D. K. SETH, J. Suit No. 540 of 1997 has been filed by the petitioner before the learned Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) IVth Court, Moradabad against the opposite parties for an injunction restraining them from taking possession of the properly except through proceedings instituted in the Court of law. The Trial Court upon an application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure granted an ad interim injunc tion by an order dated 21st December, 1998. Misc. Civil Appeal No. 11 of 1999 and Misc. Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1999were filed by the defendant opposite parties and the plaintiff petitioner, respectively, against the said order. By an order dated 17th July, 1999 passed by the learned Dis trict Judge, Moradabad, Misc. Appeal No. 11 of 1999 was allowed and the order dated 21st November, 1998 was set aside. By the same order, Misc. Appeal No. 15 of 1999 was dismissed. 2. Mr. K. K. Arora has challenged the order dated 17th July, 1999 passed in the appeal No. 11 of 1999 on the ground that the question that was posed before the Court below was as to the consideration whether z prima facie case is made out or not. On the other hand, the court had entered into the question as to whether the petitioner had any right to possess the property or not. In fact is has dealt with the merit of the case, which was not supposed to be done while considering the question under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2. He further contends that even if the petitioners claim for tenancy appears to be invalid or void by reason of Sections 11, 13,16 and 17 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, still then he cannot be evicted except through a proceeding under Section 12 of the i said Act. He further contends that the Petitioner cannot be dis possessed by reason of the execution of the order passed in proceedings under Sec tions 145 and 146 of the Code Criminal Procedure, particularly when the petitioner was not a party to the said proceedings. Therefore, in the present case, the petitioner was able to made out a prima facie case for grant of interim order in his favour as was granted by the learned trial Court. Therefore, in the present case, the petitioner was able to made out a prima facie case for grant of interim order in his favour as was granted by the learned trial Court. Therefore, the order passed by the learned appeal court suffers from infir mity, which should be interfered with through this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution pf India. He has also relied on the balance of convenience and inconvenience between the parties and has also pointed out from the order itself that there were certain materials on the basis of which it could be said that there was a tenancy created by the holders of the power of attorney in his favour. He also contends that the order passed by the ap pellate court is full of perversity and can not be sustained and as such, the said or ders should be quashed. 3. Mr. M. C. Tewari, learned counsel for the opposite parties on the other hand contends that by reason of Sections 11,13, 16 and 17 of the 1972 Act, the suit cannot be maintained. Thus there cannot be any question of making out a prime facie case in respect of a suit which is prima facie not maintainable before the Civil Court. He also contends that even on facts which were discussed in detail by the appellate Court, the petitioner has not been able to make out a prime facie case. The decision that was arrived at was no the basis of the pleadings made out by the parties and it does not require any evidence. Therefore, according to him there was no perversity in the finding of the appellate Court. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the pas ties in detail. 5. The petitioner is claiming his right of possession by reason of agreement for tenancy entered into between him and one Sri Rajendra Prasad Shukla on 26th May, 1994. It is alleged that Rajendra Prasad Shukla was holding the power of attorney of the owners of the premises. The said tenancy had commenced with effect from 1st June, 1994 and he had paid rent for which receipts were granted and therefore, there was sufficient, prima facie case for grant of injunction. 6. Admittedly, the power of attorney granted in favour of Rajendra Prasad Shukla was cancelled on 27th March, 1996. Thus Mr. The said tenancy had commenced with effect from 1st June, 1994 and he had paid rent for which receipts were granted and therefore, there was sufficient, prima facie case for grant of injunction. 6. Admittedly, the power of attorney granted in favour of Rajendra Prasad Shukla was cancelled on 27th March, 1996. Thus Mr. Arora contends that the agree ment entered into between the petitioner and the said Rajendra Prasad Shukla was during the period when the power of attor ney was Subsisting as such it was valid. The appellate Court had dealt with all these facts and had come to a finding that the rent was paid on 2nd of July, 19% for the period from April, 1996 to June, 1996. The petitioner had filed only one receipt and that is of 2nd July, 1996. There is nothing to show that the petitioner had paid rent after 2nd July, 1996 or before April, 19%. After having considered the facts in detail the appellate Court had come to a finding that the documents or agreement for rent was not a genuine one. It had also come to a finding that there was an earlier suit being original suit No. 1149 of 1993 between Rajendra Prasad Shukla and Jogendra Prasad Shukla, in which an interim order of status quo was passed on 23rd Septem ber, 1993. In the said suit the relief sought for was restraining the defendant from alienating the property. By reason of the order dated 23rd September, 1993 by which the parties were directed to main tain a status quo regarding the premises in suit, it is very difficult to accept that Rajendra Prasad Shukla would part with possession of the premises even by way of letting it out to a person. The suit being a suit with regard to the alienation of the property by the defendant, the order direction maintenance of status quo would mean that neither of the parties should alienate the property. Mr. Arora; however had contended that letting out of the property is not a transfer and as such not as alienation. 