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1999 DIGILAW 1293 (MAD)

K. M. Cherian v. D. Johnson

1999-11-30

K.SADASIVAN

body1999
Order.- The accused in Calendar Case No. 7 of 1968 on the file of the District Magistrate, Trivandrum are the revision petitioners. They are the Chief Editor, Managing Editor, and Printer and Publisher, respectively of the Malayala Manorama, a Malayalam daily published from Kottayam. The complainant in the case is one Johnson, the proprietor of a betelnut shop just to the south of the Secretariat, Trivandrum. He sued the accused under section 560 of the Penal Code alleging that a news item published in the Malayala Manorama dated 31st October, 1967 was calculated to injure his reputation and to lower him in the eyes of the public. The news item arose in the following circumstances: A gold chain and a sum of Rs. 153 belonging to Smt. Miranda Mary, a lady clerk of the Secretariat and kept by her in her office-table, were stolen on 28th October, 1967 and in that connection a peon of the Secretariat by name Kuttan Nadar was arrested and on the information furnished by him the gold chain was recovered from a bucket in front of a tea shop into which waste materials were dumped, and the money (Rs. 153) from the complainant’s betelnut shop. In connection with this, the local reporter of the Malayala Manorama published the news Exhibit P-4(a) wherein it was stated that the amount was recovered from Johnson another peon of the Secretariat to whom it was entrusted by Kuttan. This news appeared in the Malayala Manorama dated 29th October, 1967. This was followed by another report in the Malayala Manorama dated 31st October, 1967 by way of a correction in which it was stated that Johnson referred to in the previous report was not a peon of the Secretariat, but a betelnut shop-keeper near the Secretariat. This report is marked Exhibit P-1(a). Then a third report was also published in connection with the same matter and that is Exhibit D-4(a) which appeared in the Malayala Manorama dated 3rd December, 1967. That was by way of a clarification wherein it was stated that the betelnut shopkeeper Johnson, stated to have been arrested in the previous report, was not arrested in fact but only questioned by the police and made a witness for the prosecution. That was by way of a clarification wherein it was stated that the betelnut shopkeeper Johnson, stated to have been arrested in the previous report, was not arrested in fact but only questioned by the police and made a witness for the prosecution. Exception was taken by the complainant mainly in respect of Exhibit P-1(a) report, in which it was stated that of the persons arrested in connection with the theft from the lady clerk’s table, Johnson was not a peon of the Secretariat but was a betelnut shopkeeper near the Secretariat. This report was published under the caption in bold type “Moshtavic peon Alla”. This report according to the complainant has injured his reputation in so far as he was depicted as a thief and that he was arrested by the police. His case is that he was not in fact arrested but only questioned by the police. In the case taken in connection with the theft also, he was only a witness and not the accused. On these allegations the complaint was filed. Before the filing of the complaint a notice was issued to the accused by the complainant’s lawyer and in reply to that notice, Exhibit P-2 was sent by the accused. In Exhibit P-2 the allegation that the report was intended to harm the complainant’s reputation was denied, and that the accused had no intention of injuring the complainant’s reputation. The accused also expressed their regret in the following terms: “We are very sorry if we have unwittingly caused him any mental pain by our report.” In another portion of Exhibit P-2 it was also stated: “We are very sorry that such an unfortunate title should have been given to that bit of news which by itself does not make any imputation against your client.” Being not satisfied with this expression of regret the complainant approached the Magistrate with the complaint. Before the Court the accused stated that the report was not in any way intended to injure the complainant’s reputation. They however sought protection under Exception 9 to section 499, Indian Penal Code. The learned Magistrate has convicted the accused and sentenced them to pay a fine of Re. 1 each. In default of payment of fine they have to undergo Simple Imprisonment for one week each. They however sought protection under Exception 9 to section 499, Indian Penal Code. The learned Magistrate has convicted the accused and sentenced them to pay a fine of Re. 1 each. In default of payment of fine they have to undergo Simple Imprisonment for one week each. The sole question tor consideration in this case is whether the report in question is per se defamatory of the complainant. The defence put forward is that the report is not defamatory of the complainant and even if it is construed otherwise, they are protected by the 9th Exception. The Exception reads: “It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another, provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good.” On a most anxious consideration of the evidence and the circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the report is not per se defamatory