Judgment : Against the order of the interim stay granted by the Special Deputy Collector (Revenue Court), Tirunelveli/first respondent herein, staying the orders of the Tahsildar, Ambasamudram/2nd respondent herein, in T.R.No.37 of 1995 dated 16. 1996, the petitioner has filed the above writ petition. 2. According to the petitioner, he is a cultivating tenant in respect of 4 acres and 30 cents of land in Survey No.806/10 of Keelakadayam village, Ambasamudram taluk. He filed a petition under Sec.5 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands (Record of Tenancy Rights) Act, 1969 (Act 10 of 1969) read with Rule 11 of the Rules before the second respondent/Record Officer/Tahsildar, Ambasamudram. The third respondent herein contested the matter. After enquiry, the second respondent by an order made in proceedings dated 16. 1996 declared the petitioner as a cultivating tenant and directed his name to be recorded as a cultivating tenant in the approved Record of Tenancy in respect of 3.30 acres alone which was found to be in his possession. Aggrieved by the abovesaid order of the second respondent, the third respondent has preferred an appeal under Sec.6 of the said Act. The first respondent/Special Deputy Collector, Revenue Court, Tirunelveli has granted an order of ex parte interim stay of the order of the 2nd respondent dated 8. 1996. The said order of the first respondent granting stay is totally without jurisdiction and hence illegal and liable to be quashed. 3. The first respondent has filed a counter affidavit stating that the stay order passed by him is within the provisions of the powers of the appellate authority under Sec.6 of the said Act. As an appellate authority, he is empowered to grant interim stay. Further, the appellant therein represented that he has raised cotton and coconut in the lands and that they have to be protected till their harvest and requested interim stay. The said aspect has been corroborated by the Village Administrative Officer. In such a circumstance, in order to protect the crops raised by him the stay of operation of the order of the Tenancy Officer is necessary. 4. The third respondent has also filed a counter affidavit stating that the writ petition filed against the interim order is not maintainable and if the petitioner has any grievance, he is only to move the first respondent for vacation of the stay order. 4. The third respondent has also filed a counter affidavit stating that the writ petition filed against the interim order is not maintainable and if the petitioner has any grievance, he is only to move the first respondent for vacation of the stay order. It is further stated that the appellate authority has merely stayed the recording of entry to be made by the 2nd respondent in his books. The petitioner is not in possession of his (3rd respondents) lands either as a cultivating tenant or otherwise. The first respondent is also competent authority and empowered to grant stay till the appeal is disposed of by him. 5. In the light of the above pleadings, I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as respondents. 6. The only question that is to be decided is whether the appellate authority under the Act has power to grant stay of the order impugned pending disposal of the appeal. 7. In view of the limited question, it is unnecessary to refer the other factual aspects. There is no dispute that aggrieved by the order of the second respondent Revenue Officer/Tahsildar, Ambasamudram dated 16. 1996 directing the name of the petitioner to be recorded as a cultivating tenant in the approved Record of Tenancy, the third respondent herein filed an appeal before the first respondent and also prayed for stay of operation of the order of the second respondent. The said appeal was filed under Sec.6 of the Act 10 of 1969. There is no dispute regarding maintainability of the appeal before the first respondent. Learned counsel for the petitioner after taking me through the provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder, would contend that in the absence of any specific provision for grant of stay, the impugned order granting stay by the first respondent cannot be sustained. On the other hand, learned Government Advocate as well as the contesting third respondent would contend that even in the absence of any provision, grant of stay is an incidental power and the first respondent is well within his powers; accordingly the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 8. In order to appreciate the said contentions, now I shall refer the relevant provisions. Sec.6 of (Act of 1969) Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands Record of Tenancy Rights Act (herein referred to as “the Act”) speaks about appeal: “6. 8. In order to appreciate the said contentions, now I shall refer the relevant provisions. Sec.6 of (Act of 1969) Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands Record of Tenancy Rights Act (herein referred to as “the Act”) speaks about appeal: “6. Appeal: Any person aggrieved by an order made under Sub-sec.(8) of Sec.3, Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.4or Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.5 may within such period as may be prescribed appeal to such authority as may be specified by the Government in this behalf (hereinafter referred to as the appellate authority) and the decision of such authority, on such appeal shall, subject to the provisions of Sec.7 be final.” In exercise of the powers conferred by Sec.18 of the Act, the Governor of Tamil Nadu framed Rules called Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands Record of Tenancy Rights Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules). Rule 12 speaks about period of limitation for filing appeal and empowers the appellate authority to admit appeal even after the expiry of the period mentioned in Sub-rule (1), if the aggrieved person is sufficient cause for not presenting it within the said period. Rule 12 is as follows: Rule 12: Appeals against orders under Secs.3(8), 4(3) or 5(3): (1) Every appeal against an order of the Record Officer under Sub-sec.(8) of Sec.3, sub-Sec.