7. In the present case transfer in cludes transfer of possession apart from transfer to title. Thus a transfer by way of letting out is also a transfer. Mr. Arora; however had contended that letting out of the property is not a transfer and as such not as alienation. 7. In the present case transfer in cludes transfer of possession apart from transfer to title. Thus a transfer by way of letting out is also a transfer. Then letting out is also lease, which may be under the Transfer of Property Act or can be governed by the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act but still then it was a lease governed by the two different provisions of two different Acts. Lease is granted subject to Transfer of property Act or subject to 1972 Act. Therefore, the said order of status quo would stand in the way of trans ferring of the property. That apart, it is contended that the property was a house which was let out through the petitioner by virtue of an agreement. Admittedly, by reason of Sections 11,13,16, and 17 of the 1972 Act, such house cannot be let without following the provisions of the 1972 Act as provided in Chapter III thereof. 8. Sections 11 of the 1972 Act prohibits letting out of a building except in pursuance of an allotment order issued under Section 16 thereof. Sections 13 restricts occupation of a Building without order of allotment or release. Section 16 empowers the District Magistrate to pass an order of allotment or release in the manner provided therein. Section 17 lays down the condition for making allotment. Section 31 makes the contravention of any of those provisions penal to the extent of fine or imprisonment o r both. 9. By reason of Section 13, occupa tion of a building by a tenant, without order of allotment, even with the consent of the landlord, is unauthorised. Whereas by reason of Section 11, such occupation is forbidden. The cumulative effect of Sec tions 11 and 13 makes an occupation by a person, claiming to be tenant, without order of allotment, is void-no matter even if such occupation is with the consent of the landlord. 10. In the case of R. S. Sinha v. Addi tional District Judge, Lucknow and others (1994 (1) ARC 418), it was held that deem ing clause has got its own effect and creates a legal fiction. 10. In the case of R. S. Sinha v. Addi tional District Judge, Lucknow and others (1994 (1) ARC 418), it was held that deem ing clause has got its own effect and creates a legal fiction. Occupation, with the con sent of the landlord, may in ordinary par lance not be said to be unauthorised oc cupation because of the consent of the landlord, but even in such cases occupa tion without allotment order is unlawful. 11. The impact of the Full Bench Decision in Udhoo Das v. Prem Prakash (AIR 1954 All. . . . . (FB) was rendered in effective by reason of legislative over ruling by enactment of the 1972 Act. Then again the said Full Bench decision was over- ruled by a five Judge Full Bench in the case of Abdul Hamid v. Md. Isha ( AIR 1975 All 166 ). 12. In the decision in the case of Nootan Kumar and others v. IInd Additional District Judge, Banda and others (1993 (2) ARC 204 (FB), it was held by the Full Bench that from the provisions of Sections 11,13,17 and31ofthenewact. it is as clear as the light of day that an agreement in volving transaction of either letting by the landlord or occupation by any person of any building except in pursuance of an order of allotment or release being prohibited has to be treated to have been invalidated by the statute rendering it void and unenforceable in a Court of law. No remedies are open to either party to an agreement the very formation of which is illegal by virtue of the provision of a statute. It is firmly settled that if an agree ment is made to do or suffer a prohibited act, that agreement will be unenforceable, and no Court will extend its assistance for its implementation. Reference was made lo the decision in the case of Munna lal Khetan v. Kedar Nath Khetan ( AIR 1977 SC 536 para 19), wherein it was held that no decree for ejectment of a tenant can be passed in favour of the landlord on the basis of such agreement of lease between them as it is in contravention of the provisions of the new Act. 14. 14. In the case of Geep Industrial Syn dicate Ltd. v. Rent Control and Eviction Of ficer, Allahabad (1982 (1) ARC 585 (DB), it was held that a "conjoined reading of Section 11 imposes prohibition on letting without allotment order. Section 13 places restriction on occupation without an allot ment or release. These two Sections are required to be read together. Reading these two Sections, it would appear that neither could a landlord let out a premises without an allotment order nor can any one occupy it". . . . . . . "if any one occupies the premises without allotment order, he would not only be an un-authorised oc cupant but also liable to prosecution under Section 31 of the said Act. His pos session being unauthorised cannot be recognized in the eye of law. " 15. In the case of Smt. Kishan Devi v. Additional District Magistrate (1988 AWC 260), it was held that the owner of the premises is entitled to possession even without release ordcr. Following the said decision in the cake of Mohan Lal Mehra v. The State of U. P. and others (1995 (1) ARC 533), this Court directed restoration of possession to these landlord evicting the un authorised occupant. 