Judgment.- This is an application for the issue of a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to delete the names of the petitioners in the annexure to G.O.Ms. No. 1368 dated 21st December, 1964 and G.O.Ms. No. 1338 dated 13th July, 1965. It arises in the following circumstances. Five villages were declared by the first Government Order to be in a disturbed state, and consequently, one head constable and 8 constables were posted originally for six months, which period was subsequently extended to another one year by the second notification. The first notification says that the expenses involved in such posting shall be recovered from the persons whose names appear in the annexure to the said Government Order while those, whose names do not appear, were exempted from the payment of such punitive costs. The Second Government Order extended the period by one year. The petitioners contend that their names have been wrongly included in the annexure to the Government Order since they are not responsible for the conditions created in those villages which compelled the Government to impose the punitive police force. It is now not in doubt that a mandamus is a discretionary remedy and cannot be claimed as a matter of right nor it can be issued as a matter of course. In order to successfully obtain such a relief, the petitioners have to show that the respondent has a statutory public duty to perform or refrain from performing and that the petitioners approached the authority concerned to discharge that public duty or forbear from performing the duty, and thirdly that the officer has refused to so perform or abstain from performing. Unless these three things exist, it is obvious that no mandamus can be issued. In this case, all the three things, in my opinion, are patently absent. Section 15 of the Police Act is in the following terms: “(1) It shall be lawful for the State Government by proclamation to be notified in the Official Gazette, and in such other manner as the State Government shall direct, to declare that any area subject to its authority has been found to be in a disturbed or dangerous state, or that from the conduct of the inhabitants of such area, or of any class or section of them, it is expedient to increase the number of police. (2) It shall thereupon be lawful for the Inspector General of Police or other officer authorised by the State Government to employ any police force in addition to the ordinary fixed complement to be quartered in the area specified in such proclamation as aforesaid. (3) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (5) of this section, the cost of such additional police force shall be borne by the inhabitants of such areas described in the proclamation. (4) The Magistrate of the district, after such enquiry as he may deem necessary, shall apportion such cost among the inhabitants who are, as aforesaid, liable to bear the same and who shall not have been exempted under the next succeeding sub-section. Such apportionment shall be made according to the Magistrate’s Judgment of the respective means within such area of such inhabitants. (5) It shall be lawful for the State Government by order to exempt any person or class or section of such inhabitants from liability to bear any portion of such cost. (6) Every proclamation issued under sub-section (1) of this section shall state the period for which it is to remain in force, but it may be withdrawn at any time or continued from time to time for a further period or periods as the State Government may in each case think fit to direct. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, ‘inhabitant’ shall includepersons who themselves or by their agents or servants occupy or hold land or other immovable property within such area and landlords who themselves or by their agents or servants collect rent direct from rayats or occupiers in such area, notwithstanding that they do not actually reside therein.” A close and analytical reading of section 15(1) indicates that it shall be lawful for the State Government to declare that (a) any area has been found to be in a disturbed or dangerous state; or (b) from the conduct of the inhabitants of such area or any class or section of them, it is expedient to increase the number of Police. Sub-section (2) says that it shall thereupon be lawful for the Inspector General of Police or other officer authorised with the sanction of the State Government to employ any police force in addition to the ordinary fixed complement to be quartered in the area specified in such proclamation. Sub-section (2) says that it shall thereupon be lawful for the Inspector General of Police or other officer authorised with the sanction of the State Government to employ any police force in addition to the ordinary fixed complement to be quartered in the area specified in such proclamation. Sub-section (3) enjoins that the cost of such additional police force shall be borne by the inhabitants of such areas described in the proclamation. Sub-section (4) empowers the District Magistrate to apportion such cost after inquiry among the inhabitants who are liable to bear the same. Sub-section (5) empowers the Government to exempt any person or class or section of such inhabitants from liability to bear any portion of such cost. Sub-section (6) states that every proclamation shall state the period for which it will remain in force. It may, however, be withdrawn at any time or continue for a further period as the State Government may think fit to direct. It would immediately be plain that the State Government is vested with a discretion to declare as to whether any area is in a disturbed or dangerous state or the conduct of the inhabitants, any class or section of them is such that it has become expedient to quarter additional police in that area. The determination of such a question is left to the subjective and exclusive judgment of the State Government. It may collect the material from any source and take a decision thereon. It is plain that such a decision being subjective it is not quasi-judicial to which rules of natural justice could apply. Nor it is possible to objectively find out whether the subjective satisfaction was proper. It is clear that in such cases the exercise of the discretion cannot be judicially reviewed firstly because it relates to the Government’s state of mind and if the Government says that the area is in disturbed or dangerous state or that the conduct of inhabitants is such that additional police force is necessary to maintain law and order it is impossible to