Judgment P.K.Deb, J. 1. This appeal has arisen out of the judgment and decree dated 28-8-1985 passed by the then 2nd Addl. Sub-Judge, Chapra, in Title Appeal No. 137 of 1980 reversing the judgment and decree dated 24-7-1980 passed by the then Munsif-III, Chapra in Title Suit No. 144 of 1970. 2. The plaintiffs of the suit are the appellants in this appeal. The case of the plaintiffs are that their father Dina Nath Pandey died in the year 1967 and he was bataidar under Tribhuban Pandey the predecessor of the defendants in respect of Schedule-I land and Sikmidar in respect of Schedule-Ill land. Dina Nath Pandey was close to Tribhuban Pandey and he was helping him in all respects during his old age as Tribhuban Pandey was not in a position to look after cultivation work. Dina Nath Pandey was given the lands in bataidari and sikmidari on condition of payment of rent by produce towards Schedule-I land and in cash in respect of Schedule-II land. Tenancy was created on 30-10-1940. There was no written settlement as relationship between the two were so close that the question of written settlement did not arise and Dina Nath Pandey the predecessor of the plaintiffs started possessing the lands as bataidar and sikmidar respectively on the basis of oral settlement. Dina Nath Pandey planted five jack-fruit trees on Schedule-Ill lands which alter full growth started bearing fruits and in the Schedule-I land the plaintiffs started cultivation and used to give rent both on produce and in cash as per oral settlement to Tribhuban Pandey. In the old age, before death. Tribhuban Pandey gifted away by registered gift, deeds the suit lands in favour of the defendants and after Baksisnama by Tribhuban Pandey in favour of the defendant Nos. 1 to 3, they started accepting the plaintiffs as bataidar and sikmidar. It was also stated that Tribhuban Pandey used to grant receipts in lieu of payment of rent and out of those receipts some have already been destroyed and some are in custody of the plaintiffs and one of them has been filed in the suit. In the year 1947, it is stated that Tribhuban Pandey has deposed in a case No. 4 of 1946 in which he had admitted that Dina Nath Pandey is a bataidar of the property in question. In the year 1947, it is stated that Tribhuban Pandey has deposed in a case No. 4 of 1946 in which he had admitted that Dina Nath Pandey is a bataidar of the property in question. There was also some dispute between Dina Nath Pandey and Tribhuban Pandey and Tribhuban Pandey took possession of the suit land in the month of Ashardh 1954, but afterwards the. dispute was resolved and bataidari continued on payment of produce of the lands half and half between the landlord and tenant. On that way, on 30-6-1954 Tribhuban Pandey wrote a letter in the form of relinquishment in the name of Dina Nath Pandey. Just before filing of the suit, there was a proceeding under Sec. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to respect of the suit land in which possession was found in favour of the defendants by the Executive Magistrate which clouded the status of the plaintiffs and hence, the suit was filed for declaration of tenancy right under the defendants. 3. On appearance, the defendants filed a joint written statement and denied all the averments of the plaintiffs including that there was never any settlement between Tribhuban Pandey and Dina Nath Pandey the predecessor of the parties nor there was any occasion for Tribhuban Pandey to make any statement in Court regarding admission of tenancy of Dina Nath Pandey over the suit land rather Dina Nath Pandey was making Pairvi of the case, as he was closed to Tribhuban Pandey, he might have manipulated such statement in the suit as mentioned from the side of the plaintiff. The existence of rent receipts and the letter of relinquishment had been totally denied and those were termed as forged and fabricated from the side of the defendants. Their case is that the suit land was in exclusive possession of Tribhuban Pandey and after Baksisnama was executed in favour of defendant Nos. 1 and 3 they came in exclusive possession of the same. Their names were mutated, they were paying rent to the State of Bihar and the plaintiffs names were never being included in the survey settlement or in khatiyan at any time. It was contended that the plaintiffs suit should be dismissed with costs. 1 and 3 they came in exclusive possession of the same. Their names were mutated, they were paying rent to the State of Bihar and the plaintiffs names were never being included in the survey settlement or in khatiyan at any time. It was contended that the plaintiffs suit should be dismissed with costs. Several issues were framed before the original Court and the vital issue were framed which Was in the following manner: Are the plaintiffs bataidar and sikmidar of Schedules-1 and II properties exclusively and they have acquired right of occupancy as under raiyats so that they may get the defendants restrained from the alleged interference. 4. The plaintiffs were depending on oral evidence regarding settlement of tenancy and also on three documents, Ext. 1 was a single receipt alleged to be granted by Tribhuban Pandey in favour of Dina Nath Pandey. Ext. 2 is the certified copy of deposition of Tribhuban Pandey before the Munsif in case No. 4 of 1946 which was a money suit on the basis of a hand note filed by Tribhuban Pandey against another and Ext. 3 is the alleged letter of relinquishment by Tribhuban Pandey in favour of Dina Nath Pandey which, according to the plaintiffs, was the documents reverting the earlier settlement of tenancy in favour of the predecessor of the plaintiffs. The trial Court disbelieving Exts. 1 and 3 and found out that those two documents were prepared and manufactured for the purpose of creating evidence in favour of the plaintiffs regarding tenancy but on the basis of Ext. 2 regarding admission being made by Tribhuban Pandey regarding tenancy of the plaintiffs the suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiffs and then defendants preferred T.A. No. 197 of 1980. 