Judgment P.K.Deb, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 15-7-1992 passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Samastipur, in Eviction Appeal No. 1 of 1989 (36 of 1990) by which the judgment and decree dated 19-8-1988 passed by the Munsif-II, Samastipur, in Eviction Suit No. 29 of 1986 has been affirmed. Thus, the present Second Appeal is against the concurrent findings of both the Courts below dismissing the plaintiff-appellants suit for eviction. 2. The plaintiff-appellant brought the suit for eviction from the suit premises described in the plaint on three grounds, namely, (i) defaulter (ii) personal necessity and (iii) breach of the terms of tenancy. The relationship, landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant is admitted. According to the plaintiff, the defendant was inducted as a tenant on monthly rental of Rs. 100.00 . An agreement was executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff with the terms of paying the rent regularly and would not make any alteration without the permission of the landlord and that he would vacate the premises as and when required by the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, the defendant was irregular in making payment of rent and since May 1986 till the date of filing of the suit i.e. 1-12-1986, the defendant became arrears of rent and as such on the ground of defaulter the defendant is liable to be ejected. It was further alleged that the defendant has made some alteration in the premises in his occupation and as such, for such ground the defendant is also liable for ejectment. On the ground of personal necessity, it has been alleged by the plaintiff-appellant that his second son Nirmal Narain Lal is unemployed and he wants to open up a leather manufacturing business as he has got training in the leather manufacturing business but for paucity of accommodation, no such business could be opened and as such the suit premises being most suitable for the purpose, eviction of the defendant is required for satisfying the personal necessity of the plaintiff. 3. On filing written statement, all the averments made by the plaintiff have been denied from the side of the defendant. 3. On filing written statement, all the averments made by the plaintiff have been denied from the side of the defendant. On the ground of defaulter, it has been stated that the plaintiff was pressurising the defendant to enhance the rent of which the defendant did not agree and when he tendered rent for the month of May 1986, it was refused to be accepted on this ground that ground and ultimately he had sent the rent for the months of May 1986 and June 1986 by Money Order in the month of July 1986 and henceforth the defendant remitted rent by Money Order on month to month and the plaintiff was refusing the same. On the ground of alteration as alleged from the side of the plaintiff the same has been totally denied from the side-defendant. Regarding personal necessity also, it has been denied that the plaintiff has got any necessity. According to the defendant, the plaintiff has got a business in front of the suit house in the name and style of New Leather Shop and both the sons of the plaintiff are engaged in that business and there is no necessity to open up a separate business by the second son of the plaintiff. It was further denied that the second son of the defendant i.e. Nirmal Narain Lal has got any training of leather manufacturing business. Both the parties adduced evidence and on consideration of the evidence on record trial Court i.e. Munsif-II. Samastipur, dismissed the suit holding that none of the grounds for eviction could be proved from the side of the plaintiff. On appeal being preferred, the First Additional District Judge by reappraisal of the evidence on record came to an independent finding that the plaintiff could not be able to prove any of the grounds for eviction against the defendant. Hence, the dismissal of the suit by the Munsif-II has been affirmed by the appellate Court. Hence this Second Appeal. 4. While admitting this appeal, a Bench of this Court vide order dated 8-9-1993 formulated the substantial questions of law in the following manner, that- Whether the finding of personal necessity as recorded by the Court of appeal below is vitiated on account of drawing of an unwarranted adverse inference from the failure of the appellant to produce certificate in regard to the training of leather manufacturing. 5. 5. During the course of hearing of this appeal, the learned Advocate appearing for and on behalf of the appellant did not press much on the substantial question of law as, according to him, it has become settled principle of law by this time that it is the choice of the landlord as to how he would utilise the suit premises to cater his personal need and in that way, even if when the son of the plaintiff had no training regarding leather manufacturing but he got the expertise when he was admittedly helping the business of his elder brother in leather manufacturing shop for long days. It is true that such sort of inference as brought by the learned Courts below is not warranted and cannot be legally maintained. But it appears on perusal of the appellate Courts judgment that the personal need as alleged from the side of the plaintiff-appellant had not been totally turned down on that ground only. It was also turned down when it could be found during the course of trial that two rooms were vacated by a tenant of the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit and those vacated rooms had also been filled up by inducting separate tenants which definitely infers negativity of the personal need of the plaintiff. It was also held by the appellate Court that the need of the plaintiff can be catered by a small space for setting up of sewing machine for the purpose of leather manufacturing and when two rooms were available during the pendency of the suit then the plaintiff could have set up his son in one of those rooms but instead he was pressurising the defendant to vacate by continuing the eviction suit on the ground of personal necessity which rather infer the correctness of the defendants version that for pressurising for enhancement of rent the present eviction suit has been filed. Thus, the substantial question of law framed although may be answered in positive in favour of the plaintiff-appellant then also on the ground of personal necessity the plaintiff-appellant is not entitled to get a decree of eviction. Thus, the substantial question of law framed although may be answered in positive in favour of the plaintiff-appellant then also on the ground of personal necessity the plaintiff-appellant is not entitled to get a decree of eviction. Moreover, this factum of personal necessity of the plaintiff had been found to be false and frivolous by both the fact-finding Courts on appreciation of evidence on record, In that way, there is no scope by the second appellate Court to go into the merits in view of the findings on factual aspect. The other ground of alteration of the suit premises by the defendant-tenant had been negatived by both the fact-finding Courts on reference to the evidence and there was reappraisal of the evidence on this point by the appellate Court and came to the same finding that there was no alteration being made by the tenant in the suit premises. So this ground of eviction was also not available to the plaintiff and on this ground, no argument has been advanced by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff for obvious reason. 