Judgment 1. This writ petition has been preferred with the prayer to quash the order bearing letter no. 454 Mohania, dt. 7.8.99 (Annexure 1), issued under the signature of respondent no. 11 (Secretary, Agriculture Produce Market Committee, Mohania), as well as the order dt. 16.11.99, passed by espondent no. 3 (Managing Director, Bihar State Agricultural Marketing Board, Patna) By the former order (Annexure 1), the petitioners licence to hold mela has been cancelled, and by the latter order (Annexure 2), the appeal preferred by the petitioner herein has been dismissed. 2. The petitioner has been holding a cattle fare, known as Vijay Virat Pashu Mela, on his raiyati land after obtaining permission of the appropriate Agriculture Produce Market Committee, within whose jurisdiction the mela is situate, namely, respondent nos. 10 and 11, under the provisions of the Bihar Agriculture Produce Market Act, 1960, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and the Rules thereunder. Respondent nos. 10 and 11 had issued a show cause notice bearing letter no. 303, dated 21.5.99 (Annexure 8), calling upon the petitioner to explain as to why his licence to hold the mela be not cancelled on account of violation of the terms and conditions of the licence. The petitioner was alleged to be extending his market to the government land which has resulted in encroachment of the govt. land. He was realising the market fee at a higher rate, and receipts were being manipulated to withhold the govt. revenue. He was alleged to be holding mela far more than prescribed occasions and days, and also withholding the govt. revenue. The encroachment resulted in damage to the plantation thereby endangering the environment. The encroachment also resulted in obstruction to the traffic on the highway, as well as misusing public land and highway for personal use. He was, therefore, called upon to explain as to why his licence be not cancelled. The petitioner had shown cause by his letter dated 24.5.99 (Annexure 9). After consideration of the entire matter, the petitioners licence was suspended for a period of one month, vide order dated 24.6.99, which was never challenged and became final. This much by way of background. 3. During the period of suspension of the petitioners licence, he continued to hold the mela. It appears that respondent no.3 (Mg. After consideration of the entire matter, the petitioners licence was suspended for a period of one month, vide order dated 24.6.99, which was never challenged and became final. This much by way of background. 3. During the period of suspension of the petitioners licence, he continued to hold the mela. It appears that respondent no.3 (Mg. Director of the Bihar State Agricultural Marketing Board), had received reports about the same and had therefore, requested the District Magistrate, Kaimur (Bhabua), to hold an enquiry, vide letter no. 185, dated 9.7.99 (Annexure 8). The District Magistrate, had directed one Prem Kumar Jha, Executive Magistrate to conduct the requisite enquiry, vide his letter no. 1183, dated 11.7.99 (Annexure I). As directed, the Executive Magistrate conducted an enquiry and submitted his report dated 11.7.99 (Annexure I contd.), whereby, in substance, he stated that the mela had spread over to public land including the highway and the mela continued to be held during the period the licence had been suspended. It also mentioned that five trucks, stating recording their registration numbers, loaded with livestock ready for transportation. The petitioner had informed the Executive Magistrate that operation of the order of suspension had been stayed by the High Court and, therefore, he could not be prohibited from holding the mela. 3.1) On the basis of this enquiry report dated 11.7.99 (Annexure I), respondent nos. 10 and 11 served letter no. 438, dated 29.7.99 (Annexure 14), calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to why his licence be not cancelled for having acted in contravention of the terms and conditions of the licence, for holding the mela inspite of the order of suspension. The show cause notice made copious references to the report dated 11.7.99 (Annexure I), of the Executive, Magistrate, and recorded the details borrowed from the enquiry report. The petitioner had shown cause by his letter dt. 2.8.99 (Annexure 15). It is relevant to state that there is another report dated 16.7.99 (Annexure 13A), submitted by the Committees Supervisor which, in substance, stated that the mela had not been held after the order of suspension was served on the petitioner on 26.6.99. The Supervisor did not find any cattle or trader on the mela ground. 2.8.99 (Annexure 15). It is relevant to state that there is another report dated 16.7.99 (Annexure 13A), submitted by the Committees Supervisor which, in substance, stated that the mela had not been held after the order of suspension was served on the petitioner on 26.6.99. The Supervisor did not find any cattle or trader on the mela ground. There is yet another report dated 21.7.99 (Annexure J), submitted by the Officer-in-charge of Durgawati Police Station to the SDO, Mohania, that in compliance of the latters direction, the mela has been stopped with effect from 14.7.99, and the petitioner had been strictly warned not to hold the mela during the period his licence has been cancelled. He accordingly reported that the mela had been stopped w.e.f. 14.7.99. 