R. PAL, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant has preferred this appeal against the dismissal of an application under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act,1940 (referred to as the Act ). ( 2 ) BRIEFLY, the facts are that an agreement was entered into between the appellant and the respondents for construction in connection with bridges at Mughalsarai. The work was to have been completed by September, 1992. According to the appellant the respondent failed to complete the work in terms of the agreement and the appellant terminated the contract on 21st March 1994. ( 3 ) THERE was an arbitration clause in the agreement and pursuant to an order passed under section 20 of the Act, the General Manager appointed Mr. S. K. Mallick and Mr. R. B. Singh as Joint Arbitrators. A statement of claim was filed by the appellant on 11th February, 1996 claiming approximately Rs. 44 lakhs under 15 different heads. On 28th March 1996 a counter-statement was filed by the appellant when a meeting was held by the arbitrators. ( 4 ) THE arbitrators made and published their award on 21st November, 1996. After allowing and dis-allowing some claims the arbitrators held that a sum of Rs. 12, 76,548/- was payable by the appellant to the respondent together with interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum from 1. 5. 95 until realisation of decree from a competent Court. ( 5 ) BROADLY speaking, three points have been raised by the appellants on the basis of which it is argued that the award should be set aside. The first ground is that the arbitration award was an unreasoned one contrary to the arbitration agreement and therefore could not be sustained. The second submission is that the award was an exparte one in the sense that the appellants were denied adequate opportunity to prove their case. The final submission is that the arbitrators had no jurisdiction to award interest contrary to the terms and conditions in the contract. ( 6 ) THE respondent has submitted that sufficient reasons had been given by the arbitrators after consideration of all the materials before them. It is submitted that the reasonableness of the reasons given cannot be gone into by court under sections 30 and 33 of the Act. ( 6 ) THE respondent has submitted that sufficient reasons had been given by the arbitrators after consideration of all the materials before them. It is submitted that the reasonableness of the reasons given cannot be gone into by court under sections 30 and 33 of the Act. It is submitted that arithmetical computation was not necessary to be stated and even an implicit reasoning would be sufficient. On the question of exparte award it is submitted that repeated opportunities had been given to the appellant but the appellant had not produced its witnesses. On the question of interest it is submitted that the arbitrator has the power to grant interest irrespective of any clause in the contract. ( 7 ) THE appellant filed an application under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (referred to as the Act ). The learned Judge dismissed the application by a judgment and order dated 7th April 1998. It was held that specific reasons had been given against each and every item in respect of which the claim was more than Rs. 3 lakhs and that the only item in which the claim was more than Rs. 3 lakhs was claim No. 3 but the Arbitrators had refused to grant an award on that claim. It was held that, therefore, prima facie, the award could not be said to be without any reason whatsoever. As far as the grant of interest is concerned the learned Judge differed from the view expressed by another single Judge in Award Case No. 139 of 1994 (union of India v. Prestressed Concrete Works) and held that the clause in the agreement could not take away the right under the statute for payment of interest. On the question of exparte hearing it was said that the prayer for adducing oral evidence was made at the final stage of the proceeding. An opportunity had been given by the Arbitrators but not availed of and therefore there was no question of violation of the principles of natural justice. ( 8 ) THE arbitration clause in question provides inter alia that:"in case where the claim is upto Rs. 3, 00,000 (Rupees three lacs) only, the Arbitrator (s)/umpire so appointed, as the case may be shall give the award on all matters referred to arbitration indicating therein break-up of the sums awarded separately on each individual items of dispute. ( 8 ) THE arbitration clause in question provides inter alia that:"in case where the claim is upto Rs. 3, 00,000 (Rupees three lacs) only, the Arbitrator (s)/umpire so appointed, as the case may be shall give the award on all matters referred to arbitration indicating therein break-up of the sums awarded separately on each individual items of dispute. In cases where the claim is more than Rs. 3, 00,000/- (Rupees three lacs), the Arbitrator (s)/umpire so appointed, as the case may be, shall give an intelligible award ( i. e. the reasoning leading to the award shall be stated) with the sums awarded separately on each individual item of dispute referred to arbitration. " ( 9 ) THE clause makes a distinction between "claim" and "an item of dispute". The use of the singular indicates that the word "claim" is the sum total of the individual items of dispute. In terms of the arbitration clause the arbitrators must give the break-up of the sums awarded separately against each head. The arbitrators are also required to state the reason 'leading to the award'. In other words the process of deduction must be stated and the award must be referable to the facts as found. The requirement for giving reasons is a protection against a possible abuse of the arbitrator's power and is a safeguard against dishonesty. ( 10 ) THE arbitrators have given a break-up of the sums awarded against each item of dispute, but have, in our view, failed to give 'reasons leading to the award'. ( 11 ) "reasons" have been defined in Union of India v. M. L. Capoor : AIR 1974 SC 87 as :"the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject matter for a decision, whether it is purely administrative or quasi judicial. