Judgment :- C.S. Rajan, J. The Divisional Forest Officer, Kothamangalam as per Ext. P1 order dated 10.12.1987 ordered confiscation of the vehicle belonging to the first respondent. The first respondent took up the matter in appeal before the second respondent. The second respondent by Ext. P2 order allowed the appeal and reversed Ext. P1 order. The main question on which the second respondent allowed the appeal was that unless it is proved that the vehicle in question was involved in the commission of the forest offence coming within the provisions of the Forest Act relating to any forest produce the vehicle cannot be ordered to be confiscated. At the time of removal of the alleged timber in the alleged vehicle the teak poles cannot be said to be the property belonging to the Government since these teak poles were sold in public auction and therefore, it became the property of the auction purchaser and ceased to be the property of the Government. It must be noted that this ground was not raised by the first respondent in the original memorandum of appeal. The second respondent allowed the above ground to be raised only at the time of argument by allowing the petition filed by the first respondent for the above purpose. But the second respondent did not consider the question as to whether the title to the property was passed to the auction bidder immediately after the auction and whether the property was still in the custody of the petitioner or in the custody of the auction bidder. Now it has been averred in the Original Petition that the auction took place on 26.6.1987. Confirmation of the above auction was only on 29.7.1987 by the Conservator of Forests, Kottayam. The theft was on 6.7.1987. Without the confirmation order the auction bidder cannot acquire any title to the property. The auction held on 26.6.1987 can either be confirmed or set aside. Till that it cannot be said that the Government is not having any title over the property. Therefore, it is obvious that the theft took place while the property was still that of the Government. It is also pertinent to point out that the theft took place while the property still remained in the forest depot. 2. Till that it cannot be said that the Government is not having any title over the property. Therefore, it is obvious that the theft took place while the property was still that of the Government. It is also pertinent to point out that the theft took place while the property still remained in the forest depot. 2. In order to overcome the above difficulty the learned counsel for the first respondent relied on a decision of this Court reported in Bhargavan v. Divisional Forest Officer (1994 (2) KLT29). In that the teak poles were auctioned, confirmation made and passes were issued. The theft took place from the deport of the petitioners wherein the teak poles were stored. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt about the passing of title of the teak poles to the auction purchaser. Therefore, the above ruling cannot help the first respondent. 3. The other ground on which the second respondent allowed the appeal is that there is no mens rea on the part of the first respondent because the owner was unaware of the dubious dealings of the driver involved. But now it is an accepted principle that under S.61A of the Forest Act is the duty of the owner of the vehicle to show that he had taken reasonable and necessary precautionary measures against the user of the vehicle involved in forest offences. The matter was no longer res integra because of atleast three decisions of this Court, (please see Baby v. Forest Range Officer (1986 (2) ILR Ker. 57) and State of Kerala v. Pushpan (1984 KLT 257). The third decision is of a Division Bench of this Court reported in State of Kerala v. Mathew (1995 (2) KLT 772) wherein the two earlier decisions referred to above have been relied on. Dealing with the above question the Division Bench held as follows: "5. The restriction against confiscation contained in sub-s.(2) can operate only on the combination of the three postulates. First is that the owner or his agent was totally unaware of the illicit use. Second is that he had taken all reasonable and necessary precautions against such use. Third is, the person in charge of the vehicle had also taken reasonable and necessary precaution against such use. If the owner succeeds in satisfying only the first two postulates, "he would not get the benefit of the restriction against confiscation. Second is that he had taken all reasonable and necessary precautions against such use. Third is, the person in charge of the vehicle had also taken reasonable and necessary precaution against such use. If the owner succeeds in satisfying only the first two postulates, "he would not get the benefit of the restriction against confiscation. The third condition is as important as the other two and unless that also is established no advantage would practically enure to the owner of the vehicle. Sub-s.(2) would remain at bay if the third condition remains unsatisfied". 6. The contention that such a strict view would adversely affect an innocent vehicle owner cannot be countenanced since any narrow or liberal interpretation of confiscator provisions in the Act can eventually lead to disastrous consequences for forest wealth which is a very endangered bounty of nature. The idea behind extension of confiscator provisions to vehicles etc. is to convey a peremptory and explicit message to the vehicle owners not to allow their vehicles to be used for depletion of forest wealth. If any vehicle is caught in the nefarious act of carrying illicit forest produce, it is not enough that the owner establishes his innocence alone. If he wants to retrieve his vehicle he must show further that the person who was in charge of the vehicle has taken reasonable and necessary precautionary measures against such user of the vehicle. The owner cannot rest with establishing his innocence in the matter. It may be that having succeeded in showing his innocence his failure to establish the next limb might lead to hard consequences to him. Legislature intended, by providing such stringent conditions, to prevent harder consequences for the society and for the posterity." Under these circumstances, I have no doubt to hold that the second respondent erred in holding that the first respondent is not liable and his vehicle cannot be confiscated. Therefore, the Original Petition is allowed, Ext. P2 is set aside and Ext. P1 is restored.