3.2) After consideration of the materials on record, respondent nos. 10 and 11, passed the impugned order dated 7.8.99 (Annexure 1), whereby the petitioners licence to hold the mela in question has been cancelled because, during the period the licence had remained suspended, the petitioner had continued to hold the mela. The impugned order clearly stated that the petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of the licence for the second time. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Boards Mg. Director, respondent no.3, who dismissed the appeal, and upheld the aforesaid order of cancellation, vide appellate order dated 16.11.99 (Annexure 2). 4. While assailing the validity of the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a copy of the enquiry report dated 11.7.99 (Annexure 1), had not been served on him. The entire proceeding, rested on this report and, therefore, the same is bad in law on account of violation of the principles of natural justice. He has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1967 SC 1269 (State of Orissa V/s. Binapani Dei). He next submitted that the impugned order had been passed on the dictates of an authority not recognized by the Act, namely, Executive Magistrate. He relies on the judgments of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1952 SC 16 (Commissioner of Police V/s. Gordhandas) as well as AIR 1970 SC 1896 (Purtabpur Co. V/s. Cane Commissioner). He submitted in the same vein that the Executive Magistrate not being recognized authority under the Act could not have been entrusted with the enquiry under the Act. He relies on the judgments of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1952 SC 16 (Commissioner of Police V/s. Gordhandas) as well as AIR 1970 SC 1896 (Purtabpur Co. V/s. Cane Commissioner). He submitted in the same vein that the Executive Magistrate not being recognized authority under the Act could not have been entrusted with the enquiry under the Act. He further submitted that the impugned order dated 7.8.99 (Annexure 1) passed by the first authority, states only one ground for cancellation of the licence, namely, to hold the mela during the period the licence was under suspension and, therefore, the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to go beyond the same. He relies on the judgment on the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1978 SC 851 (Mohinder Singh Gill V/s. Union of India). The appellate authority has added reasons of his own which vitiates the appellate order. He further submitted in the same vein that the order of the first authority (Annexure 1), does not assign any reason for cancellation of the licence, and only gives the conclusion and, therefore, is bad in law. He next submitted that none of the authorities has considered the Supervisors report dated 16.7.99 (Annexure 13A), and, therefore, both the orders are bad in law. 5. Learned counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 6, namely, the Marketing Board and its functionaries, submitted that the earlier order dated 24.6.99, cancelling the petitioners licence to hold the mela for a period of one month w.e.f. the same date had become final and, therefore, binds all the parties. He next submitted that the only violation alleged in the present show cause notice dated 29.7.99 (Annexure 14), is that he had violated the terms and conditions of the licence, namely, he was holding mela during the period, it remained under suspension. Therefore, on a detailed enquiry, after service of the show- cause notice on the petitioner and affording him reasonable opportunity of hearing, the licence has been cancelled. Therefore, the impugned order, in his submission, cannot be faulted on the ground that no other reason was mentioned. Therefore, on a detailed enquiry, after service of the show- cause notice on the petitioner and affording him reasonable opportunity of hearing, the licence has been cancelled. Therefore, the impugned order, in his submission, cannot be faulted on the ground that no other reason was mentioned. He further submitted that the fact that a copy of the enquiry report dated 11.7.99 (Annexure I), conducted by the Executive Magistrate was not supplied to the petitioner, has not acted to the prejudice of the petitioner in the present case for the reason that the same is copiously referred to in the show-cause notice dated 29.7.99 (Annexure 14), and the contents of the enquiry report is stated therein. The petitioner had never called upon the concerned authorities to supply a copy of the same. 6. One Pusp Kumar is the holder of a licence from the said Committee to hold a similar mela at a near-by place, it was he who had submitted the application before respondent nos. 10 and 11 for cancellation of the licence of the petitioner, he was heard by the first authority as well as the appellate authority, but has not been impleaded as a party respondent in this case. He has filed an application to be impleaded as a party respondent. I have heard learned counsel for the parties on this application and, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, hereby allow the application. Consequently, he is allowed to be impleaded as respondent no. 14 in this writ petition and his counsel has been heard on merits. 