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinions or decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable. " ( 12 ) AN illustration of this definition is to be found in Indian Oil Corporation v. Indian Carbon Ltd. , AIR 1988 SC 1340 , 1343. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinions or decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable. " ( 12 ) AN illustration of this definition is to be found in Indian Oil Corporation v. Indian Carbon Ltd. , AIR 1988 SC 1340 , 1343. The Arbitrator had refused to grant interest setting out the facts which showed that the claimant had not delivered nor offered to deliver the goods in respect of which the claim was made. In upholding the award the Supreme Court said:"the aforesaid grounds are the reasons of the arbitrator for making the award. The award is that the Indian Oil Corporation is not entitled to any interest nor any shifting charges, The reasons for the said conclusion are the aforesaid three factors mentioned by the arbitrator. How the arbitrator has drawn inference is apparent from the reasons. " ( 13 ) ALTHOUGH it is not necessary for the arbitrators to give a detailed judgement (See: Indian Oil Corporation v. Indian Carbon Ltd. AIR 1988 SC 1340 ; G. D. Rathi steels Pvt Ltd. v. Delhi Development Authority: AIR 1992 Del; 343) but the reasons must be adequate, in the sense that they must deal with the points raised; intelligible, in the sense that the facts found must reasonably support the conclusion, and proper, in the sense that the conclusion must not be an illegal one [sec: Re: Poyser and Mills Arbitration : 1963 1 All. E. R. 612; Union of India v. M. L. Capoor (supra); Indian Oil Corpn. v. Indian Carbon Ltd. (supra)]. The reasonableness of the reason cannot perhaps be scrutinised by court (Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. M/s Jagannath Ashok Kumar: AIR 1987 SC 2316 ) but in this case the arbitrators have not given any reasons at all in the sense of the word as defined above. Claim No. 1 was for balance payment towards executed work. The amount claimed was Rs. 8,98,890. The arbitrators awarded Rs. 7,33,688. Claim No. 1 was for balance payment towards executed work. The amount claimed was Rs. 8,98,890. The arbitrators awarded Rs. 7,33,688. This is what the arbitrators said:"after considering basic documents of pre-level and post-level recorded, duly signed by the representative of the Respondent and assessment of quantum of earthwork done by both the parties separately, and provision of quantity of earth work in the contract agreement, we found that some amount is due to the claimant against earthwork for item Nos. 1 and 2 of Schedule "a" of Contract Schedule as set out as claim No. 1 (a and b) in Statement of Case. " ( 14 ) HOW that "some amount" was Rs. 7, 33,688 has not been stated. ( 15 ) CLAIM No. 2 was for refund of security deposit and earnest money. All that is said was:"after considering facts of the case, documents, other submissions and arguments it was concluded that termination of contract by the Respondent under Clause 61 (1) of GCC was not correct in the instant case; hence there is no cause for withholding Security Deposit retained by the Respondent, therefore, we award release of said cash amount recovered and return of Bank Guarantee. " ( 16 ) CLAIM No. 4 was on "account of materials brought to site but not utilized and wasted due to prevention caused on the part of railway administration in performing work". This was allowed but only the conclusion was stated but not the reason in support of the contention. This is also the case as far as claim No. 7 is concerned. Merely stating the conclusion will not do. Thus a statement that "an officer is not suitable" has been held to be the conclusion and not the reason for superseding him (Gurdial singh v. State of Punjab: AIR 1979 SC 1622 , 1627 ). ( 17 ) AGAIN in claim No. 5 which was for "compensation for increased cost of inputs for execution of work during prolonged period due to laches on the part of Railway Administration. ", it was incumbent on the arbitrators to determine whether the prolongation was in fact due to the laches of the Railway Administration. ( 17 ) AGAIN in claim No. 5 which was for "compensation for increased cost of inputs for execution of work during prolonged period due to laches on the part of Railway Administration. ", it was incumbent on the arbitrators to determine whether the prolongation was in fact due to the laches of the Railway Administration. The arbitrators said:"the period of performance has prolonged beyond original stipulated period of 12 months due to laches of the Respondent and by virtue of that price variation for value of remaining portion of work done is also payable to the claimant, hence it is partly allowed beyond the payment already paid. " ( 18 ) WHAT the facts were on the basis of which the arbitrators drew the inference of laches on the part of the Railway Administration