6. On the ground of defaulter, both the Courts below had come to the finding that the plaintiff has failed miserably to prove that the defendant was defaulter for non-payment of rent for the months as required under Section 11(1)(d) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. The claim of the plaintiff is that the defendant became defaulter since May 1986. On the other hand, the defendants plea is that when he tendered the rent for the month of May 1986, on some false and frivolous plea the plaintiff refused to accept the same on several occasions and as such he had no other alternative but to remit the rent for the month of May and June 1986 through Money Order in the month of July 1986. Both the Courts held that even if it is held that the defendant is defaulter for the month of May 1986 when he had not remitted the rent during the month of June, 1986 then also the defaulter ground is not available to the plaintiff-landlord when since the month of June, 1986 the rent was being regularly remitted through Money Order as one months defaulter cannot be construed for the purpose of eviction on the ground of default. 7. 7. It has been strenuously argued by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant that both for the month of May and June 1986 the defendant became defaulter as the rent of June 1986 was sent conjointly with that of the rent of May 1986. Even if the plaintiff would have accepted the rent then he would have lost the right of getting the defendant defaulter for the month of May 1986. In that way even if the rent was sent timely for the month of June 1986 then also defendant became defaulter both for the month of May 1986 and June 1986. In this connection, he has referred to a judgment of this Court as reported in 1962 Patna 162 Ujjal Singh and Ors. V/s. Rajendra Kr. Kedia. In that reported case, the tenant had remitted the rent by Money Order not only for the current month but also for the succeeding month and the said Money Order was refused by the landlord. The effect of such remission was considered by the single Bench of this Court and held that the landlords refusal to accept the future rent along with the current months rent was a justified one. The main thrust in that judgment was regarding non-production of receipt of Money Order but it was held that the landlord was justified in refusing to accept the money order as he could not accept it in part only and those remission was invalid and could not be availed of by the tenant to save his eviction. But, in the present case, such relief is not applicable as it is the specific case of the defendant that he had tendered the rent for the month of May 1986 and on some plea or other the same was refused and by that time the month June came and then he sent the rents for the month of May and June 1986 at a time in the month of July. The remittance of rent for the month of June 1986 was proper. Whether the landlord would accept it or refuse it i. e. up to him. Nowhere it has been stated by the plaintiff that he had refused payment of rent on the ground that it was conjointly sent along with the rent of May 1986. The remittance of rent for the month of June 1986 was proper. Whether the landlord would accept it or refuse it i. e. up to him. Nowhere it has been stated by the plaintiff that he had refused payment of rent on the ground that it was conjointly sent along with the rent of May 1986. It has also not been informed to be tenant that the landlord would be accepting the rent of June 1986 if it is paid within the time-frame. Now, it cannot be taken to the effect that as the rents of both the months have been sent conjointly, such remittance was not proper and as such the tenant cannot be saved, his protection from eviction. Position remains that the tenant should tender rent within the time-frame. Definitely in the present case, he has not tendered for the month of May 1986 in time and for the month of June 1986, he rendered the rent in time, acceptance or otherwise remains to the discretion of the landlord. It has always been held by the Courts that the tenant should be protected from the tricky effort of the landlord and for that reason Rent Control Acts are being made at every stage to protect the tenants from the whims of the landlord. It appears that in the present case the landlord was bent upon to make the tenant defaulter and as such he refused to take payment of rent for the month of May 1986 on some grounds or other and finding the position the defendant had to remit the rent by Money Order and in sending so he had made himself defaulter for the month of May 1986 but for the month of June 1986 he cannot be held to be defaulter. It is not that the rent for the month of June 1986 was not due when the same was sent to the landlord so ruling submitted has got no application in the present circumstances of the case. 8. It has further been argued that although the Money Order coupons have been exhibited but no Money Order receipts have been proved from the side of the tenant-defendant and non-proof of Money Order receipts render Money Order coupons ineffective and the same cannot be construed as a valid tender. 8. It has further been argued that although the Money Order coupons have been exhibited but no Money Order receipts have been proved from the side of the tenant-defendant and non-proof of Money Order receipts render Money Order coupons ineffective and the same cannot be construed as a valid tender. The same ruling as mentioned above has also been referred on this point by the learned Counsel for the appellant. In a given case if Money Order receipts are not being proved then the Money Order coupons might not have proper validity regarding tendering of rents. But in the present case, it is the specific admission on the part of the plaintiff himself in his evidence that the rent for the month of May and June 1986 and after that month to month rents had been sent every month by Money Order and the landlord was refusing the same. In view of such admission, it becomes clear that the rents had been tendered properly, and such admission takes away the burden of the defendant to prove the Money Order receipts. Thus, when the plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendant was defaulter for two months as contemplated under Sec. 11(1)(d) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and eviction) Control Act the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for Eviction on that ground too. That the appeal has got no force in respect of eviction. 9. But, it appears that both the Courts below had not at all considered the claim for arrears of rent and the suit been dismissed as a whole. Admittedly, the rent tendered by the tenant had not been accepted by the landlord. In that way, rents for the month from May 1986 to December 1986 as claimed from the side of the plaintiff must be decreed against the defendant but without costs. But, the eviction prayer should be dismissed with costs as has been rendered by both the Courts below. Thus, the appeal is dismissed with a slight modification in the decree itself to the effect that the plaintiffs suit stands decreed for the arrears of rent without costs and the prayer of eviction shall stand dismissed with costs throughout.