prove that such things did not exist; and secondly, because the Court cannot substitute its own state of mind for that of the Government. It must be remembered that if power for speedy action had to be given, wide powers to be exercised on this subjective satisfaction of Government had to be conferred on the authorities. It must be remembered that if power for speedy action had to be given, wide powers to be exercised on this subjective satisfaction of Government had to be conferred on the authorities. In cases visualised by section 15, quick decision and swift and effective action is of the assence of these powers. The exercise of such power therefore has been left by the Legislature to the subjective satisfactionof the Government charged with the duty of maintaining law and order. To make the exercise of such powers justiciable and subject to the judicial scrutiny will defeat the very purpose of the enactment. It should be borne in mind that the duration of proclamation under section 15 is for a limited time. It can be withdrawn at any time. The apportionment of the cost is left to the District Magistrate. Sub-section (4) provides guidance to him while apportioning the costs. Sub-section (5) empowers the Government to exempt a person or a class of persons. Thus the rigour of the section has been considerably minimised. It must be said that where the question of maintenance of law and order arises and where in order to prevent danger or injury to the public swift action and speedy decision are required, a power exercisable on the subjective satisfaction of an authority must be upheld as valid. See Virendra v. The State of Punjab1. Section 15 therefore cannot be said to be violative of any Constitutional provision. It is true that Courts abhor the Legislature conferring arbitrary powers on State Government, unrestricted by any directions as to how the power was to be exercised. But if from the purview of the Act it can be gathered how the discretion is to be exercised and in what circumstances, then even though the section is widely worded it would not be necessarily void. The whole scheme of section 15 lays down the circumstances in which proclamation can be made, expanses of additional police force can be recovered from the inhabitants and as to who should be granted exemption from hearing the costs. The section therefore cannot be said to be infringing any Constitutional provision and it is not therefore void. B. Aswartha v. The State2, holds that the validity of section 15 cannot be questioned. In this case the proclamation gives the lists of the members belonging to the two factions. The section therefore cannot be said to be infringing any Constitutional provision and it is not therefore void. B. Aswartha v. The State2, holds that the validity of section 15 cannot be questioned. In this case the proclamation gives the lists of the members belonging to the two factions. It is because of these factions that the Government declared the area comprising of five villages as a disturbed area and also that the conduct of the factionists whose names are mentioned in the proclamation, was such that the quartering of special police force had become necessary. It is true that the Government granted exemption to all other inhabitants of the said villages except those whose conduct was responsible four disturbed conditions and consequently compelled the Government to post the additional police. It is also true that the Government directed that the factionists described in the proclamation shall bear the costs which will be apportioned by the District Magistrate. In these circumstances, can it be said that the notification reverses the procedure laid down in section 15 and consequently is inconsistent with section 152. It will not be correct to say that in a case where the Government declares any area to be in a disturbed or dangerous state all the inhabitants of that area automatically become liable for proportionate costs. Any such interpretation would necessarily overlook that the additional police can be quartered even when from the conduct of the inhabitants of such area or of any class or section of them, it has been found expedient to do so. Thus any class of persons or section of the inhabitants may be responsible for the action which the Government has taken in posting additional police. In such a case, proclamation is issued under sub-section (1) on the basis that the conduct of any class of inhabitants or section of them has compelled the Government to increase the number of police. It cannot be said that such a proclamation is inconsistent with sub-section (1). In this context, the words “shall be borne by the inhabitants of such areas described in the proclamation” appearing in sub-section (3) assume importance. The words “described in the proclamation” obviously refer to “inhabitants” and not to “such areas” appearing before these words. The expression “such areas” take us back to sub-sections (1) and (2). In this context, the words “shall be borne by the inhabitants of such areas described in the proclamation” appearing in sub-section (3) assume importance. The words “described in the proclamation” obviously refer to “inhabitants” and not to “such areas” appearing before these words. The expression “such areas” take us back to sub-sections (1) and (2). Sub-section (2) also uses the words “the areas specified in such proclamation as aforesaid”. Finally it is to sub-section (1) that one has to look to find out what is the meaning of “such areas” appearing in sub-section (3). Sub-section (1) is clear in that behalf. “such area” means “any area subject to its (State Government’s) authority”. Thus the words “described in the proclamation” apply to all the inhabitants or any class or section of them mentioned in the proclamation. When a class of persons or a section of inhabitants can be mentioned in proclamation issued under sub-section (1), what must follow is that the costs of additional force shall be borne in such cases by any class of or section of inhabitants. I do not therefore find anything wrong in the proclamation when it mentions that the two factionists described in the proclamation shall bear the costs of additional police force. The exemption of all other inhabitants under sub-section (5) in the proclamation itself cannot be said to be inconsistent with section 15. The assumption that sub-section (3) in all cases holds all the inhabitants liable for costs except those who are exempted under sub-section (5) is not warranted. Apart from a case where all the inhabitants may be