has not been stated at all. ( 19 ) THE same criticism is true of the award in connection with claim No. 6. ( 20 ) THE other claim which was allowed is claim No. 15. No reasons whatsoever have been given by the arbitrators for awarding interest on the awarded amount. Apart from this, the arbitrators also violated the clause in the contract by awarding interest. In Secretary, Irrigation Department v. G. C. Roy: 1992 (1) SCC 508 a five Judge Bench held that the arbitrator had power to award interest pendente lite only:"where the agreement between the parties does not prohibit grant of interest and where a party claims interest and that dispute (along with the claim for principal amount or independently) is referred to the arbitrator. " ( 21 ) THIS view was affirmed in Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta v. Engineers-de-Space-Age: (1996) 1 SCC 516 although in that case the award of interest was upheld because the clause read that "no claim for interest will be entertained by the Commissioner". According to the Supreme Court:"strictly construed the term of the contract merely prohibits the Commissioner from paying interest to the contractor for delayed payment but once the matter goes to arbitration the discretion of the arbitrator is not, in any manner, stifled by this term of the contract and the arbitrator would be entitled to consider the question of grant of interest pendente lite and award interest if he finds the claim to be justified. We are, therefore, of the opinion that under the clause of the contract the arbitrator was in no manner prohibited from awarding interest pendente lite. " ( 22 ) IN this case the clause in the agreement between the parties specifically forbade the grant of interest on security deposit and earnest money. Clause 8. 3 of the Instruction to tenderers which formed part of contract said: "no interest will be payable upon earnest money or security deposit or any other amount payable to the contractors under the contract. " ( 23 ) THE learned Judge has not indicated as to what statute provided for the payment of interest which override the clause in the agreement. No such statute was pointed out to this court. Further, it was not open to the learned Judge to differ with the view expressed by another learned Judge of co-ordinate jurisdiction. It was incumbent upon him to have referred the matter to a larger Bench. ( 24 ) THE respondent then relied on the decision in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation. v. Brojo Nath: AIR 1987 SC 1571 to contend that clause 8. 3 is against public policy and therefore under section 23 of the Contract Act should be deemed void. ( 25 ) WE are not in a position to accept this argument at this stage. The point should have been raised before the arbitrators and decided upon by them. In fact the submission underlines the lack of reasons in respect of the award of interest. ( 26 ) THE final submission relates to the denial of a reasonable opportunity to the appellant to prove its case. The award purports to record that hearings were held on 11. 09. 95, 17. 10. 95, 21. 12. 95, 11. 02. 96, 28. 03. 96, 25. 05. 96 and 9. 11. 96. The recording is wrong. There could be no hearing before the statement of claim and counter-statement were filed before the arbitrators. Admittedly the statement of claim was filed on 11. 02. 96 and the counter-statement on 28. 03. 96. In fact there were no minutes in the record for the meetings held on 11. 09. 95, 17. 10. 95, or 21. 12. 95. ( 27 ) AT the meeting held on 28. 03. Admittedly the statement of claim was filed on 11. 02. 96 and the counter-statement on 28. 03. 96. In fact there were no minutes in the record for the meetings held on 11. 09. 95, 17. 10. 95, or 21. 12. 95. ( 27 ) AT the meeting held on 28. 03. 96 as far as the claims 1 (a) and (b) were concerned parties were directed to reconcile their figures and come out with the statement showing the points of agreement and dis-agreement and assigning the reason thereof. No such reconciliation sheet was filed. On 25. 05. 96 the Appellant sought time to produce the reconciliation sheet in respect of claim 1. The arbitrators directed the filing of a reconciliation sheet within 7 days. No such reconciliation sheet could be filed. The parties differed with regard to the figures in respect of these claims. The parties were heard in respect of claims 2,3,4,11,12,13 and 14. As far as the claims 5,6,7,8,9,10,15, and 16 were concerned, the appellants stated that the arbitrators had no jurisdiction to hear the same. The respondent was given an opportunity to file written notes of arguments. The minutes record: "with the submission of both the parties, the hearing is completed unless the Arbitrators decide to hold further hearing. " ( 28 ) BY a letter dated 10th June 1996 the appellant submitted written notes of argument and contended that in view of the dispute between the parties relating to the reconciliation sheet, the appellant should be permitted to produce witnesses in order to establish its case. The names of five witnesses and their connection with the matter were given. No decision was taken in the matter by the Joint Arbitrators. This was followed by a letter from the appellant on 16. 08. 96 again asking for leave to produce witnesses. By a letter dated 29th August 1996 the Arbitrators asked the appellant to submit its contentions in writing by 9. 9. 96 so that they could ascertain whether there was any new material ground for another hearing. ( 29 ) ON 4th September 1996 the appellant wrote another letter alleging that out of 12 days fixed for hearing of the matter, the meetings were held only on 4 days and hearings were repeatedly postponed because the arbitrators were otherwise pre-occupied. 