Judgment : Landlords in R.C.O.P.No.442 of 1987, on the file of Principal District Munsif-cum-Rent Controller, Madurai, are the revision petitioners. 2. Fifth petitioner is the father of petitioners 2 to 4. First petitioner is the step-mother of petitioners 2 to 4. Subject-matter of the eviction proceedings is in the possession of respondents who are man and wife. They are doing business in textiles therein under the name and style of ‘ABC Stores’, agreeing to pay a monthly rent of Rs.575. .3. The entire first floor portion is in the occupation of fifth petitioner wherein he is carrying on both manufacturing and sales of all kinds of hand blow (moulded) plastic toys and other various plastic items, and is carrying on that business under the name and style of ‘Rajam Plastic Industries’. He is carrying on the business for the past about ten years prior to the institution of the proceedings. He has a turnover of more than two lakhs of rupees per annum. According to petitioners, the space occupied by fifth petitioner is highly insufficient for the business. It is said that there is a staircase on the western side of the building which leads to the first floor. The breadth of the staircase is only about two feet. Number of labourers have been employed for assembling the toys, who are carrying on that job in the only hall in the first floor. In the same hall, in the first floor, fifth petitioner is carrying on the whole sale business of toys and other plastic items. As all the toys are moulded items fifth petitioner has to engage painters also to paint each and every piece of the toys. The painters are also doing their painting work in the same hall in the first floor. As there is no proper show room for the items manufactured by the fifth petitioner, he is not in a position to carry on the retail sales business. He is also not in a position to improve his business. It is said that the fifth petitioner has put up the manufacturing machine in the second floor open space in a temporary tiled structure. The manufacturing unit also emanates heat. Added to that, the labourers working in the machine are also affected by the heat of the sun. Due to this, the workers suffer various kinds of boils. It is said that the fifth petitioner has put up the manufacturing machine in the second floor open space in a temporary tiled structure. The manufacturing unit also emanates heat. Added to that, the labourers working in the machine are also affected by the heat of the sun. Due to this, the workers suffer various kinds of boils. The manufacturing unit has to be brought to the first floor, which uses inconvenience to the labourers. In view of these difficulties, fifth petitioner wanted the schedule premises, which is in the groundfloor, as additional accommodation. Fifth petitioner is the head of the family, and he is the sole breadwinner. The requirement for additional accommodation is bona fide It is also said that the hardship that might be caused to the tenants will not outweigh the advantage derived by the landlords. When a demand was made to the respondents/tenants, they refused to vacate, which necessitated the filing of the eviction petition. .4. In the counter filed by tenants, respondents herein, they have questioned the maintainability of the eviction petition, on the ground that petitioners 1 to 4 alone are the landlords, and fifth petitioner is only a member of the family. According to tenants, additional accommodation cannot be sought for, for a member of the family. The bona fides of the claim were also disputed by the tenants. They further contend that if relative hardships assessed, they will be put to greater difficulties. According to them, it is impossible to get an alternative accommodation for running a textile business in that locality, if they are directed to be evicted. They would further contend that their very livelihood will be affected. At the same time, the plastic manufacturing industry could be set up even outside the City. They have said that the space now used by the fifth petitioner is more than sufficient for his requirement. 5. On the above pleading, Rent Controller took oral and documentary evidence. Exs.A-1 to A-29 were marked on the side of petitioners, Exs.R-1 to R-9 were marked on the side of respondents. Oral evidence consisted of P.Ws.1 to 3 and D.Ws.1 and 2. P.W.1 is the fifth petitioner. P.W.2 is one of the employees under petitioner. P.W.2 (third petitioner) is a post-graduate, and he is now doing business along with his father. 6. Oral evidence consisted of P.Ws.1 to 3 and D.Ws.1 and 2. P.W.1 is the fifth petitioner. P.W.2 is one of the employees under petitioner. P.W.2 (third petitioner) is a post-graduate, and he is now doing business along with his father. 6. The Rent Controller, after evaluating the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that the claim of petitioners is bona fide On the point regarding relative hardship also, the Rent Controller found that the tenants will not be put to greater hardship. The eviction petition was allowed. 