6.1) Mr. Y. V. Giri, Sr. Advocate, appearing for respondent no. 14, has supported the impugned order and submitted that it is manifest from a plain reading of the show-cause notice dated 29.7.99 (Annexure 14), that the report of the enquiry officer (Annexure I), has been mentioned therein and the contents of the same are repeated in detail. Therefore, no prejudice was done to the petitioner on account of non-supply of this document. He further submitted that the petitioner never asked for a copy of the same, and had submitted a detailed show cause before the first authority. He has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1976 SC 143 (City Corner V/s. Personal Asstt. to Collector). He further submitted that the petitioner never asked for a copy of the same, and had submitted a detailed show cause before the first authority. He has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1976 SC 143 (City Corner V/s. Personal Asstt. to Collector). He further submitted that the impugned order dated 7.8.99 (Annexure 1), does mention the reason for cancellation of the licence, namely, the petitioner has been holding the mela inspite of the order of suspension of the licence. It also states that this was the petitioners second violation. He further submitted that the same has merged into the appellate order. In his submission, it is concluded by finding of facts. He next submitted that there were two reports on record against the petitioner, and one report in favour of the petitioner. The matter is concluded by concurrent findings of fact and therefore, this Court should not exercise its discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the order. Law is well settled that writ jurisdiction should not be exercised to perpetuate or revive an illegality. He lastly submitted that enquiry was entrusted to the District Magistrate/Executive Magistrate, no decision making was entrusted to them and therefore, the impugned orders cannot be faulted on this ground. 7. Learned Addl. Advocate General appearing for respondent nos. 7 and 8 submitted that there is no prohibition anywhere that such an enquiry cannot be entrusted to the District Magistrate, or the Executive Magistrate. After all, only enquiry was entrusted, not the decisionmaking. He next submitted that it is correct to state that the authorities under the Act exercised statutory duties and functions. However, the SDO is the President of the local Market Committee. He has, therefore, to act in tandem with the local administration, in addition to his statutory duties and functions under the Act. He next submitted that the appellate authority can always add his own reasons provided the same emanates from the materials on record. 8. Having considered the rival submissions, I am of the view that a copy of (sic) this writ petition has to be dismissed. I am unable to accede to the first contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner to the effect that the enquiry report dated 11.7.99 (Annexure I) submitted by the Executive Magistrate, not having been supplied to the petitioner vitiates the enquiry. I am unable to accede to the first contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner to the effect that the enquiry report dated 11.7.99 (Annexure I) submitted by the Executive Magistrate, not having been supplied to the petitioner vitiates the enquiry. The same has been adequately mentioned in the show cause notice dated 29.7.99 (Annexure 13A), and the entire materials adverse to the petitioner stated in the enquiry report are restated therein. The show-cause notice (Annexure 13A) gives all the relevant details to be found in the enquiry report including the regstration numbers of five trucks which were found by the Executive Magistrate during course of enquiry ready to carry away the livestock. Therefore, the petitioner does not suffer any prejudice on account of non-supply of the enquiry report. Learned counsel for the respondents are right in their submission that the petitioner was fully aware of the enquiry report of the Executive Magistrate and never asked for a copy of the same. The reliance placed by them on the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court in City Corners case (supra), is apposite, which lays down as follows: "...It is not always necessary that the documents asked for should themselves be furnished provided the substance of those documents is furnished, always provided, however, that the summary is not misleading..." 9. I am equally unable to accede to the next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order is based on the dictates of an authority who is not a recognized authority under the statute, namely, Executive Magistrate. Law is well settled that an enquiry can be entrusted to any authority who has no interest or bias in the matter. Learned counsel for the respondents are right in their submission that spot enquiry was entrusted to the Magistrate, not the decision-making. Reliance placed by the learned counsel on the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1952 SC 16 (Commissioner of Police V/s. Gordhandas Bhanji), as well as AIR 1970 SC 1896 (Purtabpur Co. V/s. Cane Commissioner), are wholly inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. Reliance placed by the learned counsel on the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1952 SC 16 (Commissioner of Police V/s. Gordhandas Bhanji), as well as AIR 1970 SC 1896 (Purtabpur Co. V/s. Cane Commissioner), are wholly inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. The judgment reported in 1929 All England Law Reports, Page 468 (Maclean V/s. Workers Union), is also relevant in the present case, wherein it has been observed as follows: "The jurisdiction of the courts in regard to domestic tribunalsa phrase which may conveniently be used to include the committees or the councils or the members of trade unions, of members clubs, and of professional bodies established by statute or royal charter while acting in a quasi-judicial capacity-is clearly of a limited nature. Parenthetically, I may