9. 96 so that they could ascertain whether there was any new material ground for another hearing. ( 29 ) ON 4th September 1996 the appellant wrote another letter alleging that out of 12 days fixed for hearing of the matter, the meetings were held only on 4 days and hearings were repeatedly postponed because the arbitrators were otherwise pre-occupied. It was prayed that the date should be fixed so that the evidence relating to the reconciliation sheet could be placed. A request was also made that the original records relating to payment of labour by the respondent should be directed to be produced. In reply to the letter the arbitrators, who appeared to have taken umbrage at the remarks directed against them and six weeks later wrote a letter on 22. 10. 96 saying that they were "refraining from giving a point by point reply as a matter of decency". According to the arbitrators ample opportunity had been given to the parties for being heard. However in view of the "fervent request" they decided to give the appellant one more hearing on 9. 11. 96 and asked the appellant to consent to an extension of the time for the arbitrators to make the award. ( 30 ) ALMOST immediately, by a letter dated 28. 10. 96, the appellant consented to the extension of the period of the arbitrators to publish their award till 30. 11. 96 but prayed for an adjournment of the hearing after the "chatt Puja" on 17. 11. 96, as most of the appellant's witnesses had intimated that they would not be able to attend hearing because of Dipawali and Chatt. ( 31 ) THE arbitrators however did not adjourn hearing on 9. 11. 96 and held a meeting. The appellant's Advocate field a petition in which a prayer for adjournment was made for adducing evidence saying that he had no knowledge of the letter dated 28. 10. 96 but apologized for any remark which may have hurt the sensibilities of the arbitrators. ( 32 ) THE arbitrators rejected the prayer for adjournment saying:"the respondent has prayed for adjournment of hearing fixed on 09. 11. 96 through a letter received at last stage even without the knowledge of its Advocate stationed at Patna merely on ground of difficulties of non-existent witness which is not appreciated. ( 32 ) THE arbitrators rejected the prayer for adjournment saying:"the respondent has prayed for adjournment of hearing fixed on 09. 11. 96 through a letter received at last stage even without the knowledge of its Advocate stationed at Patna merely on ground of difficulties of non-existent witness which is not appreciated. " ( 33 ) THE arbitrators stated that there was no ground in support of the prayer for adjournment. They expressed their dissatisfaction about the approach of the respondent. As far as the prayer for adducing oral evidence was concerned it was said that the question of adducing oral evidence should have been raised prior to the commencement of the arguments and that ample opportunity was given to the appellant to establish its case both orally and in writing. ( 34 ) THE arbitrators then closed the proceeding treating the hearing as complete. ( 35 ) WHERE the written documents were disputed the arbitrators could not decide the truth of the contents without oral evidence. The prayer for production of witnesses was made six months earlier and should have been allowed. The names and designation of the witnesses had been given then. To say that they were "non-existent" was incorrect to say the least. The prayer for adjournment was made immediately upon the arbitrators notifying the date of hearing and not at the last stage as recorded by the arbitrator. There was ample time to accommodate the appellant as the time to make and publish the award had been extended till 30. 11. 96. It was not a case where the appellant had displayed any intention of delaying the proceedings nor does it appear from the records that any earlier adjournment had been asked for by the appellant. The failure to give an adjournment in this case was violative of the principles of natural justice in that adequate or an opportunity was not given to the appellant for proving its case. ( 36 ) FOR all these reasons the award must be set aside. There is no question of remanding the matter to the arbitrators under section 16 of the Act as according to the appellant the same arbitrators are no longer available. In any event having regard to the facts of this case it would not have been appropriate to remand the matter to the arbitrators who have not acted. There is no question of remanding the matter to the arbitrators under section 16 of the Act as according to the appellant the same arbitrators are no longer available. In any event having regard to the facts of this case it would not have been appropriate to remand the matter to the arbitrators who have not acted. "with that absolute impartiality, with that sense of fairness to both sides", which was "so essential and so preliminary an element" in cases of that class. "[sm. Toolsimony Dassee v. Sm. Sudevi Dassee, 3 Cal WN 361 (B ). " ( 37 ) THE General Manager is accordingly directed to reappoint arbitrators in terms of the arbitration clause within a period of four weeks. The arbitrators must enter on the reference within two weeks of their appointment and will decide the matter afresh within a period of four months. The order under appeal is accordingly set aside and the appeal allowed but without costs. M. H. S. Ansari, J.-I agree. Appeal allowed.