7. Aggrieved by order, tenants filed R.C.A.No.43 of 1996. The Appellate Authority, on a re-assessment, held that the claim is not bona fide. The Appellate Authority further came to the conclusion that even if the claim is bona fide, when relative hardship is assessed, the tenants will be put to greater hardship. The Appellate Authority was also of the view that the landlords business can be had even outside the City and that the same need not be confined to the schedule building. It further held that to avoid heat from the sun and also from the heat emanating form the machine, landlord can provide other means of protection, and for that purpose, the tenants need not be evicted. The eviction petition was dismissed by allowing the appeal. The said judgment of the Appellate Authority is challenged in this revision under Sec.25 of the Rent Control Act. .8. Learned counsel for revision petitioners submitted that the decision of the appellate authority is not in accordance with law, in the sense that the well-settled legal principles have not been followed and, therefore, this Court is entitled to interfere under Sec.25 of the Act. Learned counsel submitted that when the landlord sought eviction the ground of additional accommodation of a non-residential premises, a comparative assessment should not have been made only on the basis of sales-tax turnover. According to learned counsel, the turnover in textile business will always be high, and that depends upon the cost of the cloth, whereas in plastic industry, run by fifth petitioner, dealing only in the manufacture of toys, the turnover will have no comparison with that of turnover fetched by textile business. The sufficiency of space will have to be considered while taking into account the requirement. This, the Appellate Authority failed to do. The sufficiency of space will have to be considered while taking into account the requirement. This, the Appellate Authority failed to do. So far as petitioners are concerned, they are manufacturing and selling plastic toys, which require more space. It was submitted by learned counsel that the evidence of P.W.2 shows that because of the heat emanating from the machine and sun, health of the labourers is affected, and consequently the machine has to be brought down very frequently to the first floor, where painters will have to do their work, and more than ten persons are employed in a small room. It is also contended that merely because the landlord has not shown improvement in the business, his bona fides cannot be questioned. It is argued that improvement could not be achieved because of lack of space. Petitioners have no show room even though they are manufacturing toys for the last more than ten years. 9. As against the said contention, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that how far the petitioners have improved the business and whether they have adduced evidence regarding the proposed expansion is a relevant matter while considering the question of additional accommodation and also the question of bona fides in the requirement. Learned counsel supported the judgment of the Appellate Authority wherein it has been held that the sales tax assessment is a relevant piece of evidence. .10. After hearing learned counsel on the both sides regarding bona fides for additional accommodation, I find that the approach made by the Appellate Authority is not correct. As rightly argued by learned counsel for petitioners, requirement for additional accommodation does not depend upon the assessment made by the sales-tax authorities. It is well-settled that a business could be run even over a phone and sales-tax authorities assess a business in few lakhs. If the argument of Appellate Authority is accepted, it may mean that merely because a person is assessed for a larger amount, his requirement is more. That is not the criterion for assessing the requirement for additional accommodation. Whether the space occupied by the landlord is sufficient for his requirement is a matter to be decided on other considerations, especially, the nature of business. Merely because a landlord is having a small turnover or the sales-tax assessment is small, it cannot be said that the requirement is also small. Whether the space occupied by the landlord is sufficient for his requirement is a matter to be decided on other considerations, especially, the nature of business. Merely because a landlord is having a small turnover or the sales-tax assessment is small, it cannot be said that the requirement is also small. While considering the requirement, the assessment may also be a relevant piece of evidence. The Appellate Authority has approached the question only on the basis of sales-tax assessment. That approach of the Appellate Authority is not correct. 