16. If such occupation, which cannot be protected under the 1972 Act, is protected through a proceeding before the Civil Court, then it would be supporting house grabbing Completely frustrating the effect of the 1972 Act. 17. In the present case, it is not al leged that the petitioner has come to pos sess the house by virtue of an allotment order. Therefore, his occupation is un authorised and as such, unenforceable in law. No injunction can be obtained by vir tue of an unenforceable right. Then again if injunction is) granted then it would frustrate, Sections 11,13,16,17 and 31 of the 1972 Act. An occupation for which a person is liable to conviction does not make out a prime facie case. A contract which is void by reason of operation of law or is otherwise prohibited in law, cannot lend support to establish a prima facie case to press for injunction. Court cannot sup port illegality. 18. In the Case, the petitioner claims to have come to possess by reason of con sent of the Attorney but without any nomination or allotment. Attorney cannot bind the owner through his illegal act. Court cannot sup port illegality. 18. In the Case, the petitioner claims to have come to possess by reason of con sent of the Attorney but without any nomination or allotment. Attorney cannot bind the owner through his illegal act. If the action of tie Attorney is contrary to law is otherwise prohibited in law the same does not bind the owner nor it creates any right in favour of the alleged tenant in view of the impact of 1972 Act. 19. In the case Sarfaroz Khan v. XIth Additional District Judge, Saharanpur, 1992 (1) ARC 25, this Court had found that the power of Attorney did not authorise the holder to exercise the power of the landlord and as such his actions were void. 20. In the present case there is noth ing to show that the power of Attorney had so authorised the Attorney. Then, how ever, even if there was any such authoriza tion, even then the action being prohibited in law, it could neither bind the owner nor it could be enforced, and as such would be as much void, 21. Thus in the present case the docu ment on which the petitioner had been relying being void document, cannot come in the aid of the petitioner to seek an enforcement thereof or seek any right out of it in the Court of law. 22. Mr. Arora however, referred to the pleadings, where it has been pleaded that the house in question is exempted under Section 2 of the 1972 Act. Admitted ly, the alleged rent was agreed at the rate of Rs. 200 p. m. Now the house has not been pleaded to be a house which has been exempted under Section 2 of the 1972 Act as stipulated in various clauses of the said Section. So far as clause (g) thereof provides that any building, whose monthly rent exceeds two thousand rupees are ex empted from the application of 1972 Act. The petitioner could not claim exemption from the application of 1972 Act because the rent was Rs. 200. Therefore, that ex emption cannot be attracted. The build ing, admitedly, belongs to a private in dividual, who is not included in any of the clauses (a) to (h) of Section 2 of the 1972 Act. 23. Mr. The petitioner could not claim exemption from the application of 1972 Act because the rent was Rs. 200. Therefore, that ex emption cannot be attracted. The build ing, admitedly, belongs to a private in dividual, who is not included in any of the clauses (a) to (h) of Section 2 of the 1972 Act. 23. Mr. Arora also contended that the house if constructed after 1985, in that event the same may be exempted by reason of Section 2 of the said Act as contained in the Second proviso to sub- section (1) of Section 2. But this case has not been made out by the petitioner either in the plaint or in the written statement or in this writ petition that the house was constructed within 40 years from 26th April, 1985. Therefore, this question is not open to him at least prima facie at this stage. Then again the appellate Court has come to a con clusion on the finding of fact that the al leged agreement was not genuine, par ticularly in view of the fact that the rent was paid only on 2nd July, 1996 and that too for three months, April, 1996, May, 1996 and June, 1996 and the petitioner has not been able to show any rent receipt for the period 1st June, 1994 till April, 1996 or from July, 1996 and thereafter/thus it appears that it is very difficult to accept the proposition that the petitioner has been able to make out a prima facie case. 24. Sp far as the question of petitioners eviction is concerned, the petitioners possession being un authorised, be cannot seek protection of law. He having been a house-grabber, he is liable to be evicted by the authority under the 1972 Act. But whether the petitioner can be evicted or not is not a question which can be gone into by this Court in this proceeding. So far as to whether the petitioner could be evicted by reason of the execution of the order passed under Sec tions 145 or 146 the Code of Criminal Procedure is concerned, it does not call for any determination in this proceeding before this Court. In this proceeding, this Court is concerned with the question as to whether the petitioner can seek injunction in the facts and circumstances of the case. 25. In this proceeding, this Court is concerned with the question as to whether the petitioner can seek injunction in the facts and circumstances of the case. 25. Thus after having gone through the order of the appellate Court, I do not find any infirmity or perversity in the order passed by it as has been sought to be made out by Mr. Arora. For all these reasons, I am now inclined to interfere with the order dated 17th July, 1999. 26. Accordingly, this writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No cost. 27. Let it be recorded that the find ings or observations made in the order dated 17th July, 1999 on those in this order are all tentative for the purpose of deciding the appeal and this petition. The same will not affect the merit of the case and the Court below will in no way be influenced by any of the observations made in this order or in the proceedings under Sections 145 or 146 of the Cr. P. C. or in any other proceedings. Petition dismissed .