JUDGMENT 1. - On a contract been made with the respondent No. 2 M/s. Ann Contract Services, the petitioners were engaged to work on the posts of Data Entry Operator/Steno/Typist in the Department of Transport, Government of Rajasthan. Initially, the agreement been made on 14.8.1997 was to continue up to 31.3.1998, however, the same was subsequently extended up to 31.5.1999 vide order dated 31.3.1999. 2. Before expiry of the above contract with the respondent No. 2, another tender notice was issued on 13.5.1999 for providing services of Data Entry Operator/Steno/Typist/Telephone Operator. After the tenders been received a fresh agreement was made with M/s. Gulab Chand Kewal Chand-respondent No. 3, vide letter dated 28.5.1999. The respondent No. 3 was to make available services of the employees with effect from 1.6.1999. 3. Since a new agreement been made with the respondent No. 3 w.e.f. 1.6.1999, services of the petitioners were not to be supplied by the respondent No. 2, the contract of whom had expired on 31.5.1999. Taking it to be termination of service w.e.f. 31.5.99, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition challenging their termination of service w.e.f. 31.5.1999 seeking protection of not only the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but also the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. Petitioners have further prayed for direction to the State Government to give regular pay scale of the respective posts to the petitioners from the date of their initial appointment. Petitioners have also challenged the new work order given to the respondent No. 3 vide letter dated 28.5.1999. 4. Mr. Ajay Rastogi, learned counsel for the petitioners, has submitted that the State Government, been a model employer, cannot be allowed to resort to such an unfair labour practice of engaging employees through a contractor without resorting to regular selections as provided under the relevant Rules. While heavily relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in case of " Secretary, Haryana State Electricity Board v. Suresh & Ors." [(1999) 3 SCC 6011 , Mr. Rastogi has submitted that all the petitioners should be treated as the employees of the State Government. Since there is violation of not only the provisions of the Act of 1970 but also the ID Act, 1947, the petitioners are entitled for reinstatement with continuity of service and have also a right of consideration for regularisation with regular pay scale of the posts. 5. Mr. Since there is violation of not only the provisions of the Act of 1970 but also the ID Act, 1947, the petitioners are entitled for reinstatement with continuity of service and have also a right of consideration for regularisation with regular pay scale of the posts. 5. Mr. S.M. Mehta, learned Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the State, while relying on the detailed reply filed on behalf of the respondent State, has submitted that the petitioners cannot be treated as employees of the State Government since they have been engaged by the contractor. While referring to various clauses of the contract made with the respondent No. 2, Mr. Mehta has submitted that by no stretch of imagination the relationship of employee-employer can be gathered in the present case so far as the State Government is concerned. 6. Mr. Mehta has further submitted that after issuing of fresh tender notice, the respondent No. 2 had already filed an application for temporary injunction before the Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) No. 2, Jaipur City, Jaipur, however, the application for temporary injunction was rejected by the trial court on 31.5.1999. The respondent No. 3-new contractor, had already sent his employees for performing the job allotted to the new contractor w.e.f. 1.6.1999. Admittedly, after 31.5.1999, petitioners were not on job of the department concerned, however, the present writ petition was filed only on 14.6.1999, after the application for temporary injunction been rejected by the trial court, and in view of the interim order passed by this court on 18.6.1999, in which directions have been issued to the respondent-department to allow the petitioners to work on the same job, they were performing earlier, the department had to continue the petitioners on the same job. 7. Submission of Mr. Mehta is that the payment has to be made to the petitioners by their contractor as per the contract made with the respondent No. 2, however, termination of the contract w.e.f. 31.5.1999 of the respondent No. 2 not having been challenged by the petitioners in the present writ petition, it is difficult for the Government to continue the petitioners on the same job for which otherwise they are not legally entitled for. 8. After having considered the submissions made at the Bar, I have carefully gone through the entire material on record. 9. 8. After having considered the submissions made at the Bar, I have carefully gone through the entire material on record. 9. There is no dispute that the petitioners were initially engaged by the contractor and payment has also been made by the department to the contractor only, as per the agreement made with the contractor. Petitioners have also not been able to establish their regular appointment in the department even on temporary basis. Even as per clause 2 of the agreement if there is any misconduct of any of the employees of the contractor, the department could terminate the whole contract instead of terminating the services of the employee concerned of its own or to say take any disciplinary action as well. 10. A bare reading of the documents, as made available on record, it can well be gathered that services of the petitioners stood terminated with effect from 31.5.1999 after the contract with the respondent No. 2 been over on the same date. Since the petitioner themselves have submitted the copy of the agreement with the respondent No. 2, it seems that they were aware of the application for temporary injunction filed by the respondent No. 2 before the trial court and it was only after the rejection of that application on 31.5.1999 that the present writ petition was filed on 14.6.1999 seeking protection of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as also the Act of 1970. Petitioners are praying for treating them as regular employees, whereas, the respondent-States disputing the factum of their regular employment. Even applicability of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 has been disputed by the respondent-State and further violation of provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 have also been disputed by the respondent-State. 11. Without going into the merits of the case, since so many disputed questions of fact and law are involved, I am of the opinion that the petitioners have got an efficacious alternative remedy by way of raising an industrial dispute before the competent forum under the Act of 1947 itself. It is only a competent court which can decide not only the nature of employment but also the legality of termination and further appropriate relief can also be granted only by the competent court after considering the evidence led on behalf of both the parties. It is only a competent court which can decide not only the nature of employment but also the legality of termination and further appropriate relief can also be granted only by the competent court after considering the evidence led on behalf of both the parties. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of " Gopi Lal Teli Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr" ( 1995(1) RLR 1 =1995(1) WLC 1) has held that in such disputed questions of fact and law this court should not interfere under its writ jurisdiction. So far as judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Secretary, Haryana State Electricity Board (supra) is concerned, there also the Apex Court was dealing with an award passed by the Labour Court, passed on the basis of evidence led on behalf of both the parties. 12. Taking into account entire facts and circumstances of the present case, in my opinion no ground for interference is called for by this court under its writ jurisdiction in the present matter. 13. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed as having no merit. However, petitioners shall be free to approach the competent authorities under the provisions of the Act of 1947, if they so choose. There will be no order as to costs.Petition Dismissed. *******