11. In recent decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta , (1999)6 S.C.C. 222 it has been held thus: “It could not have been the intendment of the rent control law to compel the landlord is such facts and circumstances to shift to a different house and locality so as to permit the tenant to continue to live in the tenanted premises. If the landlord wishes to live with comfort in a house of his own, the law does not command or compel him to squeeze himself tightly into lesser premises to protect the tenants occupancy.” [Italics supplied] Though that was a case relating to residential premises, the same principle could be applied to non-residential premises also. Relevant portion of Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act reads thus: “A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, whether residential or nonresidential, may, notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a), apply to the controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be.” If the claim is bona fide and, on an assessment of the relevant hardship, the tenant is not put to greater difficulty, the court will be unjust in holding that the landlord must adjust himself somehow or other with the available accommodation. It is also too much to direct the landlord that he can do business in some other locality, in order to protect the tenants interest. The Rent Control Act has not gone to such an extent. .12. The third petitioner has been examined as a witness. It is also too much to direct the landlord that he can do business in some other locality, in order to protect the tenants interest. The Rent Control Act has not gone to such an extent. .12. The third petitioner has been examined as a witness. He is a Post-Graduate in Chemistry, and he is assisting his father in his business, though the business is in the name of the fifth petitioner. It is also admitted that the fifth petitioner is the head of the family, and he is the sole bread-winner. There is a machine for manufacture of toys, and a temporary tiled shelter is provided in the terrace portion, are admitted facts. It is also not a matter in dispute that the landlords are consuming electricity where the voltas is 2000, for the purpose of their business. The heat emanating from the machine and also the heat of the sun make it impossible for the labourers to do their work. P.W.3 has spoken about the difficulties which he and other labourers undergo due to lack of space, and also because of the heat from the sun. Occasionally they have to shift the machine to the first floor. Painting work of the toys is also done in the first floor. The finished goods are also stored in the very same place. Fifth petitioner has also said that due to lack of space, they could not have a showroom. I do not find any lack of good faith in the case put forward by the landlords that they need additional accommodation, for their business. The Rent Controller rightly appreciated the case of the landlords and believed their case. As said earlier, only on the basis of sales-tax assessment, the landlords’ case was found against them by the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority has not into consideration the fact that there is no showroom, and how the landlords are affected. The sales-tax assessment is mainly for manufacturing purposes, for which they have to purchase raw materials and also other materials. The very case of the landlords is that due to lack of space, they could not promote the business. As stated earlier, the Appellate Authority has not considered the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 wherein they have spoken about their requirement and also as to how their business was affected due to want of space. The very case of the landlords is that due to lack of space, they could not promote the business. As stated earlier, the Appellate Authority has not considered the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 wherein they have spoken about their requirement and also as to how their business was affected due to want of space. Non-consideration of relevant evidence is a ground for interference under Sec.25 of the Act. I hold that the claim of landlords is bona fide. 13. The further question that arises for consideration is, even if the claim for additional accommodation is found to be bona fide eviction cannot be ordered unless the court finds the point of relative hardship in favour of the landlords. The hardship that might be caused to the tenants should outweigh the advantages that might be gained by the landlords. 14. While considering the same, both the evidence of landlords and tenants will have to be taken into account, and it is not a case of burden of proof, either on the landlords or the tenants. The court will have to assess the evidence of both. .15. Before going to the evidence, let us consider paragraph 9 of the counter of respondents (tenants), which reads thus: .“Allegations in para 9 of the petition relating to” relative hardship “ are vague and imaginary. This respondent has been carrying on cloth trade in retail in the petitioner schedule property for over 15 years and the annual turnover is around 18 lakhs. The business has acquired a goodwill. There are about 10 employees. It is well-nigh impossible to get alternative accommodation for this respondents cloth shop in that locality which is the established locality for retail trade in textiles, uprooting this respondent from the petition mentioned premises will result in an end to the business. On the contrary, plastic toy manufacturing can be had in any part of the City or even in the outskirts and the first floor in the occupation of the 5th petitioner is more than sufficient for the 5th petitioner. In any event, inconvenience that may be caused to the 5th petitioner if additional accommodation is not obtained, will be only very little and can be otherwise made good, while eviction will result in a total closure of the respondents flouring trade in textile and the retrenchment of all the 10 employees. In any event, inconvenience that may be caused to the 5th petitioner if additional accommodation is not obtained, will be only very little and can be otherwise made good, while eviction will result in a total closure of the respondents flouring trade in textile and the retrenchment of all the 10 employees. This respondent therefore submits that the hardship which may be caused to this respondent by granting eviction will far outweigh the advantage that is likely to accrue to petitioners 1 to 4, if eviction is ordered.” 