JUDGEMENT P.K. DEB, J:- This revision petition has been preferred against the order dated 20.11.1998 passed by Subordinate Judge I, Purnia in Title Suit No. 83 of 1968 by which the learned Court below has disposed of two matters at a time, namely, that there was already an amicable settlement as claimed by the Opposite Party and also injunction, as prayed for under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the C.P.C. from the side of the petitioner. 2. The admitted fact remains that the plaintiff filed Title Suit No. 83 of 1968 for partitioning of his 1/8th share in the joint family property both movable and immovable as mentioned in different schedules of the plaint. The defendants did not appear and the suit was heard ex-parte and by order dated 15.12.1970, the suit was decreed ex-parte on hearing. The plaintiff's share as 1/8th in the joint family property was declared and it was further mentioned that as per the share of the plaintiff, the parties may sit together for making an amicable settlement allotment of respective shares in the joint family property within six months next so that final decree can be passed on the basis of that amicable arrangement otherwise the Court would proceed to pass final decree after making Takhtabandi by appointment of a survey knowing pleader commissioner. 3. After 1970 practically no steps were taken by either of the parties in the suit. The petitioner, who was plaintiff in the suit, filed a petition for appointment of a survey knowing pleader commissioner for the purpose of making Takhtabandi on the basis of the ex-parte preliminary decree as mentioned above, in that petition, the plaintiff petitioner had mentioned that some arrangement was made regarding possession of the different shares by convenience but those had not been properly approved by the other co-sharers and, as such, there still remained dispute and, hence, the partition should be made by metes and bounds by making Takhtabandi on appointment of a survey knowing pleader commissioner. 4. 4. Objection was raised from the side of the opposite parties to the effect that after the preliminary decree was passed, an amicable settlement was made between the co-sharers within the time frame as fixed by the Court below in the preliminary decree itself and on the basis of that the parties are possessing their respective shares and some sale had also been made by both the parties in the meantime in respect of the property which were allotted in their shares. In support of that contention, a piece of paper was produced from the side of the opposite parties showing allotment of shares in the suit land although the same has not been signed by anybody. On the injunction matter also the learned Court below heard both the parties and then passed the impugned order accepting the contention of the opposite parties that there was already amicable partition between the parties and, as such, he had not passed any order regarding petition filed by the petitioner for passing a final decree. His contention was that as already two decades have passed, no final decree can be prepared at this stage. It has been held that after the preliminary decree was passed, there was no scope to reopen the matter and, as such, the amicable partition as has been alleged from the side of the opposite parties should be maintained and, hence, the prayer of the petitioner has been rejected in toto. Reliance was placed by the learned Subordinate Judge on a decision of this court as reported in A.I.R.1980, Patna 184 (Smt. Lalmuni Devi and Others Vrs. Shiv Shanker Tiwary and Others). 5. On hearing the learned counsel for the parties and also going through the impugned order passed, it appears that the learned Court below has committed fundamental error in approaching the matter on the point of limitation. When a preliminary decree has been passed which remained pending, it was the duty of the Court to proceed for the preparation of final decree and there is no time frame provided in any statute for preparation of final decree. In the present case regarding share of the plaintiff petitioner, preliminary decree was passed and a pious wish was made by the Court granting ex-parte decree that the parties may amicably settle the allotment of shares within six months next thereafter. In the present case regarding share of the plaintiff petitioner, preliminary decree was passed and a pious wish was made by the Court granting ex-parte decree that the parties may amicably settle the allotment of shares within six months next thereafter. It was also made clear in that ex-parte order that unless such amicable settlement is arrived at, the Court would proceed to appoint a survey knowing pleader commissioner for doing proper partition by metes and bounds for the purpose of final decree. In the present case although six months time has elapsed long back, no petition was filed by either of the parties that there was amicable settlement between the parties, hence, the matter was kept open and it was the duty of the Court to appoint a pleader commissioner for the purpose of the Takhtabandi and that matter was initiated from the side of the petitioner although at belated date. 6. Be that as it may, although two decades have passed after the preliminary decree was passed, but by efflux of time, the preliminary decree passed in favour of the petitioner had not been obsolete rather it remained alive till a final decree is arrived at, so the rejection of the petition on the ground of limitation was not only illegal but without jurisdiction. After the time-frame has elapsed, it was the duty of the Court below to proceed for preparation of final decree. In that way, the impugned order is definitely bad in the eye of law. Moreover, amicable settlement has been urged from the side of the opposite-parties but that amicable settlement was not pressed for preparation of final decree on that settlement within the time frame as mentioned in the ex-parte order. Thus, there was no scope to rely on that so-called amicable settlement when on the basis of that no final decree was passed as per the time frame of order passed by the learned Court below while decreeing the plaintiff's suit ex-parte preliminarily. Thus, there was no scope to rely on that so-called amicable settlement when on the basis of that no final decree was passed as per the time frame of order passed by the learned Court below while decreeing the plaintiff's suit ex-parte preliminarily. I have already mentioned that the piece of paper on which it has been alleged that there was amicable settlement of partition had not been signed by anybody and so it had not the semblance of any amicable settlement between the parties although in the petition of the plaintiff-petitioner, it has also been mentioned that some amicable arrangement was made by which possession was there in some petition of the land from the side of the petitioner and other co-sharers but by passage of time, it cannot be said that arrangement was finalized as a final decree. It was only for the purpose of possession for convenience amongst the co-sharers till a final decree for partition by metes and bounds is arrived at. The reliance put on the judgment of this Court is totally misconceived. That judgment related to a compromise decree passed in a partition suit and the matter was considered in the light of order 23 Rule 3, C.P.C. Here, in the present case, no compromise decree was passed. There was only a pious wish of the Court below while passing the ex-parte decree that the parties may settle up their allotment according to shares by sitting amicably on the basis of which the final decree may be arrived at but that had never been done and the suit was kept pending. In that way, the impugned order is totally bad in this respect. Sale by co-sharers in the joint family cannot construe partition by metes and bounds in the present circumstances of the case. 7. During the course of argument, it has been alleged that some of the co-sharers had already died and there was abatement of the suit. Although I am of the view that there may not be any abatement in the case for proceeding for final decree, however, the matter is left for consideration by the learned Court below. 8. The revision petition is, thus, allowed. Although I am of the view that there may not be any abatement in the case for proceeding for final decree, however, the matter is left for consideration by the learned Court below. 8. The revision petition is, thus, allowed. The impugned order is hereby set aside regarding the processing of final decree alone but not in respect of the injunction matter as the same has not been pressed from the side of the plaintiff-petitioner by filing appeal against that part of the order. No costs.