5. The appellate Court after independent scrutiny of the documents and the evidence on record came to the finding that the documents Exts.. 1 and 3 are forged and fabricated documents and he had Upheld the reasonings of the trial Court holding those two documents to be unreliable unbelievable. Regarding the third document i.e. Ext. 3, the learned Court below came to the finding that this document should also not be accepted to the effect that Tribhuban Pandey had admitted the tenancy of Dina Nath Pandey in respect of the suit property. Regarding the third document i.e. Ext. 3, the learned Court below came to the finding that this document should also not be accepted to the effect that Tribhuban Pandey had admitted the tenancy of Dina Nath Pandey in respect of the suit property. On scrutiny of the evidence on record and also on the document it self, learned Court below arrived at the finding that the deposition was allegedly being given by Tribhuban Pandey in a money suit on the basis of promissory note against another person and in that money suit Dina Nath Pandey was not in any way connected. There was no occasion of raising any question regarding the tenancy or otherwise in respect of the suit land rather the suit land was in no way the subject-matter or connected with that money suit and the way the said statement, in the last part of the deposition was recorded rather reveals that it was a manipulation only to create evidence of tenancy in favour of the predecessor of the plaintiffs. The oral evidence given regarding the veracity of Ext. 2 was also, disbelieved on independent scrutiny by the learned appellate Court and the reasonings given by the trial Court in believing that document have also been turned down by giving counter reasonings. Even though the document in Ext. 2 disbelieved by the appellate Court but then also he had considered the same in another angle vis-a-vis that even if that deposition is taken to be true then also the same should be construed as only a supporting evidence regarding the tenancy between Dina Nath Pandey and Tribhuban Pandey and if no other evidence is there regarding creation of tenancy then such statement, unconnected being made in a money suit was held to be not a solely reliable one for the purpose of tenancy and hence the decree passed by the trial Court has been reversed by the first appellate Court. 6. While admitting this appeal a Single Bench of this Court vide order dated 2-4-1986 has formulated the following substantial questions of law as contemplated under Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Whether the Court appeal below has erred in holding that on the basis of the evidence adduced, it could be held that the plaintiffs acquired the occupancy right. Whether the Court appeal below has erred in holding that on the basis of the evidence adduced, it could be held that the plaintiffs acquired the occupancy right. Learned Counsel appearing for and on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants has streneously argued that the appellate Court although the last fact-finding Court have given a finding contrary to what has been found by the original Court but such finding of fact must be based on strong footing and reasonings given by the trial Court if not being properly discussed and rejected there was no scope for the appellate Court to come to a different finding. His submission is that the appellate Court did not give reasons while he gave a reverse finding than that of the original Court and in that way the judgment of the appellate Court is bad rather the discussion made with regard to the facts by the original Court were proper and just and the evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs can infer only the establishment of the plaintiffs case and not the denial of it. 7 On the other hand, Mr. Dwivedi, Senior Counsel appearing for and on behalf of the respondents, while supporting the appellate Courts judgment has submitted that if the findings of the appellate Court on the basis of the evidence on record are found to be a plausible inference regarding the totality of the evidence then even if the second appellate Court considers that the other view may also be taken up on the evidence on record the findings of the first appellate Court ought not be annulled in the Second Appeal. In this connection, he has referred to the judgment of the apex Court as reported in -- , Ram Das @ Ram Suraj V/s. Gandiabai, wherein it was held that unless the findings of the appellate Court being affected by any of the errors contemplated by Clauses A, B and C of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure then such pure finding of fact reached by the first Appellate Court of reassessment of evidence cannot be interfered by the High Court in Second Appeal. (1) of Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure then such pure finding of fact reached by the first Appellate Court of reassessment of evidence cannot be interfered by the High Court in Second Appeal. He has further referred to a recent judgment of the apex Court as reported in 1998 Supreme Appeal Reporter (Civil) 693, Smt. Satya Gupta V/s. Brijesh Kumar, wherein it was held that the findings of the lower appellate Court based on facts and appreciation of evidence cannot be reversed by the High Court in Second Appeal merely on the ground that on the facts opinion formed by the Appellate Court can infer another plausible view. A recent judgment of the apex Court as , Arumugham (dead) by LRs, and Ors. v. Sundarambal and Anr. has also been referred to by Mr. Dwivedi on the same point wherein it was held that Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not permit a High Court in Second Appeal to interfere with the judgment of the first appellate Court merely on the ground that the first appellate Court failed to advert to the reasons described by the trial Court. It was further held that the first appellate Court can consider the evidence adduced by the parties and give its own reasons for accepting or rejecting the evidence of one party or the other party. He may not give reasons for coming to a different finding by adverting the reasonings given by the trial Court. In the present case, it has already been stated earlier that the plaintiffs claimed their settlement as bataidar/sikmidar and based their claim besides oral evidence on three documents Ext. 1, 2 and 3. Ext. 1 and 3 have been held by both the Courts below to be forged and fabricated and