16. In one of the earlier decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Mrs.Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahad Khan, (dead) By L.Rs and others Mrs.Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahad Khan, (dead) By L.Rs and others Mrs.Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahad Khan, (dead) By L.Rs and others , (1979)1 S.C.C. 273 in paragraphs 21 to 24, their Lordships have held thus: “21. Let us now probe into the extent of the hardship that may be caused to one party or the other, in case a decree for eviction is passed or is refused. It seems to us that in deciding this aspect of the matter each party has prove its advantages or disadvantages and the entire onus cannot be thrown on the plaintiffs to prove that lesser disadvantages will be suffered by the defendants and that they were remediable. This matter was considered by this Court in an unreported decision in the case of M/s.Central Tobaco Co. v. Chandra Prakash M/s.Central Tobaco Co. v. Chandra Prakash M/s.Central Tobaco Co. v. Chandra Prakash , (1974)I S.C.C. 661 wherein this Court observed as follows: We do not find ourselves able to accept the broad proposition that as soon as the landlord establishes his need for additional accommodation he is relieved of all further obligation under Sec.21, Sub-sec.(4) and that once the landlords need is accepted by the court all further evidence must be adduced by the tenant if he claims protection under the Act. Each party must adduce evidence to show what hardship would be caused to him by the granting or refusal of the decree and it will be for the court to determine whether the suffering of the tenant, in case a decree was made, would be more than that of the landlord by its refusal. Each party must adduce evidence to show what hardship would be caused to him by the granting or refusal of the decree and it will be for the court to determine whether the suffering of the tenant, in case a decree was made, would be more than that of the landlord by its refusal. The whole object of the Act is to provide for the control of rents and evictions, for the leasing of buildings etc. and Sec.21 specifically enumerates the grounds which alone will entitle a landlord to evict his tenant. The onus of proof of this is certainly on the landlord. We see no sufficient reason for holding that once that onus is discharged by the landlord it shifts to the tenants making it obligatory on him to show that greater hardship would be caused to him by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. In our opinion both sides must adduce all relevant evidence before the court; the landlord must show that other reasonable accommodation was not available to him and the tenant must also adduce evidence to that effect. It is only after sifting such evidence that the court must form its conclusion on consideration of all the circumstances of the case as to whether greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. This case was followed in Bhiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant N.Patel Bhiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant N.Patel Bhiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant N.Patel , (197)I S.C.C. 661. In the case of Kelley, Lynskey, J. observed as follows: The next matter one has to consider is whether there was evidence on which the country judge could come to the conclusion that there would be greater hardship in making the order than not making the order. He has taken into account, in relation to that question, first, the position of the landlord, and, secondly, the position of the tenant. He has taken into account the financial means of the tenant. It is argued before us that he was wrong in doing that. In my view, he was quite entitled, in considering hardship, to have regard to the financial means of the tenant in considering whether he could obtain other accommodation because by reason of his means, he was in a position not merely to rent, but to buy a house. It is argued before us that he was wrong in doing that. In my view, he was quite entitled, in considering hardship, to have regard to the financial means of the tenant in considering whether he could obtain other accommodation because by reason of his means, he was in a position not merely to rent, but to buy a house. It seems to me also that, on this question of hardship, the Judge was entitled to take into account the fact that the tenant had taken no real steps to try and find other accommodation or no real steps to buy a house. [Italics