of the complainant and even if it be so, the accused are protected by the 9th Exception. The report that is impugned is as already stated Exhibit P-1(a) and this report has 2 parts. One is the caption “Moshtavu Peon Alla” and the other the implication that the complainant was also arrested along with the thief. Regarding the caption, all that could be said is that it is an exaggeration. At first blush it might appear that Johnson the complainant is also the thief. But in the body of the report the matter has been made clear that Johnson was arrested in connection with the theft (Moshtichathu Sambandichu). The factum of arrest is denied by the complainant and according to him it is an incorrect statement. But this contention cannot be accepted. What really happened was that on the information supplied by Kuttan, the Sub-Inspector of Police with two police constables went to the complainant’s shop and seized from him the money which is the subject-matter of the theft. On seeing the police, the amount was handed over to them by the complainant and a seizure mahazar Exhibit D-1 was immediately drawn up and that has been attested by the complainant. Learned Counsel would argue that since the amount was surrendered, it would be incorrect to say that it was recovered or seized from the complainant. On seeing the police, the amount was handed over to them by the complainant and a seizure mahazar Exhibit D-1 was immediately drawn up and that has been attested by the complainant. Learned Counsel would argue that since the amount was surrendered, it would be incorrect to say that it was recovered or seized from the complainant. The amount was of course handed over to the police without any stress or strain. But all the same it is seizure in the eye of the law and aseizure mahazar as already stated, was drawn up. After the seizure, the complainant was taken to the Police Station and both the Sub-Inspector and the constables were in their uniform. A newspaper reporter seeing this sight, if thinks that the person was under arrest cannot be blamed and that is the normal inference that a man of ordinary prudence would draw in such a situation. The reporter has stated in his evidence as D.W. 2 that enquiries were made by him of the people who had collected there and it is on the basis of the information so collected that the report was sent by him. It is true that no record of the arrest was made at Police Station and that, finally the complainant was let off from the Police Station. A person submitting himself to the custody of the police can be considered as a person arrested. Section 45 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which deals as to how an arrest is to be made, does not make it mandatory that for effecting the arrest the officer should touch or confine the body of the person arrested, if the person has already submitted to the custody of the police by his word or action. In other words, the arrest is complete when there is a submission to the custody by word or action. In the present instance, there was a submission to the custody of the police and the complainant was actually seen walking to the police station under their custody. It was in such circumstances that the reporter happened to send the news item to the effect that in connection with the theft two peons were arrested, which was later corrected so as to read that one of the persons arrested was not a peon but only a shopkeeper. It was in such circumstances that the reporter happened to send the news item to the effect that in connection with the theft two peons were arrested, which was later corrected so as to read that one of the persons arrested was not a peon but only a shopkeeper. The heading of the news is nothig but an exaggeration and it could be treated only in that line. “Mere exaggeration or even gross exaggeration would not by itself prove malice” observed Lord Esher in Marivale v. Carson1. But if the language is highly intemperate and disproportionate to the facts, then the position might be different and malice could be inferred But that contingency is not present here. It has also to be remembered in this connection that the standard of criticism indulged-in by the newspapers is changing and in dealing with a newspaper-report, considerable latitude is now allowed by the law as in seen from the trend of rulings on the subject. This does not mean that newspapers have any special right or privilege to make unfair comments or can make imputations on character or motive. It means only that the tests of relevancy and honesty as well as of defamatory language are interpreted liberally in the light of prevalent standards of public discussion and criticism. There cannot be any doubt that these standards are not so strict now as they were formerly. "Where a matter is of public interest the Court ought not to weigh any comment on it in a fine scale, some allowance must be made for even intemperate language, provided however the writer keeps himself within the bounds of substantial truth, and does not misrepresent or suppress any facts. The comment must be based on admitted or proved facts." Emperor v. Fernandez1." In the present case, it is difficult to say that the factual basis of the report was wrong. The important ingredient of the ninth exception is that the report made is substantially true