manufactured for the purpose of creating evidence in respect of the tenancy and both the Courts below have given reasons for not accepting those documents as valid documents. In holding those documents to be outside the scope of consideration in respect of the plaintiffs case have considered the evidence orally given from the side of the plaintiffs and the defendants in support of those documents and learned appellate Court after independent appreciation of the documents and the evidence given in support of those two had held that those are rightly been rejected by the original Court. The only document then remains Ext. 2 i.e. certified copy of the alleged deposition of Tribhuban Pandey predecessor of the defendants. The original Court believed that document and decreed the suit on the sole basis of that document in favour of the plaintiff. The appellate Court after independent scrutiny of the document itself and the evidence adduced in support of it came to the finding that Ext. 2 cannot be relied on to be a truthful document. The reasonings have been given cogently by the learned first appellate Court to the effect that part of the deposition supporting the tenancy of the plaintiffs predecessor was a stray statement unconnected with subject-matter of the money suit based on promissory note against a party who has no connection with either of the parties in the suit. If the deposition is read as a whole then it could be found that the same statement has got no bearing with the suit where such deposition was recorded. The certified copy is a typed one and the said copy also has been disbelieved on the oral evidence adduced in support of that document. After that also, the learned appellate Court considered the case is more broader angle and he had then considered the factum of settlement and possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land as tenant on the oral evidence being adduced by the parties. Each and every evidence had been considered by the learned Court below and he has rightly held that even if Ext. 2 is construed to be a valid document then also the same can only be considered as a supporting evidence regarding tenancy of the plaintiff but when the plaintiffs have failed to prove their tenancy by any other evidence then there is no scope to declare tenancy of the plaintiffs on the basis of Ext. 2 alone. Thus, it appears that the first appellate Court has re-appreciated the evidence both documentary and oral and came to a finding after giving proper reasons and while giving those reasons he had also considered the reasons being given by the original Court and where necessary he held that the reasonings given by the original Court was right and where it was found to be wrong he mentioned so. Thus, it cannot be said that the first appellate Court did not consider the reasonings given by the original Court and gave his findings independently without considering the original Courts judgment. 8. Nothing can be shown by the learned Counsel appearing for and on behalf of the appellants that the findings arrived at by the learned first appellate Court suffers from misreading or non-reading of the evidence both documentary and oral resulting in miscarriage of justice. Although by amendment in the year 1976, the wordings of Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure have been changed but the apex Court in the recent judgment as (supra), held that in consideration of the case in Second Appeal, the High Court must advent to the grounds enumerated as (a), (b) and (c) in Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was in vogue before amendment of 1976. Thus, the High Court can intervene to the first appellate Courts judgment as contrary to law or it failed to determine some materials issue of law or usage having force of law or there was substantial error or defect in the procedure as provided under the Code which may result in decision making in merits. Only because an appellate Court being last fact-finding Court has given a contrary finding than that of the original Court, the same cannot be the ground for the second appellate Court to interfere with the judgment unless the same does not come within the preview of grounds (a), (b) and (e) of Sec. 100(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure which was in vogue before the Amendment of 1976. The principle laid down had not been changed by the Amendment of 1976 under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The apex Court has gone to a further extent as reported in 1998 S A R (Civil) 693 (supra) to the effect that even the first appellate Courts judgment cannot be interfered by the High Court in Second Appeal if the facts found by the lower appellate Court can also infer another plausible view. The apex Court has gone to a further extent as reported in 1998 S A R (Civil) 693 (supra) to the effect that even the first appellate Courts judgment cannot be interfered by the High Court in Second Appeal if the facts found by the lower appellate Court can also infer another plausible view. Thus, the sum and substance remains that until and unless it can be shown that last fact-finding Court has committed errors of law or the illegality in the procedural law in arriving at his decision on the merit factually then there is no scope of the High Court to interfere in Second Appeal. 9. In the present case, it could be found that the first appellate Court has very ably gone into the merits of the cases of both parties. Although he had reversed the findings regarding Ext, 2 of the original Court then also he considered that document on the worst possible view taking the same to be valid in consideration of the settlement of tenancy in favour of the plaintiffs and then also he could find that even Ext. 2 is held to be valid then also the plaintiffs claim of tenancy could not be established. Thus, it could be found that the appellate Courts judgment does not suffer from any irregularity, illegality rather the decision arrived at by the appellate Court is the only possible inference on the factual aspect of the case. There can be no other plausible view on the factual aspect. 10. Hence, I do not find any force in this Second Appeal and the same is rejected having no force with costs to the contesting respondents.