Judgment I.P.Singh, J. 1. This is an application under sections 397(1) and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the Code). It is directed against the order dated 20th March, 1998 passed by Shri D.K. Sinha, Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Jamtara in Cr. Misc. No.17 of 1930 by which an application filed under section 125 of the Code by opposite party no.2, the wife, has been allowed and an order has been passed for paying maintenance to her at the rate of Rs.400/- per month by the present petitioner 2. The case of opposite party no.2 was that she was married to the petitioner according to customary religious rites. At the time of her marriage her lather had given her ornaments etc. On her marriage she went to her Sasural and started living with the present petitioner as his wife. Subsequently the petitioner and the members of his family began to demand a sum of Rs. 20,000/- in cash as dowry and put pressure on opposite party no.2 for its payment. Since, however, the father of opposite party no.2 happened to be too poor this demand could not be fulfilled, which resulted in assault on opposite party no.2 and she was denied food and clothing. She was driven out of her house and was forced to live with her father. In her petition filed under section 125 of the Code opposite party no.2 had contended that the petitioner is a man of means and subsequently he has also married one Sachirani Mandal. 3. In the show cause filed by the petitioner in the case under section 125 of the Code he has taken the stand that allegations against him were frivolous and fictitious. The applicant opposite party no.2 had filed a complaint case against the present petitioner under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code (P.C.R. Case No.99 of 1984/Tr. No. 122 of 1990). Thereafter the present application under section 125 of the Code was filed only to harass the present petitioner. There was no marriage between the petitioner and opposite party no.2. She being a lady of questionable character; was having sexual relationship with her brother-in-law. No. 122 of 1990). Thereafter the present application under section 125 of the Code was filed only to harass the present petitioner. There was no marriage between the petitioner and opposite party no.2. She being a lady of questionable character; was having sexual relationship with her brother-in-law. The complaint petition under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code was filed in the year 1984 and its judgment was delivered on 29th July, 1990 and in between the period the petitioner got married to one Sachi Rani in the year 1986 and has been blessed with two male children. There is no earthly reason why opposite party no.2 waited too long to claim maintenance specially when according to her case she was expelled from the house. Thereafter the present petitioner was married to Sachi Rani in the year 1986. In the present petition filed under section 125 of the Code opposite party no.2 has suppressed the fact of filing a case under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code and its dismissal. The judgment dated 24.7.1990 passed in the case filed under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code became final since it was not challenged or set aside by any court. 4. It has further been contended that earlier the claim for maintenance of opposite party no.2 was dismissed on 24.2.1995 by the Judicial Magistrate and the same was confirmed on appeal by the Additional Sessions Judge. Both these orders were, however, were quashed by this Honble Court in Cr.W.J.C. No.645 of 1997 by which the trial court was again asked to pronounce the judgment on the basis of the materials available on record. This is how the impugned judgment has been passed. The judgment was passed on 24.7.1990 in the case filed under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code. This complaint case was dismissed. In this judgment it was held that opposite party no.2 is not the married wife of the petitioner. Since no appeal has been filed against this judgment the finding of the court became final and the claim of opposite party no.2 for her maintenance under section 125 of the Code is barred by the principle of estoppel. The opposite party no.2 was living in adultery even after her alleged marriage to the present petitioner and as such she is not entitled to any maintenance. The opposite party no.2 was living in adultery even after her alleged marriage to the present petitioner and as such she is not entitled to any maintenance. The evidence of her witnesses suffered from material contradiction and, therefore, no reliance on the same can be placed. The findings of the learned court below are perverse and contrary to the evidence adduced by A.Ws. or O.P.Ws. From the evidence it would appear that at the time of the alleged marriage with the petitioner, opposite party no.2 had a pregnancy of four months. This will show that she was leading a life of adultery. On these grounds; amongst others; it has been contended that the opposite party no.2 is not entitled to any maintenance and, therefore, the impugned judgment of the learned court below be quashed. 5. The only point for decision before me whether this application is fit to be allowed or not. 6. At the outset the learned counsel for the petitioner has seriously contended before me that since the present opposite party no.2 (who had filed the petition under section 125 of the Code) had filed a complaint case under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code against the present petitioner which ended in his acquittal, she would not be entitled to any maintenance. In the said case, as will appear from the copy of the judgment (Annexure- 1), the allegation against the present petitioner was that he had driven away his wife (Opposite party no.2) from his place since her father was not prepared to meet a fresh demand of a dowry of Rs. 20,000/-. Opposite party no.2 has further contended that on 25.5.1984 the present petitioner had married one Sachi Rani Bala Devi on 2.6.1994. As such, opposite party no.2 filed complaint petition under sections 494 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code on the ground that the present petitioner has taken the second wife even when opposite party