observe that I am not confident that precisely the same principles will apply in all these cases; for it may be that a body entrusted with important duties by an Act of Parliament is not in the same position as, for example, the executive committee in the present case. Speaking generally, it is useful to bear in mind the very wide differences between the principles applicable to courts of justice and those applicable to domestic tribunals. In the former the accused is entitled to be tried by the judge according to the evidence legally adduced and has a right to be represented by a skilled legal advocate. All the procedure of a modern trial, including the examination and cross-examination of the witnesses and the summing-up, if any, is based on these two circumstances. A domestic tribunal is in general a tribunal composed of laymen. It has no power to administer an oath, and a circumstance which is, perhaps, of greater importance no party has the power to compel the attendance of witnesses. It is not bound by the rules of evidence; it is, indeed, probably ignorant of them. It may act, and it sometimes must act, on mere hearsay, and in many cases the members present or some of them-like a British jury in ancient days are themselves both the witnesses and the judges. Before such a tribunal counsel have no right of audience and there are no effective means for testing by cross-examination the truth of the statements that may be made. Before such a tribunal counsel have no right of audience and there are no effective means for testing by cross-examination the truth of the statements that may be made. The members of the tribunal may have been discussing the matter for weeks with persons not present at the hearing, and there is no one even to warn them of the danger of acting on preconceived views. It is apparent, and it is well settled by authority, that the decision of such a tribunal cannot be attacked on the ground that it is against the weight of evidence, since evidence in the proper sense there is none and since the decisions of the tribunal are not open to any sort of appeal unless the rules provide for one." The contention is, therefore, rejected. 10 The next ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order of the first authorty (Annexure 1), mentions only one ground for cancellation of the licence, whereas the appellate authority has added reasons in support of the impugned action. I am unable to accede to the contention for the reason that the order of the first authority (Annexure 1) as well as the appellate authority (Annexure 2), took only one ground for cancellation of the licence, namely, violation of the terms and conditions of the licence, viz., organizing the mela during the period the licence was under suspension. In such circumstances, the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in M. S. Gills case (supra) is wholly inapplicable to the present case. The contention is based on a factually incorrect premise. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has next submitted that the Supervisors report dated 16.7.99 (Annexure 13A), is in favour of the petitioner and has been completely overlooked by both the authorities. In his submission, had the same been taken into account, there might have been a difference in the conclusion of the order. I am unable to accede to this contention for the reason that the matter is concluded by findings of facts. Both the courts below have concurrently held that the petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of the licence and had organized the mela during the period the licence had remained under suspension. I am unable to accede to this contention for the reason that the matter is concluded by findings of facts. Both the courts below have concurrently held that the petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of the licence and had organized the mela during the period the licence had remained under suspension. I am convinced on the basis of a perusal of the materials on record that the respondent authorities had dealt with the situation with maturity and fair play. Adequate opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to meet the allegations against him. The contention is, therefore, rejected. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also made a grievance that both the orders are non-speaking orders and, therefore, are fit to be set aside. I have no doubt in my mind that both the orders do assign the reason for cancelling the licence. The order of the first authority (Annexure 1) states the reason for cancellation of the licence, namely, holding the mela during the period the licence was suspended. It also clearly states that this is the petitioners second contravention and, therefore, the case is clearly covered by terms of rule 129(iv) of the Rules which lays down to the effect that if the breach is repeated twice, licence may be cancelled by the Market Committee provided before passing such order reasonable opportunity of being heard be given to the licensee. The appellate authority discusses the matter at length and affirms the aforesaid reason to be the one for cancellation of the licence. 13. It is next submitted that the appellate authority has not issued any notice to the petitioner and, therefore, the order is bad in law. The contention is stated only to be rejected, inasmuch as the licensee (the petitioner herein) was himself the appellant before the appellate authority and, therefore, there was no question of issuance of any notice to him. 14. In the result, this writ petition is dismissed.