supplied] To the same effect is the decision in the case of K.Parasuramaiah v. Pokuri Lakshmamma K.Parasuramaiah v. Pokuri Lakshmamma K.Parasuramaiah v. Pokuri Lakshmamma , A.I.R. 1965 A.P. 200 where a Division Bench of the High Court narrated the mode and circumstances in which the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the landlord and the tenant could be weighed. In this connection, the court observed as follows: Thus the hardship of the tenant was first to be found out in case eviction is to be directed. That hardship then has to be placed against the relative advantages which the landlord would stand to gain if an order of eviction passed… What is however required is a careful consideration of all the relevant factors in weighing the relative hardship which is likely to be caused to the tenant with the likely advantage of the landlord on the basis of the available material on record. …The proviso however should not be read as if it confers practical immunity on the tenant from being evicted. That would destroy the very purpose of Sec.10(3)(c). Likewise the requirement of the landlord in accordance with that provision alone cannot be given absolute value, because that would mean to under-estimate the value of the proviso to that section. Keeping in view therefore the purpose of the provision and the necessity of balancing the various factors each individual case has to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case. 22. In view of the our findings it has been established that the landlords have not only a genuine requirement to possess the house, but it is necessary for them to do so in order to argument their income and maintain themselves properly. 22. In view of the our findings it has been established that the landlords have not only a genuine requirement to possess the house, but it is necessary for them to do so in order to argument their income and maintain themselves properly. Being the owners of the house they cannot be denied eviction and be compelled to live below the poverty line merely to enable the respondents to carry on their flourishing hotel business, at the cost of the appellants. This shows the great prejudice that will be caused to the plaintiffs if their suit is dismissed. The plaintiffs have already produced material before the court to show that their income does not exceed more than Rs.70 to Rs.80 only. There is no other means for them to augment their except to get their own house vacated by the defendants so as to run a hotel business. It is vehemently contended by Mr.Andley that there is nothing to show that the plaintiff Mohd.Yusuf or his mother had any experience of running a hotel, and, therefore, it is fruitless to allow them to run the hotel by evicting the respondents. Mohd.Yusuf is admittedly doing shoe business, and has got sufficient experience of business. Nothing has been brought on the record to show that he is incapable of running a hotel in the premises. The building belongs to him and there is no reason for us to think that he cannot establish a hotel business. 23. On the other hand the defendants have been running the hotel for the last 30 years and must have made sufficient profits. To begin with, the defendants had taken the lease only for 10 years which now by virtue of the statute has been extended to 30 years which is a sufficiently long period for which the plaintiffs have been deprived of the possession of the house. There is thus no equity in favour of the respondents for continuing in possession any further. 24. It was then submitted by Mr.Andley, counsel for the respondents that if the respondents are evicted they will be thrown out on the road; that the hotel is the only source of their sustenance and they are not likely to get any alternative accommodation on being evicted. 24. It was then submitted by Mr.Andley, counsel for the respondents that if the respondents are evicted they will be thrown out on the road; that the hotel is the only source of their sustenance and they are not likely to get any alternative accommodation on being evicted. If the defendants had proved that they will not be able to get any accommodation anywhere in the city where they could set up a hotel, this might have been a weighty consideration, but the evidence of all the witnesses examined by the defendants only shows that the defendants may not get alternative accommodation in that very locality where the house in dispute is situated. There is no satisfactory evidence to prove that even in other business localities there is no possibility of the defendants getting a house. To insist on getting an alternative accommodation of a similar nature in the same locality will be asking for the impossible. The defendants are tenants and had taken the lease only for 10 years but had overstayed for 20 years and they cannot be allowed to dictate to the landlord that they cannot be evicted unless they get similar accommodation in the very same locality. “ [Italics supplied] 17. In Bhaichand Ratanshi v. Laxmishankar Tribhovan Bhaichand Ratanshi v. Laxmishankar Tribhovan Bhaichand Ratanshi v. Laxmishankar Tribhovan , (1981)3 S.C.C. 502 their Lordships have considered this aspect, and have held as follows: “The Legislature by enacting