no.2, his legally married wife, was alive. As such, opposite party no.2 filed complaint petition under sections 494 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code on the ground that the present petitioner has taken the second wife even when opposite party no.2, his legally married wife, was alive. It may be stated here that section 494 of the Indian Penal Code relates to an offence when a husband having a wife living marries again, in the said case filed under section 494 the allegation of opposite party no.2 was that though she is the legally married wife of the present petitioner and is still alive the present petitioner has taken a second wife and, therefore, he is liable, to be punished under section 494 of the Code. Annexure-1 shows that the learned Magistrate who fried the case under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code has observed in Paragraph 6 of his judgment that not a single witness was examined in whose presence the alleged second marriage was performed by the present petitioner with Sachi Bala Devi. In this connection he has referred the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 who in their examination-in-chief had stated about this marriage. In his cross examination P.W.2 has stated that he had not seen the marriage of the present petitioner with Sachi Bala Devi being performed. The learned trial court disbelieved the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 and has held as follows:- "Thus, prosecution could not prove that Samir Mandal was married to Shibani Mandal and he has again married Sachi Bala Devi, during continuance of relationship with his first legally married wife Shibani Mandal, as alleged." This is how he held that the complainant (present opposite party no. 2) failed to prove the charge under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code against the present petitioner through legal and sufficient evidence. He accordingly held him not guilty of this charge and acquitted him. 7. It is not in dispute that against this judgment passed by the learned Magistrate no appeal was filed. Under the circumstances it has been seriously argued before me that this finding of the learned Magistrate will bar the application of opposite party no.2 filed under section 125 of the Code inasmuch as she will be stopped from taking the plea that she is the legally married first wife of the present petitioner. Under the circumstances it has been seriously argued before me that this finding of the learned Magistrate will bar the application of opposite party no.2 filed under section 125 of the Code inasmuch as she will be stopped from taking the plea that she is the legally married first wife of the present petitioner. It was the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the principle of estoppel will apply to the facts of the present case and, therefore, the entire claim of the present opposite party no.2 is hit by the same. Since a serious question of law has been raised in this connection it is necessary for me to examine the same in detail. 8. This takes us to the consideration of the question what is meant by the law of estoppel and what are the principles underlying it. Estoppel has been defined in section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act. It runs as follows: "115. Estoppel.When one person has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative, to deny the truth of that thing. Illustration.A intentionally and falsely leads B to believe that certain land belongs to A, and thereby induces B to buy and pay for it. The land afterwards becomes the property of A, and A seeks to set aside the sale on the ground that, at the time of the sale, he had no title, He must not be allowed to prove his want of Title." 9. From the aforesaid it would become clear that the very essence of principle of law of estoppel would be that when some body by his declaration, act or omission intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief then in such a situation neither he nor his representative will be allowed to deny the truth of that thing. From this it would appear that estoppel deals with the question of fact and not of rights. A person is not estopped from asserting a right which he has said which he will not assert. From this it would appear that estoppel deals with the question of fact and not of rights. A person is not estopped from asserting a right which he has said which he will not assert. Estoppel is only a rule of evidence which prevents a party from alleging and proving a fact contrary to his earlier stand. By it a person is not allowed to plead the contrary of a fact or state a thing which he has formerly asserted as existing. The rule, which is also at times viewed as a substantive rule of law comes into whenever a person causes another to believe a thing to be true and act upon such belief and subsequently he alters his petition. The foundation of the rule is the equitable doctrine that it would be unjust, if a person, who by his representation has induced another person to act in manner which otherwise he would not have done, is permitted to deny the truth of his former representation to the detriment of the person who acted on it. 10. From the aforesaid it would become clear that in the case filed under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code opposite party no.2 did not cause or permit another person (the present petitioner) to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief. In the case she has alleged that the present petitioner had committed the offence under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code. She, however, could not produce sufficient evidence to the satisfaction of the learned trial court to warrant conviction of the present petitioner Under the circumstances it is clear that the present case will not be hit by the principle of law of estoppel. It may be stated here that this was a criminal litigation in which the rights of the parties were not adjudicated upon. Since, however, opposite party no.2 could not prove her allegations made under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code by cogent evidence to the satisfaction of the trial court the case ended in acquittal. Therefore, this judgment will not act as estoppel to the present claim of opposite party no.2 made in her petition filed under section 125 of the Code. 11. Therefore, this judgment will not act as estoppel to the present claim of opposite party no.2 made in her petition filed under section 125 of the Code. 11. It has been further contended on behalf of the petitioner that as he has been acquitted of the charge under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code he can no longer be asked to pay maintenance to opposite party no.2, since the learned trial court has disbelieved her claim of being the legally married wife of the present petitioner. In this connection reliance has been placed on the case of Madhusudan Singh and another V/s. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1995 S.C.1437. The facts of the said case are, however, entirely different. In the said case the appellants were charged under various sections of the Indian Penal Code as also the Prevention of Corruption Act. One of the section under which they were charged was section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. Similarly one of the sections of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 under which they were charged was under section 5(1)(c). It appears that the trial court acquitted the appellants under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code but sentenced them under various other provisions of law including under section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. When the appeal came to the High Court the conviction of the appellants was maintained except that the substantive sentence of imprisonment was reduced to the period already undergone by them. It was under this circumstance that it was held by the Apex Court that since the appellants were acquitted of the charge under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code; their conviction under section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act which is based on similar ingredients can not be sustained. I can do no better than to quote paragraph 4 of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court which runs as follows: "4However, in view of their acquittal by the trial court for the offence under section 409 I.P.C., we find that their conviction for the offence under section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which is based on similar ingredients cannot be sustained." 12. In this connection section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act may be quoted which reads as follows: (c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriated or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do, or" From this it would appear the ingredients of the offence under this section are very much similar to the ingredients of an offence under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code and since appellants were acquitted by the trial court of this offence under section 409 of the Indian penal Code, the Honble Supreme Court set aside their conviction under section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act but their conviction under other sections of the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act were maintained. 13. From the facts stated above it is clear that the aforesaid decision is of no help to the petitioner inasmuch as the case under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code had failed for want of sufficient evidence and it will not affect the petition of opposite party no.2 filed under section 125 of the Code. Hence I do not find any merit in this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 14. On behalf of the petitioner it has further been submitted that Siwani Mandal (opposite party no.2) had filed a criminal case under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code against him which was registered as P.C.R. Case No. 99/84/Tr.No. 122/90. In this case also it was her allegation that she was the legally married wife of the present petitioner who drove her out from his house since her father was not in a position to pay Rs. 20,000/- as dowry. It was further alleged that the present petitioner again married one Sachi Bala Devi even when his marriage with opposite party no.2 was still subsisting. On this ground she alleged that the present petitioner had committed an offence under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code and he should be punished accordingly. From the Judgment of the learned trial court as contained in Annexure-1 it appears that the learned court below held that opposite party had failed to prove the charge under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code and he accordingly held the present petitioner as not guiity under this section. From the Judgment of the learned trial court as contained in Annexure-1 it appears that the learned court below held that opposite party had failed to prove the charge under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code and he accordingly held the present petitioner as not guiity under this section. In paragraph 6 of the judgment, however, he has held that the prosecution could not prove that the present petitioner was married to the present opposite party no.2 and that he had again married Sachi Bala Devi during the continuation of the relationship with his first legally married wife Siwani Mandal (opposite party no.2). 15. On the stength of this finding of the learned trial court in the case under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that since no appeal or revision against this judgment has been filed by opposite party no.2 its findings as noted above still stand and present opposite party no.2 is, therefore, estopped from saying that she Is the legally married wife of the present petitioner. Since this plea taken on behalf of the present petitioner involves a question of law I propose to discuss it in detail. 