held liable under sub-section (3) except those who can be exempted under sub-section (5) there can be cases where any class or section of the inhabitants may be held liable to pay the costs under sub-section (3) unless anyone of them is exempted from the liability under sub-section (5). A careful and close reading of the various sub-sections of section 15 leads me to that irresistible conclusion. It is true that in B. Aswartha v. The State1, it is said “But a perusal of order above quoted shows that it makes only the 38 persons mentioned therein liable for the cost of the additional police force at Narayanareddipalli village and exempts all others thus reversing the procedure to be followed under section 15. It is true that in B. Aswartha v. The State1, it is said “But a perusal of order above quoted shows that it makes only the 38 persons mentioned therein liable for the cost of the additional police force at Narayanareddipalli village and exempts all others thus reversing the procedure to be followed under section 15. Therefore there appears to be force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant and the petitioners that the notification is not in accordance with that is required under section 15 of the Police Act”. It is however, clear that the notification was not struck down on that ground. The decision after holding that “the scheme of the various sub-sections in section 15 indicates that exemption should be granted to such inhabitants or class or section of such inhabitants who were not responsible for the conduct which may have necessitated the increase in the police force” struck down the notification on the ground that the Government action was discriminatory and offends Article 14 of the Constitution as the order made only the persons specified in the notification liable to bear the cost of additional police force and exempted the members of opposite party, though there were several cases pending against them. The said decision therefore cannot be said to be inconsistent with what I have said. It would not be correct to contend that exemptions contemplated by sub-section (5) cannot simultaneously be granted at the time when proclamation under sub-section (1) is made. There is no justification for any such assumption, nor as stated earlier, there is any justification for assuming that sub-section (3) places liability to pay the costs always on all the inhabitants initially and thereafter exemptions are granted. Thus understood, if the proclamation declares that any class or section of inhabitants, which would include the two factions, are responsible for the establishment of additional force it would quite be permissible under sub-section (3) to hold them alone responsible for costs under sub-section (3). Any one of these persons of course, is free to ask for exemption subsequent to proclamation, if he is not responsible for the disturbed conditions under sub-section (5). Any one of these persons of course, is free to ask for exemption subsequent to proclamation, if he is not responsible for the disturbed conditions under sub-section (5). But, if he State Government is clear in its mind that inhabitants other than those who are mentioned in the proclamation are not responsible for such a situation, nothing prevents the Government from exempting them even while issuing the proclamation. Such action cannot be said to be inconsistent with either sub-section (3) or sub-section (5) of section 15. Whether the petitioners are responsible for disturbing the peace and order of the said villages is a question into which, as stated above, this Court cannot go. Section 15(4) of the Police Act authorises the District Magistrate to apportion the punitive expenses between those whose names appear in the Government Order, unless of course some of the persons are exempted under sub-section (5) of section 15. Whether the petitioners are the persons who have no means or have limited means or who should get exemption has to be decided after a proper inquiry by the District Magistrate in regard to the means and by the State Government for exemptions. The State Government has the power to exempt even those whose names appear in the list annexed to the Government Order imposing punitive police force, subject of course to its being satisfied that they have to be exempted. Before any enquiry is made and order secured from the District Magistrate in case the petitioners claim that they have not or have limited means, or the petitioners approach the Government asking for exemption under sub-section (5) and the State Government refuses it is not possible for this Court to issue a mandamus to the District Magistrate or the State Government because the petitioners themselves have not approached the District Magistrate or the State Government. I do not know how a writ of mandamus to delete the names can be issued in the presence of section 15(1) of the Act. The Government was satisfied when it included the names of the petitioners in the Government Order that they are responsible for disturbing the peace. What material they had is not known. It is however not doubted that there was material before the Government, to take the decision. The Government was satisfied when it included the names of the petitioners in the Government Order that they are responsible for disturbing the peace. What material they had is not known. It is however not doubted that there was material before the Government, to take the decision. It is only when the petitioners approach under sub-section (5) the State Government claiming exemption on the ground that they were not involved in disturbing the peace and that no expenses can be collected from them that the Government will have to decide that question. The petitioners admittedly have not approached the State Government. If the petitioners are not satisfied with the order of the State Government when made, it is open to them to adopt such remedies as are available to them including a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It cannot, however, be validly argued that this Court should make enquiry constituting itself as a primary authority under sub-section (5) and then grant exemption to the petitioners from sharing the costs. I am therefore satisfied that no case for mandamus is made out. It is open to the petitioners to approach the State Government under sub-section (5) or the District Magistrate under sub-section (4) of section 15. The writ petition therefore is dismissed. In the circumstances, I make no order as to costs. A.B.K. ----- Petition dismissed.