(3) of Sec.4 or Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.4 or Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.5 shall be preferred to the appellate authority within sixty days from the date of receipt of the order. (2) The appellate authority may admit an appeal presented after the expiration of the period mentioned in Sub-rule (1) if it is satisfied that the party had just and sufficient cause for not presenting it within the said period.” Apart from this, there is no other provision regarding the disposal of the appeal by the appellate authority. (2) The appellate authority may admit an appeal presented after the expiration of the period mentioned in Sub-rule (1) if it is satisfied that the party had just and sufficient cause for not presenting it within the said period.” Apart from this, there is no other provision regarding the disposal of the appeal by the appellate authority. No doubt, as per Sec.10 of the Act, the Record Officer or the appellate authority or the District Collector or the officer referred to in Sec.7 shall, for the purposes of this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely: .• (a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; .• (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; .• (c) received evidence on affidavit; .• (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses; and any proceeding before the record officer or the appellate authority or the District Collector shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Secs.193 and 228, and for the purposes of Sec.196 of the Indian Penal Code. 9. It is clear that there is a provision for appeal against the order of the original authority, namely, Tahsildar/Record officer. In so far as certain aspects and for better disposal of the appeal the said authorities are empowered to act as a court as per the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is equally ‘true that though there is a provision for limitation for filing appeal before the appellate authority and for condonation of delay on sufficient cause, there is no specific provision for stay either in the Act or in the Rules. No doubt, in similar enactments, while empowering the appellate authority to dispose of the appeal, the legislature themselves provide power to the said authority to stay the operation of the original authority. Since the appellate authority has every power to deal with the order in appeal and such appeal is being disposed of, it is but proper for the appellate authority to protect and safeguard the interests of the person who approach before it. Since the appellate authority has every power to deal with the order in appeal and such appeal is being disposed of, it is but proper for the appellate authority to protect and safeguard the interests of the person who approach before it. If in the interregum period that is till the disposal of the appeal, by virtue of the order of the original authority, some damage or lose is caused to the person aggrieved who has filed the appeal, it would be a futile exercise for the appellate authority and it will not be possible for any one including the appellate authority for recoup for compensating the appellant before him. In such a circumstance, grant of stay being incidental to the power provided for dismissal of the appeal, I am of the view that first respondent is competent and has rightly granted stay. Though none of the counsel have cited any decision with regard to the above aspect, it is useful to refer a decision or the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Income-tax Officer v. M.K.Mohammed Kunchi Income-tax Officer v. M.K.Mohammed Kunchi Income-tax Officer v. M.K.Mohammed Kunchi , (1969)71 I.T.R. 815 In the case before the Supreme Court, the question was whether appellate tribunal under Sec.254 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 has powers to grant stay in the absence of any specific provision in the Act. There is no specific provision to enable the appellate tribunal to grant stay of the recovery proceedings. However, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, after considering the scope of Sec.254 of the Income-tax Act and also the power to grant stay of recovery proceeding spending appeal have held that power to grant stay of recovery proceedings pending appeal is an incidental and ancillary and stay will be granted in deserving and appropriate cases. Sec.254 of the Income-tax Act speaks about orders of appellate tribunal and Sec.255 gives the procedure of the appellate tribunal Sub-secs.(5) and (6) of Sec.255 speak about power of the appellate tribunal to regulate its own procedure and the procedure of facts in all matters arising out of the exercise of its power or of the discharge of its functions, including the places at which the benches shall hold their sittings. It is also stated that the appellate tribunal for the purpose of discharging its functions, shall have all the powers which are vested in the income-tax authorities referred to in Sec.131, and any proceeding before the appellate tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Secs.193 of 228 and for the purpose of Sec.196 of the Indian Penal Code and the appellate tribunal shall be deemed to be civil court for all the purposes of Sec.195 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Sec.131 of the Income-tax Act gives to the Income-tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Commissioner the same powers as are vested in the court under the Code the Civil Procedure when trying a suit in respect of the matters specified in the section. Those powers relate to discovery and inspection, enforcing the attendance of witnesses, compelling production of books of account, etc., issuing commissions and allied matters. Their Lordships have noted that there can be no manner of doubt that by the provisions of the Act or the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963, powers have not been expressly conferred upon the appellate tribunal to stay proceedings relating to the recovery of penalty or tax due from an assessee. An argument was advanced before their Lordships that in the absence of any express provisions in Secs.254 and 255 of the Act relating to stay of recovery during the pendency of an appeal, it must be held that no such power can be exercised by the tribunal, suffers