Sec.13(2) of the Act seems to strike a just balance between the landlord and the tenant so that the order of eviction under Sec.13(1)(g) of the Act does not cause any hardship to either side. The considerations that weigh in striking a just balance between the landlord and the tenant were indicated in a series of decisions of the Court of Appeal, interpreting an analogous provision of the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions (Amendment) Act, 1933 (c.32), Sec.3(1), Schedule I, Para (h); Sims v. Wilson , (1946)2 All E.R. 261, Fowle One of the most important factors in considering the question of hardship is whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenants. The court would have to put in the scale other circumstances which would tilt the balance of hardship on either side, including financial means available to them for securing alternative accommodation either by purchase or by hiring one, the nature and extent of the business or other requirement of residential accommodation, as the case may be. It must however, be observed that the existence of alternative accommodation on both sides is an important but not a decisive factor. On the issue of greater hardship the English courts have uniformly laid down that the burden of proof is on the tenant. We are inclined to the view that on the terms of Sec.13 (2) of the Act, the decision cannot turn on mere burden of proof, but both the parties must lead evidence. The question whether or nor there would be greater hardship caused to the tenant by passing the decree must necessarily depend on facts and circumstances of each case.” [Italics supplied] 18. The decision in Bhaichand Ratanshi v. Laxmishanker Tribhovan , (1981)3 S.C.C. 502 was followed in Om Prakash v. Bhagwan Das , A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1643. 19. In Bhagwan Dass v. Jiley Kaur and another Bhagwan Dass v. Jiley Kaur and another Bhagwan Dass v. Jiley Kaur and another , (1991)2 S.C.C. (Supp.) 300 an argument was taken that judicial notice can be taken regarding the scarcity of accommodation. Their Lordships rejected that contention and held thus: “Reliance was then placed by learned counsel for the appellant on Gautam Chand Jain v. Sushila Kumari Jain In our opinion this decision also is not of any assistance to the appellant. It was a case where unlike the instant case more suitable alternative accommodation for the owner was available whereas no alternative accommodation could be found out for the tenant. What was emphasised by the learned counsel for the appellant in this decision was that in course of hearing of the appeals in that case the matter was adjourned with a view to giving an opportunity to the landlord to suggest an alternative accommodation in the premises in dispute, but none could be suggested. ”According to learned counsel, scarcity of accommodation is a circumstances of which judicial note can be taken. ”According to learned counsel, scarcity of accommodation is a circumstances of which judicial note can be taken. It was urged that in this view of the matter the court may take judicial notice of the fact, even though the tenant may not have brought any material on record of his own to indicate that he made any attempt to have an alternate accommodation but was unable to get the same, that no alternative accommodation was available to the appellant. In our opinion, the question as to whether in a given circumstance alternative accommodation is available or not is not a matter of which any judicial notice can be taken but is one which has to be proved by evidence as has been emphasised in Bega Begum case. “ [Italics supplied] 20. In Inder Mohan Lal v. Ramesh Khanna Inder Mohan Lal v. Ramesh Khanna Inder Mohan Lal v. Ramesh Khanna , (1987)4 S.C.C. 1 in paragraph 20, their Lordships have held that there is no presumption that in all cases the tenants are the weaker sections the society and their Lordships took note of the fact that in may cases the tenants are more affluent than the landlord, especially in regard to non-residential premises. 21. On the basis of the above declaration of law by the Honourable Supreme Court. It have to consider whether the tenants will be put to greater hardship, and whether the reasonings of the Appellate Authority could be supported. 22. When relative hardship is considered, the most important factor to be considered is, whether an alternative building is available for the tenant to continue his business. It need not necessarily be shown that the business could be carried on the alternative building as profitably as in the original building, because, profits depends more upon economic factors than anything else. Eviction on the ground of bona fide own use is not disallowed even if the tenant is not getting an alternative building in the same locality, i.e., in the same place. The court also cannot presume that if the tenant shifts to another building, he will be put to great hardship and he will not be in a position to do business profitably. The court also cannot recognise the fact that a particular area is suitable only for a particular kind of business. The court also cannot presume that if the tenant shifts to another building, he will be put to great