and that the comment made basing on the facts, is supported by good faith. The latter element is the more important and if the accused fails to prove good faith, the whole defence is shattered. The mere fact that the report is based on facts, will not by itself save the accused. The report should be true and faithful and the comment should be supported by good faith. The latter element is the more important and if the accused fails to prove good faith, the whole defence is shattered. The mere fact that the report is based on facts, will not by itself save the accused. The report should be true and faithful and the comment should be supported by good faith. Here we have not much of comment and even if there is any, it is supported by good faith. Malice, no doubt, will take away the good faith; but in the present instance, no malice was proved against the accused. The reporter had no previous acquaintance with the complainant and against an unknown person, one cannot harbour malice. The report in the circumstances must be taken to have been made with the best of intentions and for the public good. In the case taken against Kuttan this complainant was a prosecution witness and there he turned hostile, to support the accused. The recovery of the amount from his shop by the police, was denied by him in toto. According to him (he was P.W. 4 in that case) a bundle of notes amounting to Rs. 153 was entrusted to him at 11 a.m. that day by the accused and it was taken back by the accused himself at 4 p.m. the same day. This conduct of his, is an unmistakable indication that his idea was to shield the accused or salvage him if possible from the clutches of the law. In this background the inference is justified that he was a guilty receiver, of stolen property and a guilty receiver, under the presumption of section 114 Evidence Act, is on a par with the thief himself. The caption of the report is justified in this view also. Learned Magistrate would find fault with the reporter for his not collecting the information from the police themselves. Learned Magistrate would state: "D.W. 2 had only to ask the Sub-Inspector or the policemen who were there on the spot, and whom he had seen, as to what was the real position and he would have known the truth about the incident. He did not do so and he did not even go to the police station or ring up the police station to ascertain what had happened." This is all beside the point. He did not do so and he did not even go to the police station or ring up the police station to ascertain what had happened." This is all beside the point. Learned Magistrate evidently forgets the practical difficulties, and some times the danger involved, in such a venture. The police have no duty to oblige the newspaper reporter and in the stage of the investigation of a crime, no wise police officer would disclose the secrets of the investigation, the points emerging or the clue obtained, in the course of such investigation to’ the public, much less to the press. In such a situation, a ring to the police station would have yielded no result except sometimes a rebuff in return. All that is possible and feasible for the reporter, is to make enquiries at the spot as a reasonable and prudent man and collect the necessary information, as was really done in the present case. When it struck the reporter that the complainant was not in fact arrested, but only questioned and let off, he did not waste a single second in correcting that much of the news he had already conveyed. This conduct would also show his good faith and negative malice. There is also the further aspect that injury to reputation can come in, only in the case of a person who has reputation. The complainant here, was characterised as a liar in the case (C.C.No. 2896 of 1967 which was taken against Kuttan, copy of the judgment being Exhibit D-5). To quote the learned Magistrate’s own words in that case: “On a careful analysis of the evidence of P.W. 4 it is clear that he cannot be believed for a moment and hence I discard his testimony as false.” Such a person cannot complain of loss or injury to reputation. His reputation even if any he had, has suffered a serious blow by the above pronouncement and thereafter his reputation could not but have been at a very low ebb. The accused in their reply notice had expressed their sorrow in having published such a report but the complainant was not satisfied with that. Even according to the learned Magistrate that should have silenced him. The accused in their reply notice had expressed their sorrow in having published such a report but the complainant was not satisfied with that. Even according to the learned Magistrate that should have silenced him. Learned Magistrate would observe: “This must have normally satisfied the complainant and redressed the injuries suffered by him.” But it is un-understandable how in spite of the above assessment of the situation, the learened Judge thought it fit to convict the accused and award them a “nominal sentence”! (Even though the fine is only Re. 1 the period of imprisonment in lieu of fine is one week). The result of the above discussion is that the accused are entitled to be acquitted. The conviction and sentence are hence set aside and the accused are acquitted. Fine, if paid will be refunded. M.C.M. ----- Petition allowed.