such levy as a result of which, the only conclusion that could be arrived at in this regard is that the second respondent/Corporation does not have the locus standi to pass such orders as has been done in its proceeding dated 7. 1982 or impose the collection of such levy from the petitioners and the same is hereby declared illegal and void ab initio. 24. Secondly, since a section of the residents of the Madras City who come forward to get the building plan approval for their new construction extending 1000 sq. ft. and above have been chosen by the second respondent/Corporation for such levy of the vector service charges while the problem is a factor-in-rem with which every resident of the City is concerned and hence such levy imposed on such category of men in a selective manner without assigning any tangible reason for having not imposed the same on others, such a levy imposed is nothing but selective hostile discrimination in law and the same is repugnant to Art.14 of the Constitution of India and has to be declared illegal and void and the same is declared accordingly. 25. Thirdly since malaria is a factor affecting the general public, the civil authorities are duty bound to control and eradicate the same in the usual course and for such discharge of its duties and responsibilities, the levy imposed in the name of eradication of malaria on a chosen few opting to construct new buildings as a pre-condition for providing planning permission is not only unreasonable, but also arbitrary exercise of power by the second respondent and ex facie without jurisdiction and violative of Arts.14, 19(1)(g) and 300-A of the Constitution of India and the same is held accordingly. 26. In the above circumstances, this Court is left with no option, but to allow all the above writ petitions quashing the impugned proceeding of the second respondent/Corporation in H.D. (M.C.) C.No.E.A.11/92, dated 7. 1992 further directing the respondent to forbear from giving effect to the S.O. Resolution No.311/92, dated 25. 1992 and the same is ordered accordingly. In result, all the above writ petitions stand allowed. Consequently, connected W.M.Ps. are closed. No costs.