hardship and he will not be in a position to do business profitably. The court also cannot recognise the fact that a particular area is suitable only for a particular kind of business. Merely because in a particular street or locality a particular business alone is carried on, it does not follow that other business cannot survive in that area. 23. Before the Appellate Authority, additional evidence was let in by the respondents, and all of them are only various sales-tax assessment marked as Exs.B-1 to B-20 and various demand notices after the assessment. Except Exs.B--10 and B-11, all other documents are subsequent to the institution of the proceedings. .24. R.W.1 is the Manager who was authorised to depose on behalf of the tenants. Ex.B-6 is the authorisation letter empowering him to give evidence on their behalf. In chief-examination, what he has stated is that if they are ordered to be evicted, their customers will leave them, and that will affect their business. He has further said thus: .In cross-examination, he has said thus: 25. Similar is the evidence of R.W.2, who is the first respondent himself. From their evidence, it is clear that no attempt was made to verify whether any alternate accommodation is available. As per the decision in , (1981) 3 S.C.C. 502 the financial position for securing a building, the nature and extent of business and other requirements of accommodation are all relevant factors. Taking into consideration the various sales-tax assessment on which the Appellate Authority has placed reliance, the financial position of the tenant can never be said as bad as the landlords. His annual assessment goes to more than Rs.40 lakhs. So far as the landlord is concerned, the assessment is only within two to three lakhs of rupees. Naturally, being a big businessman, the financial position of the tenant will be higher than that of the landlord. Neither the tenant nor R.W.1 has said that they made any attempt to purchase any property or whether they verified as to the availability of any alternate accommodation in that locality. As per Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act, an alternative accommodation need not be confined or restricted to the very same place where the tenant is doing business. Neither the tenant nor R.W.1 has said that they made any attempt to purchase any property or whether they verified as to the availability of any alternate accommodation in that locality. As per Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act, an alternative accommodation need not be confined or restricted to the very same place where the tenant is doing business. Therefore, he cannot insist on the availability of an alternative accommodation in the very same street where he is doing business. The Appellate Authority has said that in the street in which the tenants are doing textile business, the business is restricted to textile business and, therefore, alternate accommodation must also be only in that area. I feel that the Appellate Authority has gone beyond the scope of the section and it has given some more benefit to the tenants which is not provided by the Statute. .26. In , (1979)1 S.C.C. 273 , their Lordships have held that the tenants cannot insist that they should get alternative accommodation in the same area, and if they insist on the same, then it means that they are asking for an impossibility, which is not to be considered for the purpose of assessing the relative hardship. In this case, the landlords have adduced evidence to show that during the relevant time, various buildings in the very same locality were available for occupation. P.W.1 has spoken about this as follows: .The Appellate Authority has discarded the evidence of the landlord as P.W.1 on the ground that even the business covered by Exs.A-13 to A-27 is only in respect of textile business or ready-made garments connected with textile business and, therefore, that reinforces the case of the tenants that business in that street is confined only to textiles. From the evidence of P.W.1 and also from Exs.A-13 to A-27, it is clear that during the relevant time, various shops fell vacant and other tenants have occupied them and they have started business of their own. Whether they are doing textile business or not, is not a matter in issue. The only question is, whether other buildings are available in the same locality. Landlords have proved the same by adducing positive evidence. 27. Tenants, by their own case, have shown that they are financially in a better position and do not being to weaker section of the Society. The only question is, whether other buildings are available in the same locality. Landlords have proved the same by adducing positive evidence. 