16. To sum up the law relating to estoppel as contained in section 115 of the Evidence Act may briefly be stated as follows. In plain words as per this section a person shall not be allowed to say one thing at one time and the opposite of it at another time. A reading of this section will clearly show that it applies to the person who by his declaration intentionally caused another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief he will not be permitted to deny the truth of that thing, in any suit or proceeding between him and such other person. Thus this law clearly shows that if a person by his act or omission intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and on any such representative the other person acts believing it to be correct, then in that situation that person would not be allowed to retrace his steps or to deny the truth of a thing declared or asserted by him. This is the simple law relating to the law of estoppel. This is the simple law relating to the law of estoppel. The law as contained in section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act is a rule of evidence that has to be formulated and operated in the courts of law. In order to bring a case under section 115 of the Evidence Act certain ingredients have to be specified. They are as follows: (i) There must be a representative by the person or his authorised agent. (ii) The representative must be of the existing of facts enforceable in contracts. (iii) The representative must have been meant to be relied upon. (iv) There must have been belief on the part of the other party in its truth. (v) The declaration, act or omission must have actually caused some body else to act on the faith of it and to alter his former position to his prejudice or detriment. (vi) Person claiming the benefit of estoppel must show that he was not aware of true state of things. It is only if the aforesaid circumstances are satisfied that the principles of estoppel will apply. 17. It may be stated here that the law with regard to estoppel may be summarised as follows: (i) Estoppel is a rule of evidence. (ii) There is no estoppel against statute. (iii) A person is not estopped from asserting the right even when he had earlier said that he will not assert the same. (iv) In plain words a person shall not be allowed to say a thing at one time and opposite of it to another time. (v) Estoppel deals with the question of facts and not with question of rights. (vi) No action can be founded on the principle of estoppel. (vii) Estoppel is a rule of civil action. (viii) It has no application to criminal proceedings. (ix) The principle of estoppel has no place in criminal law. (x) The principle of estoppel can not over-ride the provisions of any statute. (xi) The question of estoppel must be raised at the proper time and in the proper manner. (xii) For showing the estoppel by judgment sections 11 to 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure and sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act will have to be applied. 18. (xi) The question of estoppel must be raised at the proper time and in the proper manner. (xii) For showing the estoppel by judgment sections 11 to 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure and sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act will have to be applied. 18. In the case of S.P.E. Madras V/s. V. Sundravelu (A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1017) it has been held that unless a judgment of the criminal court bars a trial the judgment of the criminal courts are not relevant in another criminal case. The same view has been taken in the case of Ali Hasan & others V/s. The State (1975 Cri. L.J. 345). In the case of Perumal V/s. Devarajan and others (A.I.R. 1974 Madras 14) it has been held that the criminal courts judgment is admissible only to the extent of factum of charge, conviction or acquittal. In the case of Kharkan and others V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh (A.I.R.1965 S.C.83) it has been held that the earlier judgment is relevant only to show the parties and the decision but it can not be relied upon for the appreciation and interpretation of evidence. A previous judgment is relevant to bar the second case on the same allegations but the reasons for any finding in the earlier judgment can not be relied upon in the subsequent judgment. In the case of Anil Behari Ghosh V/s. Smt. Latika Bala Dassin and others (A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 566) it was submitted before the Honble Supreme Court that one Charu was convicted of murder by the Sessions Court. It was held by the Honble Supreme Court in that case that though judgment is relevant only to show that there was such a trial resulting in the conviction and sentence of Charu to transportation for file and not the evidence of the fact that Charu was the murderer. 19. From the aforesaid it would appear that estoppel is a rule of civil action. It had no application in criminal proceeding. The principle of estoppel has got no place in criminal law. 19. From the aforesaid it would appear that estoppel is a rule of civil action. It had no application in criminal proceeding. The principle of estoppel has got no place in criminal law. So far as the present case is concerned on behalf of the petitioner it has been tried to show that the present opposite party no.2 is estopped from asserting that she is the legally married wife of the petitioner since in the judgment passed in the case under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code (which was filed by the opposite party no.2) the trial court held that she has not been able to show that she is the legally married wife of the petitioner. As stated above there is no force in this submission. It has been pointed out that there is no estoppel so far as the criminal judgments are concerned. In this connection reference may be made to sections 11 to 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure as also to sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act. So far as section 11 to 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure are concerned they deal with res-judicata, bar of further suit, judgments and other presumptions. These provisions of law will apply to civil litigation only and not to criminal cases. So far sections 40 to 44 of the Indian Evidence Act are concerned, they relate to the situation when a previous judgment bars a second suit or trial. Section 41 deals with relevancy of the judgments in cases of probate etc. Section 42 deals with relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or decree, other than those mentioned in Section 41. Section 43 deals with the judgments etc. other than those mentioned in Sections 40 to 42 when relevant. Section 44 deals with judgments delivered by the courts which are not competent but which were obtained by fraud or collusion. 