from a fundamental infirmity inasmuch as it assumes and proceeds on the premises that the statute confers such a power on the Income-tax Officer who can given the necessary relief to an assessee. In this regard, the following observations of their Lordships are relevant: “…The right of appeal is a substantive right and the questions of fact and law are at large and are open to review by the appellate tribunal. Indeed, the tribunal has been given very wide powers under Sec.254(1) for it may pass such orders as it thinks fit after giving full hearing to both the parties to the appeal. Indeed, the tribunal has been given very wide powers under Sec.254(1) for it may pass such orders as it thinks fit after giving full hearing to both the parties to the appeal. If the Income-tax officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner have made assessments or imposed penalties raising very large demands and if the Appellate Tribunal is entirely helpless in the matter of stay of recovery, the entire purpose of the appeal can be defeated if ultimately the orders of the departmental authorities are set aside. It is difficult to conceive that the legislature should have left the entire matter to the Administrative Authorities to make such orders as they choose to pass in exercise of unfettered discretion. The assessee, as has been pointed out before, has no right to even move an application when an appeal is pending before the appellate tribunal under Sec.220(6) and it is only at the earlier stage of appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the statute provides for such a matter being death with by the Income-tax Officer. It is a firmly established rule that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective Sutherlands Statutory Construction third edition, Articles 5401 and 5402. The powers which have been conferred by Sec.254 on the appellate tribunal with widest possible amplitude must carry with them by necessary implication all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make the exercise of those powers fully effective. In Domats Civil Law (Cushings edition), Volume 1, at page 88, it has been stated: “It is the duty of the judges to apply the laws, not only to what appears to be regulated by their express dispositions, but to all the cases where a just application of them may be made, and which appear to be comprehended either within the consequences that may be gathered from.” Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, eleventh edition, contains a statement at page 350 that “where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution. Cui jurisdictio date est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur, sine quibus jurisdictio explicari non potuit.” An instance is given based on Ex parte, Martin(1879)4 Q.B.D. 212: on appeal (1879)4 Q.B.D. 491 (C.A.), that “where an inferior court is empowered to grant an injunction, the power of punishing disobedience to it by commitment is impliedly conveyed by the enactment, for the power would be useless if it could not be enforced.” The decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to above in all force applies to the case in hand. 10. Apart from the above legal position, the third respondent herein/appellant before the first respondent has proved that he had raised coconut trees, cotton plants in the disputed lands and they are under harvest and the lands are in his possession. It is further asserted that the respondents therein/petitioner herein on the basis of the orders of the Tahsildar is trying to enter into the land by force and if he enters, it will be a great loss to him and hence prayed for interim stay against the order of Tahsildar. In the light of the categorical averments and the appellate authorities are empowered to consider the merits of the order passed by the original authority, even in the absence of specific provisions for stay as held by their Lordships, I am of the view that the power to stay was necessary in order to safeguard the interests of the aggrieved person. Accordingly I hold that the power to stay was a necessary corollary to the power to entertain an appeal or revision. A Full Bench decision in Dharmadas v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal , “1962” K.L.J. 1133 has held that the power to remand was incidental to and implicit in the appellate jurisdiction created by Sec.64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In Burhanpur Tapti Mill Ltd. v. Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh Burhanpur Tapti Mill Ltd. v. Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh Burhanpur Tapti Mill Ltd. v. Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh , (1955)6 S.T.C. 670 it was held that since the Board of Revenue had the power to adjudge the correctness of an order passed by the Commissioner under Sec.22-B reopening an assessment, the Board had also the power to stay the fresh assessment proceedings started by the Assistant Commissioner in pursuance of that order. In my (2000) 1 MLJ 297 at 302 opinion, the appellate authority, namely, the Special Deputy Collector (Revenue Court) must be held to have the power to grant stay as incidental or ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction under Sec.6 of the Act. When the Statute confers appellate jurisdiction, it impliedly grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution and the statutory power carries with it the duty in proper cases to make such orders for staying proceeding to save the appeal being disposed of as infructuous. It is needless to point out that the power of stay by the appellate authority is not likely to be exercised in a routine way or as a matter of course. It will only be when a strong prima facie case is made out that the Revenue court will consider and grant stay of the order of the original authority till the disposal of the appeal. I have already stated that the appellant therein, third respondent herein made out a case for staying the operation of the original order of the Tahsildar. 11. Inthe light of what is stated above, I do not find any error or infirmity in the order impugned and accordingly the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, both the W.M.Ps., are dismissed.