27. Tenants, by their own case, have shown that they are financially in a better position and do not being to weaker section of the Society. That is also a relevant factor while considering the question of relative hardship. The Appellate Authority has gone to the extent of saying that the outside the City since business in the street in which tenants are carrying on business, is restricted to textile business. The Appellate Authority has further held that if the labourers are finding it difficult to work in the premises in question, the landlords have to provide other amenities to them or shift the business to some other place. The said decision of the Appellate Authority is really perverse. When the landlords themselves say that they cannot do the business properly in the demised premises, asking them to shift the business to some other place is something beyond the intention of the Rent Control Act. Moulding the toys and stocking the same should be in one premises. Apart from that, the landlord must have a showroom to improve his business, in the same premises. Therefore, if the landlords are directed to shift their business, they will be put to greater hardship than the hardship that might be faced by tenants. The Appellate Authority has not considered any legal points while disposing of the eviction petition. 28. Learned counsel for respondents relied on the decisions reported in B.Kandasamy Reddiar v. O.Gomathi Ammal B.Kandasamy Reddiar v. O.Gomathi Ammal B.Kandasamy Reddiar v. O.Gomathi Ammal , A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 3235, Sivaraj I do not think those decisions will apply to the facts of this case, since in all those decisions, the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority has placed reliance on factual materials, and those findings are also probable. 29. At this juncture, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the question whether there is any requirement for additional accommodation has been properly considered and it is only a question of fact, and the finding of the Appellate Authority is not liable to be interfered with while considering the Revision under Sec.25 of the Act. 30. There is no argument by learned counsel for respondents regarding the maintainability of the eviction petition. 30. There is no argument by learned counsel for respondents regarding the maintainability of the eviction petition. He confined his argument only on the point of relative hardship. In a recent decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Shivsarup Gupta v. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta Shivsarup Gupta v. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta Shivsarup Gupta v. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta , (1999)6 S.C.C. 222 the question regarding the scope of a revision was considered. Their Lordships were considering the provisions of the Rent Control Act. In para 11, Their Lordships have held as follows: “The phraseology of the provision as reproduced herein before provides an interesting reading placed in juxtaposition with the phraseology employed by the legislature in drafting Sec.115, Civil Procedure Code. Under the latter provision the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is circumscribed by the Subordinate Court having committed one of the three errors, namely, (i) having exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (ii) having failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (iii) having exercised its jurisdiction with illegality or material irregularity. Under the proviso to Sub-sec.(8) of Sec.25-B, the expression governing the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court is” for the purpose of satisfying if an order made by the controller is according to law“. The revisional jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court under Sec.25-B(8) is not so limited as is under Sec.115, C.P.C. nor so wide as that of an appellate Court. The High Court cannot enter into appreciation or reappreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a court of facts. However, the High Court is obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of” whether it is according to law“. For that limited purpose it may enter into reappraisal of evidence, that is, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached on the material available. Ignoring the weight of evidence, proceeding on a wrong premise of law or deriving such conclusion from the established facts as betray a lack of reason and/or objectivity would render the finding of the Controller “ not according to law ” calling for an interference under the proviso to Sub-sec.(8) ofSec.25-Bof the Act. Ignoring the weight of evidence, proceeding on a wrong premise of law or deriving such conclusion from the established facts as betray a lack of reason and/or objectivity would render the finding of the Controller “ not according to law ” calling for an interference under the proviso to Sub-sec.(8) ofSec.25-Bof the Act. A judgment lead to a miscarriage of justice is not a judgment according to law. (See: Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co., Ltd. , (1998)8 S.C.C. 119 and Ram Narain Arora 31. In the result, the judgment of the Appellate Authority is set aside and that of the Rent Controller is restored. R.C.O.P.No.442 of 1987, on the file of Principal District Munsif-cum-Rent Controller, Madurai is allowed. It is declared that the petitioners herein are entitled to evict the respondents on the ground that the building in question is required for their additional accommodation. On the point of relative hardship, it is held that the tenants will not be put to greater hardship. The civil revision petition is allowed as indicated above. No costs.