20. According to section 40 of the Evidence Act the previous judgment can bar the second suit in a given situation. It is similar to the provision made under section 300 of the Code corresponding to section 403 of the Old Code of Criminal Procedure. 20. According to section 40 of the Evidence Act the previous judgment can bar the second suit in a given situation. It is similar to the provision made under section 300 of the Code corresponding to section 403 of the Old Code of Criminal Procedure. It lays down that a person who has once been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall not be liable to be tried for the offence when such conviction or acquittal shall remain in force. 21. I have discussed thread bare but in brief, the principle of law of estoppel as contained in section 115 of the Evidence Act. As pointed out above in the present case; inspite of the acquittal in the case under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code; the present petitioner opposite party no.2 will not be estopped from asserting in the present case that she is the legally married wife of the petitioner. The learned courts below have concurrently held that she is the legally married wife of the petitioner and the principle of estoppel will not apply in a criminal case under the facts and circumstances as pointed out earlier. Hence I do not find any force in this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 22. In revision petition a reference has also been made to the case of Sumitra Devi V/s. Bhikan Choudhary (A.I.R. 1985 S.C.765). In this case it has been observed that for a valid marriage according to Hindu law, certain religious rites have to be performed. Invoking the fire and performing Saptapadi around the sacred fire have been considered by the Supreme Court to be two of the basic requirements for a traditional marriage. It was further held that there can be a marriage acceptable in law though performed according to customs which do not insist on performance of such rites referred to above and even marriages of this type give rise to legal relationship of husband and wife which law accepts. 23. In the present case as will appear from the impugned judgment the evidence of A.Ws. has been properly discussed. A.W. 1 is the Priest who has stated that the marriage of opposite party no.2 with the present petitioner had taken place according to Hindu Religious rites in a temple. A.W.2 is the father of opposite party no.2. 23. In the present case as will appear from the impugned judgment the evidence of A.Ws. has been properly discussed. A.W. 1 is the Priest who has stated that the marriage of opposite party no.2 with the present petitioner had taken place according to Hindu Religious rites in a temple. A.W.2 is the father of opposite party no.2. He has also supported the factum of this marriage between the present petitioner and opposite party no.2 in the Durga Temple according to Hindu customary rites. Same is the statement of A.W.3. From this it would appear that the evidence on record has sufficiently proved, the marriage between the present petitioner and opposite party no.2 and this fact has been properly discussed in the impugned judgment. In this connection a reference has also been made to the order dated 12.12.1997 passed in Cr.W.J.C.No.645 of 1997 (Annexure-2). In this decision the following observation has been made by this Court: ".......In this case, the petitioner has examined altogether six witnesses in support of her case and they have all consistently supported the fact that the marriage had been performed according to the Hindu customary rites." 24. From this it would appear that this Court had occasion to examine the question of sufficiency of evidence with respect to the marriage of the present petitioner with opposite party no.2 and had held that six witnesses examined on behalf of the petitioner had consistently supported the factum of marriage between the present petitioner and opposite party no.2. Hence the aforesaid decision of the Honble Supreme Court is of no assistance to the petitioner. 25. On behalf of the petitioner it has been contended that opposite party no.2 was leading a life of adultery and, therefore, she would not be entitled to any maintenance. In this connection my attention has been drawn to some evidence of record to show that even at the time of the marriage between the petitioner and opposite party no.2 she was pregnant. This, however, will not be a bar to any claim for maintenance inasmuch as any such adultery as alleged had taken place prior to the marriage and not subsequent to it. In this connection a reference may be made to sub-sections 4 and 5 of section 125 of the Code. This, however, will not be a bar to any claim for maintenance inasmuch as any such adultery as alleged had taken place prior to the marriage and not subsequent to it. In this connection a reference may be made to sub-sections 4 and 5 of section 125 of the Code. Sub-section 4 says that no wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery. This pre-supposes the marriage between the wife and husband and any alleged adultery prior to the marriage will not disentitle the wife to maintenance because the expressions. used in this section are wife and husband which pre-suppose that they are already married. So far as sub-section 5 is concerned this relates to the period after passing an order of maintenance according to which if it is found that the wife is living in adultery even subsequent to the passing of the order of maintenance the Magistrate can cancel the same. Hence on this ground opposite party no. 2 can not be denied maintenance. 26. So far as the quantum of maintenance is concerned the learned Magistrate has allowed a sum of Rs.400/- per month as maintenance. In my view in the days of high prices Rs. 400/- per month can not, by any stretch of imagination, be said to be excessive. 27. For the detailed discussions made above it becomes clear that there is no merit in this application. It is, accordingly, dismissed and the impugned judgment is hereby confirmed. The order dated 30.6.1998 passed by this Court staying the operation of the impugned order is hereby vacated.