J.N. SARMA, J. — This is a second appeal by the defendant. The plaintiff brought a suit being TS 134/91 before the Munsiff No.l at Nagaon. The brief facts are as follows: 2. That the plaintiff purchased the suit land from defendant No. 3 -Manfk Chandra Sharma by registered sale deed and obtained delivery of possession of the same and continue to possess the same. But they were forcibly dispossessed from the suit land by the defendant on 15.4.80. After such dis-possession the defendant constructed some thatched houses thereon and denied the title of the plaintiff on the plea that the suit land was sold to Raising Bordoloi by Manik Sharma and Raising Bordoloi sold the same to defendant No. 1 Sachindra Mohan Deka Raja. On enquiry the plaintiff came to know that the defendant mutated their names in the patta of the suit land. Hence the suit. The case of the defendant was that the defendant No.3 promised to sell the suit land to the father of Raising Bordoloi and received an amount of Rs.2,000/- about 25 years back, but did not execute the sale deed. However, after the death of Bordoloi's father the sale deed was executed in 1978 in favour of defendant No. 2. The defendant No. 2 sold the same to defendant No. 1 in the year 1980. It was further pleaded that the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and the father of defendant No. 2 were bonafide purchaser for value without notice. It was further pleaded that defendant No. 3 never delivered the possession of the suit land to the plaintiff. 3. As many as 4 issues were framed in the suit. They are - (i) cause of action (ii) right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the suit land (iii) adverse possession (iv) to what relief, the plaintiff is entitled. 4. The trial Court decided Issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff. With regard to Issue No. 2 the trial Court found as admitted by both sides that defendant No. 3 was the owner of the suit land prior to sale. Plaintiff produced the sale deed executed by defendant No. 3 and the defendant No. 1 produced 2 sale deeds executed by defendant Nos. 2 and 3. The sale deed in favour of the plaintiff is prior in point of time of its execution i.e., in the year 1972. Ext. Plaintiff produced the sale deed executed by defendant No. 3 and the defendant No. 1 produced 2 sale deeds executed by defendant Nos. 2 and 3. The sale deed in favour of the plaintiff is prior in point of time of its execution i.e., in the year 1972. Ext. 'ka' and 'kha' - the two sale deeds in favour of the defendant were executed in 1980 and 1978. The sale deed exhibited as Ext. 1 was duly admitted in evidence and proved without any objection and that also is the finding of the learned Munsiff. He found that the sale deed has been duly proved. It was further found by the learned Munsiff that on comprising the signatures of Manik Sharma Kataki on the exhibits 1, Ext. Kha it is found that signatures on both the deeds are similar and written by the same persons. That comparison was by the learned Munsiff in exercise of the power u/s 73 of the Evidence Act. It was further found by the learned Munsiff that defendant No. 3 sold the suit land to the plaintiff in 1972 by registered sale deed, Ext. 1 and therefore, he lost all his right, title and interest over the suit land in the year 1972 itself. It was further found by the learned Munsiff that the plaintiff was dispossessed from the suit land. Accordingly the suit was decreed by the learned Munsiff. There was an appeal being TA 32/91 before the learned Assistant District Judge, Nagaon. The learned Judge on consideration of the materials on record affirmed the finding of the learned Musnsiff and dismissed the appeal. Hence, this second appeal. 5. Three substantial question of law formulated in this second appeal, they are - (i) whether the suit of declaration of title and recovery of possession of the land without partition is maintainable in law? (ii) whether the right of the appellant is protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act being the bonafide purchaser for value without notice? (iii) whether the learned trial Court is justified in acting as a handwriting expert in comparing the signature in Ext. 1 and Ext Kha? 6. (ii) whether the right of the appellant is protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act being the bonafide purchaser for value without notice? (iii) whether the learned trial Court is justified in acting as a handwriting expert in comparing the signature in Ext. 1 and Ext Kha? 6. Regarding question No. (i) this is a new plea taken up in second appeal, but this plea was never taken up either before the trial Court or before appellate Court and as such this cannot be a substantial question of law in the second appeal and that question shall stand rejected. Regarding question No. (ii) the deed in question in favour of the plaintiff was a registered deed executed in the year 1912. A registered deed itself is a notice u/s 3 of Transfer of Property Act. Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act provide as follows: "A person is said to have notice of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it. Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act provide as follows: "A person is said to have notice of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it. Explanation I. Where any transaction relating to immovable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property of any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration or where the property is not all situated in one sub-district or where the registered instrument has been registered under sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908) from the earliest date on which any memorandum of such registered instrument has been filed by any Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district any part of the properly which is being acquired or of the property wherein a share or interest is being acquired, is situated: Provided that-(1) that the instrument has been registered and its registration completed in the manner prescribed by the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908) and the rules made thereunder; (2) the instrument or memorandum has been duly entered or filed, as the case may be, in books kept under Section 51 of that Act, and (3) the particulars regarding the transaction to which the instrument relates have been correctly entered in the indexes kept under Section 55 of that Act. Explanation II. Any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof." 7. In the instant case, the deed was registered in the year 1972 itself and the name of the plaintiff also was mutated. The defendant could have gathered the knowledge of such a transaction, if enquiry would have been made. But it is the further findings of the Courts below that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land and that possession of the plaintiff also will be a notice. Sot it cannot be said that the plaintiffs are bonafide purchaser of value without notice. But it is the further findings of the Courts below that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land and that possession of the plaintiff also will be a notice. Sot it cannot be said that the plaintiffs are bonafide purchaser of value without notice. As such, the question No. (ii) also is not substantial question of law in view of the position as stated above. This law also has been laid down in AIR 1992 Gau 17 (Shrimati Faijabi Devi-Vs-Sree Surendra Sil & Ors.). 8. Regarding question No. (iii) what can be said is that Ext. 1 was duly proved and the Court exercised the power u/s 73 of Evidence Act only to satisfy itself. S. 73 specifically empowers the Court to compare the disputed writings with the specimen/admitted writings shown to be genuine, prudence demands that the Court should be extremely slow in venturing an opinion on the basis of mere comparison, more so when the quality of evidence in respect of specimen/admitted writings is not of high standard. 9. That is not the position in the instant case. In the case in hand, there were evidence with regard to execution of Ext. 1 and the Court in order to satisfy itself only compared both Ext. 'Ka' and 'kha' and the Court is competent to compare the disputed writings. The Court can always itself compare it in order to appreciate the other evidence produced before it in that regard. 10. That being the position, this question also must be answered against the appellant. Accordingly there is no merit in this second appeal and the same is dismissed. However, I leave the parties to bear their own costs. 11. Heard Mr A.C. Sarma, learned counsel for appellant and Mr M. A. Laskar, learned counsel for respondents.